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AN EXPLANATION FOR AN INDIVIDUAL’S EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE
DIALECTIC OF ACTION RESEARCH
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this text is to analyse the educational development of a 
reflective practitioner. It contains two analytic frameworks. The 
'inner* framework considers the origin, constitution, and use of values 
in education. Vithin this framework I examine the dominant assumptions 
of the literature of values education, and that of other related 
disciplines, and conclude that they are not adequate as a basis for 
generating an explanation for my own educational development.
The 'outer' framework analyses my own educational development in terms 
of an educational theory which can account for this development as both 
a generative and transformatory process.
The presentation is designed to show the origin, constitution and use of 
a critical educational science in which educational research can be 
shown to be both intrinsically educational and a proper base for 
teaching.
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1 RATIONALE FOR THIS TEXT
This text arose out of a meeting held in September, 1988, at the 
University of Bath. The meeting was between myself and Nary Tasker, 
Cyril Selmes, and Jack Whitehead, all lecturers in education at the 
University. The audiotaped recording of that meeting (AT46) is in 
Appendix I.
The meeting was part of the validating procedure for my submission of my 
PhD thesis. I had presented a working draft to my three colleagues for 
their critical evaluation. Although it was still a working draft, in 
that I was prepared to make some changes to the text, I imagined that it 
would be a final draft, and one which I could submit to my examiners.
Ny colleagues rejected my work as not of an overall standard for 
submission for a PhD. The grounds for the rejection are itemised 
shortly. I am therefore writing this text, the second version, some of 
which is quite different in form from the first, though substantially 
similar in substance. Nuch of this text is original, not to be found in 
the first version.
In order to understand the reasons for my colleagues' rejection of it, 
it is necessary for me to give a brief overview of the text I produced * 
and the events which caused me to produce it.
( ii )
Please note that the contents of this introduction are a gloss of what 
is expanded in the coining pages of the text. I am concerned here to
N
give only a brief overview of circumstances.
2. WRITING THE FIRST VERSION
The text of the first version exists as part of the data archives of my
total project.
Hy study, which began in 1981, was to do with personal and social 
education; specifically, to document the progress of the personal and 
social education courses which I had helped to introduce into the school 
where I was deputy headmistress. The original title of the study was 
'An evaluation of the social, personal and careers education (SPACE)
programme in --  School', and I was particularly concerned to evaluate
the impact of the work of Leslie Button as I applied it in my classes.
The study lasted in school until 1986. Over the years I had altered my
views about the nature of personal and social education quite radically. 
I Intended to document this shift in view in the thesis, and to offer 
explanations for the changes in my practice and my thinking. The text 
was to be a record of my work in school, 1981-1986.
( iii )
In 1986 I became ill, and eventually took early retirement from school 
in 1987. During my convalescence I read extensively, wrote a book, and
s
started to write my thesis. The actual writing of the thesis was not a 
solid stint of writing, but was composed of episodes of creative 
writing, reflection on the writing which included further reading, re­
writing, and further reflection. This cycle of action-reflection, in 
which the action of writing was itself the spur to further reflection, 
led me to shift the focus of my study.
I had originally intended to write a report. At the beginning of the 
writing exercise, December 1987, I started writing the report in 
prepositional form. I completed Chapters 1, 2 and 3 by February 1988. 
I now ran into severe difficulties for two main reasons:
(i) The ideas I was working out, through my writing, were much more 
exciting than the material of the personal and social education project 
that I was re-telling. I was much more intrigued by the original ideas 
that I was expressing in my writing, but which I felt were illegitimate 
in this report. I was frustrated by this state of affairs, and 
constantly found myself wanting to write a text in which I could express 
my original ideas, rather than feel continually constrained to write 
about the past practice of personal and social education in school.
( iv )
(ii) Because I felt that my thesis was to do with past school practice, 
I was careful not to include my present self in my report. The only way
N
I felt I was justified in doing so was to critique my practice of 1981- 
86, but I excluded any further development of ideas, 1986-88. This was 
doubly frustrating, for the period of exciting mental growth since I had 
left school had continued some fundamental value shifts that were 
already taking place in 1984-86, as I shall elaborate in Chapters 3 and 
4. Yet I felt I had to put myself back into the frame of mind in 1986, 
when I left school, in order to document the practice of school.
In February 1988, I completed Chapters 1, 2 and 3, at crisis point. The 
frustrations I have just identified had become so acute that I felt I 
had to abandon the project in its current form until I was more 
confident of where it was leading me. I was given solid support by my 
supervisor, Jack Whitehead; he suggested avenues for my reading, and 
spent quantities of time talking through my project with me.
I came to understand issues concerning dialectical forms. I came to see 
that I was attempting to exclude the 'living I' (Whitehead, 1980) from 
my work. In attempting to write the report of 1981-1986, I was 
divorcing the *1' of now from the 'I' of then. Instead of seeing myself 
as a complete person, whose personal history leads to the present, I saw 
myself as existing at discrete intervals, each interval unrelated to the 
other. In the text, I was attempting to deal with my developing 
understanding of dialectical issues of interactions and 
interrelationships, but in propositional form.
( V )
There was a clear breakthrough in my work, half way through Chapter 4, 
when I began positively to think dialectically. I began to build my
■s'
understandings into the text, consciously using the text both as a 
medium of expression for my thoughts, and as an instrument of thought. 
I was recording my cognitive processes, while deliberately using the 
exercise of those processes to bring about change in the processes - in 
short, I was becoming critical.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 show the development of critical awareness. By the 
time I reached Chapter 6, I could put a name to it, and explain my own 
development in terms of critical reflection-in-action.
The quality of maturity of thought is far better in Chapters 4-6 than in 
Chapters 1-3. In AT46, JV, CS and MT agree that Chapters 4-6 are of a 
standard and presentation appropriate for a PhD.
I was anxious to demonstrate this critical awareness throughout the 
text. I wondered if I should re-write Chapters 1-3. In correspondence 
with Jack, I expressed this wish, stating also that if I were to re­
write, I would be destroying the evidence contained in Chapters 1-3 to 
show the muddled state of my thinking that was slowly resolved in 
Chapters 4-6.
Ve Jointly agreed a strategy that might solve the dilemma. I felt I 
could build into the text a critique of my own work, using the insights 
I had gained through the work and that were evident in Chapters 4-6, in 
order to critique Chapters 1-3.
( Vi )
In the text I had made it clear (Chapter 5) that I had undertaken cycles 
of action-reflection to move forward the development of my thinking, 
low I intended to embark on a further cycle, where I was going to 
critique my own work, using the understandings that had been generated 
by that work.
The end result shows a progression, in which (Mary Tasker's comment) 
unstructured episodes of random creativity are disciplined into 
organised structures, and inchoate forms (Jack Whitehead) are given 
coherence by critical reflection.
The text was nevertheless rejected by my colleagues for the following 
reasons:
3 CRITICISMS OF THE TEXT
(i) I did not communicate easily with my reader in Chapters 1-3. The
content was muddled and the presentation difficult to follow. Chapters
4-6 were of an appropriate standard, but the reader would have become 
disenchanted with the entire project, having had to "wade through" (JV) 
the text laboriously, long before ever reaching the good stuff, and
would probably lose interest and stamina.
( Vii )
(ii) There was frequent repetition throughout the text. I explained at
the meeting that this was because ideas were created during the writing,
\
and were often worked out to a more mature form later in the work. Even 
so, said Mary and Cyril, there was repetition of material, which 
detracted from the authority of the overall project, and again distorted 
communication.
(iii) There was lack of systematic planning throughout the project. 
Although my critics praised some of the original work, it was felt that 
many episodes appeared as bursts of sporadic activity, which sometimes 
bore no relation to the context.
(iv) The presentation was confusing. I had tried to build in
Identifiable cycles of action-reflection, using different strategies 
(for example, different type faces) to indicate the different categories 
of thought structures I was using, and the times at which I was using 
them. This fact was not immediately clear to the reader, who felt 
(Cyril Selmes) that he had to pick his way carefully through the
Intricate maze.
(v) I was presenting my study from an epistemological ground that is as
yet still regarded as dubious by many in the research community. I
proceed from the fundamental premise of the freedom of the individual, 
the right of every person to claim personal knowledge as the basis for 
action (Polanyi, 1958); and, in terms of educational research, the right 
of every individual enquirer to exercise her creativity in making her * 
enquiry personally educative (Walker, 1987; see also Part III of this
( viii )
text). Because this research tradition is still in its infancy, my 
colleagues felt that I would be courting disaster to present a 
technically difficult text that rested on a tentative basis.
Because of these objections, we agreed a re-write. I would re-caste the 
text in critical terms; that is, using the original version as an 
expression of my practice, I would reflect upon that practice and 
attempt to demonstrate in the practice of this present text how I have 
brought about an improvement in my own understanding of my practice.
In order to clarify this concept, let me explain the root epistemology 
of my project:
4 CHOICE OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL STRATEGY
After careful investigation of different strategies, and active 
experimentation to see which best suited the demands of the action of my 
practice (McHiff, 1984, 1988), I opted for Jack Whitehead’s presentation 
of minimal steps to resolve an unsatisfactory situation in which the 
enquirer is attempting to turn statements of value into statements of 
fact:
( ix )
1 I experience a problem when some of my educational values are 
denied in my practice;
2 I imagine a solution to the problem;
3 I act in the direction of the solution;
4 I evaluate the outcome of my actions;
5 I modify my ideas and my actions in the light of my evaluation.
(Whitehead, 1977)
I suggested the addition of a generative component (McNiff, 1984) to 
allow an enquirer to focus on specific issues of concern without losing 
sight of the overall project, or to accommodate shifts of interest 
within the overall project (see also Chapter 6 of this text).
I consciously adopted this strategy in the production of the first
version, and I endeavoured to make clear the sequence of action- 
reflection steps I took. Chapters 1-3, the report about my practice in 
school, described in propositional terms the action-reflection cycles I 
undertook in school in order to enhance the quality of education for the 
children in my care. Chapters 4-6, which documented the beginnings of 
my critical awarenesses, constituted another action-reflection cycle, 
focusing both on the personal and social education project in school, 
and the production of the text so far. My project assumed the 
dialectical characteristics of linking the relationships between the 
propositions I had been making about past practice to the critical 
awareness of present practice, which incorporated the propositions (see 
also Chapter 7 of this text). Because I had developed insights into the 
structured thought processes I had been using, and consciously decided
( X )
to use other, dialectical-transformational thought processes, I embarked 
on yet another action-reflection cycle, in that I built in the critique 
to the whole text.
Later in this text, Chapter 6, I shall explain how I believe that a 
crisis of practice generates sufficient tension in the practitioner to 
make her want to change that practice. I am at that stage now. My 
crisis of practice is that my first version does not communicate easily 
to the reader, for reasons I have identified above. So I must modify my 
practice. I must attempt to find a form that is easily comprehensible. 
*y search for that literary form prompts me to embark on yet another 
action-reflection cycle, this text, in which I write (action) my 
thoughts (reflection) about the action ...
low, there is a crucial point here, and one that will recur throughout. 
I take the point from Roderick (1986, p.13) when he identifies a 
fundamental difference between the perspectives of Gadamer and Habermas. 
Roderick speaks about "the anti-foundationalism present in current 
philosophical debate. . . , While Gadamer is content to meet this 
challenge by looking backward to the positive function of tradition, 
Habermas hopes to meet it by looking forward to the possibility of 
embodying concrete structures of communicative rationality in a 
transformed society".
( Xi )
I nay apply the sane concept to ny present task. I nay say that 
Chapters 1-3 of the First Version, which documented the past practice of
N
school, were written from the perspective of a secure 'foundation', in 
at least two senses: (1) I based my claim to substantive knowledge in
the tradition of the literature of personal and social education, that 
there was an accepted way of 'doing' personal and social education with 
a normative outcome - a more socially adjusted child; (2) I based my 
claim to epistemological knowledge in the tradition of academic texts, 
that there was an 'accepted' way of writing a thesis with a normative 
outcome - a document structured in linear form which was an expression 
of the writer's propositions.
My secure foundation was a reflection of my acceptance of the concept of 
the control of educational knowledge. The crisis generated in the 
writing of the first version caused me to realise that the cognitive 
processes I was using, that rested on the secure foundation, were 
inappropriate, in that they were inadequate to deal with the action of 
nry practice - the attempt to keep past practice separate from present 
reality. This realisation is traced throughout first version chapters 
4-6.
My present task, then, is not only to interpret, but to develop a 
critical understanding; and, further, to communicate that understanding. 
In order to do this, I need to focus on the creativity of the 
enterprise; in my attempt to move my own understandings forward, to 
explain critically how it is that I have come to know, I need to embark
( xii )
on action-ref lection cycles that rest on the premise of the 
identification and systematic resolution of problems.
N
As part of the exercise, I need to suggest ways in which you, the 
reader, and I, the writer, may agree my basic claim that I understand my 
own educational development. We need to agree those "structures of 
communicative rationality" that Roderick suggests will lead to a 
transformed society; a society in which we do not depend on a secure 
foundation of reified knowledge, but on personally created foundations 
of mutually agreed knowledge.
This text, then, is a further action-reflection cycle within the total 
body of my project. I have skimmed some issues in this introduction, 
and I shall endeavour to make the issues explicit in the course of the 
text.
In terms of my current action-reflection plan, then:
1 I experience a problem when some of my educational values are denied 
in my practice
Problems:
(a) The first version of my thesis did not readily communicate to my 
readers.
(b) Communication was distorted because of
( xiii )
- inappropriate cognitive structures
- lack of identifiable plan
n
- lack of critical understanding of substantive propositions of
the text, and of appropriate form
The educational values that are being denied, and that I am trying to
realise in practice, may be expressed in terms of my identified
educational alms:
(a) I wish to present, and have validated, my claim to educational 
knowledge - that I understand my own educational development;
<b) I wish to enjoy my own intellectual freedom, which until
recently has been restricted by my dependence on the secure 
foundation of my belief in the control of educational knowledge;
(c) I wish to continue critically exploring my own intellectual 
development through the writing of this text. By turning it 
into a critical analysis of my previous practice (First Version)
I believe I will further enhance my own development.
2 I Imagine a solution to the problem
The solution I imagine is the production of this text, conducted again
in the strategy of first version chapters 4-6, where I endeavoured to 
create thought through the action of writing. This text will, I hope, 
present the distillation (Mary Tasker) of the first version, while at 
the same time communicate to you, the reader, how and why I have 
embarked on the values shift as evidenced in the text.
( xiv )
3 I act in the direction of the solution
\
I am about to start on the body of this text.
4 I evaluate the solution
Time will tell. I like Habermas’s view (1976) that the validity of 
communication is that it stands the test of time. "In the interaction 
it will be shown in time whether the other side is 'in truth and 
honesty* participating or is only pretending to engage in communicative 
action." Is this text an improvement on the first version? Can we 
identify the criteria that indicate improvement? and can we agree a 
mutual understanding of the notion 'improvement'?
Most importantly, do we agree that this text does what it sets out to 
do? Do we agree that it lives up to the intentions that are spelt out 
in the title? I am claiming to understand my own educational
development. In the text I attempt to present my understandings of the
terms 'educational', 'development' and 'understand' - and also of the 
term 'I', It may seem strange that I feel I need to explain my
understanding of the term 'I', yet that is perhaps the most significant
discovery to emerge from my project so far. I understand myself better 
now than I did before. And that, I submit, is what education is all 
about. But you may disagree; so I will invite you to read the text 
ahead in the spirit in which it was written: an unfolding of an 
enterprise, the discovery of the self by the self.
( XV )
The evaluation will then occur, In its technical sense, when we meet and
discuss the project. Then you will perhaps challenge some of the
\
assumptions and claims, and I will defend my work; or I will acknowledge 
that yours is the better argument, and modify my work. And certainly 
your fresh insights will inspire new thoughts in my mind, and I will 
want to hasten home to my writing table and investigate the emergent 
ideas.
This will then lead us to: -
5 I modify my ideas and actions in the light of the evaluation.
And the beauty is that the process will go on. For I have discovered 
through my project that now is not the full stop to the past, but the 
beginning of the future.
( urt )
5 THE OHGAHIC HATURE OF THIS TEXT
At several Junctures in this text I point out that, as a thesis, the 
form of this text is unlike that of other theses that I have read. The 
difference of form stems, I believe, from its novel character.
Xost of the theses I have read adopt the form of proposing specific 
research questions/hypotheses, and working towards providing answers or 
corroborations. My thesis does not do that. Instead, my thesis readily 
admits that it has no final answers, other than an answer that says that 
I have adopted the form of life that questions. This form of life has 
been generated by my study.
In Chapters 2 and 4 of this text, I try to show how I originally wanted 
to write a thesis in a normative fashion, as indicated above, of 
positing an hypothesis and working systematically towards its 
corroboration. I explain how and why I found this form of text 
incompatible with my evolving form of life. I explain how I shifted the 
focus of my text from a report of the past personal and social education 
project in school to an account of my own intellectual development, and 
how the reflection-in-action involved in the production of the first 
version enhanced this development. Proceeding from this view, I suggest 
that my study is educative, for it has deepened my understanding of my 
own practice, and has enabled me to communicate the processes that 
encouraged that understanding.
( xvii )
In this Introduction, I have already said that I am embarking on another 
action-reflection cycle by writing this present text. I am continuing 
my education. I do not regard my present task in the light in which I 
embarked on the first version, that I would try to prove an hypothesis. 
I am embarking on this text from the stand that I feel I may present 
certain hypotheses, my present best thinking, that are pertinent to my 
project. But - and this sort of proviso has become a factor that has 
evolved out of my study (for I am beginning to understand how I learn, 
the very mechanics involved in my ratiocination) - I am learning to 
"hold my concepts loosely" (Rogers, 1961). This strategy is quite 
different from that which I used before, when I would often be quite 
dogmatic in my assertions, and refuse to give up a dearly-held theory. 
I shall presently say more about the mechanics of my learning.
I believe this willingness to be provisional is a sign of the improved 
quality of my own education. The strategy of provisionality, however, 
has arisen out of the writing of this second version. It is a strategy 
that I have been forced to adopt because people rightly disagreed with 
some of my definitive but mistaken views. Again, I am led to realise 
that inflexible theories, in this case, fixed personal theories, have 
not always enhanced my practice, and I am required to consider the 
practice of my life in a pluralist society of other thinkers whose 
argument sometimes is better than mine, and to generate a new theory 
that will accommodate the diversity of thought.
( Xviii )
So my study continues to be organic. If I have an initial hypothesis 
that I wish to corroborate, the hypothesis is that I have latent answers 
within me that I wish to discover - that is, I have the potential within 
me, as, I believe, we all have as human beings, to find a better form of 
life. My hypothesis so far has been corroborated through the course of 
my study: life gets better as it goes on, for I understand myself
better with the passing days; and, I believe, because I am able to 
understand myself, I am helped to understand others better as well. 
This is not the vanity of individualism. Indeed, I believe my vanity 
has been systematically demolished through my study, for I find that 
there is little room for vanity within a truly dialogical form of life
that is grounded in a willingness to meet others on mutually-agreed
territory.
I said above that I am beginning to understand the mechanics of my 
learning. This is a new and exciting area of discovery.
Through the writing of the first version I discovered that there were 
different forms of thought, and that these forms, when seen as values- 
in-action (Chapters 6 and 8 of this text) could be manifested in 
corresponding forms of life. In this second version I have indicated
how I have moved from prepositional to dialectical forms of thought, and 
how my form of life has become free.
How I am looking at the mechanics of my thought, and studying how it is
that I learn.
( xix )
This area of study is new for me, so what I have to say here is as yet 
not particularly well-formed. It is crucial to the drift of my present 
project, however, for I believe I may enhance the quality of my own 
education by understanding the processes of mind/brain tht are involved 
in my own educative process. In Chapter 3 I suggest a working 
definition of the concept of education as being “an improvement in the 
process of the development of rationality". I feel I am moving nearer 
towards understanding the nature of my own mental processes that are 
involved in rationality.
Let me try to be more explicit:
As I see it, there is a significant factor in my ratiocination: I tend 
to be dogmatic. I was made aware of this by Jack Whitehead: in
conversation about the first draft of this second version, specifically 
about Chapter 5, Jack pointed out that I had made dogmatic assertions 
that were the products of a train of thought that was not properly 
carried through. I agreed - I know I do this. Through my reading, I 
believe I am beginning to understand what happens in my mind:-
Vhen I first encounter a concept C it comes to me as a proposition. It 
is not yet part of my mental repertoire, being external as yet to my 
personal knowledge.
( XX )
Consider, for example, the word 'salsify'. This could be a noun or 
verb, by analogy with 'dragon fly' and 'qualify'; its pronunciation
could be salsiflE or salsifEE. My knowledge of the word 'salsify' has
as yet no referrent, other than that it obeys the rules of English 
morphophonemics, and qualifies to be part of the grammar. I look it up 
in the dictionary, and find it is a vegetable. I now have an Immediate 
frame of reference, though I still do not know what salsify looks, 
smells or tastes like. But in the lexicon its significant features are 
those of vegetable, rather than those of animal or mineral. I then 
purchase some salsify. I now know about the plant in a propositional 
sense, and my knowledge has become personal. I experience the real 
plant.
I believe the same thing happens for me in the wider context of 
'knowledge'. When I encounter a new concept C I immediately try to make 
sense of it. My evolved understandings help me to make sense of the
processes I engage in when I am attempting to make sense.
In Chapter 6 of this text I have presented a hypothesis whereby 
structures are transformed into new structures. I suggest an analytic 
model to explain the nature of change, that the process of understanding 
proceeds by the minimal steps (i-v). I have explained the process there 
with reference to statements of the type:
( xxi )
(i) I experience a problem when some of my educational values are 
denied in my practice;
\
(ii) I imagine a solution to the problem;
(iii) I act in the direction of the solution;
(iv) I evaluate the outcomes of my actions;
<v> I modify my ideas and actions in the light of my evaluation.
(Whitehead, 1977)
In such a process of minimal steps, I suggest, (v) is a modification of
(i). My introduction of the generative component (see above) allows an
enquiry to follow an infinite number of steps (i-v). In Chapter 6 I 
present the model in its notional terms to account for the process of 
personal development. Such a process, I suggest, is enhanced by the 
individual's exercise of critical reflection, in her intention to 
generate (v) from (i) within the total framework, in an effort to 
realise her educational values.
I am now reminded of Polanyi's (1958) invitation to thinkers to be 
dogmatic. "This invitation to dogmatism may appear shocking", he says 
(p. 268), "yet it is but the corollary to the greatly increased critical 
powers of man". In my scheme, I will suggest that what happens could be 
this; when I encounter concept C, I try to make sense. I imagine what 
it could be like (of course, I may be mistaken in my imagining), and I
implement my imagined form. Now this is my stage of dogmatism. It is
here that I come to rest with a definition. But my critical powers 
continue with evaluations. I see, because of increased understanding, 
that the formulation is deficient, and I modify accordingly. As I said
( xxii )
above, I possess the latent answer that there is possibly a better form 
of life, and my critical awarenesses lead me ever to question and 
modify. I believe this is the way in which I learn, and I will attempt 
to show this process in action in Chapter 5 of this text.
In Chapter 5 I present a tentative model of how different forms of 
knowledge are generated from different ways of thinking; and I describe 
how the ideas presented in Chapter 5 were directly generated by my 
curiosity to research the mechanics of my own thought processes. But, 
for now, I am attempting to give a brief account of the processes of 
mind/brain that I use that result in a method of learning. My method of 
learning, I have discovered, lies in the process of
1 identification of C;
2 initial attempt to make sense of C;
3 initial hypothesis;
4 critical evaluation of hypothesis;
5 modification of hypothesis.
It is Immediately clear that I am mapping this notional process onto 
those already identified by Whitehead (op.cit.) and Popper (1972).
In adopting this type of strategy, which I regard now as a strategy of 
provisionality, I am reminded of the remarks of Jean Rudduck and David 
Hopkins in 'Research as a basis for teaching' (1979). They say:
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"Research underlines the provisionally of knowledge. Teaching, at 
every level, is vulnerable if it does not acknowledge that error is a 
realistic intellectual achievement and failure a realistic practical 
achievement, for a critical appreciation of error and failure is a 
necessary foundation for improvement. Research, which disciplines 
curiosity and calls certainty into question, is a proper basis for 
teaching."
I would also suggest that it is a proper basis for learning. I am 
learning how it is that I learn. I am aware now of my tendency to be 
dogmatic. In the processes that I have described in this section I see 
the dogmatism as a necessary step: I seem to come to a certain level of
understanding <my tentative hypothesis, my present best thinking), and I 
fix that temporarily in my mind as a base for further development. As 
the understanding of C grows, so the base is dissolved, and the 
hypothesis undergoes the metamorphosis into a new form of understanding 
(see also Chapter 6 of this text). Until now, the dogmatism has been a 
characteristic of my process of learning.
How I have become aware of what I am doing. How I see the erstwhile 
dogmatism for what it is - a platform on which I may rest while I work 
out the next step. The difference in my strategy now is that, because I 
understand the nature of my process of learning, I deliberately 
introduce the notions of temporality and provisionally. I am happy now 
to hold my concepts loosely. I am fairly sure that they will undergo 
modification at some stage.
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If I had accepted, even a year ago, the claims that I am making now, I 
would have become very anxious. I could never have let go of my 
security of fixed hypotheses. I would have linked 'provisonality' with 
feelings of insecurity. Today my view has changed. I have learnt that 
the art of provisionality is not a threat to security. It is a promise 
of re-creation; for if a thing is provisional, it contains the power to 
be metamorphosed into a better form of itself. Today, I link 
'provisionality' with the notion of potential and generative power. The 
fact that I have come to these understandings is itself, I believe, an 
affirmation of the generative power of a strategy of provisionality, for 
I have metamorphosed into a better form of what I was: I have developed; 
I continue to develop.
So, to return to the title of this section, my thesis continues to be
organic. I am still learning, and my learning is enhanced through my
critical reflection on the epistemology of my learning.
In order to help in the validation of this claim, I have left Chapter 5 
in its 'raw' unedited form. I have used this chapter to demonstrate in
action the strategies I employ as I learn. The material of the chapter
is relatively new in my repertoire of ideas, and I have used the chapter 
to show the mental processes involved in working out new ideas. I shall 
comment in detail in Chapter 5.
( XXV )
6 PRESENTATION OF THIS TEXT




Part I is to do largely with the action of the research project, and 
contains original work, Chapters 1-4. Each chapter presents a specific 
content, and also a critical reflection on the content.
Chapter 1 The personal and social education project, 1981-83
Chapter 2 The writing project, first version Chapters 1-3 
Chapter 3 The personal and social education project, 1984-88
Chapter 4 The writing project, first version Chapter 4-6
By organising the chapters in this way, I have attempted to show how the 
total project has two separate but interrelated foci - the personal and 
social education project and the writing project - and to trace the 
development of thought involved. It could be argued that a better 
organisation would be:
Chapter 1 The personal and social education project, 1981-83
Chapter 2 The personal and social education project, 1984-86
Chapter 3 The writing project, first version Chapters 1-3
( xxvi )
Chapter 4 The writing project, first version Chapter 4-6 
I would be pleased for advice from you, the reader.
Part II presents some reflections on Part I. It concerns itself mainly 
with theories of knowledge and theories of values, and I trace the 
emergence of my own understandings about the nature of knowledge and 
values through studying the theories, and seeing if they can account for 
my practice. In deciding that the theories do not have such explanatory 
power, I suggest a new set of theories that do meet the demands of my 
practice.
Part II contains:
Chapter 5 What constitutes knowledge of the nature of values?
Chapter 6 How is knowledge of values acquired?
These two chapters originally appeared as Chapters 4 and 5 of the First
Version, the chapters <with Chapter 6) that my colleagues admired. I
have modified them considerably to fit in with the overall presentation 
of this text.
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Part III looks at the implications of Part I and Part II, dealing 
largely with questions of validity and the need for theories that will 
replace those that I have found inadequate to deal with the issues of my 
practice. Part III contains:
Chapter 7 How is knowledge of values (acquisition) put to use?
Chapter 8 The justification of educational knowledge
Chapter 9 The generative enterprise
Chapter 7 originally appeared as first version Chapter 6. It is amended 
to fit into the overall framework of this text.
Chapter 8 considers issues of validity raised by my own enquiry - to see 
if I can justify my claim to educational knowledge.
Chapter 9 suggests some useful directions for future research that I 
feel would be worth exploring by the community of researchers, and that 
I hope to explore personally.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE PERSONAL AND SOCIAL EDUCATION PROJECT, 1981-1983 
1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH
I Joined a large secondary school in Bournemouth in 1974, after working 
for nine years with foreign adult learners of English, both at home and
abroad. I was appointed deputy headmistress of the school in 1979. An
immediate brief was to help establish and formalise programmes of 
pastoral care in the school, and to support my colleagues during this 
innovatory period.
At the time of my appointment there was little formal pastoral
provision. The school's social organisation had been re-caste in 1976 
from vertical house to horizontal year division, and I was one of two 
pastoral heads in an emerging pastoral curriculum. The new headmaster, 
appointed a term before my appointment as deputy head, was concerned 
about the lack of pastoral provision, and we agreed to work together to 
research some frameworks,
(1) My involvement in Button work
At the same time (1980), the headmaster was approached by Dorset's
adviser for personal, social and religious education to send me and my 
other pastoral colleague, R.M., on a 9-day course at the Institute of 
Higher Education in Bath, conducted by Leslie Button of the University
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of Swansea, and designed to allow teachers to learn about the principles 
and techniques of active learning in tutorial work. This was a DES 
regional course, involving teachers from five counties. Six teachers 
from three different Dorset schcools were invited to attend, the idea 
being that those persons would return to their home schools after the 
course, initially to introduce the principles and practice to their 
immediate colleagues, but later to set up training sessions county wide.
I was deeply influenced by the course. I had always been personally
dissatisfied with my practice in school. I taught mainly disenchanted,
underprivileged youngsters, who usually hated the idea of school and 
learning. I wanted to teach in the empathic style I had used in my work 
with foreign learners, but the children seemed entrenched in hostile 
attitudes, and it was difficult to get through. The course at Bath 
seemed to offer help in the methods and techniques to get across the 
Ideas of care, to help the children help themselves, and to establish a 
world in school which regarded personal integrity as fundamental.
On my return to school (still 1980) I set about trying out the 'Button 
schemes' in some of my classes, both for myself and with R.M., and 
setting up training sessions for other interested colleagues. At the 
same time I was heavily involved in formalising a general pastoral 
curriculum, together with the headmaster. There was some confusion in 
my mind now what was happening. On the one hand I was convinced of the 
power of the Button approach which concentrated on group dynamics (as I 
then understood it, but see Chapters 2 and 3) and experiential learning, 
and at that time I saw this approach as essential to successful pastoral
work; on the other hand I was required to support newly-appointed heads 
of year within the brand new horizontal division of the school, and to 
draft up possible curricula for the five years, all dealing with pastoral 
themes. At that time (1980-81) there was relatively little literature 
dealing with pastoral inclusions, and the only literature I had 
knowledge of and access to was Leslie Button's own work, couched in the 
terms of his experiential approach. At the time I did not perceive the 
difference between content and process which in part characterised my 
task: first to provide a contents framework for the five years of the 
school, and second to 'teach the subject' which was processional in 
nature. I did not formalise these ideas until 1983 when I wrote my first 
book (Mcfliff 1986).
This was a confusing period, but very exciting, for I saw myself on the 
brink of a new era in which pastoral care was to become part of the 
formal curriculum. The books of Marland (1970) and Hamblin (1978) had 
enjoyed huge success in setting the scene; current HMI/DES documents 
(e.g. 1979, 1980) stressed the need for personal and social education to 
lie at the heart of the curriculum. 1981 saw the publication of 
Priestley and McGuire's 'Life after school' (1981), FEU 'Social and Life 
Skills’ (1981), 'Active tutorial work' (1979-82) by Baldwin and Veils, a 
work based squarely on Leslie Button's ideas and which was to become 
almost a cult, and Button's own work 'Group tutoring for the form 
teacher' (1981).
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Because of the magnitude of the projects I was involved in I approached
the University for assistance. I felt that
(1) I needed to enlist support to help me clarify issues and 
determine coping strategies for my work;
(2) the projects themselves were so interesting that they deserved 
documenting;
(3) it was part of my brief to set up training sessions for 
colleagues, and reference to my own research findings would 
probably be useful;
(4) I was intensely dissatisifed with my current practice, but I 
could find no way to improve the situation.
I registered for an M.Phil, at the University of Bath, and took as my
main research question the seemingly simple question "How do I improve 
this process of education here?" (Whitehead, 1980). I shall explain in 
Part One how I came to realise that this was not such a simple question.
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This is an account of the background to the research. The field widened 
considerably over the years, and I can identify three significant 
chronological periods:
(a) 1981-1982 My early projects at school
During this time I introduced a ’Button' programme into several of my 
classes. I worked closely with R.M., my colleague on the Bath course, 
who acted as a monitor and critical friend (Kemmis, 1983). I was also 
accompanied, on occasion, by R.C., the adviser for personal, social and 
religious education in Dorset. The classes responded as I had hoped, 
with improved behaviour and apparently deeper understandings of how to 
get on with each other (see below for a clarification of what I mean by 
'improved behaviour' and for the validation of my claims). I focused on 
one class for my research purposes, documenting their progress on audio 
and videotape, as well as conventional paper and pen methods, and 
recording conversations with colleagues in our attempt to make my 
systematic enquiry public (Stenhouse, 1982).
(b) 1982-1988 Exploring the field
1982-1983: I was seconded to the South East Dorset Teachers' Centre and
worked closely with teachers in 18 different schools in an attempt to 
help them set up their own personal and social education programmes. I 
was now concentrating full time on the issues of personal and social 
education, reading widely, spending much time with colleagues in
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discussing matters of education, and my own understandings matured 
considerably. I now produced my early work on the generative enterprise 
(Mcififf 1984) and on the principles and practice of personal and social 
education (McNiff 1986). Researchers often comment on the value of 
writing as an instrument for shaping thought (see above, and also 
Rowland, 1982), and I felt that I made considerable headway this year, 
so much so that I applied for and was awarded transfer from M.Phil. to 
Ph.D.
1984-85: These were fallow years (see Chapter 3) when my research 
seemed to lose momentum because of enormous personal and professional 
difficulties. I tried to keep up my reading, but my heart was not 
really in my research, and all my mental and physical energies were 
given over to coping with matters of daily concern.
1985-1986: The extreme turbulence began to settle, and I was able to
work with one group of children. This was a particularly challenging 
group, and I had to dig deep into my own resourcefulness to find ways of 
coping with them. My own response to the challenge made me think all 
the more about my own practice. I abandoned all attempts to conduct a 
modified Button approach, or indeed any systematic Lifeskills training, 
but switched to a style which I felt would simply encourage some sort of 
communication (see Chapter 3).
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(c) 1986-1988: Synthesis
For much of 1986 I achieved virtually nothing in school, illness forcing 
me to take extended leave. In early 1986 I attempted to write up the
report so far, but quickly realised that I needed to read much more in
order to relate my ideas to those of others and to give the whole 
academic legitimacy. It so happened that I was now at home, and I began 
to read, seriously and widely, and the maturity of thought was
considerable.
In 1987 I felt the need to synthesise much of my then best thinking, and 
I produced ’Action research: principles and practice' (McNiff 1988).
This was a particularly important manuscript for me. It was clear from 
the reactions of some reviewers of the text that I was in a delicate and 
controversial field, and I needed to be quite sure of my ground when 
making claims about epistemology and practice. I read widely, and 
started communicating with a number of colleagues in schools and
institutes of higher education.
In 1987-88 I wrote my thesis (what I call throughout this text the first 
version: see Introduction above). For reasons that I have itemised in 
the Introduction, much of that text was unsuitable for submission. I 
undertook to re-caste the thesis in the form of this present text 
(second version). The action and reflection involved in the production 
of the book and the first version helped to develop the critical 
faculties which I use in this second version to demonstrate my 
understanding of the process of the development of my own rationality.
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These are the chronological periods of the research study, 1981-1988. 
I nbw continue with what is particularly pertinent to this section:
(ii) The work of Leslie Button
My work in personal and social education in school was modelled largely 
on the work of Leslie Button. I will here give a brief sketch of his 
philosophy.
In his 'Developmental group work with adolescents' (1974), Button gives 
a rationale for his work (Chapter 1, p.1):
"To be human is synonymous with being in communication and in 
relationship with other people, which demands of us a range of social 
skills. In accommodating ourselves to other people we will also have to 
accept some of their demands on us, which, together with our natural 
concern for them, is the source of much of their influence upon us. . . . 
Thus our personal satisfaction, growth and development is achieved 
mainly through the part that we play in the lives of other people and 
they in ours. Group work is about helping people in their growth and 
development, in their social skills, in their personal resource, and in 
the kind of relationships they establish with other people. Social 
skills can be learnt only in contact with other people, and it is the 
purpose of group work to provide the individual with opportunities to
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relate to others In a supportive atmosphere, to try new approaches and 
to experiment in new roles. The health of the wider community also will 
depend on the individual's social skill, and his empathy with and his 
concern for others."
This book is the theoretical base for Button's subsequent production of 
occasional papers (e.g. 1975, 1976) in the philosophy and management of 
personal and social education, which he then put together in a coherent 
form <1981, 1982) as a systematic approach to personal and social
education in secondary schools. I understand that Button's own efforts 
were overtaken by his student, Jill Baldwin, who published 'Active 
tutorial work' (1981), together with Harry Wells, as part of the
Lancashire Project. Button's own work, published later in 1981, 
ironically appeared almost a copy. 'ATV' has since become an 
established tradition as a foundation of active pastoral work in 
secondary schools, and such is its popularity that in-service courses
have been arranged at local and even national level based on the
courses. I will later comment on the danger inherent in such 'package
deals' and the denial of some basic assumptions of personal and social 
education through 'teaching by the book’ as some packages would persuade 
teachers to do (e.g. McConnen, 1989).
Personal and social education goes under a variety of names. In the 16+ 
sector it tends to be called Lifeskills, and is a much more established 
part of the educational tradition than in the secondary sector. 
Lifeskills teaching came into being through social and youth work. Many 
of its ideas came from a movement in the 1940s and 50s that started in
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America with a view to improving relations in industry and social 
institutions. A main initiator was Kurt Lewin, who was also the
'originator' of the action research movement. It was Lewin’s 1946 paper 
that popularised the name 'action research' and the processes inherent 
in the approach. Many of Lewin's ideas (e.g. his techniques of 
sociometry and sociodrama, 1947) appear in Button's work, as well as in 
that of McGuire and Priestley (1981), Hopson and Scally (1981), and 
Baldwin and Wells (1981).
Lifeskills work in secondary schools appears variously as personal and 
social education, personal, social and moral education, tutorial work, 
and other titles. Its place in the curriculum varies according to the 
degree of importance, and the philosophical base given to it, for 
individual schools. Some schools see personal and social education as a 
foundation for the curriculum (HMI/DES, 1980), as a total educational 
concept which will colour all the teaching that goes on in the school 
and contributes to a school ethos. Other schools see personal and
social education as a part of the timetable, during which time 'personal 
and social education' is taught as a subject. David (1983) gives a very 
good review of the field and comments on the amount of confusion such 
variation of viewpoint can cause teachers, particularly those new to the 
profession, who suddenly find themselves 'teaching' personal and social 
education as well as their ordinary subject. In a conversation I had 
with a colleague at school, she pointed to this lack of guidance from 
the literature and senior staff (me), both in terms of lesson content 
and lack of resources:
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BD The staff feel, and I certainly do, that you don't want to spend too 
much time planning these things. You've got a full teaching day to
worry about. The last thing you want to do is sit down on a Wednesday 
morning and write a lesson plan and think, 'What are we going to do in 
SPACE time?' That's the main reason that staff are perhaps a little bit 
anti SPACE time. A lot of staff do see that there's an extra lesson and 
to have to plan. That's why we need material given to us so that we 
don't have to rack our brains as if it's an extra lesson to do every 
day. Then it's a problem.
JK I'm sure it is, as it's a very crowded day.
BD When you've got your own lessons to worry about, your teaching
subject, you don't want to worry about how you're going to plan a lesson 
for SPACE. <AT27b>
As far as Button is concerned, as I understand his work, the way in for 
pupils and teachers alike is through experiential learning. It is only 
by doing that we come to understand (Button, 1981). This tradition of 
learning by doing has a very long history, starting with the notion of 
the difference between techne and praxis of Aristotle, in which
phronesis is the guiding light or telos. Modern commentators point to 
its importance, writers such as Wilson (1967) who talks of "learning 
rules and procedures through group work"; Polanyi (1967), who tells us 
that "it is not by looking at things, but by dwelling in them, that we 
understand their Joint meaning"; and the FEU (1980), that comments on 
the desirability of a Social and Life Skills "programme being so
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arranged as to provide a range of appropriate experiences in it" (p.42), 
and <1982) "an approach to young people that uses EXPERIENCE as the 
relevant starting point for structuring learning" (p.6).
The main vehicle for promoting learning of social shills through 
experience is seen as group worh (Button, 1974). This is also a 
popular theme in much of the social and life skills and personal and 
social education literature (e.g. Hopson and Scally, 1981; Douglas,
1976; Brandes and Phillips, 1978; Pfeiffer and Jones, 1975). The FEU
(1982) gives clear guidelines in the organisation and management of 
group work, and sees one of the teacher's main functions as "to manage 
and structure the group's work - for example, by the use of a group
exercise - so that the students are able to work through some of the key
Issues and themes identified".
I will indicate in Part Two that I am dubious about the legitimacy of 
the term 'social education'. While I agree that personal and social 
education should be at the heart of the curriculum, I believe that the 
aim of education is the creation and fulfilment of personal potential, 
and that education is to do with the development of personal knowledge 
(McNiff, 1989Cb3). Social education, I feel, is a matter Df schooling, 
whereas personal education is encouraged through a process that is 
itself educational.
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This has been a brief outline of the background to the research project 
in personal and social education. We now move on to a consideration of 
my practice in personal and social education, 1981-1983.
2. PRACTICE IN SCHOOL - FIRST TRIALS: 1981-1983 
(i) The action
On our return from Bath, my colleague, R.M., and I set about teaching a 
'Button course’ to selected groups of children. At the time our main 
criterion was to make the children more socially aware, so that they 
would behave better in class, and become more competent citizens. We 
like to think that we were successful, as attested to by parents and 
staff. It was to explain this success that I undertook my formal study, 
- at least that was one of my several reasons - to know, as I stated in 
AT45, "why the courses worked".
I began my formal study in September, 1981, choosing to work with one 
group of children, in an attempt to evaluate the Button work I was doing 
as part of the overall SPACE (social, personal and careers education) 
programme of the school. I took as my research strategy the model 
formulated by Jack Whitehead (1977: see above). To ground my claim that 
I was trying to enhance the quality of education for my children, I took 
as criteria for my practice the recommendations for the aims of 
education, and the aims of personal and social education, as exemplified
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by the school handbook (1903), Dorset LEA Policy Statement (1983), and 
HMI/DES aims of education (1981), which I reproduce here:
1 to help pupils to develop lively, inquiring minds, the ability to
question and argue rationally and to apply themselves to tasks and 
physical skills;
2 to help pupils acquire knowledge and skills relevant to adult life
and employment in a fast-changing world;
3 to help pupils to use language and number effectively;
4 to instil respect for religious and moral values, and tolerance of
other races, religions and ways of life;
5 to help pupils understand the world in which they live, and the
interdependence of individuals, groups and nations;
6 to help pupils appreciate human achievements and aspirations.
In order to provide a rational foundation for my attempts to improve my 
practice, I took as my base line the fact that some of my educational 
values were being denied in my practice (Whitehead, op.cit.) That they 
were is evident on VT1. The children in the film are vulgar, rude and 
aggressive - a far cry from the sensitive, receptive children I had 
hoped to teach.
I shall here give a brief account of my work with this particular group. 
I adopt a literary, descriptive style for this account rather than 
critical, in order to communicate the emotional tone of the action in 
which I was engaged. A critical discussion about the practice that is 
described in this section (i) follows in sections (ii)-(iv).
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I introduced a Button course to one particular group. The group 
consisted of 14 14/15-year-olds in the remedial stream. I taught them 
English, 3 x 1  hour 10 minute lessons per week. Because they were low 
achievers and very badly behaved, I thought that the introduction of 
Button work would not interfere too severely with their academic studies 
on the basis that anything that kept them quiet would be useful, and 
also on the basis that the Button work would be bound to have some sort 
of impact with these children with so little personal and social 
adequacy.
A denial of some of my educational values may be seen in VT1. The 
children are rude, hostile to each other and to me, and profess no 
interest in school. The audiotapes that we started making at the same 
time contain the statements:
"We ain't no good."
"Ve don't care."
"The teachers treat us like dirt."
"Ve don't trust the teachers and they don't trust us."
Our lesson procedure often seemed to be that of who shouted the loudest, 
and the lesson content disappeared in the face of their rampant apathy.
Against this background I introduced my scheme of personal and social 
skills. My journal of the time, and the progress reports which give 
detailed progress chart my frequest outbursts of despair - "Why am I 
doing this? They don't care!" Three or four children were immediately
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intrigued by what I was trying to do and were prepared to co-operate, 
but their conciliatory attitude was often overwhelmed by the 
forfcefulness of some of the more aggressive children, notably Malcolm 
and Gary. These two boys had formed a partnership in crime, inside and 
outside the school. They saw themselves as potential strong-arm men. 
They were both keen on body-building, and a favourite trick they were 
developing was striking threatening poses towards the lady teachers. 
The three girls in the class were intimidated, and seldom said a word.
For the first two weeks or so of our time together I tried to introduce 
a formal Button scheme, attempting to follow his methodologies and first 
lesson contents to the letter. This just did not work. My attempts to 
get the children to shake hands was a disaster. I abandoned the scheme 
for a week to let them settle down. This abandonment was a regular 
feature of my work. I found it necessary for my own sanity and stamina 
to return to periods of very formal didactic teaching, when the 
youngsters read and wrote under my supervision and I caught my breath. 
Then, after this period of relative calm, it was time to have another
go-
Because my introduction had been such a disaster I focused on another 
aspect, hoping this would find better favour, that of making a contract. 
Button recommends as a very first step in any course to make an initial 
contract that the group is going to work together. I had done this, and 
the children had been happy to make the contract, but had great 
difficulty in keeping it with respect to some of the exercises I had
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asked them to do. They rejected shaking hands, trust exercises, and 
small group work.
I decided to introduce the idea of a contract as an exercise in class 
democracy. I asked them their opinion about the idea and invited 
comment. This did seem to go down well. We established a system of 
house rules, outlining codes of behaviour for the children and me, that 
we would adhere to as long as the lesson was in progress. They would 
attempt to be courteous and to listen, not fool around or swear, and I 
would be more tolerant, listen to them and not tell them off. My role 
as deputy head seemed to present some problems to them in the initial 
stages.
Malcolm You're a hard lady.
JM Ho I'm not.
Malcolm You've got to be, haven't you.
JM Why?
Malcolm Your office is upstairs. (AT6)
The negotiated settlement provided a reasonable basis for our work 
together, but the initial stages of Button work (personal role 
exploration, trust exercises) were still seen as 'pathetic'. I 
abandoned the idea entirely after a disastrous lesson that boded no good 
for future attempts. Still determined to capitalise on these pockets of 
peace, I decided to go straight into what I had seen at Bath as a very 
useful piece of experiential learning which also had immediate transfer 
potential, the receiving of a visitor.
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The children were interested in the idea. They even agreed to practise 
some skills, such as how to greet a visitor, and how to put him at his 
ease!. Their patience at practising was very quickly exhausted by their 
demands to receive a visitor immediately.
My supervisor, Jack Whitehead, was due to visit the school, and I asked 
him to be a visitor. I also persuaded the science department to lend roe 
a video camera to record the visit. At that time (1981) it was very 
difficult to get much technical equipment, and the VTR that we had was 
of primitive design. The quality of film is not good, but the action on 
the film records that the children did respond in terms approaching 
social conformity and personal ease.
Ve made two short films that day. It was the first time the children 
had been on camera, so the first film inevitably was of the ’hello, mum' 
variety. My attempts to capture the flavour of Button work are
overtaken by their attempts to show off. In those days I was terribly 
naive about people's reactions to cameras (I had had experience myself 
of video work in the Eurocentres micro-teaching projects, and no longer 
considered camera work as alien) and I did not appreciate that the 
children had to get used to the camera in the room and to seeing 
themselves on film. I was disappointed in the result and expressed my 
distress to the children. By this time (December) we had established 
enough rapport for them to want to do the best for me (a considerable 
step in the project which I will focus on in Chapter 3), and said they 
would have another go. The first filming session took place in the 
morning. I spoke to the children about my feelings afterwards, while
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Jack was visiting the headmaster. The children suggested that we have 
another go that afternoon. I was not sure that such an attempt would be 
worth the organisational bother, but they promised to be good and to 
make it worthwhile.
I arranged for a lesson change myself so that I could teach the group; 
their subject teacher took my class. I asked the science department to 
let us use the VTR again, and the laboratory technician obligingly spent 
his lunch hour setting up a better arrangement than in the morning. I 
asked Jack if he would extend his visit and he was glad to do so.
This time the results really were spectacular. The children treated 
their visitor with great courtesy and engaged him in conversation for 
about twenty minutes of filming. When the 'official* period of filming 
finished they continued to talk to him in amiable terms. Mark was 
particularly struck by Jack (Mark had that week returned to school after 
temporary suspension for an unsolicited flashing episode during an RE 
lesson) and made real efforts to contribute to the success of the film.
Later, as part of his reactions to the visit, he wrote of his visitor:
"I thought he was CID because he wore a suit." Perhaps, after all, he
was feathering his own nest.
* * t t *
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At about this time I was invited to give talks about my work at various 
venues as part of the Dorset in-service provision. The introductions 
came initially from R.C. , the adviser who had been my contact for the 
Button course in Bath, but later from the head of in-service and other 
colleagues in the advisory department. I was invited to speak to a 
group of staff at the Dorset Institute for Higher Education, and there 
met a lecturer in education who was particularly interested in the 
content of my work (personal and social education) and the mode of
enquiry (action research). He was interested to follow up my work as
part of his own enquiry into in-service provision and research 
methodologies. After some discussion we agreed that he would join me in 
school to monitor my practice, and his reports would add to my own; we 
should complement each other's research studies. As such, we would both 
act as part of a validation process for the other. As things worked 
out, much of my work was recorded and used by him, but he then avoided 
making it available to me. As we had initially agreed that I would be 
in the 'action' role and he would be in the 'recording' role, I depended 
on him to keep all records of videorecordings, tape recordings and other 
memoranda. This he did, but I cannot include any documentary evidence 
of his involvement in my work. You, the reader, will have to trust my 
word that events turned out as I say they did.
Peter (as I shall call him) Joined me in January, 1982, and spent the
next six weeks in school, following my progress in many of my lessons. 
He sat in with Malcolm's group on occasion as an interested visitor. 
They greeted him in the same courteous fashion as they had Jack
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Vhltehead, but after that he became a spectator-recorder, and the 
children soon regarded him as part of the furniture. He was interested 
in monitoring my activity through the Flanders Interaction Analysis 
Schedule, and I was not then sophisticated or confident enough to 
require him to be part of my action. Sadly, a potentially very powerful 
opportunity was missed. Peter's involvement did inspire me to try an 
'experiment within an experiment', which I shall recount later in this 
chapter, and which then prompted me to pay much greater attention to the 
action research style of enquiry I had been advised about in May, 1981, 
and which I was now following with Malcolm's group but in a not very 
committed fashion (see below: (ID).
The results of my sub-experiment and the insights which I gained through 
conducting it caused me now to determine to keep a very careful record 
of what I was doing with Malcolm's group and about my own thoughts about 
my own practice. It was probably at this stage (early 1982) that I 
became a committed action researcher rather than a pretend one; in the 
sense that I actively began exploring my own views about the nature of 
my practice - I determined to investigate my present form of life - 
rather than merely acknowledge that there might be an alternative form 
of life which, at this time, I was not inclined to explore or adopt.
*y decision now to keep a detailed record of my action research led me 
to consider more efficient ways than my previous Journal or depending on 
Peter who seemed determined to stay external to my action. The 
videofilm we had made (10.12.81) had captured in action a denial of some 
of my educational values, and also a reversal of that denial (the
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negation of the negation as providing a new base and a steady state In 
order to start from a new metamorphosed point which has absorbed the 
negation: see Chapters 3 and 6). In order to keep a detailed record, I 
decided to use an audiotape recorder and to be absolutely honest with 
the children that I was keeping a record of our time together.
I was amazed at the effect the tape recorder had on them, and the 
Instantaneous nature of this effect. It was as If, as soon as we went 
Into recording mode, they started playing to an audience and were on 
their best behaviour. Our lessons of January - March, 1982, had the 
pattern that they would be 'normally' abusive and Ill-mannered for the 
short time before we recorded, they would start acting their part while 
actually on tape, and then revert to their 'normal' behaviour while 
listening to the tape. In about April - May, 1982, their 'good' conduct 
was transferred to non-recording time.
Because I used the tape recorder so extensively, I acquired many hours 
of tapescrlpts, which are included in Appendix 1. From these, it will be 
seen that I explained my project to my children (AT4 and 6) and how I 
would like them to behave. I still saw personal and social education at 
this stage as producing a certain kind of person (Pring, 1984: see also
(11) below) In terms of social acceptability, and I still saw my project 
as a socialising (schooling) activity. The children agreed that they 
would try. It speaks well of their progress that they reached a state 
of agreeing to agree - Habermas's (1975) criterion of negotiation, and 
the foundation of Bernstein's (1983) dlaloglcal communities (see also 
Chapter 3).
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I continued using the tape recorder as a major resource for about three 
months. The content of our lessons varied. Sometimes we concentrated 
on formal English studies; sometimes, though not often, I tried some 
Button exercises, but the children seemed suspicious of such organised 
activities. Usually they were happy to talk about themselves. They 
talked and I listened. I think the children began to learn how to 
listen to each other, as well. As time went on the girls began to open 
up, and became accepted by the boys. One of the shyer boys became more 
forceful as his opinions grew to be valued. I taught the children how 
to listen, and it is clear from the tapes (e.g. AT6) that, for example, 
Gary became a good listener and encourager instead of wanting to shout 
other people down. Our conversations were random, seldom planned by me, 
although I always had something ready if they should not be in a co­
operative mood.
I am aware, in making these claims, that clear evidence needs to be 
available to substantiate them, as well as an identified process of 
validation to show that (a) my claims have been grounded through an 
intersubjective process of understanding with other colleagues, and (b) 
that identified instances of action may be put forward as representative 
of the criteria that have been agreed as being representative of a 
realisation of the educational values nominated above. I will return to 
these themes repeatedly, later in this section and in Chapter 7.
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I must confess at this time that much of the children's socially 
acceptable behaviour was due to a process of bribery. They had been 
much impressed by Jack Whitehead who I told them was another teacher I 
worked with at Bath. (They never quite understood me when I said he was 
my teacher. I was a teacher, so how could I have a teacher of my own?) 
They appreciated that I had to go to Bath to work with him, and Malcolm 
had an aunt at Steeple Langford on the A36, so Bath and Jack Whitehead 
became recognizable signs. I promised the group that, if they co­
operated with me, I would take them to Bath at the end of the year in 
the mini-bus. They thought this was wonderful, and the tapes are full 
of references to the proposed trip. I did in fact take them to Bath, 
first to the University, where Jack met us and showed us around. The 
group was singularly unimpressed except for when they saw the 
sophisticated space invader machines in the lounge. They then had great 
fun when I let them go off individually into the town - heart in mouth 
as I envisaged reports in the Times Ed of an irresponsible teacher 
allowing her pupils to be unsupervised and the mayhem they caused in the 
unsuspecting city. They all arrived back at the minibus on time, 
however, and regaled me all the way back to Bournemouth with their 
exploits - no criminality as far as I could judge.
Towards the end of our time together (May, 1982) a major incident 
occurred which seemed to round off our work and drew to a close the 
first cycle of my action research enquiry. Through my contact with 
Peter I arranged to spend an hour at the recording studio at the Dorset 
Institute of Higher Education. I wanted to show in action the increased 
personal and social awareness and competence of the children as part of
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the validation process for my study. As this was a major event, I 
invited Jack to Join us again for the day. The children welcomed him as 
a friend. Peter and Jack saw the making of the video, and recorded 
their comments afterwards.
Prior to the day of filming, the group and I had had a deep 
disagreement. As deputy head I was responsible for promoting young 
people to the position of prefect. I had been delighted to do so, in 
consultation with colleagues, for Malcolm. It was not only to his 
credit that, from an uncouth, abusive youngster, he had now grown in 
responsibility to fulfil this task, but also, I felt, to mine, that I 
had helped him on his way. Unfortunately Malcolm sadly abused his 
privilege by bullying a younger boy, and I had no option but to demote 
him. The group closed ranks against me, accusing me of unfairness. 
They were hostile and rude, and rejected all overtures from me to tape 
record. Ve had had a week of sullenness and cold shoulders. I had 
booked the filming session at DIHE well in advance, and could not with 
good grace cancel, but I was apprehensive of the outcome and doubted if 
anything of worth to my project would appear on film.
Ve went ahead with the filming. The video (VT3) shows the children and 
me being polite to each other, engaging in small talk but not really 
saying much. Then the row is mentioned. I was at the time amazed at 
the children's response. Ve had not referred to the disagreement for 
some time, and now it was out in the open. Instead of becoming 
defensive, the children were ready to talk about it. I told them how 
hurt I had been at their unfair accusations and behaviour, and they
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accepted that they had been thoughtless. Ve discussed the situation 
rationally and sympathetically. Ve reached an understanding, and the
atmosphere became relaxed and warm. The video catches the changing
emotions and the action of people trying to search out each other and 
heal sadness.
Jack and Peter recorded their comments later about the episode. The 
transcript of this recording will show that they agreed that I could 
demonstrate through my work, of which this video was a good example, a 
realisation of some of my educational values. The HMI criteria of 'to 
develop lively, enquiring minds ... an ability to listen ... respect for 
others' points of view ... sensitivity ... an ability to argue 
rationally' - all these qualities come across. A comparison of VT1 and
VT3 will show a clear denial and a clear realisation of those 
educational values, as specified by me, and as recommended by the school 
(1981), Dorset LEA (1983) and HMI (1981).
Although I have worked with small groups of children since Malcolm's 
group in 1981-82, I feel that this was the most coherent episode in 
school in which I attempt to show a systematic development of practice. 
In Chapter 3 I shall review my work with colleagues as part of my IMSET 
involvement, 1982-83, and subsequent work with groups of children, 1984- 
88, which evidences substantial values shifts and perspectives on
practice.
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I wish now to critique some of the aspects of my work with Malcolm's 
group.
(11) Assumptions
I shall divide this section into two: (a) the assumptions of the
literature; (b) the assumptions of myself
(a) The assumptions of the literature
(al) Assumption (al): Persons or types of persons? Personal and
social education is concerned with producing a certain kind of person, 
rather than autonomous persons.
Pring (1984) points out that formal schemes of personal and social 
education in schools tend to exacerbate the separation of theory and 
practice. While the curriculum is supposedly geared (HM1/DES 1977, 
1979, 1981) towards helping children develop as persons, much of the 
literature of personal and social education and the practice that its 
theory generates focuses more on producing a particular kind of person 
(FBU, 1980; McGuire and Priestley, 1981). Compare, for example, the 
recommendations of HMI (1981) above, or The Varnock Report (1978):
( 29 )
"First, to enlarge a child's knowledge, experience and imaginative 
understanding and then his awareness of moral values and capacity for 
enjdyment; secondly, to enable him to enter the world after formal 
education is over as an active participant in society and a responsible 
contributer to it, capable of achieving as much independence as 
possible"
with
"Attainment targets will be set for all three core subjects of Maths, 
Bnglish and science. ...They will reflect what pupils must achieve to 
progress in their education and to become thinking and informed people" 
(DES, 1987)
The different perspectives are noted by Pring (1984) who refers to 
DBS/HMI (1977):
" ... the educational system is charged by society ... with equipping
young people to take their place as citizens and workers in adult life.
... Secondly, there is the responsibility for educating the 'autonomous 
citizen', a person able to think and act for herself or himself, to 
resist exploitation, to innovate and to be vigilant in the defence of
liberty. These two functions do not always fit easily together."
(Pring, 1984)
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and by the FEU (1980), particularly with regard to the practice of 
personal and social education (or social and life skills in the 16+ 
sector) in schools and colleges:
"The sudden popularity of the concept tof SLS) has resulted in 
considerable diversity of practice. Some tutors provide a lot of 
factual material in SLS 'courses' - about health, civil rights, 
obtaining Jobs, etc. Others emphasise the acquisition of coping skills, 
such as form-filling, using the telephone, reading bus maps. Some 
concentrate on interpersonal relationships, perhaps through role-playing 
disputes and analysing decision-making. Others emphasise the 
acquisition of specific attitudes (e.g. towards time-keeping or 
tidiness), or of more general attributes such as confidence or 
Initiative. Although these approaches interconnect, and many teachers 
mix them, it is also possible to find examples of practice which do not 
overlap at all."
I would suggest that the above passage relies on the notion of the 
production of the certain kind of person as an objective of formal 
schooling. Even though diversity of practice is noted, the assumption 
of the text is that a particular product will emerge at the end of 
controlled inputs.
It would be wrong to say that the literature exclusively emphasises the 
aspect of the production of the certain kind of person, but I feel that 
the bias is certainly there. Perhaps it is a question of emphasis. 
Consider, for example, the following passage from the FEU (1980):
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"For a variety of reasons, the provision with which we are concerned is 
most commonly referred to as 'Social and Life Skills Training'. Ve 
thiiik this label is useful in so far as it implies active learning with 
the aim of being able to perform everyday activities more competitively 
...Ve think it could be misleading in so far as it suggests that being 
trained in certain skills is all that is required for this.
"Another danger, in having any label at all, is that what we consider 
may most usefully be regarded as an aspect of personal development may 
come to be thought of as a 'subject'. This might in turn lead to 
'subject teachers’, and endless and fruitless debate about what the 
'essence' of the subject is, and the young people being offered another 
'lesson' at which to succeed or fail - instead of being offered support 
in achieving their adult aspirations.
"Ve consider it reasonable to assume that for most 10-19 year olds 
many of these aspirations are bound up with being a worker." (FEU, 
1980)
It seems to me that the FEU attempts to make explicit the need for SLS 
to be concerned with education geared to the needs of individuals via a 
noil-restrictive curriculum, but then opts for an end product of a 
'worker'. The remainder of the text makes it clear that the image of 
the worker here is not in the Marxist sense of the person whose product 
is a way of life, but of the worker as part of the means-end machinery 
of productive forces, a position critiqued by Habermas (1979), among 
others.
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The emphasis in the literature on the production of a certain kind of 
person is reflected in an associated assumption, that SLS is largely a
matter of schooling rather than a matter of education.
(a2> Assumption <a2): Schooling or education? Personal and social
education (SLS) is concerned more with the formalities of schooling than
with the education of individuals.
This is a theme which I shall take up in Chapter 7. Here I will say 
that the literature of personal and social education seems to emphasise 
the socialisation of the Individual within prescribed institutionalised 
frameworks, rather than resolve to encourage the personal development of 
the individual.
It seems to me that the notion of 'education' in the phrase 'personal 
and social education' needs to rest on a valid interpretation of what 
the generic term 'education' means in practice. I would suggest that, 
in much of the literature, sociology tends to subsume education. In the 
literature of personal and social education, the main aim seems to be 
the socialisation of the individual rather than his education, if we 
regard education to do with the personal development of the individual.
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Langford (1985), for example, states categorically that the practice of 
education is teaching, where teaching is "bringing about education"; and 
"teaching is best thought of as a social activity which may be organised 
either as a profession or bureaucratically" (p.68). He later defines 
the education that is thus brought about as 'personhood': "being
educated is to become a person". Similarly, Carr and Kemmis (1986) 
identify the goal of education as socially oriented:
" ... to intervene critically in all patterns of action which fragment 
communities and isolate individuals ... "
Personal and social education was institutionalised in the early 1980s, 
largely through the efforts of Leslie Button and Jill Baldwin (see 
above). I used both schemes of work extensively during my work as a 
teacher, and as an INSET provider (1982-83). Vhile I was using them, I 
could never quite get to grips with the difference between them. I can 
rationalise that difference today by suggesting that Baldwin's 'Active 
tutorial work' is geared toward the socialisation of young people, 
whereas Button's 'Group tutoring for the form teacher' is geared toward 
their personal development. It is a question of emphasis, Button 
constantly emphasises the value of action research - personal enquiries 
by young people into their own lives. "We call this approach 'action 
research' because through their enquiry the participants begin to affect 
the situation they are examining. Their discoveries also have a strong 
Impact on them, and stir in them a determination to take some action 
about the situation they have uncovered." (Button, 1974). As I hope to
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show later, much of Button's epistemology is based on the work of Lewin 
(1946);
Baldwin and Veils, on the other hand, mention this personal orientation 
in the introduction to their books, yet seem not to carry the concept 
through into the practices that are outlined in them. Their aims, as 
spelt out in their introductions, are biased towards the instrumental, 
couched in terms to do with adaptation and accommodation.
A number of books that appeared in the early 1980s acknowledged the dual 
nature of personal education and social education. For example, Hopson 
and Scally (1981) launch a diatribe against the restrictive nature of 
much 'traditional' schooling:
"Ve have already seen that schooling and education are not synonymous. 
Because, in the past, they have sometimes been regarded as such, we have 
produced myths such as:
- education happens only in school;
- education lasts only until you leave school;
- some people are always teachers, some are always learners;
- being educated means knowing many facts;
- being clever means passing exams;
- 'experts' and those in authority always know best."
They then set about systematically demolishing these myths, finalising 
their argument (p.45) with:
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"Schools, even with the best intentions and out of the highest motives, 
present to many a depowering, alienating experience, which some would 
say blocks off the notion and possibility of life-long education. Ve 
think it is possible to reverse this. Ve see that 'switching on* can be 
achieved by making schooling more 'person-centred'. A process that is 
about me - my interests, hopes, values, ideas, perceptions, ambitions, 
relationships, skills, and development - is one that can produce 
interest, energy, commitment, responses, and responsibility." (Hopson 
and Scally, 1981).
Yet in the same year, Hamblin (1981) opted for organised programmes of 
pastoral care, which included specific inputs of an instrumental nature:
"One weakness of pastoral care has been the tendency to overvalue 
experiential learning as if it were inherently superior. In so-called 
discovery or informal learning it is possible for the wrong things to be 
learned or for existing prejudices and stereotypes to be reinforced. 
Vhat is learned conflicts with our intentions. Pupils may miss crucial 
points without the planned intervention of the tutor."
And McGuire and Priestley (1981) saw 'Life after school' as resting 
squarely on the development of interpersonal skills, while overlooking 
the fact that 'interpersonal' is an extension of 'personal'. They state 
that, in their book, "an approach to social education is presented which 
is founded on a particular way of viewing the situation of individuals 
in the period just before and after leaving school. It defines their 
situation as a set of problems that have to be solved; and regards
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social education as a systematic attempt to help individuals acquire the
skills of solving these problems by themselves."
I have attended many courses on personal and social education, and I 
have usually been led to believe that social education is a priority (I 
part company with the term 'social education': see Chapter 6). The 
literature still seems to show this bias - for example, McConnen (1969). 
My practice of 1981-82 reflected the message that I was receiving.
I have reflected often why the situation should have emerged that HMI
documents should recommend above all the need for the personal 
development of the individual, yet the implementation of those 
recommendations seem anxious to focus on the socialisation of the 
individual. Perhaps, as Dunlop suggests (1984), it is easier to 
rationalise issues to do with social interactions than those to do with 
personal development.
(a3) Assumption (a3): There is a specific methodology to teach
personal and social education
There has been a very clear assumption in the decade of the life of 
formalised personal and social education that the two main resources are 
(1) experiential learning and (2) group work. The epistemological 
factors here seem to be that experiential learning will encourage 
personal education, and group work will encourage social education. The
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FEU <1980), for example, presents a useful analysis of 7 models of SLS
development, and draws as one of its conclusions:
"Much SLS work is best organised as a group activity, since alternative 
perceptions and the discussion of others' experiences can be very 
valuable."
I would today challenge much of what goes on in personal and social 
education in the name of experiential learning; and suggest that it is 
more in the nature of manipulation towards the identified ends of the
teacher. I am here reminded of Socrates's questioning of the slave.
This was no free discourse, as Socrates would have us believe. He knew 
all along the answers he wanted the slave to arrive at, and his 
questions were so directed.
This tendency is rife in the literature. A clear case appears in
Hamblin's <1974) 'The teacher and counselling'. Hamblin begins his work 
by rationalising the objectives of the counsellor:
"He sets out to encourage:
<i) the growth of self acceptance in the pupil;
<ii) the development of controls from inside the pupils, rather
than continuing his reliance upon external checks and 
pressures;
<iii) the learning of relevant and competent coping strategies and
of problem-solving techniques which are both realistic and
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viable for tbat pupil."
DraWlng on the work of Rogers (1942), Lewis (1970) and Krumboltz (1966), 
among others, he is keen to stress that counselling is to do with 
enabling the pupil to find personal values in which to ground his social 
identity. Yet, on page 216, we read:
"This chapter makes a distinction between group guidance and group 
counselling, showing the former to be a structured informational process 
which reinforces the aims of the school. ... Group counselling is 
concerned with the solution of developmental and personal problems." It 
appears, after all, that there are norms to which individual pupils need 
to aspire, and group work is a valuable instrument to correct deviant 
individuals. Throughout there is this emphasis, which Rogers (1961) 
identifies as the assumption by the therapist that the client needs to 
be cured, rather than helped.
Mary Varnock (1978) is dubious about the value of group work (and I 
agree with her, though I would not have done so in 1981):
"Every move in the direction of working in groups, or team activity, of 
Joint projects and communal discussion, is a move in the wrong 
direction. ... Corporate activity may be a fine thing from time to time. 
But Independence is perhaps finer." (see also Chapter 5 of this text)
( 39 )
I have tried to show how these three assumptions of the literature have 
turned the HMI recommendations on their head. These recommendations 
make explicit the responsibility of institutions to foster the personal 
development of the individual. They do not mention that personal
development needs to equate with or conform to institutionalised 
expectations. The assumptions of the literature that I have indicated 
above seem to accept the need for institutionalised norms as the 
foundation of individual growth: i.e. social conformity, which
suppresses personal identity, is seen as the basis of social evolution.
I will now outline how, in 1981-82, my own assumptions reflected these 
views in my practice.
(b) My own assumptions
(bl) Assumption (bl): My belief in the existence of a 'certain kind of
person'
It is clear to me today that I misinterpreted the philosophy of Leslie 
Button. Button's work (1974, 1981) indicates that individuals'
understandings of themselves are the foundation for social action, and
those understandings are brought about through the action research of
personal enquiry (see above). In this belief he is relatively isolated 
from many of his contemporaries, as I have endeavoured to show above, 
who seem to believe the reverse, that conformity to reified social norms
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is the basis for individual action. Social evolution, in this view, is 
the movement towards reified goals which are the product of an idealised 
tradition (see 3 below). Social evolution, in Button's view, is in the 
growth of individuals who agree mutually compatible norms which are the 
product of those individuals' rational consciousness.
The early days of my enquiry could be characterised in terms of the 
clear objective of producing the 'certain kind of person'. I saw the 
rationale for Button's work as lying in the socialisation of the 
individual through group activity. The person, in my view, was the 
product of an institutionalised methodology, which was itself an 
expression of my view of abstract social norms grounded in a view of a 
reified Truth.
Many of these views were given expression in my conversation with B.C. 
(ATI):
My comments about the purpose of Button work and the SPACE programme 
indicate my view that persons are essentially institution-bound:
"All of the Button work I think is link work. It's involving children 
in their own destinies, in helping them to create their own lives and 
being responsible for their own lives and for their own actions, and 
seeing their own actions within the line of the perspective of society 
in general."
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My view of the certain kind of person did not stop at the children, but 
extended to colleagues. Talking about a colleague who had expressed an 
unwillingness to join in the SPACE programme:
"There is one year tutor who is not committed, and what a difference he 
makes, because we are all aware of the fact that he is not committed. 
... He's being brought along now by group pressure, by the year tutors 
in the group, that he's got to conform. But he is a reluctant member, 
and it will be interesting to see if he does make the grade. ... If we 
change him I shall be extremely surprised. I'm really very negative 
about him."
In many of the tapes I express my wish that children should be tolerant, 
sensitive, be able to get on with each other; this is a recurring theme. 
I see their personal progress in terms of better behaviour, again 
conformity to reified social norms. In conversation with F.D. (AT27: 
26.1.83) I make explicit my educational values:
"I would put out such values as being: Hoping that the children will 
turn out to be more sensitive to the needs of others, will become 
lively, caring human beings, and in terms like that."
It is interesting to compare this view with the view of 1985, again with
F.D. <AT42: 26.4.85) where I say:
"I believe very strongly in the autonomy of the child, in the right of
every child to be given the opportunity to develop as a person, in the
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necessity of the youngsters having the correct amount of ego value. 
These children undervalue themselves, don't they? So that's what I'm 
trying to find for these children. I'm looking for ways to help them 
increase these aspects, and I'm also looking very critically at my own 
class practice, what I am doing in class to help them achieve these 
alms." I had, as evidenced in this statement, shifted my view of the 
outcomes of personal and social education, from an instrumental, 
socially-oriented view of the acquisition of values to a person-centred 
view of the creation of values.
This now brings me to the second major assumption that was the 
foundation of my 1981-82 practice.
<b2) Assumption <b2): My belief in a 'correct form of teaching'.
This is in fact a cluster of assumptions. In (1) I have indicated my 
view of an 'output' of personal and social education, which reflected my 
view of the control of knowledge (see below, 3: Considerations); in (2) 
I shall attempt to show that I had fixed ideas about the 'input' that 
would achieve the objective. This input embraced the notions that there 
was a correct way of 'doing' personal and social education, that I knew 
that way, and that I could get my children and colleagues to perform in 
that way as well.
There are a large number of instances in the audiotapes of these views, 
and indications also that formed the ground for my practice.
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For example. M.V. and I (AT45, 13.7.87) recall our days at school in the 
early 1980s, when she was a newly-appointed teacher and I a newly- 
appbinted deputy head.
M.V. comments: "My memories of you are not having to struggle to
maintain discipline but possibly tending to be the other way because 
your discipline was so established and so neatly compartmentalised ...
My feeling, which may be wrong, was that, consciously or unconsciously, 
when you became deputy, you did initially try to carry on the Mrs X 
tradition (former deputy headmistress). And that is where I think you 
were going against yourself. Because although there is no doubt about 
it, Mrs X did care very strongly about the children, at the same time it 
was a very Old Testament type of discipline, wasn't it? I suppose the
analogy is quite a good one, actually, because it was a kind of pre-
Hosea type of discipline, whereas you and I would want to temper it with
a bit more love and forgiveness in a more Hew Testament tradition. But
initially you appeared to be fitting into that mould, which didn't seem 
natural.
JM I felt very strongly, because that was the only model I had of 
becoming a deputy head, I felt I had to live up to that; and I felt also 
that other people's expectations of me fitted that mould.
Later I say:
JM I saw my rale very much as a functional role rather than a personal 
one. ... In my early Button days .. I saw everything in terms of black 
and'white, and I had a specific job and a specific function. It was all 
externalised. It was all in terms of other people's expectations of me 
and my expectations of myself, and it gave rise to enormous conflict. 
It went totally against the grain that I had to treat these horrible 
children as equals, on a person to person level. I had a - how shall I 
say it? - snooty attitude towards them that they were children and they 
had to do what they were told and not what they wanted. And I am very 
aware of this, in my earlier work. It took a lot of personal - 
'sacrifice' is the word that comes to mind, but that's not the word I'm 
looking for. I’ve learnt humility."
However, the lack of humility and the conviction of the correctness of 
my form of life extended to my view of colleagues' responsibilities, and 
in ATI (21.6.81) I hold quite a coercive view of the imposition of my 
will on others:
JM I regard one of my functions a breaking down the hostility (to the 
new Button work). It's very much a hidden objective in my work ...
RC How many can'ts have we and how many won'ts (in teachers undertaking 
Button work).
JM How many CAMS might be a better t word], and how many WILLS might be 
a better basis.
( )
RC ... I think the staff dynamics of this are very interesting, and 
very often missed out of consideration, treated as slightly irrelevant
JM Veil, I'd be happy without the staff dynamics. If I could have one 
hundred per cent co-operation, as I have had in the other years ...
I related my practice very decisively to school policy, of which I was a 
representative. In a conversation with BD (AT27b: 9.2.83) I survey the 
field with the hope of her confirmation that my views are becoming the 
norm:
JM "I think what's appearing - the pattern that's becoming clearer in 
the first year - is that there are very clear notions as to what should 
be done in SPACB. Staff are very clear that they want to be encouraging 
among the children positive attitudes, lively, free-thinking people, the 
ability to relate to each other, the ability to relate to adults and 
authority, to get on well in society. I think that is fairly well 
accepted, isn't it? That these are the aims that we have ...
"Another thing that's emerging is that the style of teaching is 
still fairly centred from teacher to children. There doesn't seem to be 
a tremendous emphasis on group work, on activities. I wonder perhaps if 
next half term if we couldn't get together and look at different 
methodologies - ways of presenting the material."
( )
I carried this view with me into my in-service work at The Oaks, 1982- 
83. Because of my interest in the field I was invited to work at the 
Teachers' Centre with a view of promoting personal and social education 
in local schools. One teacher at The Oaks had heard me speak, and had 
thought, as I had with Leslie Button, that possibly here was a way for 
him to overcome the troubles he felt in his practice. The headmaster, 
PL (AT26) had in fact long wanted 'improved tutoring' to be a feature of 
the curriculum, but was delighted that the initiative appeared to have 
been generated by the staff; and he lent his unqualified backing. "We 
needed a fairly fundamental change in attitude towards tutorial work in 
its wider sense. Encouraging, I think, different relationships inside 
the school, in lessons particularly. To get many teachers to see a 
wider role, a wider educational role than just purveying their academic 
excellence. I think this can only come from the staff themselves, and 
so we had to recognise deficiencies, looked for ways to put them right, 
and came to develop this philosophy themselves."
In the next section I shall discuss the epistemology of my practice, and 
in PL's last sentence he makes explicit the systematic action-reflection 
plan of identifying a problem and working towards its solution which is 
formalised in Vhitehead <op.cit.) I shall give an ongoing account of my 
work at The Oaks in Chapter 3, where I situate the chronological shift 
away from propositional forms of practice to dialectical forms of 
practice.
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On my entry to The Oaks, October 1982, I carried with me my assumptions 
about ' controlled forms of life. I met people who held the same 
assumptions, and together we reinforced each other's prejudices. It was 
only through our own practice (e.g. PC's realisation, through his own 
action-reflection, that his epistemology reflected assumptions that he 
now realised were alien to his educational values: AT26b) that we came
to see our prejudices for what they were, and to allow our 'instincts to 
blossom' (PL: AT26) - to substitute an alternative set Df realisations 
about the nature of people and the nature of forms of knowledge, that 
were more closely aligned to the educational values that were emerging 
out of the liberated forms of consciousness that we were encouraging 
(see also Chapters 3 and 4).
At the beginning, however, October - December, 1982, we all seemingly 
believed in controlled forms of life, in which the focus of education, 
and personal and social education in our specific case, was to turn out 
the certain kind of person who would be socially adjusted. For example:
PL It was rapidly becoming apparent that the pupils needed to have a 
good deal more social skill in enabling them to cope with the problems 
of the outside world than perhaps they had obviously had to do in the 
past. ... The increasing complexity of the world meant that pupils 
clearly needed to have a much wider range of social skills than perhaps 
we traditionally thought they had to.
He identifies current coping strategies:
( **8 )
"Somehow the feeling all the time, they lacked the maturity to handle 
fifth year courses. And the strategy for that ranged from 'We ought to 
be caning them harder and drilling them harder' to 'Well, is there 
something we're not getting across? Are we failing somehow in 
developing their maturity?"' (AT26: 13.12.82)
MK (Teacher) I feel very strongly at the end of five years that people 
leaving our school should be better able to cope with life than they do 
at the moment. I find that a lot of our boys when they leave are 
socially inadequate and very immature, and one would hope that this type 
of course would sort out some of the things that obviously mattered. 
(AT25)
It is interesting that MK refers to personal and social education here 
as a 'course', a specific input. The headmaster picks up this point
(AT26):
PL (identifying how the staff initially had fixed ideas about 
controlled practices which were gradually modified into ideas about 
mutable practices): I think they've learnt a lot out of the course.
You know, they still talk about it .. it's probably a shorthand . . as a 
course, just as CSE English or geography may be a course. I’m not sure 
how many of them see it as .. I would argue that it's nothing to do with 
a course. It's a philosophy of working.
JM I think that a good half of them have accepted that now, that 
through the techniques, the strategies, they ...
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PL Yes, there are signs that they do that now when they say. 'Oh, 
we've thrown that piece out. That wasn't working. We can do it in a 
different way.' They are now much more ready to adapt. I think at one 
stage some of them wanted to have the textbook in their hand, and this 
week we . . if it's the third week we must be on whatever. I think
they've learnt a lot from that.
Summary of <ii): The Assumptions
The assumptions of the literature of educational theory, and those 
inherent in my practice, reflect a view of knowledge that I shall 
investigate further in (3) below (Considerations). This view is 
grounded in the notion of the control of knowledge by external experts, 
who in turn ground their epistemologies in the concept of reified Truth.
This concept is vital for many of the arguments of this thesis, and it 
is important that I make quite clear what I mean by it.
The concept of reified Truth, the notion of a Truth 'out there' that 
exists as a body of knowledge independent of individuals, is one that is 
a foundation of many philosophies, among them, for example, Sir Karl 
Popper's (1972) notion of 'objective knowledge'. In his World 3, 
knowledge exists as "the objective content of thought, expressed in
language as products of the mind" (Haymes, 1988), in sharp contrast to
the World 2 of subjective thought processes. Donne (Satyre) noted that
( ::o  )
"On a huge hill,
Cragged, and steep, Truth stands, and he that will 
Reach her, about must, and about must go", 
a view of an unknowable and unattainable Truth. This was also the great 
question of the Platonists. "Plato said that we could know truth if we 
could sublimate our minds to their original purity. Arcesilaus said 
that man's understanding is not capable of knowing what truth is.
Carneades maintained that not only our understanding could not 
comprehend it, but even our senses are wholly inadequate to help us in 
the investigation." (Brewer's 'Dictionary of Phrase and Fable, 1963).
This view may be contrasted with a view of truth as being the property
of an individual thinker. Browning (Paracelsus, part 1) states that
"Truth is within ourselves", and Gorgias the Sophist said, "What is
right but what we prove to be right? and what is truth but what we
believe to be truth?" (cited in Brewer, op.cit.)
I will hope to demonstrate in the coming chapters how my view changed
from a belief in reified Truth to a belief in created truths; but this
will be explained in due course.
In my early work I adopted a belief in the unassailability of reified 
Truth through my reading of the literature and through the training I 
had received during my professional life. I would imagine that my 
misinterpretation of the philosophy of Button had been an automatic 
attempt to distort his work to fit the mould of my preconceptions; and 
this attempt in fact produced misconceptions which I then applied in my
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practice. As time went on (Chapter 3) I realised that my practice did 
not fit the framework of my misconceptions. I changed my views about 
the nature of teaching; I became dissatisfied with my role as a teacher; 
I saw how my children struggled to express their own ideas in spite of 




The epistemology of my early practice was characterised by a belief in 
positivist frameworks of cause and effect, an inclination towards a 
behaviourist mode, and a belief in specific end products. My practice 
was a structured enterprise, the structure emanating from a belief that 
I and the children upheld the values of obedience and conformity to a 
reified system. I take these issues further in 3<i> (Considerations), 
and I investigate how I ground my beliefs in my understanding of the 
literature of educational theory and research. For this section I will 
point to episodes in my practice to illustrate the forms of thought I 
was using at the time.
I began my preliminary enquiries into personal and social education 
directly I returned from the Button course in 1980. It was always in my 
mind to conduct an experiment along 'traditional' lines to 'prove that 
the Button methdologies were successful' - in terms of my then current 
thinking, to produce children who were more amenable and more socially 
adjusted. I began my formal study in 1981, and agreed to try out an
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action research approach (Whitehead, 1977). At the time I saw little 
relevance in this approach to my area of enquiry. A research question 
(Foster, 1982) was; 'How can I show that this methodology works?' My 
assumptions were that it did work, and that I could demonstrate its 
success by producing the required end product of improved children. 
Straughan's question (1981) of 'How can we teach children to be good?' 
was about to be answered.
I did notionally adopt the agreed strategy, but I never systematically 
applied it until after I had found an opportunity to conduct the 
experiment I had always envisaged, and which was then a complete 
failure. I am here minded of Medawar's (1969) comment that "What shows 
a theory to be inadequate or mistaken is not, as a rule, the discovery 
of a mistake in the information that led us to propound it; more often 
it ie the contradictory evidence of a new observation which we were led 
to make BECAUSE we held that theory."
My experiment and subsequent crisis of practice occurred thus:
In February 1982 I was five months into my Button course with Malcolm's 
group. At that time Peter had Joined me as an observer, with a view to
documenting my practice. I told him about my wish to conduct an
experiment to compare the results of two teaching styles, one control 
group in my 'traditional' way (didactic/authoritarian) and the other in 
an 'experimental' way (experiential/democratic). I set about finding 
two groups in school that were parallel in age, ability, distribution of
sexes, and other variables. I aimed to 'teach a Button course' to the
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experimental group, and 'teach English' to the control group. I would 
administer pre- and post-tests, which I devised and produced, to measure 
change in behaviour and attitude. The experiment would last one half- 
term, enough time to allow the experimental group to assimilate the 
ideologies I would be trying to get across, and to change their 
behaviour accordingly.
I abandoned my experiment within a week.
The videotapes of that experiment unfortunately disappeared with Peter. 
Vhen we viewed the action of my teaching with the two groups, we both 
agreed that it was indistinguishable which group I was teaching. My 
style varied minimally with the experimental and control group. The 
resources I used in lessons were different. There was a lack of books 
in the experimental group, whereas I used books for reading and writing 
in the English control group. But, I reasoned, what would happen when I 
extended my initial lifeskills teaching with my experimental group into 
THE IK Bnglish component? That, I reasoned, would be the same as my 
control group.
The actions of the children in the two groups were different, in that I 
was asking them to perform differently. My control group were talking, 
reading and writing as part of their English studies, but they were also 
laughing, talking and listening to each other, engaging in paired oral 
work, moving about the classroom - all the skills which I was attempting 
to convey in an accelerated fashion to my experimental group. My 
experimental group were doing the same things (not reading or writing)
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through the medium of concentrated group work. A viewing of the videos 
of both groups showed that the seating arrangements were different, and 
the grouped arrangement of the experimental group facilitated their 
communicating with each other more than the ranked arrangement of the 
control group. In both groups, however, the pupils were communicating 
throughout.
I learned some immediate and very important lessons from my experiment, 
which may be summarised:
(a) My epistemology was faulty. I could not evaluate my practice by 
operating within a positivist framework.
(b) My concept of personal and social education in the curriculum was 
faulty. It was not Just a lesson, but a total educational concept, an 
approach to teaching rather than a content.
(c) My understanding of myself as a teacher was faulty. I am 
essentially a living person, whose inalienable integrity of personality 
will communicate itself to people, no matter what the circumstances.
(d) My understanding of the nature of people as individuals was faulty. 
People in groups do not become the group. They are still individuals, 
each with his or her own inalienable integrity of personality.
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The experience of this experiment now led me to consider seriously the 
viability of action research as a way of tackling my problems of
edubational practice. It began to dawn on me what I was doing 
generally: I was trying to persuade the children, but in a quite
coercive fashion, to adopt my values, that is, to behave in the way that 
I wished them to. As indicated in (ii) above, I had definite ideas 
about the end products of personal and social education, and I wanted my
children to conform to those expectations. I was expecting my children
to fit themselves into my imposed frameworks, while at the same time 
working to fit my whole practice into a self-imposed framework, in 
accordance with my understanding of the literature of educational 
research and with my interpretation of the function of schools and
schooling.
On a number of occasions, particularly in my work with colleagues, I was 
questioned about the rightness of persuading our children to adopt our 
values. I responded cheerily that yes, we were right, because we based 
our values on HMI recommendations and on the Truth. I now see that I 
was in error. The journey to this realisation has been sometimes very 
painful. I understand now that there are different orders of values 
(Chapters 5 and 6), and different means of arriving at shared forms of 
life (Chapter 7). In 1982 I was concerned with rules rather than 
principles, with imposition rather than agreements. I explore these 
notions further in Part Two, and trace the path by which I came to these 
understandings and which resulted in value shifts for myself and changes 
in my actions in the world.
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(iv) The results
In 1982, when I was asked what I had achieved with my pupils, I 
responded that they were more socially adjusted. My assessments were 
borne out by colleagues, and by the children themselves. For example:
RT Vhat do you think the Button work has achieved?
JM They get on better with each other. They're more sensitive, more 
aware ...
and later:
Pupil: Miss lets us talk among ourselves. Ve don't call each other
names so much now. <AT4)
and:
JM They seem to know better what's expected of them. Instead of 
yelling out immediately, they take time to consider. (AT4)
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The children are quick to state that their behaviour has improved. In 
the tapes AT4 - 6, there are numerous instances of the children's
ackhowledgement that they were not initially prepared to get on with
each other, and that they 'improved' to the extent that they were now 
better adjusted. They freely acknowledge that the improved situation is 
because of my influence. The clearest evaluation is seen in VT3, the 
conversation between Jack Whitehead and Peter, where they agree that the 
criteria of HMI (1981) that I had identified as approximating to my own 
educational values had indeed been realised in practice. The
conversation outlines the unsatisfactory state at the beginning -
JV ... we agreed that Jean's practice showed a denial of her
educational values . ..
- to a developing resolution:
JW ... that is clear evidence here of a realisation of her educational 
values. The children are bright, sensitive, articulate. There is 
evidence of lively, enquiring minds, the ability to argue rationally ...
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This tfiew extended also to my in-service work. I hoped to enable the 
teachers to help their children also to become more socially adjusted. 
I am not entirely sure what I hoped to achieve with the teachers; I 
believe it was to become more skilled, more technically efficient, in 
applying the Button methodologies. There is evidence of this view 
throughout the documents, most notably perhaps in the videotapes of 
Bourne Hall School. I was asked by the headmaster of this school to 
work closely with some members of staff in class, and also to conduct 
in-service courses for others. As a body, the staff appeared 
interested, but many could not attend the sessions. The headmaster and 
I decided on the strategy that I would make training films. From my 
position today, from my critical vantage point, I may understand better 
the Implications of the notion of 'training films'; for training is 
precisely what the intention was in the overall strategy. The films I 
made would present a model, a target of expertise, towards which 
colleagues, supposedly, would aim.
I speak critically of this venture, but I will maintain that much 
education did in fact come out of it, for the pupils, for colleagues, 
and for myself, in the following ways:
For pupils: It is notable that a number of pupils rapidly developed
insights as to the merit of what we were doing. On the video I arrange 
for them to engage in trust exercises, and then I ask them what they 
have learnt from the experience. Comments abound such as:
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"You realise you're in other people's hands."
"You learn about responsibility."
At the time I had a restricted view as to the function of personal and 
social education, and I saw such comments as indicators of the 
children's increased sociability. Indeed, they were; but what I failed 
to see at the time, and did not begin to realise until about 1983, a 
year later, was the degree of personal commitment, brought about by 
their own critical reflection on their own practice (their behaviour in 
class), that occasioned the increased sociability. At the time, I was 
still conditioned by my own training (and I use the word advisedly) that 
let me operate in terms of end states and fixed expectations of pre­
determined outcomes.
For colleagues: I made a series of video films with one teacher in
class. Linda was keen to learn about the Button methodologies, and she 
watched and Joined in as assistant while I demonstrated the techniques. 
Ve got the children to use the camera.
Having made three films, we then showed them, one a week, to the rest of 
the staff as a short course of personal and social education. As part 
of the whole project, we then used video to practise specific 
techniques, such as counselling, listening, correcting, encouraging 
children to talk, and so on. A small group of four was particularly 
enthusiastic, and agreed to lead sessions at the Teachers' Centre as 
part of a more comprehensive personal and social education course that I 
arranged for secondary schools in the area.
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I have only one of the films as documentary evidence, the original film 
in which I present techniques. The other films in which the teachers 
took part were kept by the Teachers' Centre. I can say that the term 
during which I was active in the school encouraged amounts of talk about 
education and willing criticism of personal practice. The headmaster 
attested to this many times, as did colleagues; and two later registered 
at universities to document their enquiries into their practice.
For myself: It was involvement with people in this manner that led me
seriously to question what I was doing as a teacher, both of children 
and of colleagues. Over the year 1982-83 I became intensely involved 
with small groups of teachers and their children in 16 different 
schools, and I had peripheral contact with many others through the 
various courses I arranged at the Teachers' Centre. At the beginning of 
the year I saw my function as a role model. By the end of the year I 
saw myself not so much even as having a function. My secure foundation 
in the surety of clear objectives was shaken. My convictions were 
loosened, and I doubted keenly whether the models I was presenting were 
appropriate, or indeed if I should be attempting to present models at 
all.
This uncertainty - the disequilibrium which is part of the nature of 
change, as I suggest in Chapter 6 - was profoundly disturbing, and led 
me to question; and it is the questioning itself which I claim to be 
educational. For the uncertainty created vacuums in my practice, 
inconsistencies which had to be resolved.
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During 1981, when I wished to demonstrate the value of my work, I would 
claim that my children and colleagues had 'improved'. It never occurred 
to me to think that I might need to improve. The improvement I pointed 
to was in terms of greater tolerance, sensitivity and sociability (ATI, 
4, VT1, 3, 5)
Malcolm: Ve get on better than we used to (AT4)
Gary: Let me say that again. I didn't like what I said. (AT6)
The improvement in colleagues was in their acceptance of the Button work 
and their technical expertise in applying it.
Adviser: The staff's attitudes have improved considerably. (AT19)
Headmaster: His (a teacher's) interest in the pupils which I'm sure 
was always there, but it's been formalised and brought 
out. (AT26)
By the end of 1982 I was beginning to question the notion of improvement 
- not the process of getting better, but the concept of the end product
towards which the improvement was directed, I was never aware of this
shift at the time. I was aware only of uncertainty where before I had 
been so sure; and I was aware of irritation that, instead of increased 
surety through my accelerated involvement in personal and social 
education during my year at the Teachers' Centre, I had in fact created 
uncertainty and dissatisfaction with my own practice. By 1983 I was 
intensely dissatisfied with the role-model role I had assumed, and
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proceeded to abandon it. My practice of 1983-86 (Chapter 3) shows the 
process of this shift.
3. CONSIDERATIONS
This section contains some critical reflections on my early practice in 
the personal and social education project. I will indicate how my 
practice reflected the cognitive structures I was using at the time, and 
also indicate how the inappropriateness of those structures resulted in 
the dissatisfaction with my practice that prompted me to change both my 
thinking and my action.
I have identified three broad areas for this section:
(i) How my practice reflected my view of knowledge;
(ii) How my practice reflected my view of persons;
(iii) How my practice reflected my view of personal development.
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(i) How my practice reflected my view of knowledge
Vhen my headmaster and I, both new appointees to our respective 
positions, decided in 1980 to try to rationalise our pastoral programme, 
I undertook to draw up some kind of blueprint for SPACE time. I 
searched the literature, including the schemes of other institutions, to 
see what sort of content there might be. I came up with a recipe for 
success, as I thought at the time. The recipe was an A4 sheet of paper, 
divided into a term's schedule indicating weekly contents, for all five 
years of the school. The weekly contents were then reproduced on A4 
sheets, with daily contents written in, for all classes within the same 
year. I was proud of my efforts. I was also very cross when colleagues 
refused to use the scheme, on the grounds that it was confusing, too 
tightly structured, and not appropriate to their needs.
A similar fate befell another senior colleague and good friend at 
another school. Together we had discussed the contents of our 
masterschemes. He entered the staff room one day, only to duck a paper 
aeroplane.
My anecdotes serve to illustrate my view of knowledge, a view that 
lasted until 1983, then to be radically revised.
I was convinced that knowledge rested with the experts, an abstract, 
reified entity that bore no relation to present circumstances. This is 
the view critiqued by McCarthy in his introduction to Habermas's 
'Communication and the evolution of society' (1979): Philosophy could
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be seen "in its traditional sense as a presuppositionless mode of 
thought that provided its own foundations".
My reading of the literature of educational research reinforced this 
view. I accepted that philosophy belongs to the realm of 'pure' 
knowledge: "Philosophy is ... primarily an analytic pursuit. ... It is
a second-order area of knowledge." (Hirst, 1974) I accepted that 
theory dictated practice: "The advances which have recently been made
in our control of the learning process suggest a thorough revision of 
classroom practices and, fortunately, they tell us how that revision can 
be brought about." (Skinner, 1968) I accepted that knowledge was the 
property of experts, that I should regard my practice as an applied 
science (O'Connor, 1957) which was the property of the experts (Hirst 
and Peters, 1960).
I saw knowledge in terms of structures rather than transformations. A 
favourite book in the 1970s was Mager's 'Preparing instructional 
objectives' (1960), and I organised my teaching along these lines. I 
saw teaching and learning as separate areas of discourse, each with its 
own set of expectations and end products: teaching had an ultimate
objective of controlling the learner. Learning had an ultimate 
objective of accepting pre-determined knowledge. I saw my practice as 
grounded in the concept of pure knowledge, and of imposing that 
knowledge on others. I operated on two levels of 'knower' and 'known', 
or 'subject' and 'object'. Carr and Kemmis (1986) identify this view, 
when applied to issues of education, as a systems approach: "From this
perspective, it is natural to think of education as a COMMODITY . .. and
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to think of educational organizations as DELIVERY SYSTEMS which make the 
commodity available to the 'clients'. ... Under the 'systems' view, it 
is compelling to think of curricula as 'programmes' which are designed 
to make certain knowledge (information, skills) available and to create, 
monitor and assess student progress." (Carr and Kemmis, 1986: their 
italics).
I saw my practice as part of an overall system, in which I was the 
object of other subjects' wills; and I saw my children's practice as 
part of my system, in which I was the subject-knower and they were the 
objects of my will. My view of educational systems was hierarchical, 
with a pecking-order on claims to knowledge. My own place in the order 
was ambivalent.
By 1983 I was developing insights that allowed me to see myself as an 
autonomous person, with the possible ability of stepping out of the 
system altogether. By 1986 I was applying this view to the children, 
seeing that they had the right to step out of my system altogether. But 
these realisations were still a long way off ....
In terms expressed by Habermas (1979), I may say that my early practice 
reflected my desire to reach consensus, rather than agreement. By this 
I mean that 'consensus' indicates the acknowledgement of the correctness 
of substantial propositions by a body of knowers, and 'agreement' 
Indicates the common resolve of a body of knowers to find grounds for a 
shared form of life. My later practice reflected the reversal of these 
states, in that I no longer regarded consensus as desirable - indeed, I
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now believe that much consensus is damaging; I shall elaborate in 
Chapter 7 - but saw instead my practice as a procedure to bring about 
the higher order principle of agreement to agree. In this case, what 
counts as knowledge rests in intersubjective agreement, rather than, as 
I saw it in my early work, as the attainment of a reified, objective 
Truth (see (iii) of this section).
(ii) How my practice reflected my view of persons
My thinking here continued to be influenced by the training in the 
disciplines foundation I had received in my initial teacher training 
(1963-64). I saw matters of education falling into contributory sectors 
of history, sociology, psychology and philosophy; and my view of persons 
was that theirs wa9 a form of life that could be classified according to 
these sectors. This view of persons was a derivative of the 
proposltional forms of knowledge I applied to my practice which allowed 
me to hold a concept of 'person' as an abstraction, subject to normative 
analysis.
Thus I believed that persons could be studied by experts in controlled 
situations - the 'applied' psychology and sociology of structuralist 
theories. In his 'Pelican history of psychology' (1968), Thomson traces 
the massive influence that such theories have had since the beginnings 
of psychology within philosophy. "Psychology is now regarded as a group 
of disciplines which are empirical and scientific in their methods." 
(p.13) When X first read these words in about 1975 I took them at face
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value, as a True Recording of the Facts. Today, in 1988, I question the 
assumptions: 'Psychology is regarded' - by whom? ' A group of
disfciplines' - which? He does not elaborate. Why a group of disparate 
elements? ' ... which are empirical and scientific in their methods' - 
what does he mean by this?
In my early practice as a teacher, however, I did not question inherent 
assumptions, but believed everything I read in the books. In my 1981-83 
practice in personal and social education I attempted to apply my 
knowledge to producing certain kinds of persons. Like Hietzsche, I 
envisaged a kind of production line which was the basis of social 
evolution.
Persons, in this view, could be characterised in terms of their values, 
but for me, at the time, values appeared more as distinctive features 
than as personal creations. I agreed with schools of thought that 
believed that personality could be measured by isolating such 
distinctive features and applying a scale of normative statistical 
analysis. It occurred to me only in recent work (Mclfiff 1988) that such 
an approach is reflective of the Cartesian mentality that focuses on the 
reductionism of separation, rather than the creativity of unity (Riegel, 
1968).
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My view of persons was that they were entitities external to myself, 
whom I could affect but who could not have a reciprocal effect on me. I 
saw my children and colleagues in this light. I could teach them, but I 
never thought that I had anything to learn. I had all the answers. My 
job was to get them to ask the right questions. Most relationships I 
had with children and colleagues were of an I-it nature (Buber, 1937), 
in which I distanced myself from the objects in my life.
MW My early memories of you (1981-82) were not talking down, but very 
much 'I'm deputy head and you're the pupils and I definitely need to be 
completely in charge of you.'
JM I always felt distanced when I was in my functional role. ...
MW I think it would be probably fair to say that in your early days at 
school you would not be able to give that whole-hearted support. You 
would feel that you had far more to offer them as an English teacher or 
an authority figure than they could ever give you; whereas now (1987) 
you would probably ... (AT45: 13.7.87)
I would sum up by saying that my thought and values at that time could 
be characterised as propositional. The dialectical form of life I lead 
now, in 1988, enables me to see nrjrself as a changing being in a world of 
changing beings, who is eager to enter into I-Thou relationships (Buber, 
op.cit.), in that I am affected by people as intensely as they are by 
me; I am open to change and welcome it. I see myself as changing, as 
well as the tree I see in front of me (Basseches, 1984). In 1981 I saw
( 69 )
only the tree as changing, abstracted before my eyes; and in this sense 
I did not see at all, but only perceived. The messages reached the 
brain, and were encoded; but they were not decoded. My experience of 
the world, and the people in it, were not ATTENDED TO, to be acted upon, 
but seen as objects in my space (Argyle, 1967).
As such, I had no concept of individuality, other than as an
abstraction. My view was that critiqued by Langford (1985), in his
discussion of the limiting view that role-performance imposes: 
"Performance in a role thus typically involves relations with other 
persons, but the persons concerned are required by the role to be seen 
in a limited, special way" (p.112). In terms of my practice in personal 
and social education, I saw my children not as children in their own 
right, but in their role as pupils, vis-a-vis my role as their teacher, 
and I wanted them to perform in the way I decided. My practice
entertained no concept of individual freedom, not even my own.
A colleague told me recently that his earliest memories of me were of 
Miss Clare, but today's friendship was of Miss Read (Chronicles of 
Fairacre, 1964). Miss Clare's practices had been of late "looked upon 
by some visiting inspectors with a slightly pitying eye. They are, they 
say, too formal; the children should have more activity, and the
classroom is unnaturally quiet for children of that age. This may be,
but for all that, or perhaps because of that, Miss Clare is a very
valuable teacher, for in the first place the children are happy, they 
are fond of Miss Clare, and she creates for them an atmosphere of
serenity and quiet which means that they can work well and cheerfully,
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really laying the foundations of elementary knowledge on which I (Miss 
Head) can build so much more quickly when they come up into my class." 
Was this the picture I presented - the benign authoritarian who was fond 
of her children, but at a controlled distance? Evidently so.
(iii) How my practice reflected my view of personal development
I am aware, from my relatively newly acquired position as a critical 
dialectical thinker, that I have operated for most of my life in terms 
of an absolute Truth. I still do (Chapter 8) in that I believe
profoundly in the presence of God, who, for me, is the Truth; but my 
concept of the knowledge of God has changed, along with the concept of a 
knowledge of truth. Whereas I used to envisage the Truth in terms of 
ultimates, I now operate more in terms of ever-renewable forms of being 
(Chapter 6), the realisation of presently ultimate forms. I will give 
detailed accounts of my current thinking in Part Two; here let me stay 
back in 1981-83 and look at my then views of the process and nature of 
personal development.
The main characteristic in my mind was that there was an end product to 
personal development. My view was reinforced by my search of the 
literature. Yet here I encountered two different perspectives of an end 
product.
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First, there were the general recommendations of HMI/DES documents <e.g. 
1979, 1981) that stressed the need for the development of individual 
potential. Second, there were the findings of the literature of 
educational research (e.g. the work of Piaget and Kohlberg) that 
indicated that there was an end product, a sixth stage, that signalled 
the achievement of full development.
I believe today that my conceptions were faulty because of my 
misunderstandings, in the first case, and because of misinformation in 
the second. In the first case I misunderstood the notion of potential; 
and in the second case, I was misled by what are, in my present opinion, 
faulty representations of the nature of development.
I understand today that the notion of potential contains the idea of an 
unlimited number of created forms of being. Potential is the capacity 
for infinite realisations, unbounded enquiries. I shall explain in Part 
Two how I see potential as resting in the competence of the individual, 
as part of personal knowledge. In my early understandings, I regarded 
potential as a commodity, of which the person had a capital sum which 
she used up progressively through life. This is of course a 
reductionist view, whereas the views I hold today, of the unlimited, 
creative nature of potential, are reconstructive. Then I regarded the 
development of potential somehow as a journey towards an ultimate peak, 
a realisation of the lump sum. I see now that I misunderstood the 
recommendations of this branch of the literature.
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The second aspect that encouraged me to think in terms of an end product 
to development was the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, and their 
supporters. When I first became interested in the work of Button, I 
read quite widely in the field of the psychology of development. Piaget 
seemed to dominate current thought, to the extent that cognitive- 
structuralist approaches presented a technology of teaching (Samples, 
1967: see also Chapter 6); and the work of Kohlberg presented a similar 
culture, a complete project that covered psychology, sociology and 
technology (Chapter 6). I have come to my present best thinking that 
such approaches are inadequate to deal with questions of education; that 
is, questions which deal with issues of personal enquiries into personal 
development, the enquiry by the self into the self. I have come to be 
suspicious of empiric paradigms that seek to impose structures on the 
Individual, and have opted for reconstructive paradigms that seek to 
allow the individual to create his own structures, such structures being 
in constant modification through the process of generative 
transformations (Chapter 6).
My early views of personal development, then, were of an end product, a 
state in which a person was 'developed'. My aim was to get my children 
to this state. Yet I had no personal conception of how this development 
could be characterised (see my BERA paper, 1984), other than of some 
improvement in social adaptation, in terms of my interpretation of the 
Button work. I was in an epistemological and conceptual mire, acutely 
dlssastisfled with my practice, even though my colleagues and 
supervisors all agreed that the children had improved in terms of my 
ambitions. How and why I tried to resolve the dissatisfaction is part
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of the next episode, when I returned to school after my year at the 
Teachers' Centre. I then reflected deeply on the practice of the years 
1981-63, and gathered these reflections into a manuscript that was 
published in 1986. This, I believe, was the point at which I started to 
become critical, with the result that my values shifted significantly, 
prompting a different kind of practice altogether. This is the thread 
that I shall pick up again in Chapter 3.
( 7b )
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CHAPTER TWO: THE EARLY WRITING PROJECT: CHAPTERS 1 - 3
1. INTRODUCTION
(i) Rationale
The writing project was my first attempt to write my thesis, and I have 
called It In this present text the first version. Some parts of it were 
later rejected by my colleagues (see above: Introduction). Some parts, 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6, were accepted as of an appropriate standard for 
submission for a PhD. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 were regarded as muddled. 
The total structure of the text was felt to be confusing and 
intimidating. This present text is my second attempt to write my 
thesis. The first version exists in bound form as part of my data 
archives.
The first version was written from December 1987 - May 1988. This 
second version has been written from October 1988 - May 1989.
In this text I am re-writing this Part One as a record and a critique of 
my work in personal and social education, and of my task as a 
practitioner who is reflecting on her work. The understandings I have 
developed that enable me to carry out that critique were largely brought 
about through the act of writing the first version, an intensely 
reflective exercise about past and present practice. In this sense, the 
task of writing became educational, in that it made me question my
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previous assumptions, question the very cognitive structures I was 
using, and replace unsatisfactory aspects of my practice with new 
aspects which were closer approximations to my educational values. For 
example, I came to see (first version, Chapter 4) that the propositional 
forms of expression I was using were inadequate to deal with dialectical 
forms of thought.
In this present second version I intend to incorporate the better parts 
of the First Version (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), as being first-order
reflections on my practice in personal and social education. Chapters 4 
and 5 constitute Part Two of this second version, and appear as 
Chapters 5 and 6. First version Chapter 6 appears at the beginning of 
this text Part III, as Chapter 7. The original chapters have been 
adapted to fit into the overall structure of this second version, but 
the body of the text is substantially the same as it appeared in the 
first version. This second version, Part One, is not simply a re-write 
of a section that is below standard, in terms of style or technical 
facts. It represents a radical re-appraisal of my position as a 
thinking practitioner. It is not 'can do better' but 'can do 
differently' .
I said above that writing the first version was educational. I am 
thinking here of the work of Schon (1976) who speaks of the need, not 
only for reflection ON action, but reflection IN action. I believe that 
this was the syndrome that developed in my writing. I originally 
Intended the first version to be a report about the action of my 
personal and social education project. It developed from a report about
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the technical aspects of practice into a reflection on that practice. 
As I grew more involved in my text, the writing itself developed into a 
project, a part of my practice, which was making me think and which was 
demolishing certain assumptions I had held. So here was an expansion of 
thought and action, in that I began writing about the facts of previous 
actions, progressed to writing about reflections about those actions, 
and progressed further to reflecting on my present action which 
incorporated the actions and thoughts of the past. I will develop the 
implications of this epistemology in Part Two of this second version.
In this sense, this second version continues to be educational. I am 
writing now from the stand of critical reflection. I am bringing to 
bear on my present -second version the understandings about my first 
version that I developed through the first version. I believe I am 
meeting the criteria identified by Schon <1983) that qualify me as a 
thinking practitioner; and that the action and reflection of my thought- 
in-action, resulting in an improvement in practice, will demonstrate the 
realisation of those criteria identified by Stronach <1986) that allows 
a study that is by the self of the self to be termed educational.
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(ii) The original plan
My original plan in writing the first version was that it was a writing 
up, in terms of the phrase that appeared on my University registration 
card, and in terms of my expectations of the sequence of my formal 
period of study. I saw the writing-up phase as an end product of a 6- 
year study which had been largely devoted to my enquiries into the 
nature of personal and social education. Even in 1988, I did not yet 
see the major implication of my work, that it had led to substantial 
personal development and significant value shifts. That insight came 
through the action of writing up.
*y intentions were to produce a report that documented the actions over 
1981-88, I had no intention of including the acitivity of 1986-87, much 
of which had been spent researching and writing 'Action research: 
principles and practice' (1988). That was the period spent out of 
school, during my recuperation and subsequent retirement; and which had 
been for me the most exciting time of my mental life (see below 2(ili)). 
I thought I had better confine my report only to those episodes which 
were relevant to personal and social education, which was the field of
my research, as I saw it then. I have come to my present stand of
believing that I, as a living practitioner, am the field of research 
(Stronach, 1986) and my practice in personal and social education, 1981- 
86, has been only one episode of the total field of enquiry of which my
understanding of myself is the essence - but more of this later in
Chapter 4.
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*y thesis was to be the report of my enquiry that documented my work in 
school in personal and social education. I intended to relate my 
practice to the literature of educational research, and to the 
literature of personal and social education - to my knowledge there is 
as yet no book which deals with research into personal and social 
education (except my own attempt; 1986), and only one (Button, 1964) 
which deals with the theory; the literature concentrates on the 
technology of teaching personal and social education, usually in 
prescriptive forms (see Chapters 5 and 6 of this text). I also intended 
to recount, with the documentary evidence of video and audiotapes, and 
my written reports, how my children had attained the 'end product' of 
personal development that I have discussed in second version Chapter 1.
2. PRACTICE 
(i) The action
Vhile I wrote first version Chapters 1-3, I was most unhappy about the 
project, in terms of its form and substance.
The form I had in mind was that of theses that I have read: usually in
linear progression, in report form, with a clear sequencing of ideas. 
The substance of those theses seemed to be presented in terms of answers 
arrived at through the enquiry that was being documented.
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It is important to bear in mind that I came to write the first version 
in December 1987. During 1987 I had written 'Action research', and in 
this text I had been critical of forms of knowledge that assume the 
existence of final answers. Through writing this text, I had become 
more acquainted with the contents of traditions of educational research, 
and I now 'knew the theory', what Feid (1980) terms 'knowledge-that' 
(see Chapter 5 of this text). I 'knew-that' certain traditions of
educational research operate on the basis that a researcher will set out 
to use his study to prove an hypothesis. I was critical of this 
approach when it was applied to educational situations, maintaining 
that an external researcher often used teachers as the 'objects' of his 
research and seemed to de-humanised them in the process. Teachers were 
often not seen as jpdividuals, in this role, but the functionaries of 
the researcher's master-scheme.
From my reading, and from the synthesis of my understandings that 
writing encourages, I believed I knew the operational principles of 
propositional knowledge. I knew-that this was a theory of knowledge- 
that; in other words, I had propositional knowledge about propositional 
knowledge. And in my book I had been critical of educational 
researchers who rested their claims on propositional forms.
Yet here I was, in my thesis, doing the same thing.
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I viewed my thesis, the first version, as a story unfolding to a final 
denouement. It would have a beginning, a middle and an end, and the end 
would be the conclusions I had arrived at, the answers to the questions 
I had initially asked. This form would be in line with the literary and 
epistemological form I had experienced in my reading of academic 
treatises.
I encountered serious problems with this strategy. If this was the 
theory, my practice did not fit the theory - right in line with the lack 
of congruence between theory and practice which is manifested when 
propositional forms of knowledge are seen as the grounding of 
dialectical forms of life, and which I had recently critiqued in the 
book. I had to acknowledge to myself that I had no final answers. I 
was not even sure which questions I ought to present as my research 
issues, for the emphasis seemed to change throughout the project.
As a result, first version Chapters 1-3 ramble, tumbleweeds with no 
foundation, no structure.
I realise now that what I was doing was aiming to exclude the living 'I' 
(Whitehead, 1980). I was alienating the 'I' of the past from the 'I' of 
the present. My view of myself as a person was similar to that view 
already discussed in Chapter 1 of this text - a view that sees persons 
as reified beings who are part of somebody else's schemes. I did not 
recognise myself as a material living being (Marx 1844) whose personal 
history has led to the totality of autonomy of present personhood. ^
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My decision to see the present self who was writing a text about a past 
self indicates the same epistemological error in the work that had 
caused me to see theory and practice as separate realms of discourse 
(Chapter 1 of this second version). This error was perpetuated in my 
conscious alienation of my past and present selves. My present self
undertook to write about my past self from a position of alienation.
There is an important philosophical and epistemological point here. In 
this present text, I, the self, am writing about 'I', the past self who 
wrote the first version; and critiquing the cognitive structures of the 
past 'I' who wrote about the 'I' of the personal and social education 
episode. Yet the perspectives from which history is recorded are 
different in the two cases.
The self of this second version uses critical and dialectical forms of 
thought. This enables her to see the present as a new form of being, 
which has been brought into existence by the past (Hegel, 1817). The 
present is a continuation of the past, not divorced from it, but 
grounded in it. Persons are not the material beings of discrete
moments, but products of the interplay between creative personal




History in this view is being recorded, but takes on also a creative 
element. History is changed through its interpretations (Gadamer, 
1975). Nor do we stop at the hermeneutics, but we change the 
perspective again to go on to the dialectics, where we consciously use 
our understandings of the historical events of the world (including 
ourselves) to create the future of the world (including ourselves). I 
shall explore these ideas further in Chapter 4 of this text.
The self of the first version used propositional forms of thought. This 
led her to see the past practice of personal and social education as a 
discrete episode of life that had nothing to do with her present 
practice as a thinking practitioner.
The decision to go ahead on this basis was frustrating. It meant, in 
theory, that I had to return to the less advanced inodes of thought I had 
been using pre-1987 in order to record the practice that had taken place 
then. In the first version, when I referenced the formal period of 
study, I was never sure which year to quote to indicate its end - 1986 
when I left school and stopped teaching, but started reflecting, or 1987 
when I started using those reflections and accelerated my development as 
a thinker. To exclude the self of today was deliberately to regress, 
like Vyndham's Amy (1958) who refused to use her telepathic powers and 
relied on speech. The result, by the end of First Version Chapter 3 
(see (iv) of this section) was that I temporarily abandoned the project 
in despair.
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(ii) The assumptions
I held certain assumptions in my writing of First Version Chapter 1-3. 
These assumptions (pre-conceived theories) were challenged by the action 
of writing (my practice), and were replaced by other assumptions (better 
theories) to fit with the reality of the action of my writing (an 
improvement in practice). The assumptions included the following:
(a) a thesis was an end product;
(b) a thesis needed to represent answers to research questions;
(c) a thesis was a product;
(d) this product should be in propositional form;
(e) it should exclude personal involvement.
I had gleaned this (mis)information from the tradition of educational 
researchers who produce documents in this vein, following the empiric- 
analytic paradigm which rests on various philosophies grounded in the 
notion of reified knowledge: Kant's 'ding-an-sich', Russell's 'facts
only', Hobbes's exclusion of a knowing subject.
>
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My practice of writing immediately began to negate the assumptions:
(a) Assumption (a): my work was an end product
In 1986, the end of my active school life, it would have been correct to 
say that any thesis I wrote then would have been an end product. 
However, the year 1986-87, of deep reflection and active writing, moved 
forward the thinking that had been generated by the practice of school; 
so the thesis could only be a continuation. So my view Df the need for 
an end product forced me to take an epistemological step backward, to 
the thinking of 1986 - an impossible act, impossible because thought 
cannot regress; it can only progress, that is, be creative.
<b> Assumption (b): my work represented answers to research questions
In 1981-82 I was sure I had specific answers to clearly formulated 
questions. By 1983 that sureness had been shaken. 1984-86 produced
deeply disquieting questions about the nature of my practice as a 
teacher. 1987 strengthened the questioning aspects of my life. In 1988 
I adopted a dialectical form of thought in which the only answer I could 
find was that there ever more questions to be asked. I moved from 
Hare's notion (cited in Riegel, 1968) that rationality is "a property of 
thought directed to the answering of questions" to the view expressed by 
Bob Marley (1965) that "there are more questions than answers".
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When I wrote first version Chapters 1-3 I had not clearly formulated 
this progression in my mind. Still attempting to follow the format of a 
'received' thesis, I attempted to outline the research issues I had been 
considering, and to show how I had arrived at the conclusions to those 
issues. Of course I was doomed to failure because (a) I had no
conclusions and (b) I was trying to pretend that I had.
In Chapter 5 of this text I trace Collingwood's (1939) thesis that a
dialectical form of life is a constant interplay of question and answer,
where the answer to a question immediately becomes another question. I
shall then go on in Chapter 6 to indicate how this situation may become
the ground for the epistemological aspects of the nature of educational 
theory; and in Chapter 7 to consider how it may be seen as the 
foundation of the colaraunicative competence (Habermas 1879) on which an 
educational situation may be established.
a
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Cc) Assumption (c): My thesis was a product
In' her 'Schools of thought' (1975), Mary Warnock investigates the
epistemological bases of a view of education as a commodity and a view 
of education as a process, concluding that "education is something that 
happens to a child and changes him for the better" (p.32). If, however, 
education is regarded as a desirable STUFF, "cake or money, to be handed 
out", the 'results' of education may be viewed also as products.
This is how I regarded my thesis. It was to be a product of my labour; 
I use the word 'labour' here in one sense identified by Hannah Arendt 
(1958), that is, in terms of technical production, and not as a form of 
life brought about through contemplation of appropriate action, which is 
part of phronesis. The product - the report which would be the form of 
my thesis - would be the end result of the education, itself a product, 
that I had brought about in my children. I had succeeded in 'giving 
them' personal and social education, rather like a dose of medicine,
which they in turn had 'acquired'. Further, they had acquired the kind 
of education I had intended for them, the kind of education that would 
turn them into the certain kind of person I had envisaged as the end 
product of the educational package (second version Chapter 1).
My thesis would contain descriptions of the kind of education I had
arranged for my children, and the end products of that education - i.e. 
personally and socially educated children; but in terms of what I then 
saw as 'educated' (see above). My view of personal development was that
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it was a product (Chapter 1: 3(iii)). The thesis would be a structured 
package that contained descriptions of structured packages.
I have deliberately used here the word 'description', for in this view 
my work was confined to a description of my practice, rather than an 
explanation. This is a very important point and one that is tackled in 
(d) below, and in Chapter 6.
(d) Assumption (d): the product should be in propositional form
I have already indicated that it was frustrating to keep out of my own 
work; yet I felt that the report form was the correct way to write a 
thesis. There are two major considerations here: the first is the
precedence of theory over practice; the second is a satisfaction with 
descriptions rather than explanations.
Theory over practice
By presenting my work as a report, in which I, the commentator, divorce 
past practice from present understandings which are grounded in those 
past practices, I assumed the dominance of theory over practice. The 
theory of now was sufficient, I supposed, to account for the practices 
of then.
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I could easily fall into the same error in this present text. I could 
assume that my present understandings are sufficient to present the 
report about my report (first version, 1-3). I am constantly aware, 
however, of the need to be open to new experiences, to learn from what I 
am doing. Even as I write these words I am engaging in the thought-in- 
action that Schon recommends (1983) to keep my work educational - that 
is, to keep up the level of living development through personal enquiry. 
This text is an organic vehicle for my development. The first version, 
1-3, was a static report of a practice that I now saw as dead.
Because I saw my past practice as dead, the report I wrote about it 
could only be propositional. In this text I have adopted such a form 
(Chapter 1) in reporting the actions of my work in school; but I now 
link that work to my present form of life. In doing so, I am 
incorporating propositional forms within dialectical forms. In Chapter 
6 I shall explain my conception of how dialectical forms of life are 
more mature than, and incorporate (rather than negate), the less mature 
propositional forms of life (see Chapters 5 and 6 for my understanding 
of the term 'mature').
By adopting the propositional form as dominant, I was assuming the 
superiority of reified theory over living practice. This form is 
evident in first version, Chapters 1-3, where, although I indicate at 
odd moments that I would like to refer past practice to present forms 
of understanding, I feel constrained to keep them apart.
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Descriptions and explanations
This is a major theme running through my work, and will receive more 
detailed explication in Chapter 6 of this text. A quick gloss here sets 
the scene:
I became interested in the work of Chomsky while I was studying 
linguistics at the University of Essex, 1971-72. Some of his ideas have 
influenced my own thinking, as will be apparent particularly in Chapters 
5 and 6 of this text.
Chomsky's early work was focused on aspects of syntax, but has shifted 
over the years to investigate the underlying principles of language 
competence that is a reflection of the mind/brain of the individual. As 
he makes clear in many recent texts (e.g. 1978, 1981, 1985), his work in 
linguistics is only one path of enquiry to reach certain understandings 
about the nature of mind; there are many other paths - I like to think 
that my chosen field of enquiry is one of those other paths.
I am attracted by his characterisations of the notion of adequacy, in 
terms of the epistemological grounds of a scientific enquiry.
In 'Aspects Df the theory of syntax' (1965), Chosmky identified three 
increasingly complex levels of adequacy. In terms of linguistic 
analysis, the level of observational adequacy was attained when a 
language could be observed and recorded, The next level up was that of
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descriptive adequacy, when a language could be described in terms of its 
component parts. This was the level aimed at by the structuralist 
school, notably in the work of Bloomfield and Skinner, whose ideas 
Chomsky critiqued in his 1968 'Skinner's Verbal Behaviour’. In this 
critique, he indicated that Skinner's work, and that of other people 
working in the structuralist-behaviourist mode, was confined to 
descriptions and observations of language behaviour, but did not attempt 
to explain that behaviour. By 'explain' he suggested that some 
indication was needed to account for the intuitions that go towards the 
production of an infinite number of novel uttrances; what Jespersen 
(1922) terms 'notion of grammar'. Once such intuitions could be 
accounted for, suggested Chomsky, then this was approaching the level of 
explanatory adequacy, Chomsky's contribution towards an epistemology of 
linguistic enquiry was to term as deficient structuralist analyses that 
aimed only for descriptive adequacy, and to go for reconstructive 
theories that aimed for explanatory adequacy. By 'reconstructive' I 
take the meaning spelt out by McCarthy (1978), in his discussion of the 
work of Habermas who adopts many of Chomsky's notions, that 
reconstructive theories aim to reconstruct explicitly what is already 
implicit in the mind of the individual. So, for example, when a 
speaker-hearer recognises the ambiguity in phrases such as
Time flies
Visiting relatives can be a bore
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or recognises the unacceptability of grammatically correct strings such 
as
This is the man whose aunt whose brother went to London yesterday I
saw get on the train who telephoned later
the way to explain the intuitions in the mind of the speaker-hearer that
allows him to 'know* (Chomsky's 'cognize': 1985) the elements of
ambiguity or unacceptability is to hypothesise the existence of mental 
linguistic rules. These rules, when made explicit (1965), form the
foundation of a grammar. Any utterances that do not abide by the rules 
are discounted as not belonging to the language.
This is the scientific basis of Chomsky's notion 'rule of grammar'; and 
when such rules of grammar may be organised and demonstrated in action 
(made explicit), the study that aims at this making explicit may be said 
to have attained explanatory adequacy.
Chomsky extended this notion recently, particularly in 'Knowledge of 
language' (1985) when he identified two parameters of scientific
enquiry. Now shifting his ground significantly from a relatively narrow 
perspective of the study of language to a wider perspective of the study 
of mind, Chomsky identifies the areas of E-language and I-language. For 
him, E-language refers to a study that concentrates on extended language 
- that is, the language that is used by a body of people. The 
epistemology of this level of enquiry would usually rest at description, 
i.e. it would aim to describe and record the utterances of a group, that
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served as the basis of adequate communication between members of that 
group.' An I-language refers to a study of an internal language - that 
is, the intuitions of an individual that give him the capacity to use 
any and every language that he chooses. An I-language aims for 
explanatory adequacy; i.e. it makes explicit the linguistic intuitions 
of the individual that are already in his mind, in the form of the
innate capacity for the rules of language.
I use the concepts of levels of adequacy and types of enquiry in my 
work. I indicate throughout that an enquiry that aims to record and 
describe the educational practices of other people, external to the
enquirer, is limited to the level of description, an E-study. The
epistemology here is to 'know about' something, to acquire an amount of 
propositional and procedural knowledge (Chapter 5 of this text) that
allows an enquirer to make pronouncements about other people's
practices. On the other hand, an enquiry that aims to explain the 
educational practices of the self aims at explantory adequacy, an I- 
study. The epistemology here is to understand, to create the personal 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1958) that allows an individual to make explicit how 
she has improved her life, i.e. brought about an improvement in 
practice. In this way she may claim that her enquiry has been
educational - her personal enquiry has caused her to make changes in her
own form of life that have led to an improved situation.
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In first version, 1-3, my work was in propositional form. I aimed to 
describe my practice in school, but I saw that practice as finished. In 
first version, Chapters 4-6, I increasingly adopted a dialectical form 
(see also Chapter 4 of this text). At the time I was content to stay at 
the levels of description and propositions. I am now of the opinion 
that such levels are not educational (not part of an I-enquiry), but are 
more concerned with the management of educational situations. I wanted 
to show how I was beginning to understand what constituted my own 
development, and I wanted to be free of the propositional mode. I 
wanted to write in terms of current understandings, but I did not know 
how to change. I grew disenchanted with the restrictive nature of the 
form I had adopted for first version 1-3, and I abandoned the work.
(e) Assumption (e): the thesis should exclude personal involvement
Some traditions of enquiry tend to omit personal involvement in 
descriptions and explanations. Attempts to introduce the element of 
personal involvement, in order to make the enquiry one of personal 
commitment (in the sense identified in this text), have sometimes met 
with resistance (e.g Whitehead, 1989).
!l
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I adhered to such a tradition in first version 1-3. The resultant 
practice of adopting a propositional form of life was so alien to my 
emergent enlightened thinking that a crisis of practice took place that 
forced me to abandon the project, My emergent thinking was in the form 
of educational values that focused on the freedom of the thinker to 
adopt a form in which that freedom could be expressed (Feyerabend, 
1970); the need for a form of scientific enquiry that would allow for a 
systematic abandonment of less satisfactory forms and the adoption of 
forms that approximated closer to the educational values that were 
emerging (Popper, 1972); the need for the elements of fun, curiosity and 
excitement in the discovery of knowledge (Feynmann, BBC, 1987; Popper, 
The Guardian, 1988) to be an integral part of the enquiry. All these 
aspects could not be included in the propositional form that I felt 
constrained to adopt.
When I came to the end of first version Chapter 3 I was greatly 
saddened. I enjoy writing, and I should have been enjoying writing my 
thesis. I felt that I was discovering forms of life that were 
appealing, but those forms were outside the barriers of the 
propositional descriptions that I felt confined to. Because my personal 
involvement was not allowed, 1 left the writing of the thesis, and 




Throughout, I saw the product that was my thesis as a structure. This 
structure contained a specific content. The content could be itemised 
and categorised, analysed in terms of its constituent parts. I 
deliberately adopted a structuralist approach to the work, in that I 
attempted to present it as discrete aspects of a practice that was
itself a discrete part of my life.
I was throughout aware of the need to provide a scientific basis for my 
enquiry. I was aware of Stenhouse's (1982) definition of an educational 
enquiry: Ha systematic enquiry made public"; and I wanted to fulfil the
criterion of the systematic nature of my enquiry. I realise now that I
confused the terms 'systematic' and 'chronological', seeing them then as 
synonymous. I realise now that chronology is a central aspect of
structuralist theories which adopt an essentially linear approach in a 
concentration on demonstrating cause and effect. In First Version 1-3, 
I was aware of the need to describe the systematic (chronological) 
nature of my practice, to point tq the causes and the effects in terms 
of changed behaviour in the children. To a certain extent I have done 
this in Chapter 1 of this text, but I am incorporating those 
propositional elements within the conceptually critical framework of the 
overall work.
I was also confusing the notion of 'scientific' with 
'systematic/chronological'. I had previously pointed to the work of 
Popper (1972) as the definition of 'scientific':
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"The process can be described by the following somewhat over-simplified 
schema ... :
PI------- TT   EE   P2
That is, we start from some problem PI, proceed to a tentative solution 
or tentative theory TT, which may be (partly or wholly) mistaken; in any 
case it will be subject to error-elimination, EE, which may consist of 
critical discussion or experimental tests; at any rate, new problems P2 
arise from our own creative activity." (Popper, 1972)
In first version 1-3 I had the mentality that saw the elements 
incorporated in the discrete formulations 'PI', 'TT' as chronological 
steps in the total formulation PI —  P2. In turn, this total
formulation was a chronological step in the enquiry, and the next step 
would be a new, identical formulation of PI —  P2. My thinking was 
again directed along linear paths towards end products.
I began to see, dimly at first, that 'systematic' and 'scientific' are 
not synonymous, and have little to do with chronology. I realised that 
'systematic' implies 'disciplined', in line with my previous remarks 
above of the need to make explicit what is already implicit, part of the 
personal knowledge (Polanyi, 1958) of the enquirer. It was necessary, I 
began to see, to make the knowledge I held available in an 
understandable form that would communicate itself to another enquirer. 
The conception of 'systematic' was to do with the exercise of
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communication of knowledge rather than the compartmentalisation of 
knowledge.
Similarly, I began to unravel my misunderstandings of the notion of 
'scientific' enquiry. I moved away from images of linearity and 
chronology , and turned towards concepts about total forms of enquiry 
that are a manifestation in action of a thinker's form of life. I came 
to see Popper's formulation not as a content but as a procedure - i.e. 
not specific categories of action, but general principles for action.
These were all important learnings for me, but at the time very 
confusing. I had no point of reference on which to fix my emergent
thinking, other than the act of faith that it would all come out right 
in the end. My efforts to understand, and the outcomes, are documented 
in Chaper 4 of this text.
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(iv) The results
This section glosses some of what appears in first version, Chapter 4. 
The material is expanded in Chapter 5 of this Second Version.
So far in this chapter I have given reasons for the dissatisfaction with 
first version 1-3. In first version, Chapter 4, I came to writing about 
forms of knowledge and forms of values acquisition. These substantive 
elements were in fact what were the most important elements in my mental 
life at the time; without realising it, through the act of analysing 
forms of knowledge and forms of values acquisition, I was making
explicit to myself the forms of knowledge and the forms of values
acquisition that were available to me, and the forms that I had elected 
to use. Through my study Df the literature - other people's ideas about 
these areas - I was being forced to become involved in my own 
understandings, and in decisions about my actions prompted by those
understandings. My propositional knowledge, the 'knowledge-that' that I 
had gained from my study of the literature, was being transformed into 
personal knowledge, the understanding of my internalisation of the
'knowledge-that' that was producing new forms of thought.
The crisis occurred when I came to writing about views of personhood. I 
had categorised views of forms of knowledge into
1. (1) propositional knowledge - know-that
(2) procedural knowledge - know-how
(3) personal knowledge - know + direct object
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I had further categorised views of forms of values acquisition into
2. <1) values as instrumental
(2) values as from a sociological perspective
(3) values as personal forms of life
Within 2. (3) I had categorised views of personhood as
(i) an instrumentalist's view of persons
(ii) a sociologist's view of persons
(iii) a dialectician's view of persons
It was this last that caused the penny to drop. For I saw my work until 
now resting on the epistemology of other people's ideas about other 
people; whereas now I came to the realisation of the need for an 
epistemology of the self's understanding of the self. I had until now 
tried to give an analysis of my practice in terms of the reified 
knowledge of the literature; now it became immediately evident that I 
had to account for my own understandings of my own practice.
I could not rationalise it in these terms at the time. I recall that I 
was in despair with the project. The form I was using was entirely 
inappropriate, I realised, but, short of going back and starting again, 
I could see no way out. I also had no clear idea how I would re­
formulate the text.
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I abandoned the writing temporarily until I had had time to talk to Jack 
Whitehead about my difficulties. He counselled that I was evidently 
moving towards a dialectical form of thought, and recommended certain 
texts that would be useful (for example, Riegel, 1973).
I must note at this juncture that I had been in close touch with Jack by 
letter and by phone. For all the years of my study, he had been 
generous with his time and availability, and particularly so when we 
worked together on ’Action research'. At this time of the research he 
was particularly supportive, offering advice and encouragement. But no 
one person can make a myopic see; I had to put on my own glasses. All 
Jack's encouragement could not make me change entrenched values; but 
what it did do was provide the insistent encouragement that perhaps 
there was another way of life available.
So I visited the library, collected a number of works that appeared 
useful (for example, Basseches, 1984), and settled down to several weeks 
of Intense reading and reflection.
The results were astounding. I realised the enormous difference between 
propositional and dialectical forms. I came to understand what this 
meant when applied to the reality of my own life. I continued writing 
Chapter 4, but this time from a different perspective, seeing the 
writing project now as a continuation of my practice, rather than as a 
platform from which to recount past practice.
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I will continue this theme in Chapter 4 of this text. I will here 
conclude this section by indicating that this was probably the most 
turbulent but exhilarating episode of my mental life. It opened doors 
that I had until now not realised existed, and enabled me to develop a 
mentality that is reflected in the sentence from Roderick (1986) that I 
have already quoted in Chapter 1. Here, Roderick points to the 
difference between Gadamer's hermeneutic science and Habermas's critical 
science. The former, he says, assumes that present practice is 
constituted by, and grounded in past practice. The present may be 
interpreted through the past. Habermas, on the other hand, regards the 
present as the foundation for the future; while he agrees with Gadamar's 
philosophy, he tries to change the perspective so that present practice 
will form the ground for future practice.
This was the turning point for my thesis. I abandoned the propositional 
forms that required me to see past practice as reified and external to 
myself. I now saw my present practice as shaped and formed by the past, 
but equally that my present practice was now the ground for future 
development. I realised that my life was not a linear sequence of 
discrete episodes, but a whole that was shaped by my understanding of my 
experience of events, and not by the events themselves.
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3. CONSIDERATIONS
I wish now to reflect on what I have written about my practice. There 
are two levels of reflection here: the writing about my practice is the 
first-order, reflection, and what I am about to write in this section is 
a second-order reflection on my writing.
I will start from the perspective of how my practice reflected certain 
views. I have already indicated the crisis that caused these views tD 
emerge, and I will indicate the changes in thinking in Chapter 4 of this 
text. Here I will consider how my practice reflected
(i) my view of knowledge
(ii) my view of self
(iii) my view of development
(i) How my practice reflected my view of knowledge
(a) An inclination towards propositional forms
I have indicated at length that I was inclined towards propositional 
forms. I will here only point to some implicational aspects of my 
discovery of dialectical forms of thought, and these aspects^ will 
receive more detailed treatment later.
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I see dialectical forms as a more appropriate ground than 
propositional forms in values education (Chapter 5 of this text). 
Current values education is mainly focused on propositional forms of 
development - e.g. cognitive developmental frameworks (Piaget, 
Kohlberg); values analysis (Raths et al. (1978), Simon et al. (1972), 
McPhail et al.(1972). Very few formal schemes are available that focus 
on the development of the person (Button, 1981) rather than on the 
development of a certain kind of person (e.g. McConnen, 1989) (see also 
Chapter 1 of this text).
I see dialectical forms as a more appropriate ground for in-service 
education (Chapter 7). My early practice (Chapter 1) was grounded in 
the phenomenology of experience - i.e. events themselves were seen as 
the source of experience for teachers. I will indicate that it is not 
enough for teachers to experience the events, but to experience the 
experience, to 'dwell in' (Buber, 1937) a phenomenon in order to develop 
a critical awareness of their own experience of an event or episode.
(b) An inclination towards abstractions
Throughout the First Version, Chapters 1-3, I saw my thesis as an 
abstraction, a thing to be produced. I did not see it as part of the 
living 'I', that in turn is part of the socio-economic culture in which 
I live (Riegel, 1968).
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Most importantly for the issues of this text, I did not see it as a 
contributory factor to my own development. I had the view that I had 
developed, reached the final stage that is hypothesised by the cognitive 
developmentalists, and was now creating this object that was the product 
of my development.
The contents of First Version 1-3 are also presented as abstractions. 
They are not seen as constituent parts of the ultimate development that 
I had now reached.
The change in mental perspective led in fact to an abandonment of 
abstractions. I came to see the notion of abstraction as a useful 
analytical tool. I could take an idea out of context, and discuss it as
an abstraction, but now I see the need always to reinstate it as part of
a living context. I have developed this procedure substantially in 
Chapter 6 of this text, where I discuss the characteristics of 
dialectical forms as holding within themselves propositional forms. 
Parallel to this notion is the idea of synthesis existing together with 
analysis. So, when I come to discuss in Chapter 6, say, the nature of
change as part of an educational enquiry, I deliberately abstract
elements to form an analytic model, but then reinstate it into the 
context of reality in order to demonstrate the synthesis of an 
integrated life form.
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(c) An insistence on ideologies
I became interested in the work of Jay and Horkheimer, and point to 
their efforts (Jay, 1973; Horkheimer, 1972) to demolish the concept of 
Ideologies as the basis of social evolution. Habermas also 
hypothesises alternative bases for social evolution, notably the concept 
of dialogical communities (Habermas, 1979) which encourage the 
generation of mutually agreed normative values.
In Chapter 1 of this text I have indicated how I departed from the
concept of ideologies as the basis for my practice as a teacher. I had
the view that social evolution rested on an ideological basis that saw 
the role of teachers as producing the certain kind of person who would 
adjust to that ideology. In this present chapter, I have indicated how 
I have parted from the concept of ideology as the basis for my practice 
as a thinker. I had the view that the production of a thesis rested on 
an ideological basis that saw the role of the writer as recording 
practice in a propositional mode.
My practice, both as a reflexive teacher and as a reflexive writer,
critically examines the concept of ideology as the basis for the
development of that practice. I am critically aware now of what I am 
doing in all aspects of my life. I see the production of this thesis as 
the free enterprise of a free thinker. I am not bound by an insistence 
on a certain form, other than to acknowledge the need to demonstrate in
y
practice that I have improved my practice; to demonstrate the way in
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which I have come to understand the need to make explicit the procedure 
by which I have improved my practice; and to demonstrate the procedure 
by which I validate my claims through mutually agreed realms of 
discourse (Chapter 8).
(ii) How my practice reflected a view of self
(a) A systematic negation of personal involvement
In Chapter 1 of this text I have indicated how I saw my children as 
entities external to myself, whom I could manipulate to meet my 
identified objectives (the production of a certain kind of person), in 
line with the requirements of the reified literature. In this present 
chapter I have indicated how I saw the self who had enacted the personal 
and social project as external to the self who was writing about the 
proj ect.
Both these aspects reflect a view of persons that is the main 
epistemological base in much of the literature of educational research, 
that of subject and object. Many traditions of educational research 
(e.g. Husen and Postlethwaite's 1982 book presents a wide selection of 
articles, most seemingly proceeding from this base) assume the existence 
of two parties who stand in an ambivalent relationship to each pther. 
On the one hand is the researcher; on the other is the researched. In
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empiric approaches (e.g. O'Connor, 1959; Hirst and Peters, 1970) the 
researcher-subject actively carrries out research on the researchee- 
object, usually with the aim of consolidating an hypothesis. In 
interpretive approaches the two parties agree to collaborate (e.g. 
Hamilton et al, 1967), usually with a view, again, to substantiating the 
researcher's hypothesis (see my 1988). As such, this approach 
"prioritises social over educational understandings" (Stronach, 1986). 
Stronach suggests that the approach to educational isssues that focuses 
on the research of a second party is not educational - it does not 
enable the enquirer to understand his own practice - but sociological.
My view of self, as reflected in the early writing project, was as an 
object. I held a certain fixed hypothesis (I had a certain end product 
in mind), and set out to prove the hypothesis (to create that end 
product). So I, the subject, was writing about I, the object, in the 
sense that I saw the two selves standing apart from each other, rather 
than as aspects of a self that finds synthesis through reflection and 
critical appraisal (see Chapter 4 of this text).
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(b) A mechanistic view of self
The mechanistic view I held of others applied equally to the self that 
was under analysis. In Chapter 1 of this text I have endeavoured to 
show how I viewed my pupils and colleagues as part of the wider 
sociological machinery of school, which itself is a manifestation of the 
culture in which we live. My intention throughout my work in personal 
and social education was to produce the person who would conform to the 
abstracted norms of the institutionalised aspects of that society.
Ho less did this view extend to the self I was writing about in first 
version 1-3. I saw that self as having to conform to institutionalised 
expectations, in that I imagined the form of my text should adopt a 
linear, propositional format; and in that I imagined the substance of my 
text to adopt the same epistemological base as the dominant approach to 
educational research - that of subject-writer recording the action of 
the object-actor.
(c) Inclination towards techne rather than phronesis
In the 'Nichomachean Ethics' Aristotle tells us that techne is the 
knowledge of skills and strategies that allows a craftsman to produce a 
technically acceptable work. Phronesis is the wisdom that enables the 
craftsman to apply this knowledge wisely. The application of techne 
(knowledge-that) and the appropriate action in application (phronesis;
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knowledge-how) culminate in praxis, the wise and considered practice of 
the mature craftsman.
In Chapters 6 and 7 of this text I will suggest that this theory may be 
reflected in a parallel theory I hypothesise as the basis for 
educational research. With Habermas (1979) and Bernstein (1983), I 
agree that the basis for acts of communication is to be found in 
dialogical communities; and I suggest that the grounding for the 
contents of communication is to be found in the competence of 
individuals. To my mind, educational (as distinct from sociological) 
theory is a matter of I-enquiries, where individuals may account for 
their own educational development.
In my early practice as a teacher, 1981-82, and the early writing 
project, December 1987 - January 1988, I seem to have opted for a life 
characterised by technical excellence (techne). My work as a teacher 
was skills-oriented (Chapter 1 of this text), reflecting my knowledge- 
that, as was my writing, First Version 1-3. In both areas I attempted 
to demonstrate the amount of knowledge that I had amassed.
In my teaching practice my illusions were dislodged by the insistence of 
my children to continue to be eminently human, rather than obliging 
automata (Chapter 3 of this text) in becoming the certain kind of person 
I wanted them to be. My reflection on my practice in working with the 
children caused me to re-think my position (techne modifed by phronesis) 
so that I moved nearer to the emerging praxis of a reflexive 
practitioner (Schon, 1983).
( 111 )
In my writing practice my insistence on neatly structured propositional 
forms • (techne) was dislodged by the insistence of my living self to 
enter into the action. My reflection on my work caused me also to re­
think my position here, and adopt an alternative form which accommodated 
the phronesis of reflection. The critical-dialectical form of the later 
work (first version, 4-6) may be characterised as an emerging praxis in 
that I am able to critique unsatisfactory forms and substances on the 
grounds of lack of communicative clarity (Searle, 1969), and aim for 
forms and substances that more adequately fulfil the criteria identified 
by Habermas (1979) as the basis for understanding (truth, honesty, 
appropriateness, sincerity).
My early practice as teacher and writer reflected a view of self as 
skilled technician. The hallmarks Df my success were those of 
organisational and technical excellence. In my work in personal and 
social education, I realise now that I was aiming at manipulation, 
rather than education. In my writing of first version 1-3 I was aiming 
for public acclaim at my amount of knowledge. In first version, 4-6, I 
aimed at personal wisdom in my pursuit of knowledge.
>
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(ill) How my practice reflected a view of development
This thesis is a record and an explanation of how I came to undertake a 
shift in values. This shift has involved a re-examination of the very 
concept of values, for I had thought, before becoming involved in 
writing up (December 1987) that values could not undergo substantial 
changes once the human had reached a certain level of maturity. Yet to 
my initial astonishment, here was I, an intelligent person old enough to 
know better, re-thinking basic values that I had held dear for most of 
my adult life.
The area in which this change has been most significant is the one 
explored in this section, the notion of development. I believe that 
here is a real demonstration of my reflection-in-action. Through the
action of reflecting about the nature of development, I have applied 
that reflection-in-action to my own development, and I believe that I 
have developed. The nature of that development itself has helped me to 
develop insights about the 'meaning' of development, as manifested in my 
own life rather than in the reified literature.
My views about the nature of development, as manifested in first 
version, 1-3, may be characterised primarily in terms of
(a) the notion of absolute truth
(b) the notion of reified knowledge
(c) the notion of development as structure
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(a) The notion of absolute truth
Along with the vast majority of the literature of educational research 
(and much scientific literature in general), I assumed that there was an 
ultimate Truth to which we had to aspire. Rorty, in his essay 'World 
well lost' (1982) shows how such a belief is counterbalanced by an 
alternative paradigm that Truths are Many. "In reply to this argument, 
defenders of coherence and pragmatic theories of truth have argued that 
our so-called 'intuition' that Truth is One is simply the expectation 
that, if all perceptual reports were in, there would be one optimal way 
of selecting among them and all other possible statements so as to have 
one ideally proportioned system of true beliefs."
I have indicated in Chapter 1 of this text my inclination towards this 
view, that Truth is One, as demonstrated in my practice in personal and 
social education. I thought there was a particular, good form of life, 
and mine was the job to produce the certain hind of person who would 
lead that good life. In First Version 1-3 I took the view that there 
was an absolute Truth, to which I had to aspire. The end product of my 
efforts, the thesis, would be a reflection of this Truth. Once written 
down, the words could never be questioned. I have changed my ideas 
considerably (see Chapters 3 and 4 of this text), in that I now see 
truth as interpersonal creativity. (In Chapter 3: 3 (iii) (a) I shall 
expand on this idea, that persons sharing the same form of life may 
agree to 'truths' that are reflections of the philosophies that enable 
that form of life to develop.) I also attempt to explain^ the 
reconciliation between my own beliefs of truths developed by persons
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through dialogue and the Truth that is God. This discussion appears in 
Part Three, and is also part of my further study.
In accepting the notion of absolute Truth, I subscribed to the idea of 
communities that operate on the basis of rules rather than principles. 
In Chapters 5 and 6 of this text I explore this notion in depth, 
bringing it in line with forms of knowledge which I have identified as 
propositional 'know-that' and procedural 'know-how', and personal 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1958). I suggest that a community, educational or 
otherwise, that operates on a system of rules is restrictive of its 
members. Whether the system is imposed by a benign ruler, such as the 
Old Testament community who received the Ten Commandments, or by a 
dictator, such as the interregnum of Hitler's Germany that was dominated 
by 'Mein Kampf', it still remains that the system is imposed by 
coercion, and infringement of the rules is corrected by punishment. On
the other hand, communities that operate on principles are grounded in
the personal integrity of individuals. Acceptance of higher-order 
principles, such as the two major laws of the Hew Testament: love God 
and love thy neighbour, is a matter of personal volition through
dialogue, and infringement of principles is not a matter of correction
by an external policy-maker, but of being in touch (or not, as the case 
may be) with the self. Rogers (1951) makes this point with reference to 
disturbed persons: that many societies based on rules-systems regard any 
individual aberration as a matter for curing, usually through 
punishment, whereas communities based on shared principles view 
abandonment of those principles as an individual choice which may be re­
considered through dialogue.
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My early practice as a teacher was characterised by my adherence to 
rules,' both for myself and for my children. So was my early practice as 
a writer. I adopted a set form and a set content. The content aimed at 
producing an ultimate set of answers - its own truth - while describing 
a practice that aimed at producing an ultimate set of answers.
I did not initially see my project as educational - that is, generating 
a disequilibrium that would force a better practice to emerge. I saw it 
merely as the record of my past practice, the truth as it was. It was 
the disquiet generated by such inappropriate forms of thought that made 
me aware of the possibility of other truths, which I shall explain in 
due course.
(b) The notion of reified knowledge
Until 1988 I fully accepted the doctrine of reified knowledge. By this, 
I mean a form of life that is guided by a belief in knowledge as an 
abstraction, 'out there', and which is not the property of an individual 
knower. I could appreciate the fact that there were debates in the 
literature (e.g. Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970), but I saw such debates as 
being of a closed nature, and of not concerning me other than as a 
reader. My reading was from an interpretive base, where I assimilated 
and understood as a passive observer, regarding my understanding as a 
storehouse of information. My understandings were all about this THING 
called knowledge.
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When I wrote 'Action research: principles and practice' I became
involved in a good deal of research of the literature, and had to find a 
form in which I could clearly communicate what was in my mind. This 
disciplined search led me to organise my accumulated knowledge in new 
ways, and I became aware at the time that I was using knowledge to 
interpret and create knowledge - I was creating new forms out of current 
forms (see also Chapter 5 of this text).
When I came to first version 1-3, I felt that this facility was now 
denied; it would be illegitimate to create new forms in an academic 
treatise whose function it was to present the facts. It was frustrating 
to proceed like this, since 'Action research' had been tremendously 
stimulating in terms of my mental development, and I felt now 
straitjacketed by the proposed thesis. It was in something approaching 
anger that I abandoned the project at Chapter 3 and opted later for the 
new form of Chapter 4.
This brings me to the most important aspect of this section.
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(c) The notion of development as structure
I had always been interested in the idea of development, and had read 
extensively about it. My knowledge took the same form as that presented 
in most of the literature, that development was seen as a journey from A 
to N, in which A represented non-development, and N represented 
development. In between there were intermediate stages of development, 
B, C, D, etc., that could be characterised in terms of how far they were 
from A, the beginning, and how near they were to N, or full 
development. This was the dominant view presented by the behavioural 
psychologists, usually from a skills-oriented perspective - at one stage 
the subject could not do something which at a subsequent stage he could; 
and by the cognitive developmental psychologists - at one stage the 
subject was developed to a certain level, and then proceeded to become 
more developed to another certain level. I accepted these philosophies 
without question, and attempted to fit my practice to them.
Accordingly, I tried to ground my practice in personal and social 
education in the recommendations of HMI/DES, that pupils should be
encouraged to develop their full potential. I viewed this potential as 
an ultimate development, and matched it with the ideas of full 
development as characterised by Piaget's Stage 6 or Kohlberg's Stage 
6/7. I have already indicated in Chapter 1 of this text how my 
interpretation of the concepts of 'potential* and 'development' was at
fault. I am aware now, and shall focus on the point here, that I was
operating in terms of structural analysis, part of the framework of
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prepositional forms of thought which was my major form of thinking 
during the writing of First Version 1-3.
I implemented the view of an ultimate development to the task of writing
my thesis. I intended to end up with a text about structured
development, both describing the ultimate development of my children as
they 'developed' (a tautology that I never could resolve), and
demonstrating the development of issues with the text towards a final 
s
denouement of the answers.
In the debate between Chosmky and Piaget (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980), 
the two protagonists find many mutual grounds to settle their 
differences, except the one essential notion regarding the innateness
hypothesis. Chomsky maintains that the individual is born with innate
potential, limitless creative capacity, which she organises into 
structures which she then proceeds to use to organise her experience of 
the world. Piaget argues that the individual is born in a state of
readiness to absorb and accommodate structures that are imposed on her
experience by the world. I will refer to this argument later (Chapters 
5 and 6 of this text), when I adopt the views of Chomsky in the 
hypothesis I shall present about the nature of the acquisition of 
values. Here I will say that I was inclined, in my early practice, 
towards the views of Piaget. I regarded First Version 1-3 as the 
demonstration of an organisation of my children's development. I was 
never aware of it as an instrument in my own development, for two good 
reasons: (1) I saw myself as 'developed'; (2) I saw my thesis as a
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product external to myself. My thesis became a structured part of the 
total structure of my life.
Among the many elements that jolted me out of this arrogant complacency 
was the tautology mentioned above about the meaning of the word 
'development'. Here was a term that embraced both the state of being 
developed and the action of developing. I found myself in First Version 
Chapter 2 writing about 'the development of development'; a phrase not 
only linguistically tautological but conceptually contradictory. For if 
the ontology of the concept 'development' implied an ultimate state, how 
oculd that ultimate state go on developing?
So it was that I came to first version Chapter 4, which was when I 
realised that my mental structures were re-forming, and I revived 
previous ideas (McNiff, 1984) about transformations. I began to see 
structures of development as being subject to disequilibrium and 
transformation. I started working out these ideas at the end of First 
Version Chapter 3, and it was this articulation within the thesis of the 
processes that were taking place in my life because of this making 
explicit that caused me to stop and re-think.
I shall take up the story again in Chapter 4 of this text.
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CHAPTER 3: THE PERSONAL AND SOCIAL EDUCATION PROJECT, 1983 - 1986
1 INTRODUCTION: FIRST TRIALS RE-VISITED
So what had I achieved? What changes had I initiated through the 
practices of 1981-83? I will attempt to analyse the effects of my 
practice on (a) pupils (b) colleagues (c) myself.
(a) Pupils
As far as I could tell, my pupils had changed for the better; that is, I 
had improved the quality of education for the children in my care. I 
had set out my criteria that indicated potential improvement (e.g. HMI 
1981); I had demonstrated in practice <VT1) how my educational values 
were being denied in my practice; and I had achieved a state (VT3) where 
my educational values were nearer to realisation through my practice. I 
made these claims in the knowledge that I could substantiate them 
through the validation procedures I had set up (Chapter 1 of this text) 
with children and colleagues, to show how this particular educational 
situation had improved.
In terms of the critical analysis of my practice that I have undertaken 
in this text, my 'success' needs to be seen in a balanced way. I have 
already indicated that my thinking at that time was not liberated, tuned
’■ j
always to matters of a prepositional format, and given direction by the
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institutional forces that I represented. I see now that I was engaged 
not so much in educational research as sociological manipulation, 
certainly in terms of teaching aims and objectives. Yet, lest I appear 
too damning of my own practice, education was going on, both for the 
children and for myself. I became aware, in 1983, of the need to 
educate, rather than dominate, my children; yet that educative process,
I suggest, had been going on implicitly. I shall say more on this
presently.
When asked to characterise my practice in 1982, I responded that my 
children were more socially aware, more tolerant, more sensitive to the 
needs of others (AT7). Indeed, they were, as the records of my practice
in Chapter 1 of this text bear witness. The element that I was not yet
aware of, and therefore did not make explicit, was that I was teaching 
the children to conduct their own personal enquiries, their own action 
research into their own practice. This understanding emerged over the 
years 1983-88. The more the understanding matured, the more my role as 
a teacher modified to accommodate the understanding and the responses of 
the children. I loosened the reins; I replaced rules with principles 
(see below); I became a facilitator rather than a dominator; I 
encouraged the emergence of the fun elements in the children, the 
excitement of finding out the meaning of their own development. All 
these aspects will be detailed in this chapter.
*
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So, when asked, in 1988, to characterise my practice of 1982, I may say 
that I had fixed ideas about the nature of education - primarily that it 
was sociological in focus - and fixed ideas about my own role as an 
instructor. My practice was dominated by 'bound1 theories (see Chapter 
9 of this text) which restricted my practice as a teacher and my 
development as a person. The way in which I came to develop my 
understandings of my practice, and to change it in the light of those 
understandings, forms the content of this Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
(b) Colleagues
Although I worked with colleagues in my own school, most of my in- 
service work was conducted in Dorset schools during my year's secondment 
to the Teachers' Centre, and for two years after that when I conducted 
courses in personal and social education. I can refer to the year's 
secondment, 1982-83, as the time when I kept records of my practice; 
most of these records are on audiotape, some with accompanying 
tapescripts.
As I have done in the previous section, I can point to fundamental value 
shifts, brought about through critical reflection on my practice. In 
the case of my in-service work, this episode had a much more clearly 
articulated epistemological base than my early work with Malcolm's 
group. I made explicit on a number of occasions (e.g. AT24) how I was 
proceeding from the basis that my educational values were being denied
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in my practice, and how I was systematically working towards their 
realisation. I was keen to share this epistemology with colleagues.
I can say that my practice as an in-service provider changed quite 
radically over the year.
At the beginning, 1982, I held the same underlying assumptions that 
coloured my attitudes to colleagues as those that I have catalogued in 
Chapter 1 of this text: assumptions that were centralised on the concept 
of the control of educational knowledge. The same mechanistic view of 
my children as servants of the system was evident in my work with 
colleagues. I saw my role as passing on the knowledge of skills and 
techniques to colleagues, so that they could become efficient 
manipulators of children, as I was. Courses which I led at the 
Teachers' Centre and at individual schools before the actual secondment 
were very much in this vein. I encouraged teachers to copy what I was 
doing, and put forward clear agendas for individual and series of 
lessons which I made clear were set patterns for action. In my 1988 
text I have critiqued the blueprints of Kemmis and HcTaggart (1982), 
Elliott (1981) and Ebbutt (1983) on exactly the same grounds as I based 
my 1981-82 practice: of postulating exact procedures for classroom
success. I feel now that my 'licence' to critique has emerged in this 
ironic way, and that I am justified in critiquing the work of other 
people because I am prepared to critique my own. I have challenged 
their work on the grounds that it is not educational but manipulative; 
and I level that same challenge at my own work.
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I systematically documented my work at The Oaks, as part of my formal 
study; I documented work at other schools in a less rigorous fashion. 
I Joined The Oaks in October, 1982, with the brief of supporting 
teachers in their endeavours to introduce formal schemes of personal and 
social education into, intially, two year groups, and eventually all 
five year groups. Previous to this, a group of eight teachers had 
attended courses run by myself and other county advisers, and were keen 
to learn about the Button methodologies. They held a view that 'Active 
tutorial work' (Baldwin and Wells, 1981: see also Chapter 1 of this
text) would provide a ready made pastoral syllabus, and be a handbook of 
techniques and general guidance.
I concentrated my support at a skills level for the first two or three 
weeks, leading classes with colleagues observing, sitting in with them 
and advising on their attempts to implement the same techniques. I 
attended meetings with them. The level of involvement was intense, and 
much discussion took place, with immediate implications for practice, 
both theirs and mine.
Colleagues' practice, individually and collectively, changed rapidly, 
about three weeks after the beginning of my involvement. The change is 
observable in the records in the following ways:
(1) There was a move away from the restrictive nature of the 'handbook': 
Headmaster: "It is interesting to see how they have thrown aspects out
that they have found unsatisfactory." (AT26)
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(2) There was a move away from a view of teaching as instruction: PC:
"Only'last week I wrote 'today's lesson'. Yet it's not a lesson." 
<ATi3) Headmaster: "Some of them still see it as a 'course' ... but
there is much educational talk going on." (AT26) The children sense 
this shift: Pupil: "English is the teacher's lesson: tutorial is
ours. ... In English she shouts a lot; in tutorial she's a friend." 
(AT15)
(3) There was a move away from the role of dominator to the role of 
facilitator: Headmaster: "Take Mr X, who was a hard, humourless little
man, and who is now a caring teacher ... I am most impressed by the 
comments of PL about the insights into his role." (AT26)
(4) There was a move towards an atmosphere of support for personal 
enquiry: Headmaster: "Since your (JM) involvement there has been more
educational talk in the staffroom than there has been for some time ..." 
(AT26)
My own practice changed in a parallel fashion. I began to concentrate 
less on technical aspects of teaching and more on rationales: as I see 
it now, my practice moved from techne towards praxis, the same as was 
happening with my colleagues. It was at this juncture, November 1982 - 
February 1983 that I changed my view of the nature of my practice.
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Still looking at what I had achieved with colleagues, then, I can say
that ■ I initially concentrated on passing on my propositional and
procedural knowledge (propositional ' knowledge-that' and procedural 
' knowledge-how'), the facts and skills involved in technical teaching 
skills. These factors focused on the successful management of 
classrooms, but less with the education of the children. Through 
intense reflection, in this case primarily of a collective nature in 
planning and de-briefing sessions, the teachers came to attach less 
importance to the technical aspects of classroom methodologies, and more 
importance to the growth of their children. They were unanimous (AT14, 
17) about the improvements in education that were being manifested: 
improvements such as the responsiveness of the children, the willingness 
of the children to be involved, the excitement at learning, the desire 
to take part. In this way, our joint practice moved towards an 
application of our phronesis, to bring about a situation that encouraged 
the education of our children rather than our manipulation of them. My 
involvement, I suggest, was that I encouraged teachers' personal 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1958) to emerge: Headmaster: "They are willing to
abandon their prejudices and allow their instincts to blossom." (AT26) 
Through conducting my own action enquiry into my practice as an in-
service supporter, I had encouraged colleagues to conduct their own
action enquiry into their practice as teachers; and the knock-on effect 
was that they had moved away from the roles of instructors to roles of 
educators, where they had in turn encouraged their children to conduct 
their action enquiry into their own practice.
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I would say that my involvement in The Oaks was eventually to encourage 
in-service education rather than provide in-service instruction. The 
shift was subtle but clear. From initially being a role-model I 
withdrew to lending encouragement to colleagues' experiments with
different approaches in class. The headmaster identifies my role thus:
"But, you see, the training at first. ... Hopefully they will need you
less and less. ... Now you've a more supporting role ..."
(c) Self
I agree with Walker (1985) when he says that "what is changed most by 
the research is the researcher". I made enormous progress during the 
years. The best evidence of this progress lies in comparing
publications that were a direct result of my reflection on my practice 
with those earlier ones that were a direct result of my underlying 
assumptions. In the latter case I am thinking of progress reports (see 
Appendix 2); in the former case I am thinking of 'Generative action 
research', written in 1983 and published in 1984, and 'Personal and 
social education', written in 1983-84 and published in 1986. (see 
Appendix 3.)
The progress to which I am referring is to do with the abandonment of 
assumptions about the control of educational knowledge and an adoption 
of forms of thought concerned with the creation of educational 
knowledge; to do with the demolition of the barriers between theory and 
practice; and to do with a view of the nature of persons and personal 
development. I shall discuss these aspects in detail in this chapter.
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An important change that I shall mention here was to begin to see my 
practice as an integrated whole rather than a series of discrete 
epiteodes. I have already indicated in Chapter 1 of this text that my 
view of my practice was initially of a structured nature, both in 
diachronic and synchronic terms. By this I mean that I saw the content 
of my practice, its ontology, as structure: certain inputs would achieve 
certain outputs. I saw the historical aspects of my practice also as 
structured: I had undertaken my initial teacher training; then a course
in EFL; then a course in applied linguistics; and so on; but each 'box' 
was self contained, and did not influence the next in line.
How I began consciously to draw Dn previous experience to make sense of 
present experience. I had been quick to apply to my work the structures 
of my initial training in the disciplines of education. I now re­
assessed the theories I was using (though I did not express it in those 
terms then: see also Elliott, 1983), and gradually came to see the
appropriateness to my work of reconstructive theories.
I had been attracted to the work of Chomsky since my studies in 
linguistics, 1971-72. I suddenly saw the relevance of his
epistemologies to the problems I was experiencing in my attempts to 
characterise the nature of personal and social education (or values 
education, as I began to re-phrase it: see also Chapter 5 of this text). 
My reading in this field had been dominated by the literature that 
stressed the importance of the technical excellence of classroom 
practice (e.g. Baldwin and Veils, 1981); by the work of John Vilson, 
whose assumptions about the nature of values education and the control
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of educational knowledge had influenced my own (itemised in Chapter 1 of 
this text); and by the views of Piaget and Kohlberg, which assumed the 
linear nature of development by accretion.
My major break with the assumptions of this literature was in my 
adopting Chomsky's notions of competence and performance. I initially 
hypothesised the existence of levels of mind that could be characterised 
in terms of different functions. The level of competence, I suggested 
(McNiff 1984, 1986), was the area of values formation, while the level 
of performance was of values manifestation. There was often much 
slippage between the two, however, as manifested in my practice: e.g. 
The boys in PC's class act in a silly fashion (VT4). They see 
themselves on video, and ask for it to be erased. "If people saw that," 
they say, "they would get the wrong impression of us." So I reasoned 
that performance was not always a direct manifestation of competence, as 
Chomsky had also suggested in his 1965 ' Aspects of the theory of
syntax'. Therefore there had to be some intermediate factor that 
distorted the underlying competence of the individual. I came to the 
later conclusion (see Chapter 6 of this text) that these factors were 
transformations of intention.
This major break was not only one to do with the substantial concepts of 
my study, but attacked the very epistemologies that I was using. It was 
here that I began moving away from my previous views of knowledge as 
processes of systems to my current views of knowledge as forms of 
thought (see Chapters 4 and 5 of this text).
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What, then, had I achieved with self? In terms of the personal and
social education project, I had dislodged entrenched views of the nature 
of education, with its embedded assumptions about the nature of persons 
and personhood, and developed different perspectives. I had dislodged 
views about my overall project, expanding from the narrow perspective of 
the nature of personal and social education as a 'subject' to the
broader perspective of the nature of education as a form of life; these
views incorporating those about the focus of educational research, 
whether a study of other people or a study of self. And I had 
established the groundwork that was later (Part Two) to focus on the 
generative enterprise (Chomsky, 1982), and to suggest that educational 
theory and research is primarily concerned with a study by the self of 
the self's thought processes, and, far from being grounded in
institutions, is grounded in the individual mind.
Conclusion
These, then, are indicators of changes in my thought and action that 
began in 1982-83.
In Autumn 1983 I returned to my home school to start teaching again. I 
was frustrated at having to leave the intense involvement of my in- 
service work, but in retrospect this was no bad thing. I now had the 
opportunity to put my newly-created ideas to the test of my own practice 




This section documents my teaching practice over the years 1983-1986. 
These years were increasingly problematical. 1983-84 saw many sudden 
staffing changes, often preventing me from carrrying out my own 
teaching. I often had to switch classes in mid-stream, as, for example, 
when I took over the teaching of German for two terms. In 1984 there 
were such difficult family problems that I took a year's suspension from 
my formal studies. In 1985 industrial action brought severe disruption 
to my own teaching and administrative commitments. The difficulties 
exacerbated a latent heart problem which crescendoed in 1986, causing me 
to be hospitalised for much of the year, and take subsequent early 
retirement in 1987.
These years, though traumatic in one sense, were in another sense the 
most formative of my teaching life. I truly believe that we find the 
best in ourselves when we are faced with adversity. I felt 
professionally and personally isolated, but the isolation - certainly 
from many of my colleagues because of the action - brought me closer to 
the children; and the personal isolation because of family problems and 
threatening ill health put me more in touch with my own thoughts. So 
1983-86 were years characterised by dissipated actions, but intense 
reflection; and these years also saw significant value shifts and 
changes in my practice, as I shall now detail.
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(i) A crisis of practice: reasons for a conscious change in practice
I returned to school in Autumn 1983. For the following year I had no 
opportunity to do any systematic research work in personal and social 
education* since I took over the teaching of German in the school, and 
since now was the onset of industrial action.
In Autumn 1984 I had a more stable teaching timetable, but school was by 
now feeling the effects of the action. I was to teach English to a 
group of about 15 third year girls and boys (13/14 year olds). The 
children were difficult, far more so than Malcolm's group. They were 
disenchanted low achievers, and hostile in the extreme. Three were 
already on the shortlist for special education, and did in fact leave 
during the course of the year. Two boys were receiving psychiatric 
help; one girl was in care because of parental assault; another girl was 
being encouraged by mother to be sexually adventurous (but in the 
meantime mother was asking my help to control her daughter). It really 
was the most difficult group, and I shrank from teaching them. It would 
have been impossible to split the children up, for we seemed at that 
time to be inundated with difficult children, and teaching life in a 
large part of the school was tense.
( 13* )
It took me some weeks into the autumn term to decide to tackle the group 
as a research issue (this was still my current epistemology). The point 
uppermost in my mind was that I couldn't hope to try any of the Button 
methodologies here. Yet I couldn't just leave the situation. The 
children were terribly unruly, and I simply had to keep a firm 
authoritarian lid on the whole lot to avoid potential anarchy.
Yet I had no other group available. I was otherwise teaching my usual 
'bitty* timetable, and that was disrupted by the action, so it had to be 
this group or none other - and time, as I saw it then, was running out 
for me to produce the 'results' for my research project.
How, this is a most interesting point for the epistemology of my 
project. Here is a manifestion of my entrenched positivist attitudes of 
<1) knowledge being an accumulative commodity (2) demonstration of that 
knowledge by replication of experiment and repetition of result. I 
intended my project to follow the sequence:
1 The experiment with Malcolm's group, 1981-82 (I still regarded it as 
an 'experiment WITH' the group, rather than an investigation into my own 
practice), during which I had held certain hypotheses about the nature 
of the Button work, and had proved these hypotheses to my satisfaction;
2 My in-service work, 1982-83, which had also for me the nature of an 
experiment, only this time to see if other people could do as I did with 
as clearly observable results in terms of more socially adjusted 
children;
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3 My work again in school, 1983 onwards, to implement the Button work 
more ' efficiently in school in my own classes; to introduce to my 
colleagues this work, whose benefits I had demonstrated, particularly at 
The Oaks which was now held up even at county level as a shining 
example. This approach should be institutionalised, I felt, as part of 
the overall pastoral programme. I would see to it that staff received 
appropriate training and back up.
I believe that this is a clear indication of my views of knowledge at 
the time; that knowledge is a commodity; that it is accumulated in a 
linear, accretive fashion; that theory dictates practice; that 
educational knowledge may be controlled by self-styled experts; and, as 
such, it becomes reified.
Possibly, had other circumstances of life been stable at the time, I 
might have gone along this path in all innocence. A crisis of practice 
occurred, however, that changed things, the crisis being generated by 
two factors; (a) the lack of harmony is external circumstances, and (b) 
my own dissatisfaction with my practice.
I have already indicated the lack of harmony in school. Industrial 
action was rife. No one wanted to listen to my ideas for 
institutionalised schemes. The move in the staff was away from all 
imposition, and I found my overtures often rebuffed. I seemed not only 
to be getting nowhere fast in trying to establish this innovation; my 
efforts seemed to be counterproductive, generating a certain amount of 
hostility. I had no one in school to whom to turn for advice. in 1984
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I had also experienced profoundly disturbing family difficulties. The
whole set of circumstances became overwhelming and I applied for, and
received a year's suspension to my studies.
Added to this was an acute dissatisfaction with my practice. The
dissatisfaction was centred on my relationship with the children. The
group of Autumn 1984 were deeply hostile, totally 'unsuitable', I felt 
at the time, for any pastoral work.
The epistemology of my project until now was demolished, then, for I 
could no longer continue a consecutive programme of study with 
colleagues or children. I came to view the year's suspension not so 
much a break, as an end to my project.
Hope springs eternal. I have indicated at a number of points that my 
life is an act of faith. This was truly the testing ground for that 
faith. I recall a short story I read as a child, in which space 
travellers were taken captive on an alien planet, and imprisoned in a 
cage. The earth men were visited by a mouse-like creature, which they 
entrapped in a make-shift cage for their amusement. The aliens promptly 
set them free, on the grounds that they must be creatures of 
intelligence to want to control other forms of life.
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This perhaps was my saving grace, though I do not think domination was 
now my motive. I had been cut down to size by colleagues, children and 
home circumstances, and there was much more of that in store. But I was 
still intensely curious. I wanted to know, now perhaps more than ever, 
why I was not getting through.
I felt I could not approach many of the staff. The senior management 
team all had to tread very carefully these days. I seemed unable to 
'use the children as a research field' because of their hostility and 
indiscipline. I was thrown back on my own resources, to the extent of 
becoming quite introspective. This, I believe, was when I started 
realising that what I was doing was not so much 'experimenting on' the 
children and colleagues, but challenging the assumptions of my own mind, 
and investigating my own practice, consciously and deliberately. 
Although I was officially suspended for a year, I took up my 
investigations again in January, 1985, but now from an entirely 
different perspective. I was not then sufficiently aware of the 
changes, or the reasons for the changes, but I had a sure intuitive 
knowledge that I had reached a certain turning point in my practice, and 
that this time I was on the track of something much better.
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<li> -The action: 1984-1986
N
In Chapter 1 of this text I have referred to Malcolm’s group, because
Malcolm was the individual whose personal practice underwent the most
observably significant changes. In this section I shall refer to 
Vincent's group, on the same basis. From a loud-mouthed rogue, Vincent
became a strong, caring young adult.
I started teaching Vincent's group in Autumn, 1984. I have already 
indicated the difficult nature of this group. The first term was spent 
largely keeping control. Because, however, they were the only group I 
had to work with, I decided to carry on regardless, and start a formal 
'study' of the group in January, 1985.
I decided that it would be useless trying out formal Button techniques 
to begin with; so I had no clearly formulated plan to tackle a not 
clearly formulated problem. I fell back on Jack Whitehead's 1977 
formulation, starting with ' I experience a problem when some of my 
educational values are denied in my practice'.
I captured that denial on videotape (VT4) in January, 1985. On this 
tape I appeal throughout to the children's rationality, trying to get 
them to the stage where they will listen to each other and be courteous 
to each other. There are momentary agreements by individuals, but, by 
and large, the group appear as uncontrollable louts.
( 139 )
In my mind, I think I had given up on these children even before we 
started living together, in the sense that I saw no hope that they could 
ever become socially adjusted; they were already too far gone for that. 
The most we could ever hope to achieve, I reasoned, was that they would 
adopt some modicum of personal sensitivity in order to give their peers 
- and me - a chance to live as autonomous beings - in other words, to
recognise the rights of other individuals in establishing a basis for
dialogue.
How interesting that, because of the nature of the factors of my 
practice, I had changed the basis of my practice in order to accommodate 
the factors; and this change led to the development of my practice. 
With Malcolm's group I had aimed for the social adjustment of the 
children, in which the overriding ethic was to produce the certain kind 
of person whose formation was grounded in my interpretation of the 
literature. With Vincent's group I aimed at establishing a basis for
dialogue, in which the overriding ethic was an appeal to the rationality
of each individual to agree to the establishment of a dialogical 
community. I had veered from the golden rule of Kant to the social 
ethic of Habermas (see below: 3).
I worked with this group until Spring, 1986; in total, about 18 months. 
The group changed individuals, but a core of about six remained 
constant. I found in later months that I could rely on these members to 
introduce new individuals to the moral code that gradually emerged.
( UO )
The detail of my practice is to be found in the audio and videotapes of 
that practice, 1985-86, in all, about 40 hours of recording. I shall 
not'attempt here to record the detail, but give a general description of 
the actions.
Ve had 3 x 1  hour 10 minutes lessons per week, designated ’English' on 
the timetable. Some of the group were almost illiterate; others were 
bright, but had been demoted to the group because of behavioural 
problems. I developed a strategy of mixing basic skills of literacy 
with the reading of literature, while at the same time encouraging the 
atmosphere of care that would encourage learning. This latter was a 
higher priority aim for me.
I tried again the techniques that had been successful with Malcolm's 
group - using video and tape recording. There was not the immediate 
impact as with Malcolm's group, but certainly the atmosphere seemed less 
charged when we used the tape recorder than 'live' action.
The first audio recording I made (AT38: 10.1.85) is my initial
introduction to the children of the idea of my doing research; of 
inviting them to Join with me; of my appeal to their sensibilities to 
try to get on with each other. I promise them a trip to Bath if they 
will co-operate. The children appear interested, and give a guarded 
assurance that they will agree to work with me and with each other, but 
the action on this tape often degenerates to name calling. However, 
throughout, there are clear indications of the children's interest in
a
what must have been a novel form of life.
( H1 )
The work now continued for the next six months. I made frequent tape 
recordings with the group. It is evident from a survey of the tapes 
th&t trends gradually emerged; particularly two major trends: (1) an
increase in the children's exercise of rationality; (2) an increase of 
my own rationality.
The children's rationality
The evidence on tape is characterised by a slow development of 
utterances grounded in rational thought. In the early stages of our 
work together, the children's utterances were in the nature of outbursts 
largely grounded in preconceived assumptions. The assumptions usually 
referred to a view of other persons as objects external to self who were 
products of institutionalised mores. For example, there is much abusive 
name calling, references such as 'He's thick'; 'He doesn't know what 
he's talking about'. References to teachers are that they are products 
of the institution, external and hostile to self: 'They don't like us;
they treat us like dirt; it's them and us'. References to self were 
also as products of a system, and reflected the assumptions of 
controlled forms of life; self-references frequently revealed a low 
self-esteem and negative self-image: 'We're dinloes; I'm a thicky;
everyone says I'm no good;' and so on.
( 1'+2 )
Clearly Individuals in the group progressed at different speeds. In 
retrospect I see that I could have evolved a research strategy where I 
focused on a small group of individuals, charting the evidence of their 
development. Indeed, such a detailed investigation would still be 
possible from the wealth of taped evidence that I have; but at the 
moment I have not the time for such detailed investigation, preferring 
rather to approach my enquiry from the broad scope of general trends.
Some individuals seemed to make little progress in exercising their 
rationality. Marcus and Gary, for example, consistently refuse to stop 
name calling and associated utterances; but on occasion (e.g. AT40), 
particularly when challenged by their peers, they insist that they can 
’behave' if they want, and do sometimes exhibit very clear sensitivities 
about other people. Their disruptive influence was quite severe at 
times, and often led to a breakdown in the communication patterns that 
were otherwise emerging in the group. DF, a visitor to the group, 
comments on this (AT39):
"They certainly seem to be trying, but some individuals appear set on 
wrecking the group."
These children were those designated for special education, and did in 
fact leave us in Summer 1985. On the other hand, Richard, another 
candidate for special education, shows a remarkable capacity for 
sensitivity and personal integrity. In AT39 he makes it clear that his 
previous efforts to display these qualities had been met with rqbuffs 
from his teachers, and he had felt embarrassed and hesitant to allow
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this side of his character to be publicly available. Now, however, 
given the forums of agreed frameworks of care, he is happy to allow what 
he sees as his true character to emerge, and to abandon the image of 
'tough guy' that he had been forced by peer pressure to adopt. The two 
faces of Richard may be seen on VT5, where we are visited by another 
teacher, and on AT39, in public conversation with Richard. Our teacher 
shows himself to be hesitant in his relationships with the children. 
Indeed, the children seem generous in their overtures to him, but are 
met with unease. Richard, on this occasion, shows a witty malignancy 
towards the teacher, easily out-smarting him in conversation. On AT40, 
the de-briefing of this interview, I take Richard to task over this, 
pointing out that he was cleverer and more assured than the teacher, and 
had been cruel to use his superior confidence. Richard agrees.
As time went on, then, the general trend was away from agreed platforms 
of indifference and hostile apathy, with clear recourse to established 
norms of views of persons as objects - and objects of negative attitudes 
- to negotiated transformative episodes, in which the children agreed to 
try out new forms of life. The negotiation lay in my direct appeal to 
their rationality as a basis for their actions: "Why did you say/do
that?" is a continual question, to which I demand an answer that is 
grounded in the individual's analysis of his own mental constructs 
rather than in reified norms Cl did that because ... ' rather than
'He's a ... so I did it'.)
In this pattern, I suggest that our joint and individual actions took a 
pro-active form rather than re-active, as identified also in Schutz's 
(1972) 'in order to' as opposed to 'because' motives: 'in order to'
implies a paradigm of intentionality that is grounded in individual 
critical awareness of values-in-action; 'because of' implies a paradigm 
of persuasion that is grounded in social phenomena that are outside the 
control of the individual, in which the values of others shape the 
intentions of the individual. The transformative episodes, I suggest, 
reflect the developing awarenesses of the children for the need for 
change; their entrenched attitudes are challenged by my insistence on 
personal Justification for actions, and the disequilibrium thus 
generated allows new attitudes/behaviours to emerge (see also Chapter 7 
of this text).
There is a nice piece (AT42; 26.4.85) which I think shows the essential 
qualities that the children were developing, along with the validation 
of the claims about their developing rationality that I am making. This 
was in the visit to the class of FD, a teacher who had left school but
was back as a supply teacher. She was passing the window, and I asked
her if she would Join us. During her visit, I was called away from
class, and the children held her in courteous conversation throughout.
The tape recording of the de-briefing she and I then made captures the 
flavour of her impressions of the children. Her comments include the 
following:
( H5 )
FD I don't really think they were talking to me as a teacher, as 
perhaps one would ask a teacher a question. No, they were talking to me 
as'a person, because since that lesson, if I bumped into any of them in 
the playground it has been instantly 'Hello, Miss’ and there is some 
kind of rapport. ... I felt that you didn't have to keep reminding the 
group of why you were there every two minutes. (see also below)
In Autumn 1985 I was timetabled with the group again, only this time the 
more disruptive members had departed, and we acquired new colleagues. I 
continued audio and video tape-recording with the group. They were now 
in their fourth year, still designated a low achievement group, but it 
was hoped that some members would go on to take CSE English.
This term I concentrated more on formal aspects of study, and kept 
Friday afternoons as the time set apart for personal and social 
education. I used video on a number of occasions here (VT7, 8) and I 
think there is now a distinct emergence of behaviours which are direct 
reflections of an emerging values system that is grounded in 
rationality. I may point to the criteria identified by Habermas (1979) 
as being the hallmarks of this rationality when exercised in the 
evolution of norms of social intercourse; those criteria of sincerity, 
truth, honesty and appropriateness. I believe my children had developed 
an awareness of the need for such norms; and, more importantly, were now 
aware of the need for a higher-order value of the need for rationality.
( H 6  )
I have already referred to the significant development of Vincent. In 
1985 he was quietly disruptive, but seemed always to be assessing the 
situation with his peers before deciding what to do. It was the 
development of this caution that was most striking. In our early work 
he went along with the boys; but during the summer term, Vincent's voice 
of moderation is heard more frequently. He became a stabilising force, 
often agreeing with me when I challenged the silly behaviour of others. 
He did not necessarily agree with the content of my questions, but with 
the fact that I would not accept behaviour which was outside our agreed 
frame of reference. He often supported me with "Ydu tell them, Miss" or 
"That's right, Miss, I agree". Vincent's parents started keeping in 
close touch with me, insisting that I had become a steadying influence 
and that he had 'learnt sense' instead of following the code of the 
estate on which they lived. Unfortunately I did not keep a systematic 
record of these episodes. There is, however, clear evidence of 
Vincent’s exercise of rationality in the videotapes we made in 1985/86.
VT9 is with a small group and a visiting teacher. At this time I was 
becoming unwell, and had to use strategies in school that would help me 
keep going in lessons. Ve had arranged a videorecording episode, but I 
was feeling quite ill. I usually delegate the responsibility of the 
technical aspects of filming to the children - they are much better at 
it that I - but on this occasion I was glad to let the children take 
over. I had previously set up the equipment, but it did not work. I 
was in despair how I would keep the group occupied for an hour in my 
state of health. Fortunately Vincent organised the group to investigate 
the equipment and to seat themselves, explaining to our visiting teacher
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what we were about to do. Some of this organisation is captured on the
film Which we took as the equipment started working.
The same sensitivity is shown by Vincent, and seemingly adopted by
others, in a most touching episode (VT9). Jason, one of the boys in the 
group, had consistently refused to join in the group discussions for the 
year that we had worked together. He maintained a sullen silence and 
his swastika handwriting. No matter how much I complained, he still 
formed his letters square and put spikes on the letters, as well as 
decorated his books with Nazi grafitti. On the occasion of the filming, 
the group started talking about hobbies to our visitor, a good friend of 
mine called Fred whom I had often recruited as a visitor to groups in my 
in-service work. Jason suddenly seemed to warm to Fred, who typically 
encouraged Jason to continue. Jason then recounted his exploits on
motor cycles with great gusto. The other five members of the group
listened to him with respect. I later commented to the group how
impressed I was with what he had to say, but my comments were met with 
gentle amusement. Evidently Jason had been fabricating it all. Yet the 
group had not interrupted, nor called his bluff, but had been content to 
listen to Jason's stories with sympathy and sensitivity.
( H 8  )
The final film (VT10) of my teaching is of the group with RS, the 
English adviser for Dorset, who asks them what they have learnt with me. 
The children answer that they have learnt to listen to each other, to 
understand each other and themselves, that they have grown up. He is 
impressed by the quality of their social ease, as well as the quality of 
their responses, and congratulates them on their personal and social 
skills.
When I was hospitalised in March 1986 the children wrote to me, to tell 
me that they were still helping each other. I think this is the 
greatest accolade, the best evidence that they had each developed the 
power to get on with each other without me.
My rationality
It was clear to me from the start that the children were not going to 
come round to my way of thinking, 1 My thinking' could be characterised 
at two levels of intention at least: the first, higher-order level was 
at the level of principles in which I believe social intercourse is 
grounded, the meeting of minds and the agreement by individuals to 
recognise and respect individual integrity. This was my educational aim 
and what I wished for the children in my role as educator. The second 
lower-order level was at the level of rules in which I believe my 
domination was grounded, the imposition of my expectations on the 
children. This was my institutionalised aim, and what I wished for 
myself, in my role as representative of the institution.
( H 9  )
They made it clear that they would not obey me. The first term, Autumn 
1984,' was spent keeping order, using the mechanics of the school's 
system of reprisals - extra work, staying in, etc. My miserable term 
was spent punishing myself as much as I was punishing the children; more 
so, because, as well as having to endure detention with them, my life as 
a teacher took the form of a systematic suppression of my educational 
values.
I thought about the problem deeply, and decided to try the strategy of 
breaking with domination and appealing to reason (see above). As the 
children's rationality was allowed to develop, so was mine.
In this text I continually return to the theme of reciprocity as the 
ethic of communication. While it is true that reciprocity is the 
semantic base, it is not always quite so evident that it is the moral 
base (Searle, 1989), some schools of thought preferring a view of the 
domination of one will over another. The result is then 'one-way'
communication, that is, instruction.
This latter view was my own in January 1985, a theory of systematically 
distorted communication (Habermas, 1976). My practice was guided by an 
erroneous theory, shown in this paragraph to be in error because of the 
slippage between form and substance; the 'theory' about the form of 
communication grounded in reciprocity; and the theory about the 
substance of communication (my practice) grounded in domination.
( 150 )
I focus here upon the reciprocal nature of rationality as the basis for 
communication. The children exhibited the deliberate development of
their rationality as they moved away from wanting to dominate me and 
their peers (see preceding section) to a situation of negotiated 
understandings. I equally moved from domination to negotiation.
The action of this move may be traced through the tapes and transcripts. 
AT38 is when I spelled out to the children what I hoped we could all 
adopt as a platform for negotiated values. I suggested to them that the 
substance of our lessons together should be characterised by
understandings - we stopped calling names, we made a serious attempt at 
learning - and that the form of our lessons should be characterised by 
agreements - we would adopt a view that we listen. So we would agree
(form) to agree (substance). The tape shows that the children agreed
that it might be worth a try (a step forward in the framework - form), 
but degenerated still into name calling (stasis in the content - 
substance).
In Chapter 6 I present a theory of the nature of change, in which form 
and substance are in constant interchange, as structure dissolves into 
transformation, which momentarily gells again into structure. I believe 
this process is manifested here in the development of class practice, on 
the part of the children and myself. Understanding grew on the part of 
the children towards each other, characterised on the tapes as a 
diminution of abuse and intolerance, by an emergent readiness to be 
sympathetic and to listen to other people's points of view, and a desire
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to act on these aspects - AT40: Gary: "We listen to each other now. We 
don't call each other names any more. We don't much about so much."
My awn understanding towards the children developed. This was part of 
the conscious strategy I adopted in January 1985. Truth to tell, I did 
not even lihe some of the children in the group; but we had to live 
together, and the lead for making life tolerable (survival!) had to come 
from me. Yet even as I played at it over the months, it actually 
happened. As I tried to implement my own hypothesis - how I could 
improve the quality of life for us all - it actually worked - the 
quality of life was improved. My theory, which had sprung from a desire 
to improve an unsatisfactory practice, was implemented as a new form of 
practice. Through my conscious actions, at a performance level, I 
developed new attitudes and values at a competence level. Through 
actively trying to find common grounds for understandings, through 
trying to root out those elements in the children to which I could 
appeal, I actually found those elements and grew to like them. And the 
reverse seemed to happen, that the children found aspects of me that 
they could share, and grew to like those.
My behaviour changed significantly over the 18 months. The Autumn 1984 
self was dominated by theories of knowledge that emphasised the control 
elements: control by the body of reified knowers over an uncritical
public; control by the institution of the functional self; control by 
the functional self of the personal self; control by teachers of pupils; 
control by the pupils' peer-cultural selves over personal selves; and sos
on. The January - September 1985 self underwent a slow, painful process
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of liberation of mind. Liberation is painful (Fromm: Fear of Freedom, 
1942)' in the relinquishing of norms, clear frames of reference that have 
been established by the reified knowers, and the setting adrift of the 
self to take responsibility of the self. I believe this is what is 
referred to in the term 'autonomy' (e.g. HMI, 1981) - this unselfish
self-sufficiency, which is the conscious application of understandings 
of the nature of freedom.
My behavioural changes in the tapes are manifested in utterances that 
are grounded in I-Thou relationships rather than I-It (Buber, 1937; 
Maslow, 1968; see also below, 1:3), and are characterised by the ethics 
articulated by Rogers (1961) that the disturbed person is not in need of 
cure but in need of a bridge to put himself back in touch with himself. 
I often read Rogers's work during 1985-86, and I was deeply influenced 
by these views that were helping me to understand myself and my 
children.
My speech acts also seem to move towards a questioning approach, rather 
than an approach that rests on a set fund of answers. When asked for my 
opinion, or challenged on an opinion, (e.g. AT41), I am ready to share 
my views, but I make it clear that these are my views and I do not 
necessarily expect the children to adopt them. Vhat I do expect is for 
the children to give me a courteous hearing, even if they disagree with 
me, as I am prepared to listen to them.
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I seem to develop questions of a more critical nature. My earlier 
questions, until 1985, were based on 'closed' heuristics: what? where? 
who? which? when? I submit that this type of question begs answers of a 
specific nature: e.g. Q. When did he go? A: He went yesterday. As 
such, they are manifestations of a mentality that assumes control; the 
answers appear to exist already in the mind of the questioner, who is 
exercising an hypothesis about his understanding of the nature of truth. 
My later questions, January 1985 onwards, adopt the more 'open' nature 
of the heuristics 'why?' and 'how?', which require answers grounded in
the answerer's creativity and rationality, rather than his acquiescence.
By adopting this stand, I seem to be requiring explanations from the
children, reasons for their acting as they do. In Chapter 7 I present
my theory that the action is guided by the intentions, an applied 
rationality, that is the transformative element between competence and
performance. I may say, on this premise, that actions are an
external!sation of values when grounded in the critical reflection of 
the knowing subject (see also Chapter 8). In my practice of 1985, I was 
working towards creating a community of active knowers, who could agree 
value-norms through their critical reflection on their practices.
My own acknowledgement of how I put these ideas into practice, and that
I had radically changed my own ideas, is presented in two crucial
documents: AT42 (26.4.85) and my paper to the BERA conference (1985).
The transcript of the audiorecording with FD (see above) is an 
articulation of this foregoing section. For me, the crucial utterances 
are:
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"I believe very strongly in the autonomy of the child ... I'm hesitant 
to use the word 'progress' because it sounds as if they've started off 
from somewhere bad, and it's not. I mean, it's not a disease; it's 
learned behaviour that I'm trying to help them unlearn, or learn other 
behaviours. I'm trying to present other options to them ... I'm 
desperately trying to empathise with that group. By 'empathy' I mean I
try to meet them on their own terms ... I don't judge them. I might
occasionally say 'I disagree with you', but I don't say that in a
Judgemental way. . . . Until recently my teaching style was based on the 
premise that I was right ... I [thought!, No, I am going about this the 
wrong way ... I must gD in thinking, I am right as far as I'm concerned, 
but I must look at them as people with every right to think what they 
think."
It was such calculated reflection-in-action that led to the second 
essential statement in the BERA paper that I no longer regarded the 
children as the children I wanted them to be, but as persons in their 
own right.
Such documents, I submit, are indicators of monumental changes in 
practice, and in the mental life in which the practice is grounded. I
will now turn to the epistemology that I consciously adopted. Here 
again is evidence of a values shift, for in my early practice (see 
Chapter 1 of this text: my 'experiment' with the control group) my
epistemology dictated practice. Now, I began to view my practice as 




I hope it is evident from the text so far that, from 1981, I became 
restless with epistemologies that are grounded in the notion of control. 
The restlessness stemmed from the fact that my practice appeared not to 
be evolving from my interpretations of the dominant literature (the 
literature on behavioural psychology (e.g. Skinner, 1968), cognitive- 
developmental psychology (e.g. Kohlberg, 1976), empiric-positivist 
approaches to educational research (e.g. Egglestone et al, 1976)), but 
appeared to be evolving from a form of life which was based on the need 
for principles mutually agreed by rational individuals within dialogical 
communities. The shift in my practice reflected the move towards such 
principle-governed action and away from rule-dominated action, and the 
epistemologies I used as part of my mental processes equally moved 
towards rational-critical forms, and away from controlled-acceptant 
forms.
Although the restlessness began in 1981, the clear articulation of the 
break with dominant forms of epistemologies of educational research took 
place in my 1984 text. In this article I trace the steps that led me to 
adopt a form of educational research that epitomised my own enquiry in 
action; and then how I came to question the assumptions of the dominant 
presentations of an action research 'methodology' as applicable to my 
own practice. It was here that I formulated the notion of the 
importance of the generative component in educational research.
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To make this brief resume more explicit:
My early practice was guided by my reliance on what I now see as being 
controlled forms of educational knowledge, primary sources being the 
'disciplines' of education as an overall guide to practice in the 
classroom, the cognitive-developmental approach (Piaget and Kohlberg) as 
an overall guide to my practice in personal and social education, and 
normative-analytical epistemologies as a general methodology for my own 
research study. I rejected this latter (Chapter 1 of this text) as 
being too restrictive for my practice, and investigated the literature 
of action research as an alternative form of educational enquiry.
My practice of 1982-83 as an in-service supporter, and 1983-84 as 
classroom teacher, was now consciously viewed as problematic - that is, 
I identified specific concerns with a view to finding possible 
solutions, rather than stay with the normative-analytic paradigm that is 
non-problematic, offering teachers answers-by-precedent. At the time I
believed in action research as a unified school of thought, with 
practitioners all following the same lines. I did not yet question the 
difference in philosophy between the work of Jack Whitehead at Bath, and 
the work of Stephen Kemmis, John Elliott and Dave Ebbutt, currently or 
latterly at East Anglia. This difference was in fact investigated and 
articulated in my 1988 text. In 1983, I did see that the texts of 
Elliott, Kemmis and Ebbutt were restrictive of my classroom practice, 
leading me to see that practice as having to fit in with pre-identified 
modes of conduct. I was far more inclined towards the Whitehead 
characterisation of action research as an open-ended series of
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questions, which did not attempt to provide specific answers other than 
to encourage practitioners to discover their own answers through 
critical questions about their own practices.
In my 1984 text I critiqued the work of Elliott, Ebbutt and Kemmis, as I 
have also done in my 1988 text, and showed how I rejected the linear, 
closed format on the grounds that such linearity and closedness did not 
reflect my own practice. Instead, I tried to show how I followed 
Whitehead's notion of question and answer as the basis of my 
epistemology. I also suggested the importance of a generative
component, as giving the flexibility for the iterative qualities of an 
enquiry in action.
To explain briefly: One of my central concerns was (and still is) the
random nature of a problematic action enquiry. Problems are by
definition spontaneous and uncontrollable, because they are caused to 
the practitioner by outside influences. The whole basis of action 
research is that it is a collaborative endeavour, in which one
practitioner will move forward her own understandings (of herself - 
McNiff and Whitehead; of other people - Kemmis, Elliott and Ebbutt) 
through dialogue and mutual agreements with other similarly concerned 
practitioners. If research is left on an isolationist plane - if I
present hypotheses by and for myself - problems do not arise. I am an 
isolationist individual, and my answers are universally valid, since the 
universe is limited to one. As soon as I engage in pluralist forms of 
life, however, my answers are not automatically valid, other people
Jl
holding other opinions, and their validity needs to be negotiated
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(Chapter 7 and 8). Hence I say that problems are caused to the 
practitioner by the other people involved in the enquiry.
As such, the concept of 'problem' may further be identified as a denial 
of values in practice (Whitehead, 1977). I was concerned about the 
randomness of these denials, this concern being overlooked or summarily 
dismissed (Kemmis and McTaggart, 1982) by the dominant literature. I 
had experienced the randomness in my own practice; as soon as I thought 
I had solved one set of problems, another set arose in its place. At 
times it was difficult to identify which was my main area of concern, 
since subsidiary problems often became more significant than the primary 
one.
I felt that an enquiry ought to have an in-built facility to change 
focu3 as and when it was necessary. I referred to the notion of 
generative capacity (Chomsky, 1957, 1965).
Chomsky maintains that enquiries that proceed from a comparative base 
(as structuralist theories do) depend on epistemologies that do not 
require the personal commitment of the enquirer. In linguistic 
enquiries, structuralist theories view the creation of language as a 
matter of precedent and habit (e.g. Skinner, 1968; Bloomfield, 1933), 
and approach the task of studying matters of language use and acquistion 
by recourse to precedent: comparing one language with another by means 
of normative-analytic strategies (Mackay, 1965).
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Chomsky took the view that a persons's capacity for language could not 
be understood in this fashion. Such strategies could not account for 
the unlimited production of novel utterances (Chapter 2 and 6 of this 
text). Instead, Chomsky opted for a reconstructive theory that 
hypothesised the existence of an innate disposition towards a language 
capacity, together with a generative component that allowed the 
unlimited creation of language.
I used this notion in my characterisation of the nature of educational 
research. I reasoned that the resolution of problems was the incentive 
for undertaking research; that problems, resulting from a denial of 
values in practice, were the axis of the enquiry; that problems seemed 
to spawn new problems; and the way to maintain a balanced focus was to 
hypothesise the existence of a generative component which allowed the 
enquirer to ask questions appertaining to the particular problem under 
consideration.
In Chapter 6 of this text I indicate how I became dissatisfied, like 
Chomsky, with the dominant paradigm of research into moral education. I 
critique comparative theories and suggest that, instead of studying 
descriptions of parallel studies, what we ought to be about is trying to 
find an explanation for why people do as they do - the study of the 
foundation of values rather than the study of possible organisations of 
values systems.
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My later practice, 1984-86, was based on the idea of creating answers to 
problems through questions appertaining to those problems: a critical 
reflection as a means for the potential transformation of an 
unsatisfactory situation. I believe that this phenomenon occurred on 
two tiers: (1) of my critical reflection on my own practice which I (2) 
then communicated to the children in an effort to encourage them to 
reflect critically on their practice. By setting up this chain, I hope 
that I managed to create an atmosphere in which individuals' rationality 
was encouraged to develop.
(iv) The results
Following on from section (i) 'Action' of this part, I consider now what 
I can claim were the outcomes of my changed practice. I make the 
following claims:
a I helped bring about an improvement in schooling 
b I helped bring about an improvement in education
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<a) An improvement in schooling
I have already pointed out (Chapters 1 and 2) that, as I see it, there 
is often much mis-naming in the literature. Vhat many people refer to 
as 'education' would be more aptly termed 'schooling': that is, a
concentration on the efficient delivery system in which knowledge is 
seen as a commodity to be passed on to the consumer by the manufacturer.
If I regard my practice in this way, as I did in 1981-83, I can say that 
the system came to operate in 1984-88 more efficiently because of my 
efforts. The manufacturer (myself) was by now more technically skilled 
in the production of the service/product - I was certainly more 
skilled/knowledgeable about the underlying philosophies of personal and 
social education. The delivery system (lessons) was more efficient - I 
was more skilled in techniques/presentations and management of the 
clients. The consumers (pupils) were more responsive to the product - I 
advertised and packaged the product attractively in order to make them 
more willing to obtain what was on offer. Generally, I can say that 
there was a great increase in consumer response.
But in 1983/84 I abandoned this view of education. I started seeing 
education primarily as what goes on in the mind, and secondarily what 
goes on in the classroom. For me, the action of the classroom became an 
extension of the action of the individual mind; and this later led to a 
realisation that free individual action is grounded in the values system 
of the rational individual, and free community action is grounded in the 
shared values system of mutually agreed rational individuals.
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(b) An improvement in education
I will then reiterate my definition of education as what goes on in the 
mind. Specifically, I will suggest that education is the process of an 
improvement in individual rationality. (The fact that I may coin this 
particular working definition is, I suggest, tangible proof that my own 
education has improved - I am able to exercise my improved rationality 
to come to this point of view and abandon my previous views about the 
consumer base to so-called 'education'). The process of an improvement 
in individual rationality, I believe, may be traced through the 
systematic application of that rationality in the detection of specific 
concerns and processes of working towards a negation (Chapter 6) of the 
negative aspects of such concerns. Such a process may be seen in a 
series of action-reflection cycles, in which negative situations (a 
negation of values in practice) are transformed through individual 
rationality into positive situations (a realisation of values in 
practice). In Chapter 6 of this text I present my hypothesis about the 
'mechanics' of such structures and transformations (see also 3 below).
I am claiming that my practice 1984-86 brought about an improvement in 
education. According to the working definitions I am presenting here, I 
can say that in this chapter so far I have traced the process of my own 
developing rationality and that of my children's. I have attempted to 
show how I engaged in systematic action-reflection, this process itself 
an avenue by which my rationality emerged, and was then absorbed into 
the action-reflection, to intensify my experience of my own thought-in-
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action. I have tried to show how I encouraged the children to explore 
the sane avenues.
Through my critical awareness I have come to the notion that there is no 
absolute human Truth (see Chapter 1, and (3) below). When I speak of 
development, I do not attempt to indicate 'developed'. I speak here of 
an on-going process that begins now, rather than ends now. More of this 
in the following section.
To conclude: In VT9, my colleague speaks of the fact that the children
seem to have developed. At the time I understood her in the sense of
(a) above - my children had become better consumers. Now I interpret 
her claims in a new light. I believe my children had become more 
rational persons. Certainly I had. As such, I confidently make my 
claim that I had improved the quality of education for the children in 
my care, by improving the quality of education for myself. And I claim,
as goes the title of this thesis, that I can account for my own personal
and professional development, by encouraging my own rationality to 
emerge, and by exercising it with intent. In Chapter 8 I shall write 
'exercising it with universal intent', echoing the claims Df Polanyi 
(1958) about his own practice; but that is to do with the politics ojf 
knowledge and will enter the agenda later.
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3. CQUSIDERATIONS
I Will now make some observations on what I have recorded so far in this 
chapter. I maintain that my view of my 1983-86 practice changed from my 
view of my 1981-83 practice. This shift in view I will organise as
(i) a shift in a view of knowledge;
<ii) a shift in a view of persons;
(iii) a shift in a view of development.
Many of the ideas expressed here are explicated in greater detail in 
future chapters. I will indicate references as I go.
<i) A shift in a view of knowledge 
<a) Structures and transformations
I have indicated in this chapter that I started moving away from a 
reliance on structures to an inclination towards transformations. By 
this I mean that I operated largely in terms of structures pre-1983. I 
used structured forms of thought, as can be seen, for example, in my 
belief in clearly prescribed teaching objectives, or in my belief in 
methodologies that depended on stimulus-response strategies. I not only 
used structured forms of thought (epistemology) as my modus operand!; I
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envisioned structured forms of life (ontology) as the outcome of my 
practice, in, for example, the certain type of person who would have 
achieved a certain stage which I anticipated would spell maturity.
My reading of the literature told me that this maturity, or full 
development, was achieved at a stage that could be identified by certain 
behavioural characteristics. Piaget's stage 6 of formal operational 
thought, and Kohlberg's stage 6 of universal ethical principles were 
identified as the ultimate of cognitive and moral development. Kohlberg 
makes it clear (1976) that his stage 6 of full moral development is 
dependent on a parallel full cognitive development.
Vhen I tried to apply these theories to my own practice, I ran into 
enormous difficulties, of both a pragmatic and a philosophical nature. 
Some of the difficulties were:
1. I was confused as to the age when ultimate stages were reached. I 
read conflicting interpretations, particularly of Piaget's findings. 
Different books put different ages to the stages, some maintaining that 
formal operational thought could be reached by a 12-year-old; others 
that this stage did not begin until late adolescence. Did that mean 
that I and my 12-year-old children were at the same stage of 
development? In theory, yes; in practice, plainly not. Where, I 
wondered, did the theory account for the difference? Further, I read 
that Kohlberg's ultimate moral stage could be achieved by a 16-year-old. 
Did that mean that the wisdom of maturity counted for nothing? ^Had I 
made no further progress since adolescence?
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2. If full development were to be realised at a specific stage, did
that mean that further development was then denied? Or was it
unnecessary? Did that mean that I had no more scope for personal 
development? In terms of my teaching practice, did that mean that my 
task was to get my children to a certain stage before they left school, 
after which they had no more need of education?
3. If stage developmental theory was to be believed, all my children 
ought to be behaving in a uniform fashion. They were not. In the same 
group, Sheila was a confident, mature 14-year-old who openly despised 
the silly antics of her peers. In the same individual, Richard could be 
a responsible young man who was capable of degenerating into infantile 
clowning when egged on by the others. How did the theory account for 
the differences?
These and other difficulties made me uneasy with the concept of
cognitive stage development. I still felt I had to adapt my practice to
the theory, however, since I had no alternative model available; nor had 
I yet available the epistemological model of looking for my own personal 
theory as an outcome of my practice.
This confidence grew, however, through the intense action and reflection 
of my in-service work, 1982-83, and the application in class, 1983 
onwards, of the insights I was developing. I was also particularly 
helped by the work of Carl Rogers. While I still felt that I had to 
adhere to a theory, I readily switched to Rogers's theory in preference 
to Piaget's.
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Rogers's work is mainly to do with disturbed individuals, but I saw 
clear' applications of the principles which underpin his ideas to my own 
wofk. When I read his (1961) 'On becoming a person', I felt that I was 
still on the familiar territory of stage development, but this time the 
theory was presented in a much more flexible fashion. Whereas Piaget 
concentrates on categories of behaviour, Rogers prefers to identify 
trends and inclinations. His concepts are held loosely, and have a far- 
ranging applicability. I saw the relevance of this approach so keenly 
that I attempted to present my own model with regard to the development 
of my children. This model appears in detail in Chapter 6 of this text.
In this way I suggest that I was moving form the fixed concepts of 
Piagetian-type structures to the transformative episodes of Rogerian- 
type processes.
My own attempt at a stage development model lasted about a month. I 
recall that I presented the model to Jack Whitehead in a progress report 
in 1985. Jack was pleased with the way my thinking was going, and 
encouraged me to present my ideas at the 1985 BERA conference. This I 
did. My model received pungent criticism from two colleagues who 
levelled the same objections to it that I have identified above. I 
still hear the voice ringing in my ears: "Yes, I can identify with the
comments of the children that you have written down here, but what's 
that supposed to prove? Any one of my children in class could be at any 
one of those stages at any given time. This tells me nothing at all." 
He was right, of course, and, for me, this was the final nail i^ the 
coffin of stage developmental theories.
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I was profoundly disturbed by this episode, but It was probably the 
incentive I needed for solid critical thought. As a direct result 1 
looked for an alternative explanation for my children's development, 
The outcome of that search appears in Chapter 6 of this text. There I 
shall present my theory of the nature of change, in which structures and 
transformations are in constant interplay. I shall also refer again to 
my practice to show how the theory arose out of that practice.
(b) Towards an 'end product' of on-going development
My pre-1983 concept of personal and social development indicated an end 
state: 'developed' rather than 'developing'. I reckoned then that my
task was to get my children as near to 'developed' as possible by the 
time they left my tutelage. My problem was that I had no idea how such 
a 'developed' state could be characterised. In my 1985 BERA paper I 
pointed out that there was no guidance in the literature to help me 
understand how to make my children 'developed' and no operational 
definition of what such 'development' looked like.
I realise now that I, like the literature, was at fault in using 
inappropriate cognitive structures. The linguistic metaphors that were 
expressions of my thought appeared as rigid concepts to do with end 
states: 'The children have reached a level ... '; ' I am aiming for
...'; 'They have developed to the stage where ...'.
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My practice 1983-86 indicated that I moved away from a dependency on the 
hope of end states to the excitement of the immediacy of the present. I 
began to understand (though I could not then articulate the thought) 
that 'development' did not imply an achievement of an ultimate end 
state, but a renewal of forms of being; 'developing' rather than 
'developed'.
I was able to articulate this re-emphasis in 1988, when I became
involved in the ideas of dialectical forms of thought. The insights 
generated allowed me to see that the notion 'developed' belongs to 
propositional forms which focus on descriptions of past practice;
whereas the notion 'developing' is part of the dialectical forms which 
examine present practice as a state of being which prepares the ground 
for ever-renewable states of being.
In Chapter 6 I examine these ideas much more closely, and try to give a 
coherent explanation for what I see as a form of life that sees the 
present as the springboard to the future rather than a full stop to the 
past.
(c) Involvement of knower with known
As my attitudes towards forms of knowledge relaxed over the years 1983- 
86, so did my attitudes towards the children. I moved from a position
of knower in an instrumental sense to knower in a personal sense, in
this way:
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Humanistic psychology characterises relationships in terms of the depth 
of personal involvement of the knowing subject with the object that is 
known. Thus, Buber (1965) considers relationships in which instrumental 
knowlege (knowledge-that) allows the knower domination over the known. 
In this sense, the knower is the subject over an external object, and 
the relationship established is 'I—11*. However, if the knower makes a 
personal commitment to the act of knowing, that is, instrumental 
knowledge (I know that) transforms into personal knowledge (I know), the 
relationship changes. The knower then abdicates domination over the 
object, and enters rather into a reciprocal relationship of 'I-Thou'.
When this factor is matched with forms of knowledge, we can say that 
relationships conducted from a propositional stand adopt the veneer of 
* I— It' confrontations. It is possible then for the knower to make 
pronouncements about his counterparts in a Judgemental capacity. The 
knower sees himself as reified, apart from the objects of his study. He 
it is who influences and controls the changing scenarios before him, but 
he does not allow those scenarios to change him. He carefully excludes 
himself from personal involvement. However, when the relationship is 
conducted from a dialectical stand, the knower freely acknowledges that 
he as liable to be influenced as to influence. He sees himself as a 
changing part of the changing scenario, which is now no longer before 
him, but is his own stage. In such an I-Thou relationship, the 
reciprocity allows each subject to become the other's object.
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This is the pattern that emerged during my later practice. I have
demonstrated in Chapter 1 how I maintained a distance from my children, 
1961-83, insisting on an I-It relationship in which they were the 
objects of my study. My relationships, 1983-86, were characterised by a 
growing reciprocity. Wilson (1967) identifies certain criteria as the 
foundations of moral behaviour: they are respect and responsibility,
both grounded in individual rationality. For behaviour to become moral, 
says Wilson, such respect and responsibility must be exercised 
intentionally. I suggest that I-Thou relationships are founded on this 
intentionality, what Rogers (1961) calls 'unconditional positive regard' 
and Mewsom (in Vesey, 1976-77) calls 'unreasonable care’. I believe my 
children and I approached such a relationship. I cannot pretend that it 
was always like this, but I believe the general trend was certainly 
there, and I have some golden moments recorded (e.g. VT9) when there was 
genuine affection around.
I hasten to point out that such a relationship was not confined to me 
and individual children, but extended among the children. I was the
focus, the director. As I learned, so I tried - and often managed - to 
set up the situation where I withdrew entirely, leaving the children to 
conduct their own relationships. Thus, on VT4 (1985) we see me
interacting with collective individuals; I am centre stage, and I direct 
the traffic. As I learned and relaxed more into my own I-Thou
relationships, so did the children, and so I encouraged them to respond
more to each other. Buber (1965) also speaks of the sublimation of the 
I to the Thou; this I believe is what occasionally happened in ^ class,
( 172 )
where I, the manager, was forgotten in the children's eagerness to 
discdver themselves in each other.
Many of the implications of this philosophy are expanded in Chapter 7, 
where I consider the intentionality of the individual as the basis of 
social evolution.
(ii) A shift in a view of persons
(a) The need for personal involvement in practice
Positivist forms of educational research uphold the legitimacy of forms 
of knowledge that require the knowing subject to remain aloof from the 
objects of her practice. I have indicated how I accepted this view, and 
fitted my practice to it. I then came to be uncomfortable with the 
view, for I found myself increasingly drawn into my own practice. The 
years 1983-86 were the time when I decided to abandon such a philosophy. 
My conscious beliefs were denying my intuitive beliefs. I was faced 
here with a two-fold dilemma: (1) my own resistance and (2)
institutionalised resistance.
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(1) My own resistance
I Wanted to adopt a form of practice in which I felt authorised to allow 
the children to be free. It was difficult for me over the years to 
explain the concept of freedom. When I thought such thoughts in, say, 
1982, I had visions of my children adopting roles made popular by the 
media: uncouth revolutionaries and fanatical anarchists. I recoiled
from the vision of myself as a woolly-minded liberal who had a 'laissez- 
faire' attitude and allowed the children to do as they liked. Vith 
hindsight I can say that it was not my instincts that were at fault but 
my interpretations of the concept. I have indicated so far in the text 
how I came to my present understanding of the concept of freedom; that 
freedom requires the unselfish self-conscious application of 
institution-unbound values of care, acting in others' best interests 
(see Chapter 7). The path to this realistion has been bumpy, as I have 
tried to show.
I believe that I found the way to such realisations through a personal 
commitment to practice. Like Fromm (1978), I came to the realisation 
that in order to live my life as an integrated human being I had to 
allow my life to be touched by the people around me. I was not like 
Sartre's outsider; I was involved in my own life. Such a commitment is 
"profoundly hazardous" (Polanyi, 1958), for I exposed the vulnerability 
of self to the possible attack of others. Had I sufficient trust in the 
children to risk it? Had I sufficient trust in my own strength? Like 
Polanyi, I decided to have faith in my own personal knowledge, and allow
5
the barriers to be broken down.
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(2) Institutionalised resistance
Th6 changes I have recorded here occurred over the period of three 
years. During that time I engaged in the trial and error of action- 
reflection. Hy practice seemed to become increasingly problematic, for 
in abandoning the restrictive form of practice that was controlled by 
bound theories of educational research, I had no formalised alternative 
theory available on which to model my practice. My teaching style, 
1983-86, became less and less authoritarian, yet still operated within 
the framework of my own discipline of care. This 'regime of softness' 
(Reason and Rowan, 1981) was geared towards the dialogical community 
that I felt intuitively to be the realisation, in social terms, of the 
values I was encouraging to emerge. I felt that such a community could 
operate not from the coercive base of rules, but from the humanistic 
base of mutually agreed principles that are grounded in individual 
rationality. Yet my groping efforts to find an appropriate delivery 
method in class often resulted in actions that did not convey such 
philosophies.
I always insisted on ground rules in class; we all cared for each other, 
and that meant being courteous, listening, being honest - in retrospect 
I was applying Habermas's (1979) criteria for communicative competence, 
though I had never heard of Habermas at the time. My children, however, 
often strayed from agreed frameworks, and misinterpreted my efforts to 
allow them a modicum of freedom as licence to abuse. They often took 
advantage, and then I had to resort to other forms of practice, such as 
an authoritarian shout.
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I clearly remember one afternoon when my headmaster brought a visiting 
Inspefctor to see my class. I had told the headmaster something of what 
I was trying to achieve, but I could not articulate it clearly, either 
to him or to myself. He disapproved of anything 'radical'. They came 
to my lesson, presumably with the expection of seeing a well-ordered 
group, since I was deputy head and expected to present 'model' lessons, 
to be greeted by seeming chaos. The bitter discussion that later ensued 
indicated what my headmaster thought of my 'discipline'.
Such incidents, I believe, are what are referred to by J. Nias (1984) 
when she speaks of "the deeply held values and attitudes of the 
substantial self and the behaviour expected by significant others of the 
situational self". It was very difficult for me to balance my own
values against those of my senior management colleagues. This situation 
made even more difficult my decision to continue on my chosen path of 
committing myself to an unknown form of practice. The conviction that I 
was 'right' in this decision was grounded in the belief that my previous 
form of practice would in any case deny the educational values that had 
now surfaced, and that the 'rightness' of the decision lay in the fact 
that I was trying to find an appropriate form of practice that would 
allow those values to become fact. I did not claim that my course was 
universally 'right', but it appeared to be right for me (see 3 below).
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(b) The need to see persons as material beings in a material world
Mudh of the literature of educational research assumes the control of 
educational knowledge, and, as such, assumes the dominance of the 
knowing subject over the passive, unknowing object. In this view, 
persons-as-objects are not credited with full personhood - as feeling, 
rational individuals who exist in the world and exert an influence on 
it, but are seen as abstractions.
This is certainly how I viewed my children until 1983/84. I saw them 
not as individuals, but as children 'en masse'. It would have seemed 
obvious that the very nature of personal and social education would have 
made me aware of the children as individuals, yet I was not. I feel 
this blinkered view was caused by three factors: (1) the insistence by
the literature of personal and social education on group work as the 
main vehicle; (2) my understandings of the nature of educational 
research; (3) my view of myself as an abstraction.
(1) The insistence on group work
I have already indicated in Chapter 1 that group work was regarded as a 
prime methodology by the literature of personal and social education. I 
went along with current thinking, and advocated its merits (AT9 and 
27b). I see now the grave shortcomings of regarding groups as corporate 
entitles. The individuals in those groups become abstractions. I have 
moved away from the enthusiasm I had, for I see now that the notion of 
'group' is grounded in semantics rather than ontology. 'Group' is a
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collective noun, denoting a collection of parts. If ’group’ is viewed 
as a ■ proper noun - 'the group' - the sum becomes more than its parts. 
Individuality is sacrificed to corporate identity, and the lead is taken 
from the most dominant influences in the group. Golding's 'Lord of the 
flies' illustrates this concept luridly; the hysteria of losing one's 
identity to the greater god allows one the licence to abdicate personal 
responsibility.
I believe that in trends in the literature of personal and social 
education even today, ' group work' is viewed not so much from the 
perspective of collections of people each lending each other mutual 
support, but from the perspective of establishing a corporate identity 
which then forms the abstraction of 'the certain kind of person’ who is 
the end-product of personal and social education. The 'full 
development' envisaged by the teacher may be endowed in this 
abstraction; the group becomes the creation of the teacher, an 
external!sation of her values, which may themselves be an 
externalisation of other forces. This was certainly the situation for 
me, pre-1983. All my talk of personal freedom for the children was so 




(2) My understanding of the nature of educational research
Until about 1985 I saw my research study as being into personal and
social education. As such, 'research into personal and social 
education' was part of the wider concept of research into education.
Yet my crisis of practice had left me wondering what 'education' was, 
and how I could best characterise the research into it. I was
systematically de-bunking the myth of reification, in terms of persons, 
research, education. I was beginning to see all these elements in terms 
of myself, not as abstractions pivoting around me and subject to my 
control, but as aspects which affected me deeply and changed me. 
'Research INTO education' became itself a meaningless abstraction. It 
was I who was doing the research; I who was as much a part of the 
research process as the children I had set out to research on. And if I
were an integral part of it all, subject to the influences of the
aspects of which I was a part, then the research was as much 'into' me 
as 'into' my children.
These were the thoughts, dimly articulated, that dominated my changing 
perspectives about the nature of educational research. At the time, 
pre-1986, I had not the technical knowledge to cope with such 
realisations. I felt that I had moved outside the legitimate frameworks 
of educational research; I felt I was losing touch with anything to 
research ON. I felt almost honour bound to give up my formal project, 
since I was not getting any tangible results, nor had I a specific 
methodology to go about 'recording'.
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My reading, in 1985, of 'Human Inquiry' (Reason and Rowan, 1981) was a 
saving grace. I began to move in new directions in my understandings, 
which I shall explain in the next section.
(3) My view of myself as an abstraction
It seems silly to say that I viewed myself as an abstraction, yet I
believe that is what I did in my school practice until about 1985. I
saw myself largely in terms of my functional role. In terms of my 
understanding of the nature of educational research, my brief was to 
conduct an experiment on the children. In terms of my interpretation of 
my role as deputy head, my brief was to implement the institutionalised 
values of the school, and these were largely externalised values of the 
headmaster. I simply did not see myself as a free person who had the 
right to believe in her own educational values and strive to turn them 
into reality, I insisted on obedience from the children, from 
colleagues, and from myself, to the reified abstraction called The
System,
The taste of freedom in other schools, the turbulence of the years 1983- 
86, the emergence of a self-sufficiency which overcame the difficulties, 
all contributed to the perceived need to change my practice and the
ability to do so. I began to see myself as a critical person with the 
same rights as others to live the life I chose; and I extended the same 
realisations to my children and colleagues, that they also could live
', i
the life they chose.
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I had to leave school in 1986. I felt at the time that this was a cruel 
twist; for I was genuinely enjoying my school life in my emergent 
confidence to use my freedom. However, the time was right (isn't it 
always) to stop and reflect on what had been happening during the course 
of my study. I was able now to read intensively and rationalise my own 
acts in the light of other theoretical perspectives. Further, I was 
able to formulate my own personal theories out of my practice.
The outcome is that today I regard myself as the unique individual that 
I am, savouring each moment of life as an intense state of being. I 
refer again to a favourite quotation of Lorenz (Piattelli-Palmarini, 
1980): "Two shovels filled with something or other are never equal to
each other; the number one applied to a real object will never find its 
equal in the whole universe". I rejoice in the thought, for I know that 
each one of us is the only one who ever was and ever will be created. 
Such realisations are worth all the turmoil, all the pain. Whether or 
not this text is accepted as a PhD is almost immaterial, against the 
enormous educative process that it has led me through.
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(iii) A shift in a view of development
I Will discuss the aspects of this section in much greater detail in 
Part Two, and will here give a quick gloss of the aspects that are 
directly relevant to the content of this chapter - ray practice in 
personal and social education, 1983-86.
(a) The notion of Truth as interpersonal creativity
When I became critical, beginning with the crisis of practice in 1983, I 
started not believing in reified forms of knowledge. I examined the 
concept of an ultimate Truth and found it wanting in terms of meeting 
the needs of my practice. 1 rationalised that my practice was not 
leading anywhere specifically, other than to this present moment. This 
situation, as far as I could see, would last through all of time. No 
matter how hard I believed in an ultimate truth, or state of the art in 
which all things would be revealed, that time would never come. No 
amount of ratiocination will turn today into tomorrow.
I began to see two things: (1) that a reified truth cannot exist, since
truth is the property of the people who believe in it; (2) truth is 
something for the present, able to act as the foundation for the future, 
but not able to become the future. I began to see truth as a property 
of mind, an individual's mind - and since I had rights as an individual,
*
no more and no less than other individuals, my truth was more valid for
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me than the reified Truth that I was handed by the literature. Because 
I was a person existing here and now, the truth that had the most 
immediate impact on me was the reality of here and now. If I did not 
like the truth as I found it, such as when my educational values were 
denied in my practice, it was up to me to change it.
I ran into some problems as to how I could validate my claims to 
knowledge. I felt that if I were to hold up my truth as THE truth, I 
would be guilty of presenting my views as reified. I read some of the 
work of Habermas <1976, 1979), Bernstein (1983), Rorty (1982)and Arendt 
(1958), and began to understand this theory, that the validation of an 
individual's claim to knowledge is to agree the criteria for truth and 
look for instances in which such criteria may be perceived in practice.
I shall develop these ideas at some length in Chapter 7. I will here 
now indicate how these realisations had profound implications for my 
understanding of the nature of personal development.
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(b) The notion of personal development as grounded in generative 
processes
As ever, the influence of Chomsky was never far away, and I again fell 
back on the central concept of the generative component.
As I became accustomed to doing without the concept of reified 
knowledge, and began to see knowledge as a personal creation, I brought 
into play the idea of human potential. For me, the concepts of 
potential and generative power are closely allied.
I will detail the theory in Chapters 6 and 7, but a brief outline here 
gives the flavour of the ideas that were born at about this time:
There are two aspects to the theory. One aspect is to do with the 
capacity for on-going development. The other is to do with the 
validation of claims to knowledge.
The capacity for on-going development
I have already indicated in this chapter how I was dissatisfied with 
structured frameworks of stage developmental models. I reasoned that if 
such a dominant theory were inappropriate, either I was at fault in not 
understanding the theory, or the theory was at fault in not 
understanding me. Armed with my conviction that my truth was 
appropriate for my needs, I systematically set about forging a^ new 
theory.
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My later reading brought me into touch with the work of Riegel. He
accepts much of Piaget's theory, but maintains that the enterprise is
limited in stopping at formal operations. Riegel proposes (1973) a 
further 'stage' of dialectical thought; that is, an 'end product' of on­
going development. I agree with the principle at issue, that the only 
'end product' to development is a state of non-end-product. I do not 
agree with Riegel's interpretation of the nature of human development, 
however. By sticking with even an amended form of stage theory, he 
still puts human development into linear categories, and, for me, that 
is still sticking at the level of descriptive adequacy and avoiding the
critical issue of how a theory of human development may attain
explanatory adequacy; that is, not only describe what happens during a 
person's life, but to explain why things happen as they do. I have 
attempted this; this text is the manifestation of the theory.
How to the second aspect;
Validation of claims to knowledge
Let us accept that knowledge is the property of the knower. As such, 
each individual knows what he knows. But, as I shall explain in Chapter 
5, there are different kinds of knowledge, the finest and most powerful 
being, in my opinion, the intuitive personal knowledge that is part of 
the innate endowment of a human being.
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Let us further suppose that knowledge may be shared and validated as a 
currently accepted truth by a society of knowers, all individuals, each 
with individual personal knowledge. Such truth is temporary, since it 
is subject to changes in the individuals who share their knowledge.
Now let me synthesise the two aspects:
I hypothesise that development may be accounted for by acknowledging the 
existence of innate potentials for unlimited acts of creation (Chapter 
6). I also hypothesise that the nature of change may be understood in 
terms of the constant interplay between structure and transformation, 
and that the process of the development of the rationality of the 
individual (my working definition of the concept 'education') may be 
traced in action-reflection cycles that may be mapped onto the ever- 
expanding network of structures and transformations (Chapter 6). In 
making these suggestions, I am offering a theory that seeks to
reconstruct inferred innate processes. I am led to offer this theory as
a possible explanation for the development of individuals. At first I 
applied it to the development of my children, in the fashion of knower 
and known, but now I apply it primarily to myself.
In offering my own theory to account for my own personal and
professional development, I am claiming legitimacy for my individual 
truth. In writing my thoughts down, I am inviting other rational 
knowers to consider my truth as legitimate to its own context, and, if 
they choose, to validate it as a shared truth by acknowledging it as a
*
potential form of life. In this fashion, I feel, the commune! at ion
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process itself becomes educational, in that individuals may move forward 
their own understandings, while being able to account for that 
understanding. (See also Chapter 7 for further elaboration)
Conclusion
I became ill in 1986 and left school. I officially retired in 1987. I 
felt that my research project had now come to an end. All that was left 
for me to do was record my practice in personal and social education, 
how I had helped my children become more sociable.
I saw my future as possibly writing another book. Never did I think 
that I would now develop my own education. Yet that is what I have 
done.
The one and a half years since I left school (it is now December 1988) 
have forced me to think actively about what I had been doing on a 
largely intuitive, inspirational level. Even so, I never characterised 
such thought as 'practice'. It was only through the crisis of practice 
when I came to write up the thesis (Chapter 2 of this text) that I 
realised that practice never ends. Nor, in my view, does anything else. 
Vhat we have in life is the ever-present now, and new beginnings.
So now to Chapter 4, an explanation of how I came to the understanding 
that lets me say these things; and on to a continuation of my thought-
3
in-action that is the form of this text.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE WRITIRG PROJECT: CHAPTERS 4 - 6
1 IHTRODUCTIOR
To recapitulate briefly: in Chapter 2 of this text I explained why I
had found the writing of First Version 1-3 disturbing, and why I came to 
the situation where I was forced to adopt another form. The writing of 
First Version 4-6 showed the adoption of a new form of writing which 
reflected the adoption of a new form of thought.
I have told how I gave up the formal project at the end of Chapter 3. I 
did not give up writing, however. By now I was very keen to explore 
some of the ideas that were developing through the writing, even though 
at the time they did not seem relevant to the project that I saw as 
focused specifically on my personal and social education work in school.
I decided that I would go on to Chapter 4, but write now about subjects 
that I found interesting and in a way that I wanted to. So it was in an 
almost defiant mood that I began Chapter 4, exploring the ideas of forms 
of knowledge, and how different forms influence the way people think 
about topics. This was the line I took at this stage; when I came to 
writing I began to see the need to make explicit how I thought about 
topics, rather than how other people thought. When I came to writing 
about views of personhood, and attempted the same propositional format - 
how other people viewed personhood - it was borne home how imperative it
3
was for me to be clear how I understood my own views. I realised then
( 189 )
that persons should not attempt to characterise other persons as 
abstractions, but needed rather to focus on a characterisation of their 
own personhood. It was then that I broke entirely with the 
propositional forms that I was using and started writing about my own 
views.
I stopped writing entirely while I read for several weeks. I read texts 
about dialectical knowledge and dialectical forms of life. This was the 
first time I became critically aware that there are different ways of 
thinking. I realise that this sounds teribly naive, but it is so. Vhat 
had happened through my practice of writing was that I had moved into a 
different way of thinking; but, because I had never come across an 
explicit statement that humans may engage in quite radically different 
forms of thought, I really did not understand what was happening. 
Through my reading I learned about different forms of thought, and 
through my reflection I was able to analyse what was happening to me. 
As soon as I could rationalise the situation, I started coping, and 
working towards a resolution of the problem.
I re-drafted the beginning of First Version Chapter 4 to produce a text 
that reflected the values I had formed during the writing of Chapter 4. 
In the validation meeting at Bath between Jack Whitehead, Cyril Selmes, 
Mary Tasker and myself, we agreed that the content of Chapters 4, 5 and 
© was good, and relevant to what had now emerged as the real focus of my 





The contents of first version Chapters 4, 5 and 6 aimed at providing 
answers respectively for the three questions:
1. Vhat constitutes knowledge of values?
2. How is knowledge of values acquired?
3. How is knowledge of values acquisition put to use?
In my view, the three questions synthesised the far-ranging nature of my 
work in personal and social education, and also allowed scope for the 
expression of my theories about values acquisition, theories that 
challenged and broke with current theories of cognitive stage 
development (Piaget, Kohlberg, Rogers), theories of habit formation 
(behaviourist/stimulus-response schools), and theories of comparative 
analysis (structuralist/positivist schools) (such theories claiming to 
explain, but, in my view, offering descriptions rather than 
explanations). I had anticipated that I could present hypotheses about 
values formation by reference to my practice in school: show how my 
theories were grounded in the behavioural outcomes of my children. Vhat 
I did not anticipate was that I would reconsider my research questions 
in terms of myself. Nor did I anticipate the shift in focus that made 
me stop thinking of personal and social education as something that had 
happened in school to my children, and regard it as something that was 
happening to me now.
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The action of first version 4-6 was that my project became organic, an 
extension of the living person who was writing it. It was no longer a 
report about past practice, nor even a progress report about present 
practice. It was actually a part of the machinery of present practice.
What happened was this: I wrote, in answer to my question *Vhat
constitutes knowledge of values?' that, before we could present any 
tentative answer, we had to consider what 'values' meant. In order to 
do this, we had to survey the different ways that the literature 
presented knowledge of values. And before we could do this, we had to 
survey the ways in which different people thought about such issues.
I then considered such different approaches. I did not realise it at 
the time, nor could I put a name to it, but what I was doing was 
researching the literature of thought structures: ways of thinking about 
thinking (Basseches, 1964). This was an entirely new field for me, and 
one which I found incredibly exciting. As yet, however, I still 
regarded what I was reading as part of 'the literature', intellectually 
stimulating but personally unrelated.
Then I went on, in Chapter 4, to consider the ways that different forms 
of thought influenced ways that people regarded values. I organised 
these approaches as (a) values as instrumental, (b) values as from a 
sociological perspective and (c) values as personal. I suggested a 
parallel between different kinds of knowledge and different views on 
values constitution. I reasoned that views of the constitution of 
values would inevitably colour the way individuals looked at the notion
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of personhood. A propositional thinker would view persons as
abstractions; a dialectical thinker would view persons as real, living 
entities existing in a material world; and as soon as that perspective 
was adopted, the thinker had of necessity to include himself in his own 
discussion, since he was the living entity whose property the thoughts 
were that he was expressing.
At this point I realised what I had done, the enormity of the 
discoveries I had made. I went around in a kind of euphoric haze. I 
realised now why my project was the failure that it was. It took me a 
little while to gather my thoughts sufficiently to consult Jack 
Vhitehead how to tackle the project in the light of my new forms of 
thought.
My first instinct was to go back and re-write. I remember Jack's words 
distinctly: "You need to communicate the process that has led you to
these insights." If I re-wrote, the evidence would be lost, and history 
would be distorted. I was in a dilemma. My answer was to continue 
writing, now a trusted way of disentangling intellectual morasses, like 
the ant cleaning its antenna, familiar normality as an antidote to panic 
(Hall, 1963).
As I continued to write my propositions about the nature of values, I 
started writing interludes, externalisations of my own thoughts, and I 
became aware that the very thought processes I was using were undergoing 
a rapid metamorphosis as I applied my newly found knowledge about 
different ways of thinking. I could identify how I was moving away from
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propositional forms to dialectical forms, and I commented in the text 
that ' I was producing to show this change. The interludes became
increasingly critical. At first I thought to keep a diary, but the
interludes became more than that. They began to take the form of 
conversations with myself, a new form of thought challenging the old.
To make the distinction between the text of the original plan, and the 
Interludes, which were becoming an on-going critique in dialectical form 
of what I was writing in propositional form, I wrote the text in lower 
case script and the interludes in upper case. (I have adopted the same 
strategy in Chapter 5 of this text.) I began to see that the emergent 
critique was, in fact, the focus of the study, in that I was now 
continually involved in accounting for my own on-going development, 
rather than in the 'arrested' development of my children.
I began calling the critique the 'thesis' and the propositional text the 
'dissertation'. This naming lasted for perhaps a day, for I rapidly 
realised that each part of my practice influenced the whole. Granted I 
could analyse for purposes of easy presentation, but the reality was 
that I and my text were integrated as surely as my mind and body. The 
text was me, an external i sat ion of my mind/brain, an expression of the 
form of thought that made me adopt a particular form of life.
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The experience of writing first version Chapter 4 and 5, particularly, 
was, for me, spiritual. It put me closer in touch with myself than any 
otiier experience of my life. I am reminded of a favourite passsage from 
Polanyi (1958):
"Having made a discovery, I shall never see the world again as before. 
My eyes have become different; I have made myself into a person seeing 
and thinking differently. I have crossed a gap, the heuristic gap which 
lies between problem and discovery."
and from Hall (1981): Quiller, a secret agent, is in a silent
surrounding and thinks he hears something. He is about to dismiss the 
sound as in his imagination, but he remembers his reliance on his mind:
"So quiet that it could have just been in my mind; but I know my mind; 
it doesn't play tricks on me; it lets me know things; it lets me know 
the kind of things I should know."
This is how I felt. I was in touch with my mind, and I trusted it.
I finished the text. My interludes became less frequent as Chapter 5 
progressed, and almost disappeared in Chapter 6. I found that the 
critical awareness was worked into the fabric of the text, and there was 
no need for an on-going critique.
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Vhen I reached the end I was even more dissatisfied with Chapters 1-3. 
I was* pleased with 4-6, though I felt 6 could be stronger. But what to 
do now with the overall project? I had a hybrid, neither a 
propositional report nor a dialectical portfolio; a text without a 
framework, a flowing expression of thought without a stable focus.
I decided to attempt yet another tack; and here I was at fault. For I 
fell once again into a form of thought that regarded the only form of 
progress as linear. Let me explain:
I had learnt that I had a critical faculty and I had learnt how to 
exercise it. I had turned Chapters 4-6 into an expression of thought- 
in-action. I had demonstrated to my own satisfaction how I had 
undertaken action-reflection cycles to move forward my own understanding 
of my own development. By on-going critical reflection on my current 
practice I was able to demonstrate in action how I was improving that 
practice. I had presented the theory of the need for ref lection-in­
action as a means of improving educational practice, and I was actually 
presenting living proof of the theory in the practice which contained 
the theory.
low I wanted to undertake a further action-reflection cycle to show how 
I could apply my critical faculties to the whole project, Chapters 1-6.
I therefore went through the project from the beginning, building in a 
critique as I went, using my now more powerful thought processes to 
point out the less mature thinking of Chapters 1-3, and attempting to
*
present coherently the thoughts of the inchoate episodes.
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I believe I succeeded, but the result was a text that was now so 
confufeing in its structure as to be incomprehensible. Provided one had 
the key to the maze it was possible to navigate one's way through. But 
readers are mortals with limited time and patience, and the three 
friends who read the text were unanimous in their judgements that their 
task of reading was definitely laborious.
It was my own suggestion that I re-write, but I was adamant that I 
should not produce a precis of the first version. I had other 
intentions which then I could not articulate, but now, after due 
reflection, I can, tentatively. I said earlier that my fault was in 
supposing that progress was linear. This was reflected in my desire to 
undertake the critique. In my mind was not so much a view of the whole
as a view of linear episodes; not so much the idea of presenting an
understanding of the principles underlying the whole project as an 
attempt to describe the processes that I had used as I wrote. I had 
fallen into my own trap: I had again demonstrated the restrictive view 
that descriptions of progress are sufficient. In writing this present 
text I have radically changed the form from the first version; in doing
so I hope to present explanations for why I am the person that I am
today, rather than only descriptions of the paths I have followed. I 
shall consider this point further in the next section.
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(ii) Epistemology
A theme that I draw on throughout Is the notion of adequacy. In Chapter 
2 of this text I point to Chomsky's theory of levels of adequacy - 
observational, descriptive and explanatory - and scope of enquiries - 
E (external) or I (internal) studies. Chomsky draws the parallel 
between these two aspects, in that E-studies are concerned with 
accounting for how other people behave, and are therefore descriptive. 
I would say that they are also propositional. An I-study, says Chomsky, 
aims to account for the intuitions of the individual, and therefore aims 
for explanatory adequacy. I would say that such a form of enquiry is 
grounded in dialectical forms.
I will here state my belief that propositional forms are embedded within 
dialectical forms, and, by implication, that I-level enquiries contain 
B-level enquiries. Let me explain, and say also that what I am about to 
explicate here will be used in Chapter 7 of this text as the basis, in 
my view, of the nature of communicative competence.
Ve start from a root premise that thought is the property of a living 
thinker, and not a reified abstraction. As such, thought may be 
characterised as form and substance: the thoughts I produce are
generated by the process of thought (Chapter 5). As I will attempt to 
show in Chapter 6, I suggest that form and substance are in constant 
interplay and fusion; form metamorphoses into substance, which 
metamorphoses into a new form of form. In this way, ontology and 
epistemology fuse into each other; the distinction is one of
( 198 )
convenience, a naming of processes that helps the living enquirer 
understand the processes through analysis. It is like making the light 
stand still, freezing the action, so as to study a moment in time in
order better to understand the concept of time.
The thought-as-substance produced by the thinker may be seen as the 
substantial values of the thinker. The thought-as-action may be seen as 
the expression of those values. A value may be characterised as a 
belief; and the expression of such a belief may take the form of an 
implicit prefix: 'I believe that ... '. I am here not referring to the 
distinction made by Habermas (1979: Universal Pragmatics) between the 
illocutionary component and the propositional component. As I 
understand him, Habermas is providing here a foundation for speech acts 
at a performance level. Vhat I am suggesting is a foundation for the 
Individual's claim to knowledge. If I say "It is raining", 1 am 
claiming that I know that it is raining. My knowledge takes the form of
an expressed value, albeit an implicit one: "I believe that it is
raining."
If I use the linguistic notation developed by Chomsky to further clarify 
the theory: a propositional string may be characterised as MP + V
IMP - it] [V - is raining]
( 199 )
Generative transformational theories of linguistics (for example, Fodor 
and Katz, 1964) tell us that every surface string at performance level 
may be mapped onto its semantic counterpart at competence level. Thus, 
the surface manifestation "it is raining" is an expression in linguistic 
surface terms - phonemes, intonation and other linguistic elements - of 
an underlying knowledge of the fact that it is in fact raining.
How, if the utterance is an expression of the genuine personal knowledge 
of the speaker (and here I will invoke the criterion of honesty: 
Habermas, 1979), i.e. if it is part of his personal truth (see Chapter 3 
of this text), then his truth will be manifested in the surface string 
by prefixing it with an intuitive, inferred ' I believe that . . .', this 
phrase indicating that here is a statement of value that is part of his 
personal value system at competence level. "It is raining" is a 
manifestation of his belief that it really is raining.
In Chapters 7 and 8 of this text I will carry the discussion further by 
indicating how interpersonal communication may be grounded in the 
manifestations at surface level of the underlying competencies of 
individuals, each aiming at sharing his own personal knowledge. For the 
time being, I am maintaining that substantial propositions are the 
property of the speaker, and, provided he means what he says, may be 
seen as an externalisation of his value system that is characterised by 
an inferred prefix 11 believe that ... '
( 200 )
I further maintain that such inferred prefixes are part of dialectical 
mechanisms. Dialectical forms of thought are grounded in the 
acknowledgement of the thinker that he is a material being in a material 
world. His thought is organic and in a constant state of development; 
and is unbound and capable of infinite acts of creation.
So my discussion suggests that propositional forms are embedded within 
dialectical forms.
Let me return to the notion of levels of adequacy and the scope of human 
enquiries. I suggested that enquiries that are conducted in 
propositional terms - for example, a researcher conducts an experiment 
into other people's practice - may only aspire to descriptive adequacy; 
that is, the researcher may give an account about somebody else's 
practice. I further suggest that when an enquiry is conducted in 
dialectical terms - when the enquirer acknowledges that he includes the 
living I (Whitehead, 1980) in his enquiry, and views himself as the 
research field - then the enquiry attains explanatory status, for the 
researcher may attempt to account for his own understanding of his 
practice.
So I conclude that dialectical forms of enquiry may contain 
propositional forms as substantial manifestations of the underlying 
values of the enquirer. Descriptions of practice may illustrate how 
the enquirer tackled the root problem of a negation of values; 
explanations for practice will require the enquirer to demonstrate in
>
practice how she understood what she was doing and why she was doing it.
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In my view, it is not sufficient to demonstrate an improvement in 
practice. It is necessary also to demonstrate the development of 
understandings that led to that improvement in practice.
ftftffftttfffttttft
This was the essential learning of first version Chapters 4-6. I came 
to know (Stronach, 1986), and I tried to show how it was that I came to 
know. This, for me, is what made my project educational. I earlier 
defined 'education' as the process of an improvement in individual 
rationality. I believe that I have improved my own rationality (for my 
definition of 'improved' see Chapter 6), and I believe that I have 
demonstrated the process whereby it came about.




Let me examine what I indicated in Chapter 1 of this text as the outcome 
of my project. I had intended to produce a report about my work in 
school in personal and social education, 1981-86. In producing this 
report I had a fixed hypothesis which I wanted to prove; that my 
teaching of personal and social education had produced children who were 
socially adequate and personally pleasant.
How let me examine what the real results are. I have here an organic 
text that is a record of my own education. More than that, it has been 
the expression of the thought-in-action that has helped me to understand 
my own development.
The substantial propositions of the first version showed a general trend 
away from an interest in knowledge of processes of systems to a desire 
for knowledge of forms of thought. The crucial root concept of my 
epistemology became the acknowledgement that I was a living person who 
was creating this text, and, out of my creation, was experiencing the 
liberation of innate potential to engage in unbounded forms of being.
The 'results' of this text, then, are not in the form of an end product 
of proven hypotheses. The results are in the form of life that I have 
consciously adopted. The concrete results of the substantial 
propositions were originally intended to present answers. Instead, they 
present a distillation (Mary Tasker) of my thought-in-action up till now
*
that is a part of the on-going development of my life.
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If I have reached an end product, or proven a hypothesis, it is simply 
that I have an end product of no end product. In my view, there is no 
end to anything, ever. There are only ever-renewable states of being, 
including death. Today is the sum total of all my yesterdays, but that 
total end product of experience acts as the platform for the future. 
The propositions of my past life are arrayed as the foundation for my 
future, guided by the intentionality of now.
In Chapter 6 I shall outline how I understand how questions search out 
answers, which are then transformed, through the generative component, 
into new questions. This is my state of mind. I do not see anything 
now as fixed, immutable, but recognise that everything, including 




Let me here briefly examine some of the issues raised in this chapter. 
As I indicated in Chapter 3 of this text, the major issues are 
synthesised in Chapter 6, and I do not intend to labour points here. 
Inevitably, in a text like this, some repetition will occur, but, while 
I want to reinforce central themes, I do not want to repeat details. So 
I will gloss points here that are treated later in a more explicit form.
(i) A shift in a view of knowledge
In Chapter 6, section (2) is entitled 'Towards a characterisation of the 
transformational generative nature of dialectics' . Vhat I am doing in 
this present section is to outline some of the principles I regard as 
assumptions of the theory I shall present there.
(a) An abandonment of abstractions as the grounding of my practice
It is interesting to consider the epistemological issues that underlie 
my use of the word 'assumptions' with its reference in Chapter 1 of this 
text. Then I was referring to my acceptance of the reified literature. 
How I refer to my consideration of hypotheses that I have created out of 
my practice.
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I have come full circle, I believe, In all aspects of my life where I 
have abandoned the Idea of abstraction as the grounding of my practice. 
I read now with a critical eye; I actively question the messages of the 
media, and I accept very little at face value. This does not mean that 
I have become a social hawk, demolishing the beliefs of others, for my 
critical reflection reminds me always that I am in a continual state of 
development. I will always have much to learn, and learning stems from 
the fact that I am open to the questions of others and of my own mind. 
Like Rogers (1961), "I hold my concepts loosely".
I regard abstraction as a useful and necessary part of epistemology. 
For example, theories of cognitive stage development help me to 
understand that there are perhaps recognisable distinctive features in 
any process of development; but I do not accept this concept as an 
explanatory concept. It is helpful for me, in reading the literature of 
cognitive stage development, to appreciate that other observers have 
noted general trends, metamorphoses from one set of distinctive features 
to another. I still maintain, however, that these are tentative 
descriptions of an overall process; they are not ultimate inductions 
that here is a specific form of life. I accept the descriptions for 
what they are, but I see their limitations as hypotheses of 




(b) Levels of adequacy
I look now always for explanations. In my first book (McNiff 1986) I 
went along with dominant paradigms in thinking that teachers are 
required to describe the processes that led to an enhancement of 
practice. I explained carefully in the book the processes that I felt 
teachers could undertake in order to bring about that practice. I 
included a section about my own research project, and aimed to show how 
my pupils had become more socially adequate through my enhanced 
management skills. I see now that I was offering descriptions of 
practice, and my recommendations were couched in a form that identified 
the distinctive features of good practice and exhorted teachers to adapt 
their methodologies to my hypotheses. Although the messages of the text 
are presented in a non-coercive fashion, I feel that I am guilty of 
aspiring to become part of the reified literature that regards the 
printed or spoken word as The Truth.
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(c) A view of knowledge as creation
In this way, I feel that teachers may become critical. As I did, they 
may bring their reflective capacities to bear on the grounds of their 
practices. When I did this (Chapters 1 and 3 of this text) I discovered 
that my practice was grounded in the assumptions of the reified 
literature. Critical reflection, brought about through the crises of 
practice when I resolved to negate the negation of my educational 
values, enabled me to see these assumptions for what they were, and to 
develop new assumptions. This process, itself a part of the 
epistemology of my practice, has led to a different form of epistemology 
where I view practice as creation rather than adaptation.
Knowledge, for me, is not now something I glean from the thoughts of 
others. Those thoughts are expressions of their creators' cognitive 
structures. In my epistemology of creation, they have descriptive 
status, E-levels. I may accept those expressions, and include them into
my own hypotheses, producing the formation that others' expressions may 
form part of the ground for my own explanations, I-levels.
For further discussion, please see Chapter 6 of this text.
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(ii) A shift in a view of practice
(a) Practice as creation
Continuing the theme of the above section, I may say that I see practice 
as personal creation. For me, the nature of creation is not of 
something out of nothing, but something out of something. In my 
previous thinking of the practice of 1981-83, I view Truth as a 
chronological ultimate, something to be aimed for as an end-state, and 
Creation as chronological starting point. Creativity was the bringing- 
into-being of a new form that had little relationship with previous 
forms. It was not, and suddenly it was.
In my dialectical form of thinking, I may say that each new state of
being (Chapter 6) that is a distinctive feature (descriptive level) of
an on-going process of structures and transformations (explanatory 
level) is an act of creation. Viewed in this way, each second of my 
life is an act of creation.
Viewed in this light, creation becomes something that is grounded in 
previous forms Df life (previous acts of creation). If I apply this
concept to the creation of a work of art, I may say, along with Vilhelm
von Humboldt, that the substantial work of art was already in the mind 
of the artist in its form. The process of on-going acts of creation 
eventually externalise the form (that is in fact, in my hypothesis, part
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of the innate endowment of the artist) into the substance that may be 
perceived as part of the material world.
As such, each moment of practice is grounded in previous moments of 
practice. Far from the thinking described in Chapter 1 of this text, 
where practice was the passive adaptation of others’ prescriptions, I 
see practice as the personal creation of the actor. In the living 
society of which the actor is a part, that practice is subject to the 
constraints of society (Chapter 7 of this text); but what I am 
attempting here is a characterisation of the nature of practice, and I 
maintain that it is the property of the actor's innate capacities as a 
material being in a material world.
<b) Practice as an externalisation of a view of self
As such, this view of practice reflects the view of the practitioner as 
a living, material being in a living, material world. Instead of 
viewing himself as a product of a reified system, he views himself as a 
thinking being and creator of his own system. His life is not the 
reflection of an other's thoughts, but the externalisation of his own, 
an act of creation, a coming-into-being.
How, creativity must not be regarded as a licence for anarchy. Lest I 
be misunderstood in my views about the nature of a creative form of 
life, I stress that, in pluralist societies, such a form of life is
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subject to the control of other forms of life - i.e. each individual is
subject to the control of other individuals.
By the same token, an individual is subject to the control of his own 
critical capacity. Here we need the contribution of thinkers such as 
Foucault, Habermas, Giroux, Bernstein, who tell us that the mutually 
created truths of individuals prepared to share their individually 
created truths are the moral foundation for that society. The 
individual truth is subject to the constraints of the better argument, 
when 'better' is seen as the validation by rational individuals as the 
form of life acting in the best interests of those who have agreed the 
criteria for the common truth.
I shall examine this concept further in Chapter 7. In this section I am
focusing on the concept of the nature of practice, and I suggest that
the practitioner who views his life as a constant creative act, of 
coming-into-being, will inevitably view his practice in the same light.
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(iii) A shift in a view of self
(a) Self as knower and known
In adopting a dialectical form of thought for the creation of my 
practice, I suggest that I demolished the barrier in my own life between 
theory and practice. I no longer viewed myself as the applier of 
others' theories, but as the creator of my own. I was no longer the 
object of an other's enquiry, as my children were no longer the object 
of my enquiry. I became the object of my own enquiry; my practice took 
the view that I was both knower and known, subject and object.
I have indicated at junctures in this text that this, I believe, is the 
nature of educational research. In answer to Torbert's (1981) question 
of 'Why is educational research so uneducational?' I will agree with him 
that, until recently, forms of educational research have concentrated on 
proving hypotheses about others' practices - about controlling 
educational knowledge.
Even forms of thinking that show a more liberated tendency to requiring 
teachers to account for their own classroom practices (e.g. Eggleston 
et al, 1976) still accept as fulfilling the criterion of 'educational' 
the fact that descriptions of practice will suffice. I will take this 
point further in Chapter 7, where I shall attempt to show that recent 
submissions to the University of Bath (e.g. Denley, 1987; Jensen, ^ 1987; 
Gurney, 1988) still rest at the level of descriptive adequacy. They
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present descriptions of practice. They do not aspire to explanatory
adequacy in showing why and how they came to adopt the form of life that 
led to that practice. They do not show the process of their view of 
self that has led to its concomitant view of practice. This, I believe, 
is what makes a study educational, in the sense of 'education' as being 
the process of the development of rational thought.
(b) The abolition of ideologies as the basis of development; the
creation of critiques
This, I believe, is the strength of my contribution. I have attempted 
to show in this Part One how I have come to my present form of thought
and my present form of being. Whereas in 1981 I was totally at the
mercy, through my own restictive forms of thought, of the ideologies 
that were the outcomes of the thoughts of reified others, in 1988 I am a 
free thinker, and my practice reflects that freedom. I obey the 
conventions of the societies of practitioners of whom I am a part, 
because I share a similar form of life. But I obey out of wisdom and 
not out of prejudice.
My practice is creation. I do not aim to create new ideologies, for I 
am constantly modifying and re-formulating my ideas. I rejoice in the 
process, for with each new question, each new re-formulation, my being 
as a thinking person is re-affirmed.
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I have a new kind of peace in my very restlessness, for I can allow my 
curiosity free rein without the fear of the spectre of other dominant 
knowers who will challenge my right so to do. I am happy to demolish 
the shibboleths, and I replace them with a view of self that is assured 
of the infinite comfort of her own unbounded potential.
( 2 H  )
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PART TWO: REFLECTIONS
AN EXPLANATION FOR KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES
INTRODUCTION
1 Rationale for Part Two
Much of what appears in this part is a condensation of what appeared in 
first version, Chapters 4, 5 and 6. I have attempted to pick out the 
valuable pieces of writing, and then weave them into the critical form 
of this present text.
In the first version my intention in writing these chapters was to 
demonstrate in practice the ideas that had been generated through my 
practice of writing. The writing had been focused on the report of my 
work in personal and social education.
So I can say that this present exposition is an outcome of my critical 
reflection on all past practice, that practice containing my 
understandings of my development as a teacher and as a writer. The 
difference between this present exposition and that of first version 4-6 
is that then I was reflecting on the experience of events, whereas now I 
am reflecting on my understanding of that experience. I am presenting
 ^. 1
this part as from my developing understandings of my own development, as
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part of an on-going enquiry. I fully acknowledge that I am still
learning.
In the Introduction I said that I would use Chapter 5 as an example of 
how I was still learning. Chapter 5 has an interesting history. It 
appeared first as part of the first version, which then became part of 
my data archives. It stayed substantially the same in the second
version, and was then considered by Jack Whitehead and myself as a
weaker section of the whole text. I undertook some revision, but the 
revisions themselves appeared as 'patching up' rather than the 
fundamental revision of conceptualisation that was needed. So this 
attempt at producing Chapter 5 is my third, and I have used it to show 
the development of my learning in action.
I have adopted a strategy similar to that which I used when writing the 
first version. I have used the text as the field for working out my 
ideas that are being given voice through the text. I have adopted the 
same format of writing in lower case letters for the substantial 
propositions, and using upper case script for the interludes of 
expressed thought. I have externalised these thought processes to try 
to show how I learn; how I endeavour to turn random and vaguely 
understood concepts into a systematic enquiry. I have tried to make 
clear throughout the whole text the dual nature of my enquiry: the outer 
framework of my enquiry into my own development, and how it is that I
have come to know; the inner framework of my enquiry into my study of
moral education. Both frameworks involve and influence the other, for
y
my values of the outer framework were shaped by the activities of the
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inner framework. I have indicated throughout that, although by adopting
these measures, I might appear to be presenting my study as fragmented,
as two separate issues, in fact they are not. I have tried to
interweave them, to show how the different capacities of thought and
action have led to an integration that is a reflection of the totality
of my life.
Having then accepted that the total structure of the text may be seen at 
these two levels, I will now say that Chapter 5 may be seen as 
operating at three levels: (1) the thought-in-action (upper case
script) that allows me to organise my own reflections on (2) the outer 
framework of my own development that is grounded in (3) my study of 
moral education. I hope that I have communicated the difference between
these levels, and, at the same time, shown them all to bear directly, as
a total practice, on the form of life that I lead.
I will remind you to regard Part II as a crucial part of my story and my 
claim to educational knowledge. Although Part II has a more theoretical 
perspective than Part I, the thoughts expressed here are the direct
result of the form of life generated by my practices as recounted in 
Part I. Part II shows how I have 'become critical' (Carr and Kemmis, 
1986), and how I turn my critical faculty in on itself in order to 
understand itself.
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I will remind you, also, of the central issue of this text: my claim to 
knowledge. I am claiming that I understand how it is that I have come 
to know. The considerations I express in Part II are the structures 
that have been subjected to the critical analysis of my mind; I now show 
how the structures change along with the growth of understanding. The 
changes of mind that occur inevitably generate changes in the 
substantial propositions. It is the process of change within the inner 
and outer framework that I wish to make explicit in this section. By 
doing so, I wish to justify my claim that I know how it is that I have 
'come to know'.
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2 Content of Part Two (Substance of the inner framework)
In 'Knowledge of language* (1986), Chomsky explains how the focus of 
linguistic enquiry has shifted.
" ... the shift of focus was from behavior or the products of behavior 
to states of mind/brain that enter into behavior. If one chooses to
focus attention on this latter topic, the central concern becomes 
knowledge of language: its nature, origins, and use.
"The three basic questions that arise, then, are these:
(i) Vhat constitutes knowledge of language?
(ii) How is knowledge of language acquired?
(iii) How is knowledge of language put to use?"
My work is to do with an enquiry into the nature of values education. I 
see a parallel shift in my own way of approaching my enquiry as the one 
that Chomsky formulates above. My practice as a teacher convinced me of 
the need to seek explanations for human values in forms other than overt 
behaviour. Most of the literature of values education centres on 
'behaviour or the products of behaviour'. In Part One I have attempted 
to demonstrate how this approach is inadequate to answer the questions 
of my practice, and I therefore look to 'the state of mind/brain that 
enters into behaviour' as providing some more appropriate answers. So I 
have adopted Chomsky's method of attack by posing three basic questions:
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<i) Vhat constitutes knowledge of values?
(ii) How is knowledge of values acquired?
(iii) How is knowledge of values put to use?
These three questions will form the focus of the following three 
chapters respectively; but note: (iii) forms Chapter 7 at the beginning
of Part III.
3. Epistemological issues regarding the constitution and acquisition of 
knowledge of values.
There seems to be little overall agreement in the literature as to a 
coherent categorisation system of values, and even less about how a 
system of values might be acquired. Dunlop (1984) suggests that "this 
is partly because of the inherent difficulty of the task. Emotion and 
feeling are extremely hard to talk about systematically. There is great 
imprecision and looseness in the ordinary language used to refer to 
them, and the approaches of those few writers who have tried to discuss 
them vary to a surprising extent. One constantly finds oneself
wondering whether they are even talking about the same thing at all. It
is also because the phenomena are highly obscure and elusive ' in
themselves'.M Raven (1981) comments that "examples of values are
legion". How then, to refer to a concept aired by Chomsky (1986), can
we resolve Plato's problem, of how we can know so much, given so little 
evidence.
( 221)
Chomsky explains the problem thus:
"The essence of Plato's problem was well expressed by Bertrand Russell 
when he raised the question: 'How comes it that human beings, whose
contacts with the world are brief and personal and limited, are 
nevertheless able to know as much as they do know?' In certain domains 
of thought and understanding, our knowledge is vast in scope, highly 
specific and richly articulated in character, and in large measure 
shared with others who have similar backgrounds and experience. The 
same is true of systems of belief and expectation, modes of 
interpretation and integration of experience, and more generally what we 
may call 'cognitive systems', only parts of which qualify as actual 
knowledge. The problem that arises when we consider the matter with a 
little care is one of 'poverty of stimulus'. Although our cognitive 
systems surely reflect our experience in some manner, a careful 
specification of the properties of these systems on the one hand, and 
the experience that somehow led to their formation on the other, shows 
that the two are separated by a considerable gap, in fact, a chasm. The 
problem is to account for the specificity and the richness of the 
cognitive systems that arise in the individual on the basis of the 
limited information available. Cognitive systems result from the 
interaction of experience and the organism's method of constructing and 
dealing with it, including analytic mechanisms and the intrinsic 
determinants of maturation and cognitive growth. The problem, then, is 
to determine the innate endowment that serves to bridge the gap between 
the experience and knowledge attained - or cognitive systems attained,
a
abstracting from the truce-requirement for knowledge and generalizing to
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other systems that involve belief, understanding, interpretation, and 
perhaps more." (Chomsky, 1986)
Chomsky wonders if these principles of procedure may be generalised to
other cases, and "can at least serve as a suggestive model for similar
enquiries in other cognitive domains.” He adds, "My own belief is that
the principles do not generalize, that they are in crucial respects 
specific to the language faculty, but that the approach may indeed be 
suggested elsewhere, both in its achievements and their apparent 
boundaries." It is this approach that I wish to build in to my enquiry 
into the constitution, acquisition and use of a knowledge of the nature 
of human values.
In this Part II, I propose to take a close look at some of the current 
assumptions of the literature, in my attempt to find answers to the 
questions of the chapters. In response to the questions 'What 
constitutes knowledge of values?' (Chapter 5) and 'How is knowledge of 
values acquired?' (Chapter 6), I need to explore (Chapter 5):
(1) the nature of 'knowledge', that I may understand what it is 
to 'know';
(2) the nature of values, that I may understand what they are 
that they may be 'known';
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I also need to consider (Chapters 5 and 6):
(3) what mechanisms are at work that enable a 'knower' to 'know' 
'values'. Here I will try to give a characterisation of the 
processes at work in considering how it is that we 'acquire' 
values, and how it is that we 'know' this acquisition to have 
come about.
In pursuing an understanding of the nature of the questions I have 
asked, I will suggest that most of the answers presented in the 
literature are unsuitable for the form that my practice takes. My 
practice is part of my form of life as a thinking practitioner, in which 
I experience problems when my educational values are denied in my 
practice, and I attempt to follow through a systematic enquiry as to how 
to improve it. To my mind, the dominant paradigm as expressed in the 
literature offers me answers from a
(1) psychological perspective, when I meet dominant assumptions that 
take the form of
(a) general learning mechanisms: stimulus-response (e.g.Skinner, 
1938); Thorndike, 1947); assimilation of and 
adaptation to the environment by the individual (e.g. Piaget, 
1926);
(b) general learning method: habit formation (e.g. Piaget, 1932)




(2) philosophical perspective, when I meet dominant assumptions that 
take the form of
(d) general epistemological foundations: logical-positivist 
approaches; propositional forms of knowledge;
<e) general paradigm of enquiry: empiricist, normative-analytic
approaches;
<3) sociological perspective, when I meet dominant assumptions that 
take the form of
(f) general characterisation of values: objects of knowledge;
<g) general characterisation of values systems: aspiration towards
institutionalised mores;
(h) general grounding of values systems: foundationalism of reified 
Truth; a ’correct form of life'.
I shall attempt to show in Chapters 5 and 6 how initially I attempted to 
fit my practice to these assumptions, and how and why I came to see them 
as inappropriate to the needs of my practice.
In Chapter 5 I shall present a model of the mental processes I 
hypothesise to be significant in consideration of the question of that 
chapter - 'Vhat constitutes knowledge of values?', and in Chapter 6 I
shall present a model of the mental processes that I consider to be
significant in consideration of the question of that chapter - 'How is
■J
knowledge of values acquired?' The first model will evolve from the
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questions I consider regarding the mechanics of mental processes - the 
processes of thinking; the second model will evolve from the questions I 
consider regarding the organisation of mental processes - the forms of 
thought. I will initially present the models analytically, but I will 
indicate throughout my resolve to synthesise the models as an overall 
explanation for how it is that a knower comes to know. I shall indicate 
that traditional epistemological forms require us to accept the process- 
product dichotomy; I propose to synthesise process and product into a 
whole, by suggesting, in Chapter 5, that knowledge is a form of action. 
In Chapter 6 I shall develop this notion to say that INTENTIONAL action 
may be seen as an externalisation of values; and in Chapter 7 I shall 
suggest that values-in-action may be seen as a form of life.
( 226 )
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CHAPTER FIVE: VHAT CONSTITUTES KNOVLEDGE OF VALUES?
1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I wish to examine the nature of 'knowledge', that I may 
be clear in my understanding of what we are doing when we say 'I know*; 
and the nature of 'values', that I may be clear in my understanding of 
what values are that they may be known.
I will argue that 'knowledge' may be interpreted in a number of 
different ways. I will also explore the issue, made explicit by Polanyi 
(1958, 1969), of how we may know that we know. In my view, I believe 
there is a relationship between ways of thinking and forms of thought, 
and, to make this relationship clear, I will try to show how I feel 
forms of knowing may be linked with modes of consciousness.
I shall then consider possible characterisations of the concept 
'values', and I shall state my belief, contrary to the dominant views of 
the current literature (for example, Hare, 1952; Straughan, 1982; 
Vilson, 1967) that values do not constitute a reified body of moral 
tenets, an idealised form of life which an individual should strive to 
adopt; rather that values are concepts held by a knowing individual, a 
personal creation which she may share with other knowing individuals.
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2 VHAT DO I MEAN VHEB I SAY "I KNOW?
In the overview to Part II I referred to Plato's problem: the problem of 
poverty of stimulus and richness of response. I will refer now to 
Polanyi's problem, as articulated in his text 'Understanding ourselves' 
(1961; also in Ornstein's 1973):
"Man must try for ever to discover knowledge that will stand up by 
itself, objectively, but the moment he reflects on his own knowledge he 
catches himself red-handed in the act of upholding his knowledge. He 
finds himself asserting it to be true, and this asserting and believing 
is an action which makes an addition to the world on which his knowledge 
bears. So every time we acquire knowledge we enlarge the world, the 
world of man, by something that is not yet incorporated in the object of 
the knowledge we hold, and in this sense a comprehensive knowledge of 
man must appear impossible."
Polanyi here seems to be saying that it is not enough to regard 
'knowledge' as a capital sum outside ourselves; for the act of knowing 
that we know is an additional piece to the lump sum. So the sum 
continues to grow commensurate with the acts of individual knowing.
Polanyi answers his own problem: "The significance which I attribute to
this logical oddity will become apparent in the solution suggested for 
it. Its solution seems to lie in the fact that human knowledge is of 
two kinds. Vhat is usually described as knowledge, as set out in 
written words or maps, or mathematical formulae, is only one kind of
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knowledge; while unformulated knowledge, such as we have of something we 
are in the act of doing, is another form of knowledge. If we call the 
first kind explicit knowledge, and the second, tacit knowledge, we may 
say that WE ALWAYS KNOW TACITLY THAT WE ARE HOLDING OUR EXPLICIT 
KNOWLEDGE TO BE TRUE. If, therefore, we are satisfied to hold a part of 
our knowledge tacitly, the vain pursuit of reflecting ever again on our 
own reflections no longer arises. The question is whether we CAN be 
satisfied with this." (Polanyi, his italics, op.cit.).
Now, I wish to conduct my own enquiry into Polanyi's problem and its 
solution, to see if my understanding of my own practice is enhanced by 
accepting (a) that there is indeed a 'problem of knowledge' (Ayer, 
1956), and if Polanyi's solution solves the problem.
First, I wish to consider what I feel is an appropriate starting point 
to the problem of knowledge: the nature of consciousness of the person 
who 'knows'.
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(i) The nature of consciousness.
(a) Rationale for this section
I became interested in the question of different ways of thinking 
through my own practice as a thinker. I have always used imaging as my 
primary mode of thinking. I have found that my particular way of 
thinking has served my purposes enormously well, in that I can, for 
example, remember sentences from books by conjuring up a key word, 
expanding that word to a phrase, fixing the phrase on the page where I 
have read it, 'seeing* the whole in my mind, and 'reading off' the 
sentence. Whenever I am faced with a problem that I find difficult to 
resolve, I 'accept' the problem into a total mental visual field, and 
rotate and manoeuvre the problem-as-image in order to resolve it (see 
also Luria, 1968).
I would say that my primary mode of thinking is metaphor. Instead of 
focusing upon the immediate object of my reflection, I seem rather to 
focus upon its representation in my mind. This 'off-tangent' way of 
thinking has distinct disadvantages in the outer-worldly aspects of my 
life. To myself, I often seemed inefficient in my professional work- 
situation, for I often seemed not to be operating in the same mode of 
consciousness as my colleagues. I would say that we shared the same 
field of discourse in content areas but not, in Wittgenstein’s words, 
the same language game. I seem to express myself in terms of 
intuitions, whereas colleagues often seem to express themselves in terms 
of analytic propositions.
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The same syndrome has usually been apparent when I attempt to engage In 
the analytic discourse of argument. I find flittering thoughts whizzing 
through my mind, but the thoughts take the form of images and tactile 
sensations. The shapes fuse and separate into new shapes so rapidly 
that I am unable to decipher them into speech. Further, I do not want 
to stop, in order to go through the laborious process of re-forming them 
into speech. As a result, to the observer, I often appear inarticulate 
and clumsy. So I tend to retreat from discourse, and find my favourite 
form of expression in the written word, when I may go through the 
process of translation In a leisurely fashion.
Yet metaphor, particularly visual metaphor, is an enormously powerful 
force in my thinking, and I use it consciously. I am doing that now. 
This is one of the reasons that I am writing this present rationale. As
well as wanting to ground the coming discussion as to the nature of
knowledge, I wish also to use this chapter as a demonstration in action 
of the organic nature of this text.
I have already indicated in the Introduction to this chapter that this 
present writing is the third attempt at this chapter. I wish to use
this chapter to demonstrate the growth of understanding, to demonstrate
in action how I may come to know. I intend in this chapter to discuss 
the nature of ways of thinking, and the nature of forms of thought - 
that is the proposed ontology of the chapter, part of the 'inner 
framework' that I alluded to in the Introduction. By adopting the form 
that I am here adopting, I have the opportunity to demonstrate the 
epistemology of my knowledge; the way in which I am learning about my
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own learning (the 'outer framework'). I suggested above that knowledge 
is something we do; I am 'doing knowledge' here, I am exploring the way 
I think about ways of thinking. I am using a form of knowledge - that 
of enquiry-in-action, which I believe is a process of structures and 
transformations (see below and Chapter 6) - to enquire into forms of 
knowledge. I am demonstrating in action the process of my own 
education.
What I will suggest, then, is to invite you, the reader, to regard this 
chapter as an enquiry. I will invite you to join with me as I try out 
ideas, as I comment on my observations of my own mental processes.
My situation is that I work alone. I have no contact with others in 
this chosen field except Jack Whitehead. Perhaps, had I access to other 
similarly interested minds, I would go through the process of trial-and- 
error in thought through discussion; but I have not that access. I have 
to think things out for myself. And I see that here, in the writing of 
this particular chapter, is a golden opportunity ; for this is a chapter 
in which I have important things to say, but I am not yet entirely sure 
of what I want to say. So, instead of engaging in question and answer 
with colleagues to work out my ideas, I will present the question and 
answer with myself; and the explicit form of writing will, I hope, 
enable you to understand me and to see the actual struggle as I try to 
make sense.
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I have already indicated in my initial presentation (see the Overview to 
Part II) that I am confident about the hypotheses that I hope to 
present. This is in many ways so much bluff. I am not at all 
confident, for I have not yet fully worked out the ideas. My notes are
not clearly set out, as they were for second version 1-4. Chapters 1-4
were clear in my mind; when I came to writing, it was an easy matter of 
translating thought into the action of writing. One form of 
symbolisation (my imaging) became another form of symbolisation (my 
writing). [HOW INTERESTING THAT I AM AGAIN OPERATING IN METAPHOR: THE 
' OBEJCT* OF MY THOUGHT - MY PRACTICE - BECAME AN ABSTRACTION, AN IMAGE 
OF THOUGHT THAT WAS TURNED INTO AN EXPRESSION OF THOUGHT. I As I embark 
on this chapter, I have not a clearly formulated plan of campaign. My
notes are random words on a page. On the page in front of me I read
"values - most of the lit. seen as objects to be known" and "I say -
values a property of their subject" and "object-centred epistemology vs. 
subject-centred epistemology". Yet in this I do feel confident, for 
here I have clues. These are the clues of my intuitions that, I feel 
sure, will be woven into the fabric of a coherent text. Perhaps the 
text will not be quite coherent in the first writing; that is when my
skills as my own editor will come into play, to re-work the text into a
more elegant form. And my reading of Polanyi (1969) tells me that clues 
are a form of knowledge, a subsidiary form of consciousness that enables 
me to focus on the object which I want to gain knowledge about. He says 
(p.214):
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"I an here speaking of ACTIVB consciousness, which excludes incoherent 
dreams or pathological bursts of temper. Active consciousness achieves 
coherence by integrating clues and the things Dn which they bear or 
Integrating parts of the wholes they form. This brings forth THE TWO 
LEVELS OF AWARENESS; the lower one for the clues, the parts or other 
subsidiary elements and the higher one for the focally apprehended 
comprehensive entity to which these elements point. A deliberate act of 
consciousness has therefore not only an identifiable object as its focal 
point, but also a set of subsidiary roots which function as clues to its 
objects or as parts of it." And I am also advised by Polanyi (1958) of 
the 'fiduciary component': the need to rely on the clues, as being a 
direct arrow to clear understanding.
So I am putting my faith in my tacit knowledge. I believe that 1 will 
work out some answers, but, operating in the strategy of provisionality 
that I spoke about in the Introduction to the text, I will not opt for 
definitive conclusions, but use the provisional hypotheses I arrive at 
as resting-places; rungs on the ladder rather than the top platform.
So, to embark an the journey: I have an idea that there is a
relationship between ways of thinking and forms of thought, and I will 
explore the parts involved in the hypothesis to see if it makes sense.
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(b> Two inodes of thinking
In this section I am following the advice of William James (The 
principles of psychology, 1950) that "the only thing which psychology 
has a right to postulate at the outset is the fact of thinking itself, 
and that must first be taken up and analyzed."
James's formulation of 'the stream of consciousness' suggests that the 
mental life of an individual is continuous and unbroken, and that it may 
be characterised by at least two modes. Similar to Polanyi's position 
(see above), James says that "thought is always interested more in one 
part of its object than in another, and welcomes and rejects, or 
chooses, all the while it thinks" - that is, one part of the mental 
processes attends to phenomena, while another part is aware of this 
attention - comparable to Polanyi's formulation of tacit knowledge and 
explicit knowledge (see above).
Let us for the time being accept these two modes of thinking. I shall 
provisionally adopt Polanyi's tern© of 'tacit knowledge' and 'explicit 
knowledge', and I shall return to the discussion of their 
characteristics shortly. It is important here that I fully comprehend 
Polanyi's use of the terms, however, for I shall shortly hypothesise 
that, in my view, there is a parameter of thinking that is related to, 
but separate from, Polanyi's use of the term 'tacit knowledge'.
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I refer again to Polanyi's 'The structure of consciousness' in 'Knowing 
and being' (1969). On p.212 I read:
"It is a mistake to identify subsidiary awareness with subconscious or 
preconscious awareness, or with the fringe of consciousness described by 
William James. The relation of clues to that which they indicate is a 
LOGICAL RELATION similar to that which a premise has to the inferences 
drawn from it, but with the important difference that tacit inferences 
drawn from clues are not explicit. They are informal, tacit."
So, as I understand it, Polanyi is saying here that tacit knowledge is 
functional (he says "the characteristic feature of subsidiary awareness 
is to have a FUHCTION, the function of bearing on something at the focus 
of our attention.") Explicit knowledge is functional, in that it allows 
us to attend to and gain awareness of the object of our attention (would 
Polanyi now say 'have personal knowledge of the object of our 
attention'?); tacit knowledge is functional, in that it allows us to 
attend to and gain knowledge of our attention itself (to have knowledge 
of our knowledge).
How, I wish to explore the nature of the 'logical relation' that Polanyi 
sees between the concept of functional tacit knowledge, and the concept 
of 'subconscious or preconscious awareness'.
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I came to the work of Robert Ornstein through my readings about the 
nature of mind (for example, Chosmky, 1985, 1982; Samples, 1978). I was 
particularly interested in this topic, since it gave fresh insights to 
my own 'intuitive' way of thinking (see above), and encouraged me to 
think that, rather than being an 'odd' form, I had here the capacity to 
tap into an immensely wealthy source of potential knowledge. In the 
introduction to his book 'The nature of human consciousness' (1973)
Ornstein states: "A major thesis of this book is that two modes of
consciousness exist in Man, the intellectual and its complement, the 
intuitive. Contemporary science (and, indeed, much of Western culture) 
has predominantly emphasized the intellectual mode, and has filtered out 
rich sources of evidence: meditation, 'mysticism', non-ordinary reality, 
the influence of the 'body' on the 'mind'. In part, this book is 
intended to open an inquiry into that inelegant, tacit, 'other' side of 
ourselves."
From the many excellent papers, I shall choose Bogen's analysis ('The 
other side of the brain: an appositional mind', originally 1969) as the 
paper that best guides my thinking at this point.
Bogen presents evidence from a variety of sources that the two sides of
the brain (left and right hemisphere) seem to have two specific 
functions. The left hemisphere is dominant for what he calls 
'propositional thought': it is associated with 'symbolic' functions such 
as speech, seeming "to operate in a more logical, analytic, computerlike 
fashion" (Levey-Agresti and Sperry, 1968), The right hemisphere is 
associated with interpretation, synthesis, imaginative capacities.
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Bogen suggests the use of the term 'appositional': "This term implies a
capacity for apposing or comparing of perceptions, schemas, engrams, 
etc., but has in addition the virtue that it implies very little else." 
I shall provisionally adopt the use of the term 'appositional'. So to 
clarify my understanding of his work, I may say that, for example, left 
hemisphere functions will enable us to use words, and it is complemented 
by the right hemisphere function of allowing us to use words in 
meaningful utterances.
Bogen continues in his exposition that there is now a substantial body 
of literature to support the idea of split-brain functioning. He 
summarises: "One of the most obvious and fundamental features of the
cerebrum is that it is double. Various kinds of evidence, especially 
from hemispherectomy, have made it clear that one hemisphere is 
sufficient to sustain a personality or mind. We may then conclude that 
the individual with two intact hemispheres has the capacity for two 
distinct minds. This conclusion finds its experimental proof in the 
split-brain animal whose two hemispheres may be trained to perceive, 
consider and act independently. In the human, where PROPOSITIONAL 
thought is typically lateralized to one hemisphere, the other hemisphere 
evidently specializes in a different mode of thought, which may be 
called 'appositional'.
"The rules or methods by which propositional thought is elaborated on 
'this' side of the brain (the side which speaks, reads, and writes) have 
been subjected to analyses of syntax, semantics, mathematical logic, 
etc.) for many years. The rules by which appositional thought is
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elaborated on the other side of the brain will need study for many years 
to come.M
Citing the work of Goldstein (1948, 1980) he says: "Throughout
Goldstein's work there seems a division of mental function into two 
modes of thought: an 'abstract attitude' involving discursive reasoning, 
and a 'concrete attitude' which is 'un-reflective' and 'more realistic'. 
His belief that one of these is a 'higher' function that the other and 
his disaffection for anatomical localization are not necessarily bound 
up with the essential point, that there are two types of thinking 
generated in the same cerebrum." He then cites further sources to
support this theory that "man is dual", including the work of Levi- 
Strauss (1965) who says:
"Primitive man is clearly capable of positive thought ... but it is his 
myth-creating capacity which plays the vital part in his life. ... I
believe that these two ways of thinking have always existed in man, and
they go on existing, but the importance they are giving is not the same
here and there."
I would also suggest that, in the nature of his thinking, modern man is 
no different from primitive man. I am led to this conclusion by the 
work of Sir James Frazer ('The golden bough', 1922), Freud (1955), Jung 
(1953) and Levi-Strauss (op.cit.), who all suggest that the image we 
have built of ourselves as a sophisticated, logic-oriented species is 
demolished as soon as we go to sleep, or engage in modes of thinking 
which are grounded in affective, rather than cognitive, zones.
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1 will now attempt to relate my exposition with my discussion about the 
nature of knowledge.
Let us suppose, for the time being, that there are two modes of 
thinking. I will here refer to 'thinking' rather than 'thought', for it 
is my intention to use the word 'thought' with reference to forms that 
thinking generates. In using the term 'thinking' I am referring more to 
the 'processes' involved in consciousness; in using the term 'thought' I 
refer more to the ' products' generated by thinking - and I hasten to add 
that, in the course of my exposition, I will indicate my belief that 
'process' and 'product' are but different aspects of the same concept; 
in the same way that light may be seen as point or wave. (Bertalanffy 
(1952) summarizes: “Vhat are called structures are slow processes of
long duration, functions are quick processes of short duration. If we 
say that a function, such as the contraction of a muscle, is performed 
by a structure, it means that a quick and short process wave is 
superimposed on a long-lasting and slowly running wave“. See also my 
Chapter 6 of this text.)
I will call these two modes of thinking 'appositional' following Bogen 
(op.cit.) and 'analytic', following Levy-Agresti and Sperry (1968). I 
am deliberately avoiding the use of the term ' propositional' which Bogen 
uses as the partner term to 'appositional', for later in this chapter I 
shall be speaking about * propositi onal forms of thought', and I do not 
want to confuse the issue by awarding two references to one single term. 
For my discussion, then, I refer to 'analytic thinking' to denote the 
symbolic, logical processes involved in discursive, verbal or formal-
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logical thinking; and 'appositional thinking' to denote the non-
discursive, non-verbal, eidetic processes involved in synthetic or
analogic thinking. A similar complementary system appears in the work
of de Bono ('The mechanisms of mind', 1957; 'The use of lateral
thinking', 1957). He suggests that there are four modes of thinking - 
natural, logical, mathematical and lateral. Because this area of 
enquiry is new for me, I wish to keep my discussion as specific as
possible, so I will stay with the two methods of thinking that I have 
identified.
[I VILL CONFESS HERE TO SOME UNCERTAINTY. I HAVE NOT FOUND ANYONE IN
THB LITERATURE WHO IS PROPOSING A SIMILAR FORMULATION AS I AM HERE, AND
I WONDER IF I AM WRITING JUST SO MUCH RUBBISH. BUT I HAVE A STRONG
FEELING - MY INTUITIVE THOUGHT HERB - THAT I AM ON THE TRACK OF
SOMETHING INTERESTING. I AM DOING THE SAME IN THIS CHAPTER THAT I DID 
IN THE ORIGINAL CHAPTER 4 - OF WORKING OUT MY THOUGHT THROUGH THE
PROCESSES THAT ARE THE OBJECTS OF THAT THOUGHT. I AM TRYING TO EXPLAIN
THE PROCESS OF ARRIVING AT A CHARACTERISATION OF KNOWLEDGE THROUGH THE 
ACTIVE PRACTICE OF EXPLORING THE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN 'KNOWING'.
I HAVE A FORMULATION IN MY MIND THAT:
1 THERE ARE AT LEAST TWO TYPES OF PROCESSES INVOLVED IN THINKING - 
ANALYTIC AND APPOSITIONAL;
2 THESE PROCESSES GENERATE DIFFERENT MODES OF THOUGHT - LOGICAL 
AND INTUITIVE;
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3 A FORM OF THOUGHT (IF I VIEW THOUGHT AS AH ACTIVE IHGREDIENT IH 
• THE LIFE OF A THINKER) WILL GROUND A THINKER’S APPROACH TO 
KNOWLEDGE: IF ’THOUGHT’ IS SEEN AS THE WAY IN WHICH WE ’KNOW',
A FORM OF THOUGHT INEVITABLY CONTRIBUTES TO A CHARACTERISATION OF 
’KNOWLEDGE’.
I ALSO SEE THIS FORMULATION AS THE GERM TO A COGNITIVE MODEL INVOLVING 
COMPETENCE AND PERFORMANCE. IN MY MIND, I SEE A VISUAL:-
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THE TWO 'BLOCKS’ MAY FIX INTO EACH OTHER, LIKE LEGGO, TO FORM A WHOLE. 
IF I REGARD THE TOP BOX AS COMPETENCE, AND THE BOTTOM BOX AS 
PERFORMANCE, THE TWO HALVES, JOINED TOGETHER, FORM A SYNTHETIC WHOLE. 
THE TOTAL MODEL REPRESENTS THE SYNTHETIC, RELATIONAL NATURE OF THE MIND, 
IN WHICH THE WHOLE IS GREATER THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS.
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I AH ANTICIPATING THE FORTHCOMING DISCUSSION, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE 
MOMENTUM OF THE OVERAL ISSUE OF MY PROJECT - THE WAY IN WHICH AN 
INDIVIDUAL LEARNS. I AM HERE KEEPING A DIARY OF MENTAL EVENTS. I 
ALREADY SEE DEFICIENCIES IN THE MODEL - AM I TRYING TO SEPARATE INTO TWO 
PARTS WHAT IS IN FACT A WHOLE, WHEN I USE THE TERMS 'TACIT KNOWLEDGE' 
AND 'INTUITIVE THOUGHT'?
I THINK NOT (INTUITIVELY); BUT MY CRITICAL FACULTIES ARE MAKING ME 
AWARE OF FLAWS IN MY ANALYTIC/LOGICAL FORMS. MY THEORY-BUILDING IS 
MOVING AHEAD IN JERKS, WHICH APPEAR AS CULMINATIONS OF EPISODES OF NEW 
CREATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE RE-FORMULATION OF PREVIOUS THEORIES (SEE 
CHAPTER 6 FOR MY VIEW OF THE NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT).
I SHALL FOLLOW MY IDEA. I SHALL CONTINUE TO KEEP A DETAILED RECORD OF 
HOW MY THINKING ALLOWS ME TO CREATE NEW THOUGHT ABOUT THE NATURE OF 
KNOWLEDGE-GROUNDED-IN-THOUGHT - i.e. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE.
( p-kk )
(c) • Two inodes of thought
Before I embark on a discussion of what the two modes of thought are, I 
need to establish that I now have a clear understanding of how I see the 
difference in nature between ’thinking' and 'thought'.
I said above that I saw 'thinking' as a process, and 'thought' as a 
product. I also made the point, and I continue in this belief, that 
process and product are not discrete entitites, but part of the 
interrelated mechanics of the ongoing interchange of transformations and 
structures. In Chapter 6 I make my understanding of this issue explicit 
by the presentation of a model of the nature of development.
I will first draw on the idea put forward by Kosslyn <in Block, 1981) 
that it is necessary to (1) distinguish between models and theories, and 
<2) to recognise the distinction between general and specific models. I 
will also consider Polanyi's notion (1969) of the irreducible structure 
of life forms, in order to ground the theory regarding the respective 
natures of theory and model.
Kosslyn says that a model is a component of a theory: it contains "an 
element of 'as-if' that is not present in a theory proper. That is, a 
model is assumed to be under a description, or under a certain 
interpretation, that leads one to draw points of similarity between it 
and the modeled domain. A theory proper is unambiguous and not in need 
of such interpretation."
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If I apply this conceptualisation to my present strategy of enquiry-in- 
action, I may say that I am engaged at this point of producing tentative 
models, and I will endeavour to synthesise the amalgam of my models as a 
cognitive theory.
How I draw on Polanyi's notion of 'irreducible structure'. Polanyi says 
<1969) that higher forms are grounded in lower forms, and are generated 
by those lower forms. If we can accept a temporary principle that a 
lower form is characterised in terms of context-specific features, we 
can suppose that higher forms will no longer be bound by these features, 
having transcended them, but will still contain the features in its 
metamorphosed form (see also Chapter 6 of this text). So, says Polanyi, 
the concept of 'mind' is above the concept of 'brain': "the mind
harnesses neurophysiological mechanisms; though it depends on them, it 
is not determined by them."
I will apply the same concept to my enquiry-in-action. I am proposing 
models - temporary structures in the business of building theories, and, 
according to the theory I put forward in Chapter 6 concerning the nature 
of development, my 'present' theory, in the form of my present best 
thinking, may be seen as a temporary structure that will be absorbed 
into the next step in my development, as a better thinking sets in.
( )
How it is useful here to consider Kosslyn's distinction between "two 
kinds of models, SPECIFIC and GENERAL. Specific models are designed to 
account for performance in a particular task, . . . whereas general ones 
embody the entire set of principles (assumptions about functional 
capacities and their interrelations) that should account for performance 
in all the tasks in a given domain." (Kosslyn, his italics, op.cit., 
p.211).
Let me apply this notion to the specific content of this present 
section: the generation of types of thought from types of thinking. I 
will suggest that the term 'thinking' suggests functionality, and I will 
go on to propose that this functionality may be characterised as 
transformations. (Our everyday linguistic structures seem to imply that 
'thinking' is seen as an action, embodied, as it were, in the verb 'I am 
thinking'. If I talk about a person's thinking, I imply that he is 
doing something. 'Thought', on the other hand, is normally assumed to 
be a noun: we speak of 'thought' as a structured entity.) I will also 
suggest that the term 'thought' denotes 'product' and that this product 
may be seen as data-structure. I am saying that type of thought is 
generated by type of thinking, the data-structure is generated by the 
transf ormat i ons.
[THIS BIT IS VERY HARD FOR ME. I FEEL I AM GROPING DOWN A DARK TUNNEL, 
STEP BY STEP. EVERY NOV AND THEN MY PASSAGE IS PUNCTUATED BY LIGHTS 
THAT SUDDENLY APPEAR ON THE WALL, MY IMMEDIATE SURROUNDS ARE 
ILLUMINATED, AND I SEE SHADOWS SCURRYING BACK INTO THE DARKNESS BEHIND 
ME. I AM STILL NOT SURE IF MY JOURNEY WILL END WITH AN EMERGENCE INTO
( ?-h7 )
THE SUNLIGHT. PERHAPS I WILL COME UP AGAINST AN IMPENETRABLE WALL-FACE, 
AND THE LIGHTS WILL GO OUT.
NO. MY 'FIDUCIARY COMPONENT' IS AS STRONG AS EVER. MY FAITH IN MY OWN 
INTUITION WILL CARRY ME THROUGH.]
Let me now try to draw some of the threads together by suggesting a 
characterisation of 'thought'.
There is a vast body of literature embracing numerous disciplines 
concerning the properties of mind. I will at present agree with Thomson 
<1959) and Ryle (1946) that the term 'thinking' is a "polymorphous 
concept", that is often expressed as 'reminiscing', 'opining', 
'attending', 'remembering', 'imagining'. Thomson limits his definition 
of 'thinking' as the reflective process of arriving at an envisaged 
goal. I believe that this use of the term 'thinking' is in the 
normative sense of (left hemisphere) analytic processes, and the thought 
thus generated is in the form of structures whose main characteristic is 
that they are goal-directed.
Let us then propose the concept that right-hemisphere appositional 
thinking generates 'intuitive' thought. By this I mean the kind of
thought that is diffuse, is non-goal-directed, is relational, is non­
sequential. I would suggest that such thought is analogous to the
scanning operations of computers. Such thought picks out the models 
which may contribute to the amalgamation of display presentation, the
'clues' that will contribute to the 'other' kind of thought. Let me
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also propose that left-hemisphere analytical thinking generates formal 
(transactional?) thought. Such thought is basically goal-directed.
Let me present some tentative analogies to clarify my own understandings 
of these basic conceptualisations.
In the appositional/analytic dichotomy/complementarity I see an analogy 
between playing the notes on a piano and playing music; or between
producing the morphophonemes of words and producing meaningful
utterances. An analogy to do with thinking itself would be if I had a
vague idea about the key to a code, and explored the idea to produce the 
code-breaker.
In the intuitive/formal (transactional?) dichotomy/complementarity I see 
an analogy between using a trial-and-error strategy of solving a
problem, and then homing in on the most promising one. There is a 
passage in Marjorie Grene's 'The knower and the known' (1966) which is 
relevant to my hypothesis (though I would imagine she did not write it 
with my hypothesis in mind):
"The character of problem solving may also instruct us, finally, in 
respect of Hume's third principle, the principle of association. A 
problem is solved, not by the kind of trial and error which could be 
interpreted as the product of chance or of an associative mechanism 
which is the next thing to chance. It is solved, as Koehler says, by a 
'series of complete attempts at solution' - only all but the last have 
gone wrong. Problem-solving, in other words, involves not only insight,
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but risk, and if risk, then responsibility . . . For there is always, in 
the solution of a problem, in the establishment of an induction, the 
abrupt, logically unaccountable, personal transition from puzzlement to 
insight: the transition which Kierkegaard called a 'leap'
I have experienced many such ’leaps' in my practice, particularly in 
writing texts like this, where I puzzle over a problem, seeing it first 
this way and then that; and, indeed, the sudden insight puts me on the 
other side of a gulf of not knowing. I have often been bewildered at 
the dramatic change in view that such an experience produces. I can 
look back at the difficulties of puzzlement, for I am secure on this 
side; but what has happened in the intervening space has always been a 
mystery. I am beginning to think that it is no longer a mystery. I am 
beginning to think that what happens is because of the scanning facility 
of intuitive thought. As Marjorie Grene and Koehler indicate, "all but 
the last have gone wrong". It is not so much that the last trial has 
been successful that makes the next step so radically different from the 
last; it is because the scanning mechanism of intuitive thought has 
transformed into the goal-directed structures of model-presentation. My 
scanning becomes focused; my structure becomes focal; I am temporarily 
at rest in a model that I will use in the generation of a theory.
Of course, all this is highly speculative, but I feel that it is at 
least some attempt to take into account the random, seemingly irrelevant 
aspects of thought that lead, certainly in my practice, to an insight 
that will enable my conceptualisations to develop. I find that if I 
focus intently on a topic, in an active mode, and then relax into a
( 250 )
receptive mode, as when I am gardening or doing mundane activities, my 
mind will do the rest. When I then return actively to the problem, I 
usually have the solution. The articles in Part 4 of Ornstein's (1973) 
explore this phenomenon extensively; and I was delighted to read an 
explicit account of what I have been doing automatically for years.
The reason that I have undertaken this particular path of enquiry is to 
explore an hypothesis that there is a relationship between forms of 
thought and forms of knowledge, and I present here some statements to 
ground my belief. I will hope to ground these statements in the
literature. My statements are these:
1 Most of the literature dealing with the epistemology of knowledge 
seems to assume the existence of a primary form of thought, what I have 
here called 'formal' ('transactional'?) thought. Scant attention is 
paid to intuitive thought.
2 There is a rift in the literature whether thought is seen as an 
action, or as an abstraction. The first view assumes thought to be a 
property of a thinker; the second view takes thought to be a product of 
minds. In my previous formulation, the first view is a specific model; 
the second view is a general model. The specific model is operating in 
a person-centred mode, in which the person is the epistemic centre; the 
second is operating in an object-centred mode, in which the object 
(reified thought) is the epistemic centre.
( 251 )
3 There is a direct relationship between the concept of thought and the 
concept of knowledge. Views about thinking/thought inevitably produce a 
commensurate view about knowing/knowledge.
I will now attempt to expand (3). This exposition will inevitably
involve expansion of (1) and (2). So now I turn my attention to the
idea of different forms of knowledge.
(d) Two forms of knowledge
First, let me trace the links, as I hypothesise, in the transition from 
thought to knowledge.
If I say, MI am thinking", I state that I am actively involved, I am 
doing something.
If I am thinking something, without externalising that thought in 
speech, writing, gesture, or other symbolic form, I am not making that 
thought public. It is my personal property without external 
involvement. If I externalise that thought, however, I imply that I 
know. As long as my thought is covert, I do not claim validity for it. 
As soon as it is externalised, I am claiming it as a valid 
representation of what is going on inside my mind. I am making a 
knowledge-claim about my thought. (In Chapters 7 and 6 I shall discuss 
the notion that all statements at surface level are manifestations of
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deep level competence, provided the speaker accepts and acts accordingly 
within normative rules of discourse.)
So, I am suggesting that there is a direct link between modes of thought 
and forms of knowledge, and I will anticipate future discussion by 
saying that intuitive thought generates tacit knowledge, and formal 
(transactional?) thought generates explicit (propositional?) knowledge.
So my schema at the moment is
left hemisphere right hemisphere
analytic thinking appositional thinking
formal (transactional?) thought intuitive thought
explicit (propositional?) knowledge tacit knowledge
In a moment I shall indicate that this is a first step in a much more 
refined model. First I need to show what I mean by 'explicit 
(propositional?) knowledge' and 'tacit knowledge'.
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There is a large body of literature on the knower and the known, and, 
within the literature, there seem to be two major, polarised positions, 
The first position (e.g. Ayer, 1956; Popper, 1972) indicate that 
knowledge is an object to be acquired; that it stands outside the 
individual as a reified body. The other position (e.g. Polanyi, 1958; 
Grene, 1966) regards knowledge as a property of the individual. For an 
entity to be known, there must be a knower as agent (Kant, 1785), In 
the first school, a knower is required to prioritise the characteristics 
and properties of knowledge, in order that he may train himself to 
acquire them. The knower, in this sense, is not focally aware of his 
own knowledge, but receives it, as it were, from another agency. Regard 
for one's own ability to know is ignored. Ayer tells us (op.cit. p.214) 
"To apply the physicalist thesis to one's own experience is, as it were, 
to pretend to be anaesthetised". I shall continue this discussion in 
the next section. In the second school, a knower is encouraged to be 
aware (to know) his ability to know; and Polanyi (1958) has formulated 
this dual awareness in the terms of 'focal' and 'subsidiary' knowledge: 
the focal, explicit dimension of knowing an object, and the subsidiary, 
tacit dimension of knowing one's own knowledge. Grene says (op.cit.), 
"Whatever I succeed in doing, it is I who achieve knowledge: I in my
contingent, personal existence, I-in-situation,"
I shall return to this discussion in the next section of this chapter. 
For purposes of my present argument - that there are two modes of 
consciousness which generate, to my mind, two forms of knowledge, it 
serves here only to introduce the ideas that I have expressed.
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I will suggest, then, that explicit knowledge is embedded within and 
generated by formal (transactional?) thought; and tacit knowledge is 
embedded within and generated by intuitive thought.
I must ask you here to remember that I am using specific terms to 
indicate notional properties of mind in the presentation of a model. I 
have not yet, in my formulation, arrived at a theory. My theory will 
indicate that the parts that I have identified fuse into each other in 
the dynamic process of the living person. My model, at this analytic 
stage, indicates static parts that are, in the coming section, about to 




In this section I hope to expand the parts I have identified as notional 
'processes' and 'products (outcomes)' in the mind, and to introduce the 
further elements of levels of mind, in my attempt to understand the 
workings of the mind/brain.
First, in sections (b), (c) and (d) above I have supposed that there are 
two separate but related forms of consciousness, which may all 
contribute towards a characterisation of the conceptualisation of 
'knowledge'. In my schema I showed a notional embedding of forms of 
knowledge within levels of thought. I will now show how I feel these 
currently linear representations may be linked into relational aspects.
Let us suppose that we may view the workings of the appositional mind to 
produce the top half of the structure at (1), and the workings of the 
analytic mind to produce the bottom half.
ekLjiUoLt
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In my conceptualisation, the two 'blocks' are not discrete, the lower
block being a metamorphosis of the higher. I shall return to this 
aspect in a moment, when I shall also suggest that the metamorphosis is 
effected through dialectical transformations.
I will now introduce the concepts originated by Chomsky (1957, 1965) of 
'competence' and 'performance'. I have applied these concepts
extensively in my own work (McNiff 1984, 1986).
Chomsky was concerned to account for the linguistic intuitions of the 
native speaker-hearer (see also Chapter 3 of this text). In his attempt 
to characterise the levels of mind that would account for these
intuitions, he hypothesised the existence of two levels of mind.
Competence was a deep level, which was the location for the intuitive
'knowledge' of linguistic rules that enabled a speaker potentially to 
use the grammar of any and every language. Performance was a surface
level, the externalisation in practice of the application of those
rules.
I will apply these levels to my present model. I will suggest that the 
'tacit' block is at the level of competence, and that the 'explicit* 
block is at the level of performance.
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I have stressed throughout that the model does not aim to represent 
discrete entitites, but to suggest an interrelated complementarity; in 
the same way that a mind is not divisible, but operates efficiently as a 
whole. What I now need to do, therefore, is to suggest a way in which 
'tacit' and 'explicit' elements are fused and metamorphosed.
My provisional answer is that I look now to the approach by a knower to 
his own knowledge. It is my argument that, if a knower aims at formal 
forms in which to account for his own knowledge, he tends to deny the 
tacit dimension. In my formulation, he does not realise his full
potential at competence. If he aims for dialectical forms in which to 
account for his own knowledge, he tends to appreciate the tacit 
dimension; as a result, he is aware of his own potential, and may
exercise his rationality (at performance) to transform the potential (at
competence) into a form of life.
I have here introduced the elements of form of enquiry, or approach to 
knowledge. I have used the terms 'formal' and 'dialectical'. I shall 
dwell on these elements at length in the next section.
I am now working towards a theory - that of the need for a knower to 
develop an understanding of his own potential. In my formulation, this
means that 'knowing' entails rational decisions in the act of knowing -
that is, becoming aware of competence, and desiring to turn it into 
performance.
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I now also wish to home in on the question of this chapter: 'What 
constitutes knowledge of values?' For "if knowing is essentially a kind 
of doing, and human doing is always value-bound, then knowledge is so as 
well" (Grene, 1966). But I am here anticipating the issue of what 
values are that they may be known; and that is the essence of the next 
section.
3 ’ WHAT DO I MEAN BY 'VALUES'?
(i) The creation of values as a kind of knowledge
So, to continue the discussion, I may say that the creation of values 
is a kind of knowledge. By this I mean that values are beliefs that 
individuals hold, collectively or separately - beliefs that shape their 
lives. If I say, "I believe that all people are equal" I am expressing 
a held value. In expressing this belief in explicit, symbolic form - in 
speech or writing, say - I am making a provisional claim to personal 
knowledge. In asking people to share my belief, or provisional claim to 
knowledge, I am testing it against the beliefs of others and seeking for 
my claim to be validated by the community of which I am a part. (For a 
detailed discussion of the Justification of knowledge claims, see 
Chapter 8 of this text.) So, in attempting to uphold the values which I
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have, I try to adopt a form of life which is in itself a claim to 
knowledge.
How, this is where there is a danger, in epistemological terms, of 
confusing explanations by individuals to account for the knowledge that 
they possess with prescriptions of the literature that are impositions 
of knowledge systems that may be alien to the individual. I feel 
strongly that this is where current literature about values acquisition 
and values education is misleading. I say this because, initially, I 
tried to ground my own practice in the prescriptions of the literature, 
and saw in such an attempt a denial of my own educational values of 
freedom and the inalienable integrity of the individual. I shall say 
more about this in due course.
My discussion rests in part on the formulation I have arrived at through 
the discussion so far.
(1) I have submitted the view that knowledge is grounded in thought,
and that higher forms will evolve out of lower forms.
<2) I have suggested that there are two levels of mind; that competence 
may be seen as containing the tacit component, and performance may be 
seen as expressing the explicit component.
(3) I have suggested that the creation of values is a form of 
knowledge: in tacit form values may be seen as underlying beliefs; in
explicit form they may be seen as a form of life.
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(4) I have said that performance is a metamorphosis of competence, such 
a metamorphosis being effected through dialectical transformations (see 
also Chapter 6).
(5) I have briefly referred to forms of thinking about thought - the 
epistemological bases of knowledge - and I have alluded in passing to 
formal and dialectical approaches to knowledge. This will receive 
detailed treatment here, for, in my view, this is the crucial link 
between knowledge and values. For, if we accept what I have suggested - 
that creation of values is a kind of knowledge, then 'knowledge of 
values' becomes 'knowledge of knowledge'. This is no tautology, but a 
fundamental issue in any discussion of values - and one that is, in my 
view, not only ignored in the majority of the literature, but not even 
perceived.
What I am saying is that a view of knowledge will inevitably influence a 
view of values, and, correspondingly, a view of values acquisition and 
values education. A characterisation of values has to rest on the 
characterisation a knower has of his own knowledge. If he believes that 
knowledge is reified, then values may also be reified. They will be 
outside himself, and be something at which he aspires. If he believes 
that knowledge rests within himself, then his values are part of his own 
creation, and may be something that he may share with other similarly- 
opinioned knowers.
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This is the theme I wish to explore in some detail in the next section. 
First I will consider approaches to knowledge, as expressed in the 
literature. Second I will consider approaches to values, as expressed 
in the literature. I will then specifically look at the literature of 
values education, and argue that there is an overwhelming tendency for 
values to be seen as an expression of formal approaches to knowledge. I 
will indicate my disagreement with this view, and give reasons why I 
disagree. I will also continue with my model of notional levels and 
mechanisms of mind, in an attempt to formulate a theory of what 
constitutes knowledge of values.
(ii) Forms of enquiry (epistemologies?) about knowledge
The literature of traditions of epistemological enquiries indicates that 
there are two main approaches to types of knowledge that may be
characterised as 'the knower and the known' (Grene, 1966). Questions 
arising out of this formulation would focus on who the knower was in an 
enquiry, if the 'knowledge' were an 'object' of enquiry, if this object 
were external to the knower or part of his own property, if the concepts 
of 'object of knowledge' or 'knowledge as creation' are justified, and 
how it is that he is aware of his own knowledge. Answers to these
questions will determine a knower's characterisation of the nature of
values, and this will be the point of Section 4.
( 262 )
Here, I will enquire about the epistemic centre in the two main forms of 
enquiry: I will suggest that one form is object-centred, and the other
form is subject-centred. I will argue in my synthesising discussions 
that object-centred epistemologies cannot, by their nature, meet the 
requirements of internal justification (Chapter 4) of explanatory 
levels, for they may not demonstrate the fusion of the tacit and 
explicit components involved in a full functioning of the levels of 
mind. To be biased toward an object-centred epistemology is to 
prioritise left-hemisphere activity in formulating theories that are 
grounded in the knower's explicit knowledge, while relegating to lesser 
importance the right-hemisphere activity that allows the knower to know 
how it is that he may make a claim to knowledge and seek to justify that 
claim. A more balanced view that holds right- and left-hemisphere 
activity as complementary, enables the knower to use the full power of 
his mind in order to raise the level of enquiry to an explanatory level, 
when the knower seeks internal justification for his knowledge as an 
expression of all levels of mind. He adopts a subject-centred 
epistemology, in which the epistemic centre is the 'I' who is enquiring. 
The questions are not only "How do I know this?" but also "How do I know 
that I know this?"
I will now discuss the nature of object-centred enquiries, in which 
explicit knowledge is the object of the enquiry.
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(a) Knowledge as the object of enquiry
A number of philosophers assume the dominance of object-centred
paradigms. Within the paradigm itself there is often much discussion 
about the priorities of forms of knowledge. Perhaps the discussion that 
has caused the most prolific debate has been the characterisation of 
propositional knowledge.
Propositional knowledge may be broadly formulated as being 'knowledge 
about the world' (Russell, 1973) - that is, explicit knowledge - and
takes three basic forms:
know-that
know-how
know + a direct object
There is debate whether these three forms constitute an accurate 
exposition of the field, if the forms are complementary or embedded, if 
the forms actually exist. For example, Hirst prefers to acknowledge
only the two forms of 'know-that' and 'know-how'. In his 'Human
movement, knowledge and education' (1979) he states:
" It has frequently been pointed out that the language we use when 
referring to knowledge is very varied. . . . First, there are those 
expressions in which what is known is a truth or set of truths, e.g. 
that 2+2=4, or who is President of France. These are normally referred 
to as expressions of propositional knowledge or know-that. Secondly
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there are expressions in which what is known is how to carry out a 
performance or activity of some kind, e.g. how to drive a car. These 
are usually referred to as cases of procedural knowledge or know-how. 
Thirdly there are expressions in which what is known is an object of 
some kind, e.g. Paris, the Ring, the Prime Minister, the feeling of 
pain. Here it is customary to speak of knowledge with a direct object.
But are there then three quite distinct mutually irreducible kinds of
knowledge, or can we show that there are ultimately only two kinds, or 
perhaps even one? In a strict sense it seems to me there are only two 
distinct mutually irreducible concepts: 'know-that' and 'know-how' with 
cases of knowledge with a direct object always being reducible to 'know- 
that' and 'know-how' plus another non-knowledge element."
Iris Murdoch, on the other hand <1970), claims that the knowledge that 
shapes our being, that is, pre-cognitive, possibly pre-conceptual
knowledge that forms and shapes our values, is a more important kind of 
knowledge. Consider, she says, the statement: "I know that my Redeemer
liveth". There is no amount of empirical evidence that could make this 
a propositional statement. It is a statement of faith, yet that faith 
is the essence of the life form of the person who makes the statement. 
Often, this type of belief cannot be articulated. "The virtuous peasant 
knows ... although what he knows he might be at a loss to say." His 
knowing is a more valid life form, for him personally, than much
cognitive knowledge.
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Reid <1980) also argues for knowledge with a direct object. Drawing his 
example from music, he says: "Consider one of the 'Master Classes' ton 
television]. ... The clear and important distinction between knowledge- 
that and knowledge with the direct object comes clearly if I say, 'The 
master knows-that it ought to go like this'. His knowledge-that and - 
how is clearly dispositional . . . But only so far. Then come bodily 
gestures, facial movements ... the passage Just has to go 'like this'. 
... Real musical intuitive knowledge is direct as the arrow. Many 
insightful things, in forms of knowledge-that and -how can be said by 
musicians; but musical knowledge, qua musical, does not reach its 
musically cognitive consummation finally from -that or -how. Rather, 
knowledge-that or -about music in itself derives from direct musical 
gnosis, musical intuition." (cited in Whitehead, 1986)
Ryle (1946) argues forcibly that know-how is the ground for know-that. 
Knowing-how is logically prior to knowing-that, he maintains. There is 
no gap between theory and practice, the epistemology that seeks to 
separate mind and body into separate fragments of intellect and skill. 
For Ryle, the ability to do something incorporates knowledge about that 
thing.
The scope of the discussion extends when it comes to justification of 
knowledge. A.J. Ayer (1956) argues for the acceptance of universal 
validity claims to justify a knower's knowledge; but the form of 
knowledge that he references is explicit knowledge only.
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Perhaps the most comprehensive documentation of the notion of the 
priority of explicit knowledge has been that of Popper (1972). Popper 
hypothesises three worlds: World 1, which is the material world of
everyday things; World 2, which is the realm of our own conscious 
processes whereby we know Worlds 1 and 3: and World 3, in which is 
stored man’s explicit knowledge, the world of ideas, ethics, language, 
values, and so on. World 3 is 'out there', independent of the agency of 
individual knowers. It is a world to be accessed for knowledge about 
the form Df man's life and being.
In (4) I shall argue that this view of knowledge is the dominant 
paradigm for values education; and I shall present a discussion to 
Indicate that, although I took it as the ground for my own enquiry, this 
approach turned out to be barren. I shall say how and why I came to 
this conclusion, and I shall hypothesise the alternative model that 
evolved out of my practice to contribute to my theory of 'knowledge of 
values'.
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<b) The knower as the object of enquiry
This approach to knowledge has a long history, going back at least to 
Plato. Hintikka (1974) shows that Plato's concept of 'dynamis' 
incorporated two dimensions of knowledge, and that these dimensions were 
often not clearly distinguished.
The dimensions were the DOXA that "refers to some particular opinion 
someone has and EPSITEME [which] refers to that item of information 
which is needed for someone to be in the STATE of knowledge." Hintikka 
then confesses confusion about the characterisation of these concepts. 
"How episteme and doxa are suddenly identified with faculties of 
knowledge and opinion. A FACULTY or POWER and its RESULT seem to be 
confused here."
He goes on to elaborate this seemingly dual nature of knowledge:
"In so far as a modern thinker is at all willing to speak of knowledge 
and opinion as faculties or powers, he might take the 'products' of 
these faculties to be the particular items of knowledge or of opinions 
to which these 'faculties' give rise - in other words, to those 
CQGHITIVB STATES which we mean when we speak of knowing or believing 
something. Alternatively, he might refuse to speak of products at all 
and consider instead only the functions performed by our capacities of 
knowing and of opining. One soon discovers, however, that Plato viewed 
the situation differently. Those 'functions' or 'ends' of the faculties 
of knowledge and belief which serve, e.g. to distinguish each faculty
( 268 )
from the others and which are somehow analogous to the products of a 
craftsman's skill were for Plato not just cognitive states in this or 
that man but sometimes tended to comprise also THOSE OBJECTS WHICH ONE'S 
KNOWLEDGE OR OPINION IS ABOUT. In other words, Plato does not always 
clearly distinguish from each other the OBJECTS of knowledge and the 
'functions' or 'products' of the power to know" (Hintikka, his italics, 
1974).
To my knowledge of the literature, this seeming dichotomy received 
explicit formulation in the work of Polanyi (1958, 1967, 1969). In ray 
□pinion, he succeeded in making explicit the relationship between the 
Cartesian 'cogito' and 'sum', and I shall dwell on this point in due 
course.
The way in which Polanyi expands his philosophy is by (1) suggesting a 
theory of knowledge that takes account of the personal element of 
responsibility and commitment in any act of knowing; (2) an acceptance 
that 'personal knowledge' is a "pervasive substructure of all 
intelligent behaviour" (Grene, in Polanyi, 1969); and (3) an acceptance 
of the tacit dimension that enables a knower to know his own knowing. 
Polanyi refers to the problem as identified by Plato that 'we know more 
than we can tell' (see the Overview to Part II), when Plato made Meno 
ask:
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"Why, on what lines will you look, Socrates, for a thing of whose nature 
you know nothing at all? Pray, what sort of thing, amongst those that 
you know not, will you treat us to as the object of your search? Or 
even supposing, at the best, that you hit upon it, how will you know it 
is the thing you did not know?"
Polanyi's answer to Plato's problem and, correspondingly, his own (see 
above) is to postulate the existence of two kinds of knowing: FOCAL and
SUBSIDIARY. "His central thesis is that no knowledge is, or can be, 
WHOLLY focal. And in the case of a problem, the subsidiary aspect looms 
large. We do not know, in the focal sense, what we are looking for, and 
yet we can look for it, because we rely, in looking for it, on clues to 
its nature, clues through which we somehow anticipate what we have not 
yet plainly understood. Such clues we hold in SUBSIDIARY rather than 
FOCAL awareness" (Grene, in Polanyi, his italics, 1969).
It is this tacit dimension that I have built into the model I am 
presenting in this chapter. I had already come to the point, from my 
understanding of the work of Chomsky, of hypothesising levels of mind as 
the grounding for the reconstruction of innate faculties that I could 
suggest would account for the intuitions of the individual knower. I 
may now match the idea of a particular level of mind - competence - as 
the location for the tacit component mooted by Polanyi.
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It Is here, as I indicated before, that I see a possible relationship 
between the 'cogito' and the 'sum', for if my full knowledge, at all 
possible levels of mind, is available to me, I am able to raise the
tacit to the explicit. I am able to know how it is that I 'come to 
know' (Stronach, 1986). My potential for a chosen form of life may be 
realised, and I may be aware of an intense form of BEING, instead of 
only existing. 'Knowing and being' is the theme of Polanyi's (1969) 
papers. In this view, knowing and being are complementary, are part of 
the other.
From this epistemological perspective, then, the knower is not only the 
subject of an enquiry, but also the object. The individual is at one 
and the same time both subject and object. Explicit knowledge is 
grounded in his own tacit knowledge; tacit knowledge is a potential form 
of life.
I will now proceed, from this brief exposition of the different 
approaches to the ' knower-known' issue, and from stating my own
position, to the notion of the creation of values as a form of 
knowledge. I agree with Edith Stein, when she says (1970): "Knowledge
as not yet realised is felt as a value. This feeling of values is the
source of all cognitive striving. ... An object proffers itself to me as 
dark, veiled, and unclear. It stands there as something which demands 
exposure and clarification." (Stein, 1970; cited in Dunlop, 1984). I 
also return to the hypothesis of Marjorie Grene (op.cit.) that "if all 
knowing is essentially a kind of doing, and human doing is always value- 
bound, then knowledge is so as well."
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I need now to relate the foregoing to my practice. Initially I will 
survey the literature of values education, and show how my understanding 
of the literature led me to adopt a certain form of life. This form of 
life itself was alien to my deeply held educational values, and I 
changed it. My decision enabled me to become critical of the 
literature, for I now needed to ground my practice in something other 
than the dominant paradigm. How and why I changed my practice has
constituted much of Part I, and will continue here and in Chapter 6.
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4 ASSUMPTIONS OF THE LITERATURE OF VALUES EDUCATION
It seems to me that there are some overwhelming assumptions in the 
literature of values education. I have already pointed to some of the 
philosophical and practical issues involved in Part I. I have indicated 
what I see as a danger inherent in the assumptions of producing a 
'certain kind of person', of the lack of educational commitment in a 
prioritising of the management of schooling, of the danger of 
overlooking the integrity of the individual by focusing on group 
methodologies. In this section I want to look at the epistemological 
foundations of the assumptions of the dominant paradigm.
I will suggest that there seems to be an all-pervading positivism which 
assumes the role of a secure foundation. This positivism has generated 
the view that people will react to certain stimuli in certain conditions 
with hypothesised end results (e.g. Gagne, 1970; Skinner, 1968; 
Kohlberg, 1976; Straughan, 1981); that values are objects of knowledge, 
and may be acquired as such (e.g. Downie and Telfer, 1969, 1980);
Wilson, 1967); that there is a pre-determined course of action that will 
enable the learner to acquire values (e.g. Kohlberg, 1971; Selman, 
1976); that this course of action will lead to an end-product of 'full 
development' (e.g. Piaget, 1932; McPhail, 1982; Ungoed-Thomas, 1978). 
Further, there is the dominant assumption that values reflect the 
standards and mores of a given society (Raths et al, 1978), and that it 
is the task of educators to help their children acquire the necessary 
skills to attain these values (e.g. Raven, 1981; Hamlin, 1978; Saunders, 
1979).
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I will examine these assumptions in detail, but first I wish to clarify 
a point of terminology:
A point of terminology
There is much variation in the literature about the naming of different 
branches of education in values; and a certain amount of synonymous 
naming, or using terms as mutually distributive, does not help. In my 
early work I assumed that personal and social education was a self- 
contained body of knowledge with its own literature. My reading and 
discussions with colleagues rapidly introduced new terms into my 
vocabulary: values education, social education, Lifeskills, tutorial
work, moral education, personal development, values clarification, and 
so on. I then thought that some sort of hierarchy might be acknowledged 
in the literature; say that values education would incorporate moral 
education, which would in turn incorporate personal and social 
education, something along the lines of a tree diagram:
values education
moral education
personal and social education
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*y search of the literature produced no such arrangement. Indeed, I 
discovered that the values clarification models of Harmin (1973), 
Kirschenbaum (1977) and Raths (1978) had the same conceptual and 
procedural basis as McPhail's (1975) consideration model. Similarly, 
the posing of dilemmas which are a central feature of Kohlberg's 
cognitive moral developmental model (1972, 1973) features in the
dialogical models of Button (1981), Baldwin and Veils (1979-81), and 
other lifeskills workers. The perspectives and procedures of these and 
other models which I shall shortly survey vary in detail, but their 
central issues are comparable, often with an overlap that renders them 
contiguous. It is pointless to attempt an analysis of ranking or other 
categorisation for the naming of components of the same concepts. The 
choice of name is perhaps a matter of personal taste. Wilson (1967) and 
Hersch (1980) refer to moral education; Metcalf (1971) and Simon (1972) 
refer to values education; Peters (1966) speaks of ethics in education.
I shall adopt the generic term of 'values', using other titles in 
specific contexts.
Let me now return to the assumptions of the literature, and examine the 
epistemological issues that underpin these assumptions.
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I will organise this section into three parts to consider the following 
issues:
(a) The dominance of propositional knowledge
Within this discussion I will suggest that a faith in 'knowledge- 
that' is the epistemological foundation for an instrumental 
approach to values education. I will also suggest that a faith in 
procedural 'knowledge-how' leads to:
(b) The dominance of sociological perspectives
Much of values education is conducted from a sociological 
persepective, in which 'knowledge-how' reflects a view that 
values are a skills-oriented phenomenon whose acquisition 
will enable the learner to perform adequately in a given 
society.
<c) Values as personal knowledge
Here I will consider an alternative approach, in which the 
concept of values is regarded as a form of knowledge, and 
values education is seen as developing the potential for 
personal knowledge.
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To preface here the discussions of (a) and (b), I will refer to my 
hypothesis, already explicated in this chapter, that a faith in explicit 
knowledge, here characterised as propositional and procedural 
knowledge, may be seen as a prioritising of transactional (formal?) 
thought. Explicit, reified knowledge is here seen as a desirable end; 
knowledge is a structure to be studied. In my view, the debate about 
the superiority of know-that and know-how (e.g. Ryle, 1946) may be 
characterised here as propositional know-that (a) and procedural know­
how (b); both approaches, I believe, are embedded in an object-centred 
epistemology, where know-that (in an instrumental sense) and know-how 
(in a technical, skills-based sense) demonstrate the desire of the 
knower to attain knowledge of external values.
Let me then survey the current literature of values education from these 
perspectives:
<i) The dominance of propositional knowledge
Many writers hold that values are something to be attained in the sense 
of valued goals. Most writers who adopt this stand see a close 
connection between the affective and conative, and some do not make any 
distinction between the two. (The traditional view of psychic 
experience is that there are three spheres of activity: the cognitive, 
which accounts for rational perception; the affective, which is to do 
with emotions and feelings; and the conative, to do with impulse, 
desire, determination.) For those who equate the affective and the
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conative, the will to realise a feeling or an emotion leads to the 
means-end mentality that serves instrumentality. Arnold and Gasson 
(1954) talk of emotions that "aim at the possession of suitable 
objects"; Findlay (1963) suggests that values can be acknowledge only 
through desire. Raven (1981, chapter 11) writes exclusively in terms of 
values as goals, and gives detailed coverage of the competencies 
(skills) that need to be acquired and refined in order to achieve those 
goals. "Host people already engage in these activities (necessary 
competencies), to at least some extent, in pursuit of goals they value, 
and this fact provides one way of assessing their values. Ve can seek 
to discover what they tend to think about spontaneously, what they tend 
to enjoy doing, which goals they monitor their progress toward, and 
which goals they strive to find better ways of achieving." Magee (1978) 
cites the work of John Searle (1969) in attempting to solve the problem 
of intentionality thus: "The mind imposes intentionality on objects
that are not intrinsically intentional by intentionally transferring the 
conditions of satisfaction of the intentional state to the corresponding 
object." Schaffler (1960) applies the view of instrumentality to 
teaching: "Teaching suggests ... an attempt to achieve learning by
offering to pupils good reasons for believing certain things and for 
acting in certain ways" (cited in Straughan, 1962), and Sartre (1973) 
comments: "Man is nothing else but that which he makes himself ... To
choose between this and that is at the same time to affirm the value of 
that which is chosen". Peters (1981) reminds us of Hume's position that 
moral education depended not so much on rational principles as 
disinterested passions.
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The work of Peters, especially his 'Ethics and education' (1966), 
'Psychological and ethical development' (1974) and, together with Hirst, 
'The logic of education' (1970) is particularly interesting in this 
sense. Peters assumes that emotions are states of mind which lead to 
appraisals. "The central feature of states of mind which we call 
'emotions', such as fear, Jealousy, remorse, etc., is a type of 
cognition that can be called an appraisal" (Peters, 1970). These 
appraisals, essentially linked with passivity, may be then associated 
with action, in which case they perform as motives. For Peters, one of 
the tasks of teachers is to help the development of appropriate 
appraisals.
(ii) The dominance of sociological perspectives
I have already argued extensively that an object-centred epistemology of 
knowledge leads to a fragmented view of life. In models of education,
the adoption of object-centred epistemologles of knowledge have already
produced the 'disciplines approach', in which education may be 
fragmented into separate areas, and in which theory and practice are
seen as separate realms of discourse.
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[PERHAPS I SHOULD HAVE STARTED THIS DISCUSSION FROM THIS APPROACH? 
SHOULD I HAVE MADE MORE OF THE THEORY-PRACTICE ISSUE, AND PERHAPS 
REGARDED KNOW-THAT AS GROUNDED IN THE REIFICATION OF PSYCHOLOGY, AND 
KNOW-HOW AS GROUNDED IN THE DOMINANCE OF SOCIOLOGY? I WONDER IF I CAN 
WEAVE THESE IDEAS INTO THE PRESENT TEXT WITHOUT DISTORTING THE FLOW? I 
MUST GIVE THIS FURTHER THOUGHT, AND, IF I REVISE THE TEXT, PERHAPS 
START FROM THIS ALTERNATIVE STANDPOINT.]
Most current models of moral education come within this rubric. Values 
tend to be seen as elements of social intercourse - beauty, love, truth, 
a desire for the best possible world. Voltaire's 'Candide' was the 
innocent victim of this approach. He saw 'institutionalised' values as 
the ultimate of human aspiration, and he aimed to become a part of such 
social normity. His neglect of his own personal development, including 
the neglect of the development of his critical faculties, rendered him 
spiritually impotent. His knowledge of the world was limited by what he 
perceived; there was no balance introduced by criticism, no growth 
brought about by reflection. He accepted, and was happy.
A sociological perspective seems to be widely accepted as a basis for 
values education, in that it stresses the need for understanding between 
persons in order to improve social situations and make life more 
peaceful and enjoyable for the majority (see Pring, 1984). The 
procedure to achieve this improvement is through an increase of the 
socialisation of individuals. In order for this socialisation to take 
place, individuals need to be persuaded to adopt certain life styles, 
but this adoption should be intentional. Thus an improvement of social
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situations is brought about through an extra effort on the part of all 
human beings to get on together.
Examples of this approach are many. Dewey (1959) states: "Ultimate
moral motives and forces are nothing more or less than social
intelligence - the power of observing and comprehending social
situations - and social power - trained capacities of control - at work 
in the service of social interest and aims. There is no fact which 
throws light upon the constitution of society. There is no power whose 
training adds to social resourcefulness that is not moral." Hersch et 
al (1980) give an excellent appraisal of models of moral education in 
the 1970s and 1980s, pointing to an increased public awareness of issues 
of morality and a demand for values (moral) education to become
institutionalised as part of the curriculum. As a rationale for their 
selection of six models, among a host of other contenders, they propose 
the criteria of caring, judging and acting as a basis for interpersonal 
understandings. "A 'model' of moral education, in our conception, is a 
way of thinking about the processes of caring, judging and acting in an 
educational setting. A model includes a theory, or a point of view, 
about how people develop morally, and a set Df strategies, or 
principles, for fostering moral development. A model thus helps us both 
to understand and to practise moral education" (Hersch et al, 1980). 
They emphasise the notion of skills acquisition and training as an 
assumption of moral education: "As a whole the models furnish a broad-
based pedagogy. Methods are presented to mobilize feeling, to guide 
thinking, and to sustain action. There are techniques designed to help 
students clarify personal interests, and these are methods that equip
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students to negotiate complex international problems. Considered 
collectively, we believe the models do justice to the complexity of 
moral education." The models considered in the book are:
1 The rationale building model: Shaver and Strong (1976)
2 The consideration model: McPhail, Ungoed-Thomas and Chapman
(1975)
3 Values clarification : Harmin et al (1973); Kirschenbaum
(1977); Raths et al (1978); Simon et al 
(1972)
4 Values analysis: Evans, Applegate and Tucker (n.d.); Fraenkel
(1977); Metcalf (ed), (1971); Meux et al 
(1974)
5 The cognitive moral developmental model: Hersch et al (1979)
6 The social action model: Newmann (1975); Mewmann et al (1977)
In Britain there has been a lively interest in values education, 
particularly since the 1970s, this interest being sustained by various 
HMI/DES documents (see also Chapter 1 of this text). For example, the 
Plowden Report of 1969 recommends: "At the heart of the educational
process lies the child. Mo advances in policy, no acquisition of new 
equipment have their desired effect unless they are in harmony with the 
nature of the child, unless they are fundamentally acceptable to him." 
'Aspects of secondary education in England' (1965) states that "teachers 
generally acknowledge ... the need to provide more personal education in 
the curriculum for all pupils". 'A view of the curriculum' (1981) says 
that "schools need to secure for all pupils opportunities for learning
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particularly likely to contribute to personal and social development". 
'Curriculum 11-16' (1977) comments on "the socialisation of the young,
their induction into adulthood, and their preparation as citizens, 
parents, wage earners, and voters of the future."
I have already indicated (Chapter 1) that it is interesting to note that 
most of such reports stress the need primarily of personal education and 
secondarily of social education. The take-up in the models, however, 
has turned the recommendations on their head, with an overwhelming 
emphasis on social education and little or no attention to personal 
education. Mary Varnock states (1978), and I agree with her, that the
techniques of social education (for example, group work, interaction
therapy, and so on) can be Inhibiting if not damaging for the personal 
development of the individual if this is the primary teaching medium.
She says: "I believe that perpetual society destroys the imaginative
faculty, and that children who fear solitude and are bored immediately 
they are alone are becoming deprived in this very respect. It is the 
duty of education, it seems to me, to counteract the very strong 
pressures of current fashion to make solitude seem a disgrace or a 
disaster. Every move in the direction of working in groups, or team 
activity, of joint projects and communal discussion, is a move in the 
wrong direction. Even the insistence that everyone must participate in 
everything is damaging. Corporate activity may be a fine thing from 
time to time. But independence is perhaps finer." (Varnock, 1978) 
Compare, also, the stand of Hargreaves (1982) who attaches much 
Importance to the expressive arts, especially drama, as a means of 
encouraging personal autonomy within the comprehensive school.
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I have already Indicated my critique (Chapter 3) of the overwhelming 
inclination of the 1960s-1980s literature dealing with institutionalised 
values towards group activity and the socialisation of the individual 
through group work. The APU (1981) echoes a number of other
authoritative documents (e.g. FEU 'Developing social and life skills', 
1980; 'Tutoring', 1982; FFER 'Teaching social and life skills', 1979) in 
its conclusions that "pupils' personal and social development is given 
the highest priority by teachers, both in school organisation and 
curriculum design"; that the main characteristics of personal and social 
education were "seen as being of a general or of a specific nature, viz:
a) aspects of general development concerned with persons and personal
relationships, morality and social awareness;
b) aspects of specific development concerned with occupational,
political, legal, environmental, health and community areas."
It seems to me that this sociological approach to values education puts 
the cart before the horse. The assumption is that people will develop 
as persons (and the concept of 'person' is ill-defined in the 
literature) through their contact with other people, rather than an 
alternative approach that a primary focus on the development of 
individuals will automatically enhance the social situations in which 
they find themselves (Habermas, 1979; see also Chapters 3 and 7 of this 
text).
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I would pick out in particular three elements in this approach that seem 
misleading and deficient:
1 There is no clearly set out theory of personhood to help a teacher 
decide what it means for her pupils to 'develop as persons';
2 Most texts agree that it is the approach and interpersonal skills of 
the teacher that will determine how well the schemes are communicated, 
but there are no procedural guidelines in the literature in general or 
in specific texts to give teachers operational or procedural criteria on 
which to base their teaching practice;
3 Howhere in the literature is the fact emphasised, or even aired 
except in tangential ways, that in order for teachers to engage in the 
teaching of personal and social education, they must have experience of 
personal and social education - that is, to teach children through 
experiential methods which are aimed at refining pupils' emotions and 
perceptions, teachers need to have gone through the same process of 
personal enquiry and self-discovery. In other words, for teachers to 
engage in 'education', they need to be encouraged to see the need for 
self-education, first their own, and second, their children's (see 
Chapter 7 of this text for further discussion).
The discussion so far in this part of values education as from a 
sociological perspective (which emphasises the need for 'know-how') has 
looked at values education as a specific component of the curriculum. 
It is not, however, and should not be, in my view, limited in scope so
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as to fit only into a specific curriculum spot. This dual nature of 
values education can often lead to conflict and malaise among teachers: 
are they teachers of subjects (e.g. maths) for which there is provision 
in initial training courses; are they teachers of this 'subject', 
personal and social education, for which there is currently little or no 
provision in initial training courses; are they teachers of subjects 
with pastoral responsibilities (e.g. year tutors, form tutors); or are 
they tutors with teaching duties? The confusion about the nature of 
values education and subsequent confusion about personal and 
professional roles is well voiced in David (1983), as well as in the 
audiotapes in Appendix 1, especially AT 7 and 21. My personal view, 
gleaned from my in-service work in other schools as well as my own, is 
that values education/personal and social education is usually adopted 
in schools as a specific input at a designated time, following a view 
that lesson time devoted to personal and social education presents 
issues in a focused and accelerated form that would otherwise have been 
presented throught the 'hidden curriculum' in an ad hoc manner. The 
organisation of personal and social education programmes asks the 
questions 'What can our learners do without tutors? What can they do 
better with tutors?' The answers to these questions provide the basis 
of the programme. A specific lesson input may be regarded as the short­
term means to the long-term ends, that of building caring communities 
made up of reflexive, autonomous individuals.
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On this premise, then, the aim of personal and social education as a 
'subject' is to help people to develop the necessary personal and 
interpersonal skills to build caring communities. Hargreaves (1982) 
points out that schools have to practise what they preach in their 
claims to be fostering personal and social development: "Our present
secondary school system, largely through the hidden curriculum, exerts 
on many pupils, particularly but by no means exclusively from the 
working class, a destruction of their dignity which is so massive and 
pervasive that few subsequently recover from it."
Sadly, my own experience of schools leads me to believe that many 
teachers will pay lip-service to a caring ethos, and be skilled 
demonstrators of personal and social education as a lesson, yet seem to 
be unwilling to carry the ideas over into their general dealings with 
the children (a development in my own practice which I have traced 
through Chapters 1 and 3 of this text). In AT18, MR comments on his 
pride in his own teaching skills: "... extrovert, like to think
confident, like to think in command, dominating, hopefully; that's how I 
like to think it goes." He sees personal and social education as a time 
when caring skills are appropriate, but such is not necessarily his 
attitude to the rest of the curriculum. "If somebody gives me a really 
stupid answer that is really Just a ridiculous answer in class I would - 
no, I think I probably wouldn't say anything. I would probably Just 
ignore them and carry on to something else and say, 'When you've got 
something intelligent to say, let me know'. That would probably be my 
comment then, whereas tin tutorial] they can explore little things like 
that. They know they're not going to be Jumped on if they do something
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silly. Of course, that means that they might be Inhibited because they 
might be afraid in normal lessons of saying something silly without 
genuinely meaning to be silly. In tutorial you've withdrawn that 
problem. If you say something silly without intentionally meaning to do 
it, it probably won't matter." He points to his dual rule system: 
"Yes, well, I've got two sets of rules, haven't I? I've got one set of 
rules to govern anything I do with them and I. And I've got a set of 
slightly different rules with regard to maths. And tutorial. And they 
are still perfectly aware that in tutorial they don't break the rules at 
the top."
Throughout my in-service work I have found this to be an overwhelming 
view; that there is a set of rules for teachers in tutorial time, and 
another set of rules for 'normal' curriculum time. Interestingly, the 
'rules' of tutorial time seem to apply to non-curriculum time, during 
rehearsals for plays, musical activites, and so on, when teachers relax 
from their functional role into their personal role. I am also acutely 
aware that the transformation in my own practice was brought about, in 
part, by seeing myself reflected through the eyes of colleagues such as 
MR above. I have been as guilty as anyone of implementing multiple 
rules sytems; and I believe that it is the critiquing of my own practice 
that has led me to opt, where possible, for the dialectical system of 
higher-order principles aimed at building dialogical communities.
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*y re-formed practice makes me sympathise with Pring (1984), who argues 
forcibly against formal 'programmes' of personal and social education: 
"There is no doubt in many people's minds that personal, social and 
moral development should be a major concern of the schools. But it is 
mistaken to conclude that the way of translating this concern into 
curriculum terms is to put another subject, namely, personal and social 
education, into the timetable. It MIGHT be important to look at the 
content of the curriculum . . . but the upshot of what I have argued so 
far is that there are more significant questions to be asked about the 
conditions of learning, the impact of the curriculum as a whole upon the 
young person, the methods of teaching and the relationships between 
teacher and pupil. Indeed, to add yet another subject to the already 
overcrowded timetable could be seen as a way of escaping from these 
questions."
I agree with Pring that the atmosphere in schools, as manifested through 
the hidden curriculum will go much further to encouraging personal and 
social development than any amount of 'formal' personal and social 
education. I am reminded of a lady colleague who used to march 
resolutely off to class, clutching copies of MSC handbooks on personal 
and social education, and muttering invectives against the children she 
was about to encounter. It is in personal relationships that personal 
and social education is most effective, "in a one to one relationship 
between persons" (Vincent, personal correspondence) and in the agreement 
of people to meet others on an equal footing in order to build warm, 
caring atmospheres. Whitehead also comments (1986): "The majority of
circumstances in education require warm and caring relationships to
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improve them. These qualities are often more important than the use of 
a systematic form of enquiry." (see also my 1988a). But in order to 
meet these requirements, it is necessary to concentrate on individuals 
as persons, not as people in groups, and that means breaking with the 
current popularity of formal programmes in two ways: first, to relegate 
to secondary status an approach that sees values as objects to be
acquired through a skills-based strategy and from a sociological
perspective, and therefore also to relegate the focus on sociological 
issues (the emphasis on SOCIAL education); and second to relegate the 
view of persons as existing within a social world in favour of a view of 
persons as independent beings (the emphasis on PERSONAL education). I 
am not suggesting that we abandon a sociological approach altogether. 
That would be silly, since we are all part of the world and form the
world in which we live. What I am saying is that education is
essentially to do with I-concepts, what goes on in an individual's mind, 
An E-concept describes the actions of other people. It emphasises the 
dichotomy between describer and described. Issues of sociology do not 
give intrinsic explanations for individual development, why people do as 
they do. They suggest rather what people do (know-that) and how they do 
it (know-how). Peters asks (1981): "How do children come to care?
This seems to me the most important question in moral education; but no 
clear answer to it can be found ... "
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In my opinion, any theory of personal and social education or values 
education should be based on a clear understanding of what personal and 
social education or values education means, and here there are two parts 
to the question. The first part focuses on the 'content' and the second 
on the 'process'. What does the 'values' or 'personal' or 'social' 
component mean, and what does the 'education' component mean? To assume 
that a switch to teaching through experiential techniques or group work 
is going to ensure personal and social development is naive and 
potentially dangerous. It is the assumption that habits will form if 
there are enough examples around, as stated, for example, by Straughan 
(1982), that there is a need to expose children to a wide range of 
phenomena, ''so enlarging a child's concept of 'a person'". We are back 
to Plato's problem. Given that the phenomena themselves are legion, and 
given that a child has never been taught what the concept 'a person' 
means, how can the child (a) abstract from the phenomena what 'a person’ 
means, and (b) how can his concept 'be enlarged'? An approach to values 
education that is grounded in an object-centred epistemology is to
assume that people will develop in terms of (1) accretion and (2) habit
formation. This is an essentially structuralist viewpoint. As I
understand his work, it is that adopted by Piaget in his theory of the 
cognitive and moral, development of the child (Piaget, 1932). In 
Piaget's system, the structures of the world impose themselves on the 
child, and by a process of assimilation, accommodation and
interpretation, the child will abstract from those structures certain 
rules that will then determine his understandings. We are left holding 
the questions: (1) which rules will the child adopt, given that the
phenomena are so many and so varied; (2) how will the child abstract the
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rules from such a mass of conflicting data? Given that each and every 
response from the child to Its environment is a novel response, it is a 
case of 're-inventing' the rules with every experience. These issues 
belong to Chapter 6, and will be discussed extensively there.
I will focus on the issue that an approach to an understanding of the 
nature of human values that is grounded in a sociological perspective 
is to aim at descriptions of values within social systems, without 
explaining their relevance to individuals. An understanding of values 
education that is grounded in sociology is to aim at descriptions of 
values within schools, as part of the institutionalised system, without 
explaining how it is that individuals come to think as they do, nor why 
they do so. This brings us to the third part of this present 
discussion, the view of values as personal creations.
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’ (ill)'Values as personal knowledge
I will now consider the literature of values education that proceeds 
from a subject-centred epistemology, in which the knower strives to 
realise his own values - i.e. transform his tacit knowledge into the 
explicit form of a form of life.
I will begin by dwelling again on the fact that many great thinkers 
accept as an a priori of their epistemology the fact voiced by Polanyi 
(1958) that "we know more than we can tell". Modern structuralists have 
attempted to show that we can tell everything that we know. Chomsky 
comments (1988): " ... much of modern psychology has decided, for
reasons that do not impress me, to limit itself to the study of 
behaviour and the control of behaviour ... I will merely state my own 
opinion: that this approach has proven quite barren, and that it is 
irrational to limit one's objectives in this way. One cannot hope to 
study learning or perception in any useful way by adhering to 
methodological strictures that limit the conceptual apparatus so 
narrowly as to disallow the concept 'what is perceived' and the concept 
'what is learned'." Where Chomsky and Polanyi appear to agree is in the 
assumption that to focus only on explicit, observable data is to limit 
the human enterprise to observation and description of events (the 
object-centred epistemologies and sociological approaches of the 
previous section: E-levels). In order to understand, it is necessary to 
extend the study to entertain a notion of competence that is beyond the 
scope of behaviourism, and to seek explanations for the concepts 'what
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is learned' (Chomsky) and 'knowledge' (Polanyi) in a pre-conceptual 
level of the mind. In this sense, a study becomes an enquiry into the 
workings of an individual mind (I-level). What makes the project 
explanatory is the focus by the self on the self, an effort by the self 
to account for its own ability to 'know' (Polanyi, 1958) or 'cognize' 
(Chomsky, 1986). This sense is closely akin to that of Reid's (op.cit.) 
'knowing with a direct object', manifested in Omar Khayyam's "Know 
thyself" and Shakespeare's "To thine own self be true". Maslow (1962) 
says that "phenomenology ... uses personal, subjective experience as the 
foundation upon which abstract knowledge is built". Personal knowledge 
uses personal, subjective experience as a mirror of its innate 
faculties. Maslow continues: "No theory of psychology will ever be
complete which does not centrally incorporate the concept that man has 
his future within him, dynamically active at this present moment."
I must now break into my account and introduce aspects of Chapter 6, in 
order to clarify and anticipate certain hypotheses that I will be 
putting forward in this Chapter 5. It is my thesis that personal 
knowledge is related to competence; that the area of competence is the 
location of 'felt values', essentially at a deep level; that the 
surface-level expression, or realisation, of the deep-level'felt' values 
is seen in the behavioural manifestation of values; and that the way in 
which deep level values are turned into surface level values is through 
the transformations of will and determination. These elements also use 
the traditional notions of the areas of psychic activity known as 
cognitive, affective and conative. My hypothesis will then produce 












This is a static model, descriptive in the sense that it is a 
hypothetical representation of the levels of knowledge of the 
individual. First it is necessary to hypothesise an acquisition model 
where the device receives certain inputs (for example, from the 
environment/culture) which will then cause it to produce certain outputs 
(on an observed, performance level). Thus, model 2 looks like this:-
input f  ACQUISITION 
MODEL
-^output
It is then necessary to raise Model 1 to explanatory (rather than 
descriptive) status to turn it into a performance model (I am reminded 
of Schutz's aphorism (1972) that action is meaningless without 
intention) by mapping on to it transformational structures that will
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allow elements of competence to be transformed Into elements of 
performance:












These aspects will be expanded and made explicit in Chapter 6. They are 
introduced here as a forerunner of a theory which rests on the notions 
of competence and performance, notions which are essential to the 
present discussion, and which are addressed now.
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Competence and performance
In 'Aspects of the theory of syntax' (1965), Chomsky elaborates on the 
notional tern© 'competence' and 'performance' which had been mooted in 
his 'Syntactic structures' (1957):
"Ve thus make a fundamental distinction between competence (the speaker- 
hearer's knowledge of the language), and performance (the actual use of 
language in concrete situations).”
Since 1983 I have applied these terms in my writing on the development 
of the human being's capacity to acquire and demonstrate values. I use 
the word 'acquire' loosely, since it is my hypothesis that the person 
has as part of her innate endowment the facility to develop latent 
values (personal knowledge) that is a part of her inheritance as a human 
being. 'Acquisition' of values is, in my view, a phenomenon of the 
interplay of innate structures and external structures, in the 
confluence of personal knowledge and knowledge of the world. This 
confluence is enabled through a dialectical approach of transformations 
of structures brought about through the cancellation of the negation 
(Chapter 6).
The application of the terms to the field of values shows us that it is 
possible for a person to become skilled at a superficial level 
(performance) without internalising what he is doing as a moral code 
(competence). I gave voice to these ideas in my 1986 text. I did not, 
at the time, dwell on the problems of teaching for competence, In the
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book the point is easily overlooked. In reality, I had not thought the 
problem through, or arrived at any sort of answer. I wrote:
"Applying the notions of competence and performance to the development 
of personal adequacy, I feel it is possible for a learner to become 
skilled at a superficial level (performance) without accepting what he 
is doing as a moral code (competence). In terms of the aims of 
education, a performance level is insufficient to produce a morally 
educated person.
"In similar vein, Stanton et al (1980) point to the development of 
skills on a hierarchical basis. ' It may be important to distinguish 
between (a) relatively simple skills, (b) compound (or complex) skills, 
and (c) the ability to deploy a compound skill. For example,
(a) steering (b) riding a bike (c) riding safely in traffic
"Vilson et al (1987) also point to the cumulative development of 
increasingly complex skills in driving a car, skills ranging through 
'factual information (where the brake and accelerator are), rules of 
thumb (Don't switch on when in gear), and practice'.
"But skills of a mechanical nature, suggest Stanton et al and Vilson
et al are subsidiary elements within the total exercise of being a safe
driver. The good road user, they suggest, will have learnt the skills 
of negotiating traffic, will have accepted the responsibility of being a 
road user, and will have regard for other road users.
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"In their characterisation of the morally educated person, Vilson et 
al point to those aspects of responsibility and regard, which are 
themselves dependent on the person's rationality. Responsibility and 
regard may be taught, but not necessarily learnt, or put into practice. 
For values to be realised in practice, there must be an initial 
intentionality. 'Ve might be tempted to say that we can divide the task
of moral education into two parts. First we should educate people so as 
to give them the skills, abilities and knowledge required for moral 
decisions ... and then we should 'give them the motivation' to put these 
into practice.' (Vilson et al, 1967)
"Motivation alone, however, does not of itself lead to competence. 
A learner could demonstrate his interpersonal skills for all sorts Df 
reasons - personal enrichment, reward, fear of punishment - without 
actually having accepted the values of what he is doing. 'This would 
not make them into more reasonable people, and would not count as 
education,' concludes Vilson. 'Ve need rather some way of educating ... 
people so as to improve this deep and subtle form of rationality.'"
This present discussion, then, dwells on the notion of competence as the 
location of tacit (personal) knowledge. The task of education is to 
raise that personal knowledge to a cognitive level, not as a focus of 
attention, but as a recognised facility. There is an important 
distinction here. A talent that becomes the focus of attention quickly 
loses its spontaneity. Polanyi (1958) notes this in his analysis of 
primary and secondary focusing. As soon as a learner concentrates too 
closely on the skills of riding a bicycle, he says, such as the position
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of his feet on the pedals, his total motor co-ordination is affected and 
he loses touch with the whole manoeuvre. Any typist will acknowledge 
that too close a fixation on the mechanics of finger-eye co-ordination 
will produce more mistakes than a focus on the message, where the body 
is left to get on without interference from the intellect. Treisman (in 
Haber, 1970) points to the distortion of visual messages brought about 
by conscious reflection. Einstein (ref. mislaid) comments on the 
weakening of intuitive thought by the need to translate that thought 
into spoken or written symbols. Buber (1965) speaks of the dangers of 
'over-consciousness1 as taking away the spontaneity of life.
In this text, a main theme is that of the self's knowledge of the self, 
and the need for the self to stand apart from itself and adopt a 
critical perspective in its claim to understand its own development. 
This standing aside is an aspect of the analytical procedure necessary 
for such focusing. The self is integrated, however, in the synthesis of 
its parts (Ryle, 1946), as a thinking, living person, who has the 
dialectical capacity to be one and many at the same time, to operate at 
several levels of consciousness (Hegel, 1910) while being conscious of 
that consciousness (self-consciousness).
In his paper 'Understanding ourselves' (originally 1961; reproduced in 
Ornstein's 1979), Polanyi points to this duality of human knowledge, 
what he calls 'explicit knowledge' and 'tacit knowledge'. Following 
Dn from this account of the power of tacit (personal) knowledge to hold 
within itself explicit (objective) knowledge, I may suggest that 
'knowledge of personal knowledge' may be re-phrased as the self's
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knowledge of the self. Thus the phrase becomes 'knowledge of personal 
knowledge', and in operational terms that implies the self's knowledge 
of the self. When the focus dissolves into the whole, when it becomes 
diffused within the integrated totality of the person, personal 
knowledge becomes the foundation for the personality, a basis for a life 
form that rests on the assurance of its own unity in completeness. When 
I say, then, that the task of education is to raise personal knowledge 
to a cognitive level, I mean that as teachers we need to enable our 
learners to recognise their own unity, to be confident in their 
intuitions and to have faith in their imagination and creativitiy.
This is the task that some approaches to values education adopt (for 
example, Button, 1974; Rogers, 1983) (and in my view, not enough of them 
do). Perhaps they do not approach the task from this theoretical 
principled basis, and I recognise that these personal hypotheses may not 
be the best or immediately acceptable; but I feel that a coherent, 
principled basis of a theory of personhood which incorporates within 
itself an explanation for personal knowledge would do much to promote 
the acceptability and viability of formal schemes of values education 
that operate from the basis of the integrity of the individual.
Let us now consider some models of values education (for example, 
Button, 1981) that proceed from this basis of the individual. The 
client of the curriculum of such an approach is the learner (rather than 
the learner-in-a-group, or a group itself), and the task of education, 
seen in this light, is not the socialisation of the individual, but a 
growing in the self-knowledge by the individual of the individual. The
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skills of this approach are not so much interpersonal as personal. They 
are the skills and competencies for the individual to get to know his 
own mind, and then to use that mind to explore its own knowledge.
This approach is manifested in schools in, to my knowledge of the 
literature, three ways:
1 Theories of values education as personal knowledge
2 Approaches to those theories in schools
3 Approaches to the development of appropriate skills
These three ways mirror the organisation of the constituent parts of 
these Parts II and III:
1 What constitutes . . . ?
2 How is knowledge of ... acquired?
3 How is knowledge of ... put to use? (Part III)
The same questions are now being tackled of (1) what constitutes a 
theory of values education as personal knowledge? (2) how is such a
theory acquired? (3) how is such a theory put to use? There is a
fourth component in the present discussion, however, which is the 
overall theme of my project:
4 How have I come to know that I have come to know? How can I, as 
a real, living person, explain to myself how I have developed into this 
person that I am? The answer I hypothesise throughout dwells on the
( 302 )
idea of a dialectical approach of question and answer that will help me 
to render to myself an acceptable account: to support Cavell's comment 
(in Rorty, 1982), that I am exploring "the possibility that one among 
endless true descriptions of me tells me who I am".
(a) THEORIES OF VALUES EDUCATION AS REFLECTIONS OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
To my knowledge of the literature, there are very few systematic 
theories based on this philosophy. John MacMurrary, working in the 
1930s, is perhaps a chief exponent, reacting strongly against the 
instrumental and sociological aspects of behaviourist/structuralist 
approaches. MacMurrary took feeling and vitality for human life as his 
central theme. Dunlop (1984) notes that, in this, "MacMurray's position 
here is very closely allied to that of Polanyi. He stresses that it is 
a task of education to bring children to the position where they can 
TRUST their own powers to grasp the nature of reality. Polanyi 
emphasises that every action of a living being, including a rational 
person, involves commitment, or reliance on powers or principles that he 
cannot fully comprehend. Perception, feeling and thought are all ways 
of grasping reality, or aspects of reality. We have these powers as the 
living beings we are, and have to learn to rely on them in spite of the 
social pressures that tempt the individual towards irrational reliance 
on others (though Polanyi, unlike MacMurray, gives full weight to the 
need to rely on TRADITIONS of thought and feeling). Having to rely on
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our own powers does make us vulnerable to error, but If we react
properly to mistakes we will naturally learn from them. Trust in life 
is essential." (Dunlop, 1984)
The writings of Maslow (e.g. 1968) and Rogers (e.g. 1961, 1983) are in 
this vein, much of their writing, strictly speaking, not so much about 
education in schools as education of the individual in the world, 
although Rogers's 'Educating for freedom in the '80s' (1983) is written 
specifically for values education in schools and has massive
implications for schooling. Elizabeth Leonie Simpson (in Scharf, 1978) 
writes about the need for 'creativogenic schools’ in which the emphasis 
is on the discovery of themselves by individuals through their
imaginative creativity. " ... the search for the self, for
introspective awareness through self-searching, may be the basis for
identification with all of humankind. Insight, subjectivity, private 
experience, and the empathic taking of the perspective of the other
carry the individual beyond personal idiosyncrasy, beyond shared 
communal beliefs, to an autonomy which is separate from the social group 
but is still a part of it. . .. Reality is ... a personal perception, a
creation - a product of the development of the self through the
interaction of the individual and the social and physical opportunities 
in the midst of which he or she lives and strives."
In a most interesting paper in the same volume, Robert Samples outlines 
the schools of thought about values education on an historical basis 
which has clear parallels with my arrangement in this text. He 
maintains that "each school of thought begins from a different group of
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assumptions. Each then proceeds toward an expanded knowledge based on 
those original assumptions. These schools of psychological thought are 
the Freudian, Behaviourist, Cognitive-Developmental, Humanist, and 
Transpersonal. Abbreviated statements delineating the basic
characters!tics of each follow:
Freudian The human psyche is a dynamic world constantly in turmoil
wherein the higher human instincts are in combat with baser 
animalistic forces.
Behaviourist The human psyche is little more than an aggregate of 
behaviours embedded into the nervous system by the 
experiences each human has had.
Cognitive-Developmental
The human psyche develops through sequential stages, each of 
which is characterised by a higher capacity for logical, 
abstract thought than the stage preceding it.
Humanistic The human psyche is far more expansive than any of the above 
alone, and it encompasses all of the qualities of a person 
within a context of goodness and a capacity to be godlike. 
Transpersonal The human psyche is only a portion of a cosmic, universal 
psyche that is inextricably interconnected in a little 
understood unity." (Samples, 1978)
Samples makes the interesting point that the behaviourist and cognitive 
perspectives of Skinner and Piaget have dominated Western research 
traditions to the extent that "their results have begun to affect 
technology as surely as if they were born of the technology. . . . Those
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who have moved beyond behaviouristic approaches and entered the areas of 
humanistic and transpersonal psychology have done so primarily because 
the technocratic human so well described by behaviourists was simply too 
limited. All the human capacities of spirituality, emotionality,
sexuality, and intellectuality are at the core of these final two 
holistic psychologies. In no way do the philosophies of humanistic or 
transpersonal psychology exclude either behaviorism or cognitive 
psychology. Rather, they are embraced as part of the whole. But alas, 
the opposite is not true.
"Behaviorism and cognitive psychology only have the capacity to embrace 
that which is consistent with their premises, PREMISES WHICH ARE AT THE 
OUTSET REDUCTIVE (Samples's italics).
"What we have in both behaviorism and cognitive development is really a 
kind of cultural chauvinism. Rationality can clearly be considered a 
religion if one thinks metaphorically. The logic of our actions then 
becomes a measure of our faith. Experience becomes the indicator of the 
morality of my being. My conformity to this context is a measure of my 
worth." (Samples, op.cit.)
As I understand him, what Samples seems to be saying here is that a 
dialectical approach that subsumes the less mature 
behavioural/structuralist research traditions reflects the holistic, 
flexible approaches inherent in humanistic and transpersonal psychology. 
This is my thesis, also, that an approach to values education as 
personal knowledge subsumes within its own structure the approaches of
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instrumentality (Samples’s 'technocratic dominance') and sociology as 
part of its own dialectic.
Samples concludes the paper with a description of a 'new individual' 
whose own self-knowledge acts as the basis for dealings with other 
selves. "But now a new individual emerges. One that senses a new 
tribalism, a new unity. One whose laws, religions, schools, and 
economics are being guided by a simultaneous transformation that is at 
once a return and a departure. The emergence of this individual is a 
reinstatement of collectivism BUT THIS TIME BY AFFILIATION. It is a 
departure in that there is movement toward the future. Both of these 
directions are grounded in the now. The concepts of inappropriate 
psychologies and philosophies are as destined to disappear as surely as 
the inappropiate technologies, with humankind moving toward a synergic 
survival."
Samples here presents a characterisation of his new individual for whom, 
it seems, dialectical operations would appear to be the highest form of 
cognitive activity (Riegel, 1973), and whose philosophy of action is 
grounded in the now of dialogical communities (Bernstein, 1983). I am 
similarly interested, and I would now suggest that the I-perspective of 
the self's investigation of the self results in the establishment of 
communities of selves who share a common interest of moving towards 
mutual understandings.
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(b) APPROACHES IN SCHOOLS
The writings of Mary Varnock stress the need for an approach to values 
education by refining cognitive skills through affective areas (in my 
view, the dialectical interdependence of competence and performance, 
where competence leads to performance, which in turn shapes and alters 
competence: see Chapters 6 and 7). She emphasises the need for
curricula to be geared toward the individual: "Education is something
which is essentially tailored to the recipient" (Varnock, 1977), and for 
curricula to enhance the education of the imagination and feelings (in 
Vesey, 1978). Pring (1984) shares the same view. The formal 
curriculum, he feels, should be so organised and constituted as to "fit 
in to the overall aims of personal and social education". He indicates 
several entry points: through humanities, citing in particular the
Humanities Curriculum Project 14-16 of Lawrence Stenhouse (begun in 
1967), and the 'Man: a course of study' of Bruner (1966). "In
particular ... it should be noted how an integral part of the 
understanding of humanistic studies in their contribution to personal 
development is the classroom atmosphere, the active mode of learning, 
the non-authoritarian relationships between teacher and pupil, and the 
strategies for involving pupils in deliberation and reflective 
learning." He stresses the enjoyment of literature. Citing the work of
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Bantock, 1955, 1963, 1965, 1967, he says: "The place of literature and
the arts In the refinement of the emotions and in the moral education of 
young people has been a constant theme in Bantock*s many contributions 
to education". He also stresses the need for the expressive arts: "The
general argument is that an essential feature of personal growth is the 
development and refinement of a 'feeling response' to oneself, to 
others, and to the environment." (Pring, 1984)
<c> APPROACHES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF APPROPRIATE SKILLS
To my knowledge, these approaches fall into two categories, the first 
being aspects of formal schemes of personal and social education that 
are primarily sociological in focus; the second through specific schemes 
of Instrumental Enrichment.
First, then: many schemes of personal and social education see
themselves from a sociological perspective, such as Priestley and 
McGuire (1981), Manpower Services Commission (1980), Hopson and Scally 
(1981). Others attempt to switch the focus to the individual as 
operating independently of society while still acknowledging herself as 
part of that society, much in line with Stenhouse's (1975) thinking that 
the individual and society are interdependent, one influencing and 
shaping the other. The schemes I have in mind are those of Button 
(1981) and Baldwin and Veils (1979-81) (but see my comment in Chapter
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1). Button approaches issues of socialisation through group work and 
interaction techniques such as trust walks and role exchanges. He 
approaches issues of personal development through his concept of 
personal enquiry. Personal enquiry is conducted through paper and pen 
methods and experiential learning with immediate transfer to the real 
world.
Paper and pen methods take the form of questionnaires, worksheets and 
personal diaries or logs. The techniques range from straightforward 
questions: 'What is my best subject at school? Do I consider myself
honest?’, open-ended statements: 'My best point is ...; I think I could
improve ...' to accounts: 'Write a few sentences on what you are going
to do about it.' The emphasis is on getting the young person to clarify 
his thinking about himself, to face up to weaknesses and difficulties, 
to help him to improve his own self-image, to encourage him to find 
solutions to his own personal and social problems. Within Button's 
programmes, the learner is thrust into real experience as soon as 
possible. One of the first requirements of the programme is to engage 
someone in conversation, having practised the skills of dialogue in 
class within the supportive group atmosphere, in order to find out about 
that person. The person approached may be mother, milkman, neighbour, 
brother, friend. When this exercise is prepared in class, the teacher 
stresses that the learner should be prepared for some surprises: Mum 
sometimes says unusual things when you actually ask her to take time out 
to sit down and talk to you about herself! The underlying assumption is 
that the more people are prepared to find out about each other, the more 
they will learn about themselves; and the main epistemological
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assumption is that the more they are prepared to find out about the 
workings of others* minds, the more they will find out about their own. 
These thoughts are given voice particularly in the work of Buber, Fromm, 
Rogers, Maslow, and in the words of the great Prophets. "The world of 
Thou is not closed. He who goes out to it with concentrated being and 
risen power to enter into relation becomes aware of freedom. And to be 
freed from the belief that there is no freedom is indeed to be free" 
(Buber, 1958). Fromm (1978): "Only in the process of mutual alive
relatedness can the other and I overcome the barriers of separateness, 
inasmuch as we both participate in the dance of life."
For Button, the greatest field of experience is real life (contrasted 
with, for example, Kohlberg's schemes which stop at the level of 
vicarious experience in role play and discussion of hypothetical 
dilemmas). Learners are encouraged to take on and welcome real life 
experiences, but their first steps are cushioned within the supportive 
group atmosphere in class. For example, when a visitor is to be 
received, each person of the group bids for a specific job: welcoming, 
thanking, introducing the conversation, and so on. In this way the 
individual is encouraged to see himself as an important part of the 
whole exercise. As a transfer exercise he is then invited to try out 
the skills he has learnt in real social settings, and to report back to 
the group. The aspect of de-briefing is important in Button's 
methodologies, from a personal point of view. It gives the learner an 
opportunity to talk over his experiences with a supportive group, and 
thus affords him the chance to reflect on his actions and plan future 
modifications. In this respect the principles of action research, to
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which Button refers repeatedly, are clearly identifiable, in that pupils 
undertake cycles of problem identification, planning, acting, observing, 
reflection, re-formulation of problems, and so on.
My role in class was to help the pupils engage in their own action 
research and personal enquiry.
For example, in AT6, Malcolcm's group are being rather silly and Gary 
makes a comment. When we listen to the tape, Gary is uncomfortable and 
asks me to erase the tape.
JM Why?
Gary It's stupid.
JM Why is it stupid?
Gary It's not me, is it.
JM Vhat are you going to do about it?
Gary Let me do it again. I want to do it again.
This is not behaviour modification, as, for example, Skinner would have 
us believe. It is the result of an active reflection by a thinking 
individual into his own values, who has decided to reject certain values 
(as exhibited in this case by his verbal behaviour) and take on others. 
In my hypothesis, he has decided to modify his performance through the 
transformations of selective reasoning and determination, to match more 
harmoniously the values of his underlying competence. There are a 
number of examples of this kind of personal re-routing throughout the
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conversations in Appendix 1. I have indicated in Part One that my 
project in personal and social education in school took the form of an 
action research enquiry into my pupils' action research enquiry; and a 
personal enquiry into self, the spin-off of which was to encourage my 
pupils to undertake a parallel personal enquiry. In this way I engaged 
in EDUCATIOIAL research; and in using this term I invoke my working 
definition of 'education* as a process of the development of individual 
rationality, and point to Chapter 3 of this text where I have attempted 
to show the process in action.
To move on to Instrumental Bnrichment: the techniques adopt the same
principles of action-reflection, but not within the specifically social 
settings of Button's pedagogy. In a Schools Council production (1983), 
Veller and Craft give an interesting account of a national project based 
on the work of Reuven Feuerstein (1979). Instrumental Enrichment is “a 
curriculum intended to furnish tools for thinking. [ It] seeks to break 
the lock-step between traditional assessments and curriculum planning. 
It rejects the tautology Implicit when tests of pupils' current 
performance levels are taken as predictors of potential. It criticizes 
the vicious circle integral to this practice and emphasises the damage 
that can be done when teachers overtly reduce their expectations and 
thereby set arbitrarily low ceilings on children's development." 
(Veller and Craft, op.cit.) Feuerstein believes the teaching involves 
"a radical shift from the static to a dynamic approach in which the test 
situation was transferred into a learning experience for the child." 
(Feuerstein, 1979). "This approach is concerned with changing the 
course of intellectual development and with 'thinking' as the key to
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that change." (Veller and Craft, op.clt.) They comment In passing that 
the major aim of an improvement in thinking also brings about an 
improvement in feeling. I regard this aspect as crucial; they regard it 
as a spin-off. For example, Feuerstein identifies six sub-goals, as 
explained by Veller and Craft:
"The overarching goal of Instrumental Enrichment is to render 
individuals more susceptible to change through encounters with their 
environment. Feuerstein also describes six sub-goals. They are:
t the correction of deficient cognitive functions as a means to 
improving the social and intellectual competence of culturally deprived 
individuals.
* the promotion of an array of concepts, vocabulary and skills needed 
for high-level thinking and problem-solving activities.
* the creation of habits that make higher-level thinking part of an 
individual's active and spontaneous repertoire.
♦ the encouragement of a reflective style of problem-solving in which 
pupils take their time to gain insights and formulate organized and 
articulate responses.
# the promotion of an approach to learning in which pupils both enjoy 
the work for its own sake and recognise its wider practical value.
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t the arousal of pupils from a passive and regurgitative state to one 
where they view themselves as active generators of new information.
...But success is equally tied to the style and classroom climate 
adopted by teachers.” (Veller and Craft, op.cit.)
Pupils' responses to the questions of the evaluation of the pilot study 
Include:
"It is brilliant for your brains.”
”It helped me do my other lessons.”
"It helped me to be more alert."
"It helps you not to be impulsive - before I used to rush into things."
"It helped me from being frightened of new things." (Veller and Craft,
op.cit.)
The tone and content of these comments is parallel to that of the 
comments from my own children on many occasions.
Teaching approaches are taken as an active component of the success of 




Let me try to summarise and synthesise the discussion so far. In doing 
so I shall consider the models I have used, and try to integrate the 
whole into a tentative theory of the grounding of values education - to 
answer the question of this chapter: ' Vhat constitutes knowledge of
values?'
I started from the root premise that people see the world, including 
themselves, in different ways. I went on to suggest that one particular 
way has become dominant in much modern western thought, and this way has 
coloured spin-off disciplines. This bias, I suggest, is representative 
of an imbalance of integration - first an integration of the person-in- 
the-world, and second of the working of the individual mind.
To make this view more explicit I will now integrate the hypotheses I 
have put forward so far. The model for the derivation of knowledge 
Indicates that knowledge is grounded in forms of thought which are 
grounded in the workings of the brain:




I then went on to suggest that different types of thinking would 
generate different types of knowledge:
analytic thinking appositional thinking
formal thought intuitive thought
explicit knowledge tacit knowledge
The forms of knowledge thus generated, I proposed, could be identified 
according to the knower's view of his knowledge. Explicit knowledge may 
be characterised as 'propositional', which, depending on one's 
epistemology, could then be further extended or sub-divided into 'know- 
that' or 'know-how'. Tacit knowledge could be extended to become 
'personal knowledge', not only in the sense of knowledge + a direct 
object as in 'I know John', but also in an extended sense of 'I know'. 
The model becomes:
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I have also indicated that the two columns are symptomatic of the 
underlying epistemology of the knower; that propositional knowledge is a 
property of the person who approaches the task of knowing in which 
knowledge is the epistemic centre, external to the individual knower. 
Personal knowledge is a property of the knower who approaches the task 
of knowing in which she is the epistemological centre, and knowledge is 
her personal creation.
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intuitive thought knower as
tacit knowledge subject/
knowledge as \ propositional knowledge personal knowledge
obj ect
procedural knowledge
know that know how
knower as
J obj ect
In my discussion about the nature of values education, I have indicated 
the dominance of the ‘knower as subject/knowledge as object' syndrome. 
I have indicated that I feel this approach is unwise in ignoring the 
vast potential of forms generated by a subject-centred epistemology. I 
have also indicated that an object-centred approach focuses on a view of 
the individual as part of a certain kind of society, and that this view 
perpetuates the assumption of the existence of reified knowledge.
These views, I have suggested, form the basis of the dominant paradigm 
of values education today.
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I will now refer to the need for integration that I have specified 
above. I see this fragmented approach as leading to (1) a separation of 
theory and practice: in values education the dominant paradigm is of a 
form of life to be attained, and educational practice is centred on 
teaching learners to attain it; (2) a view of persons as objects: in 
values education the dominant paradigm is a view of a person living-in- 
the-world, in which knowledge of the world is to be accessed, rather 
than created; (3) a view of personality as fragmented: the mind is seen 
as a separate entity to the body. There is little relationship between 
the 'cogito' and the 'sum'; forms of thinking and forms of being are 
seen as separate realms of discourse.
My response to my dissatisfaction with current dominant assumptions of 
the literature has been to suggest a break with enquiry via the social 
sciences, and to adopt a reconstructive strategy. I have proposed that 
it is necessary to view the person as an integrated organism living in a 
self-perpetutating, self-transforming state of being (see also Chapter 
6).
So I will now formalise my tentative theory of what constitutes 
knowledge of values.
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5 A THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES
In the discussion so far I have suggested that the concept of mind is 
seen often from a separatist view: 'mind' is the piece of a human that 
is the converse to 'body'. Researchers working from an alternative 
'appositional' ground have suggested that the concept of mind itself 
needs investigating (e.g. Freud, 1950; Jung, 1953; Maslow, 1968; 
Chomsky, 1985). These researchers have suggested that the concept 
should not be approached as a rigidified structure, but should be 
credited with notions of fluidity and metamorphosis. Certain 
researchers (e.g. Chomsky, 1982; Fodor, 1977) have suggested a view of 
the concept of mind as that of a 'power house', containing a generative 
component that is capable of producing an infinite number of creative 
acts.
I will adopt this view and refer again to the introduction of the 
concept of levels of mind. By introducing this concept, I said above, 
it would be possible to transform seemingly separate activities of 
different forms of thought into an integrated whole, and thereby affect 
a parallel integration of seemingly disparate approaches to a view of 
the workings of the mind. Instead of dwelling with a model of two 
separate columns, I proposed a unit consisting of two interrelated 
halves:
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Through this integration, I will suggest, the notion of the 'concept of 
mind' m y  be transformed into the notion of the 'concept of self'. I 
refer again to Polanyi's idea of irreducible structure: in my
formulation, 'selfhood' transcends 'mindhood'; a view of self 
incorporates ideas of mentalism, for, in my view, the 'self' is grounded 
in the mind, but is more than the mind (by 'mind' I mean the notional 
products of the workings of the brain).
The first part of the question 'Vhat constitutes knowledge of values?' 
m y  be approached via the question 'What is knowledge?' I have tried to 
show my understanding of the idea of knowledge: that it is not an
external object of enquiry to be accessed by the individual enquirer, 
but is a creation of the knower that is externalised in the knower's 
form of life. My understanding of the nature of values, that they m y  
be 'known', is that the creation of values is a form of knowledge that 
also has a mnifestation in an individual's form of life. Values
formtion, I believe, is associated with competence; values expression 
is part of performance. By adopting this stand I m y  say that the
individual's form of life m y  be seen as a realisation of her values.
From this formulation, I need now to go on to say how my practice (form
of life) is a mnifestation of my values, so that, when I come to
substantiate my claim to knowledge (Chapter 8), I m y  point to how I 
struggled to adopt the particular form of life that I lead. I need to 
show how I lived a form of life that was, in fact, a denial of my
values, and how I strove, through my reflection-in-action, to overcome
that denial, and adopt a form of life that was a realisation of my
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values. In other words, I may say that I did (action) in accordance 
with what I thought (values-as-knowledge). It is the nature of my doing 
(my practice) that enables me to formulate a theory of the basis of that 
doing.
So, as part of my theory, I need to consider two further aspects: (1) a
summarising commentary on my own 'values into practice', to see how I 
attempted to integrate two hitherto separate realms of discourse, and 
(2) to investigate the notion expressed above that 'selfhood' is, as I 
shall hope to demonstrate, the essence of the steady state (Chapter 6) 
of our existence.
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<i> VALUES INTO PRACTICE
This is a brief recapitulation and synthesis of what I have explicated 
in detail in Chapters 1-4 of this text. I present this summary here to 
Indicate how my views pre-1984 were left-hemisphere dominated, and how I 
came gradually to recognise the importance of my own 'appositional' 
faculties to see <a) myself as an autonomous person; (b) my children as 
autonomous persons; and <c) the notion of 'person' as a concept that is 
grounded in a view of a synergic world.
In the last part of this chapter I shall explore the implications of my 
view of the 'synergic individual', and in Chapter 7 go on to suggest 
that an agreement to a synergic form of being by self-aware individuals 
is perhaps the way forward for social evolution.
The first tape recording of my study was made on 21.7.81. This was a 
conversation with RC, the adviser for personal, social and moral 
education, and in it I seemed to demonstrate an intuitive grasp of what 
I have presented above, that personal and social education was primarily 
about the education of the individual which then had secondary 
repercussions in society. I say that I see the basis of the work as 
spiritual development .. .
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RC ... it is sad that in some of the training we were on <in Bath), at 
least one of the church girls found it difficult to relate beliefs to 
what she was doing in the developmental work.
JM I see no conflict. ... I see the two areas dovetailing neatly ...
RC ... If a parent asks you, "What is this group developmental work?", 
what would you say it was all about?
JM Ve teach the child to be aware of himself, ... to be aware of 
himself in society, to care for others, we try to teach him ways in 
which he can be more self-reliant, be more sensitive to the needs of 
others, to like himself ....
The adviser then made a comment which in subsequent years had 
encapsulated for me the dilemma of which perspective to adopt in values 
education. In the conversation, I am speaking about the staff's 
tentative approach to Button work:
JM ... our staff see its possibly attacking their individuality. I 
think they are hostile in some cases because they are afraid it might 
strip them naked of all their defences.
RC Here again we may see part of the curious relationship we have in 
modern western society. The individual is over against society, keeps 
himself to himself, and, by doing that, makes himself more himself. In 
fact, the reverse will be true: the more we get out of people that they
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learn to cope In the modern world, the more Individual and 
characteristic we become."
I believe RC is here referring to the alienation of the individual that 
is recounted in the works of, for example, Marx, Engels, Sartre, Kafka, 
when the individual is forced into social roles which are incompatible 
with his personal role; and that RC is suggesting that if the 
educational system helps people to become more at ease in a given 
society, the more they will be able to realise their own individuality. 
These sentiments are expressed more intensely by Feyerabend (1976), who 
resists the idea of individuals being oppressed by the reified, non- 
rational rules of a restrictive society. "A society that is based on a 
set of well-defined and restrictive rules so that being a man becomes 
synonymous with obeying these rules, forces the dissenter into a no­
man's land of no rules at all, and thus robs him of his reason and his 
humanity. It is the paradox of modern irrationalism that its proponents 
silently identify reationalism with order and inarticulate speech and 
thus see themselves forced to promote stammering and absurdity. 
Remove the principles, admit the possibility of many different forms of 
life, and such phenomena will disappear like a bad dream." (Feyerabend, 
1970).
My dilemma in personal and social education was always a question of 
perspective: whether to embrace the principles of social education and 
its techniques (group work, role play, and so Dn) with a view to helping 
the individual realise his personal potential through this medium; or 
whether to concentrate on personal education and its techniques
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(personal enquiry, expressive arts, and so on) with a view to helping 
the individual relate more appropriately to others in society. I had 
thought about the problem sufficiently to be able to rationalise and 
articulate it. In a 1984 progress report I wrote:
"The Button work I am doing seems to concentrate on the group at the 
expense of the individual; yet I still feel all the children are making 
progress as individuals. On the other hand, I feel I ought to pay more 
attention to them on an individual basis to help them get on with each 
other."
It is only in recent work <1986 onwards), through my reading of the work 
of Bernstein (1983), Gadamer (1975), and Habermas (1975, 1970), that I 
have been able to resolve the two apparently conflicting perspectives 
into a synthesised view of the nature of universal pragmatics and 
communicative competence (Habermas, 1979).
I shall dwell on these Issues further in Chapters 6 and 7 of this text. 
Here, let me refer back to the indications I made in Chapters 3 and 4, 
that I take the view that all individuals are equal; that all 
individuals have the same inalienable right to develop as individuals. 
Persons in society, however, are essentially ambiguous, in that they are 
individuals for themselves and also individuals for each other. The 
resolution of these two perspectives, I believe, lies in the ability of 
each and every individual person to recognise other people as individual 
persons. The way to achieve this resolution may be through an agreement 
to reach mutual understanding. Rorty, in 'Philosophy and the mirror of
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nature' (1979), takes the same line In hypothesising how disagreement 
may be avoided through the conscious use of strategies designed to reach 
a common understanding. The theme is abundant in the work of Habermas 
(e.g. 1972). The principal strategy, suggests Rorty, is to reach a
state of 'commensurability'. "By 'commensurable' I mean able to be 
brought under a set of rules which will tell us how rational agreement 
can be reached and what would settle the issue on every point where 
statements seem to conflict. These rules tell us how to construct an 
ideal situation, in which all residual agreements will be seen to be 
'non cognitive' or merely verbal, or else merely temporary - capable of 
being resolved by doing something further. Vhat matters is that there 
should be agreement about what would have to be done if a RESOLUTION 
were to be achieved." (Rorty, 1979).
This base is a significant shift from my previous view that, although I 
held as a fundamental belief the fact that all people were individuals 
and all individuals were equal, my approach to those individuals was 
that of researcher and researched, teacher to taught, reflecting the 
positivist view at the root of my practice that I still knew what was 
best for my children. This view is reflected in the crucial statement I 
made in my 1985 BERA paper (see Chapter 3 of this text) that "Until now 
I was teaching my children to be a certain kind of person, the kind of 
person I wanted them to be. Now I see them as the kind of person they 
are." I can say today that my practice was dominated by this positivist 
approach and was made explicit in two ways. The first way was in the 
propositional form of know-that, and characterised by statements such as 
" (I know that) my children are hostile. (I know that) they should be
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sensitive to one another. (I know that) they do not like learning. (I 
know that) they should like learning."
In essence, my propositions were taking the form of statements of fact 
and statements of value as separate realms of discourse. Similarly, the 
second way, my values took the form of propositions in an instrumental 
sense: "Personal and social education is here to show my pupils the
benefits to be gained by adopting these philosophies and procedures. I 
am here, as a teacher, to help them, and as an in-service provider to 
help the staff see these obvious truths."
The know-how aspects of my practice took a similar line of: "Personal 
and social education is here to show my pupils how to get on with each 
other. 1 am here to help them to develop appropriate personal and 
social skills to facilitate their socialisation."
By 1985 (as I have outlined briefly in Chapter 3) I had changed my views 
considerably, both in regard to the individuality of the children and of 
myself. I began to see personal and social education as complementary. 
I saw the way to personal education as through an individual's personal 
enquiry, and the way to social education as through individuals' joint 
enquiry. It is important to stress here the difference in view. I no 
longer viewed 'a group' as an entity but as a collection of individuals, 
each exercising his or her own personal freedom. The group for me was 
no longer the unit that I was teaching. What I saw now was the unity of 
individuals functioning collectively; I could help individuals use the 
resources of other individuals to asist their personal growth; the
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children could learn about themselves from each other. In this way, 
each person was growing in his own personal knowledge, explaining his 
own competence through the performance aspects of his conscious actions 
with other individuals. Personal structures and concepts of self could 
metamorphose into, and Juxtapose onto structures and concepts of 'self- 
and-others', through the process of dialectical transformations.
1 have pointed out that my role as teacher underwent a similar 
metamorphosis. Because I had undertaken my own personal enquiry I had 
grown in strength as an individual. The strengthening of my 'I* enabled 
me to enter into a relationship with other 'I's, not from a position of 
dominance but from a position of respect. I came to see that the 'I and 
Thou' relationship in turn helped my children to develop their own 
living 'I's. I was able to explore my own competence, to become aware 
of my own personal knowledge as an organic notion, to raise that 
knowledge to consciousness to enable me to enter into an I and Thou 
relationship with my pupils and colleagues. In taking this stand of 
commitment, my statements of values, as part of the personal knowledge 
of my competence, became reflected in my statements of fact, as part of 
the realisation of my personal knowledge in my performance.
How, before going on to the crucial question of the process of 'coming 
to know’, it is necessary to investigate the question in which my 
enquiry is grounded: what it means 'to be a person'.
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(ii) VHAT IT MEANS TO BE A PERSON
There are many different approaches to this question in the literature 
(Radford and Kirby, 1975). For the purposes of this text, I will follow 
the overall organisation of this chapter in its discussion of approaches 
to a knowledge about knowledge, and of approaches to a knowledge about 
values; suggesting that there are three broad approaches to these issues 
which reflect (a) the investigator's view to thinking about the object 
of his enquiry and (b) his interpretations about the nature of that 
object.
I will suggest, then, that the answers to the questions implied by 'what 
it means to be a person' may be couched in the language of <i) formal- 
structuralist interpretations, (ii) cognitive-developmental
interpretations, and (iii) dialectical interpretations.
In a formal-structural1st approach, an answer to the question will 
include the assumptions of the investigator that he already has clearly 
formulated ideas about his approach to knowledge, and will probably 
interpret 'being a person' as 'being a certain type of person' (Pring, 
1984). The type of person will be the stereotype envisioned as the 
product of empiric investigation; the approach and its object of 
investigation are controlled by the methodologies of an ' objectivist' 
approach which is grounded in a normative-analytic epistemology.
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The cognitive-developmental1st' s answers, too, will include his 
assumptions that he has clearly formulated ideas about his approach to 
knowledge, and he will interpret 'being a person' as 'being an 
Individual whose development is shaped by the society in which he is'. 
The person envisioned here is studied in his role-bound context in 
relationship with the mores of a given society. His development is 
plotted along currently sociological dimensions. It is seen as a linear 
progression which is determined by biological factors interacting with 
the environment (Levinson, 1978) and which follows a relatively stable 
trajectory.
The dialectician's answers rest on his acknowledgment that he has no 
final answers, and, as such, his interpretations of 'being a person’ 
will allow him to suggest frameworks and indications, but prevent him 
from making definitive propositions about characterisations. His 
approach to the structure of knowledge entails an acknowledgement that 
change, disequilibrium and contradiction are important and necessary 
aspects of life which free that life from the stultification of stasis 
and encourage it to develop. This view is reflected in his 
interpretation of what it means to be a person, along two dimensions. 
First, he will acknowlege that, as a living investigator, he himself is 
subject to change and therefore his interpretations are temporary. 
Second, his view of 'personhood' is that it, too, is subject to change, 
and any definitions that are arrived at must also be temporary and open 
to re-interpretation.
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This characterisation in terms of current trends may be spelt out as:
(1) a formal-structuralist approach sees personhood as the state of an 
accumulation of the criteria that go towards making a 'certain type of 
person'. This approach closely parallels the mental structures of the 
investigator working in a formal-analytic mode who writes in 
propositional terms. The person under investigation is seen as a 
technocrat (Samples, 1978), and his RAISON D’ETRE is seen as functional 
and instrumental. The view of a person here is grounded in the
investigator's mental structures.
(2) a congitive-developmentalist approach sees personhood as an 
expression of the individual life form in its role-bound relationship 
with the institutions of society. This approach closely parallels the
mental structures of the investigator working in a sociological mode.
He sees persons as parts of society, as contributing to the formation of 
a given society in its current state of development. The person under 
review is seen as contributing to the maintenance of that given society, 
its mores and its culture. The view of a person here is still grounded 
in the mental structures of the investigator who sees the person as 
external to the society in which the person lives; and the investigator 
sees the person and the society as external to himself. They are
objects of a study of which he is the subject and the person is the 
obj ect,
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(3) a dialectical approach sees personhood in terms of temporary 
notions. Dialectical investigators accept that their own mental 
structures are constantly in process of transformation, yet the 
temporarity and transitions of the transformational process itself 
provides a stable framework of reference (Chapter 6). The person thus 
is not a feature of the external world 'out there' but is the person- 
investigator herself. The 'criteria' of dialectical thinking (Basseches 
[1984] speaks in terms of 'schemata' that characterise dialectical 
thinking) involve the ability of the individual to see relationships 
along a multitude of dimensions. He sees himself as a constituent 
member of a society in its historical, political, economic and cultural 
senses; he lives in a transactional mode (Riegel, 1968) in which there 
is a reciprocal influencing and shaping of the individual and of other 
individuals who make up the society. In this way, the one-dimensional 
man (Karcuse, 1964) of the approaches summarised at (1) and (2) are 
incorporated in the multi-dimensionality of the (3) dialectical person.
Similarly, dialectical approaches to the structure of knowledge 
incorporate those approaches summarised at (1) and (2). Broughton 
(1987) says that the shift to dialectical from formal thinking means a 
shift of centres rather than a restructuring; mental operations 
transform their relationships, like the coloured bits of plastic in a 
kaleidoscope when it is turned, rather than undergo radical 
restructuring themselves. What causes this 'shift of centre', he says, 
is the conscious critical reflection of the investigator, and the 
reflexive process itself generates the turbulence necessary to occasion 
the shift. The view of the person here is grounded within himself.
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I wish now tD apply these thoughts to my chosen area of personal and 
social education. I will argue that the functionalist view of (1) is a
basic assumption of those who believe that education is to do with
schooling. In this view, the aim of schools and their curricula is to 
turn out the 'certain kind of person1 who will perpetuate the system 
(Chapter 1 of this text). The aim of values education (personal and
social education) here is to develop that type. The ontology is
adaptation of the self to the system; the epistemology is propositional.
I will argue that the sociological view of (2) is a basic assumption of 
those who believe that education is to do with the socialisation of the 
individual. In this view which incorporates the functionalism of (1), 
what we aim for and end up with are descriptions of the behavioural 
mores of a given society. A study that assumes that there is a 'certain 
kind of person' (1) who belongs to a 'certain kind of society' (2) aims 
to investigate the performance of the individual, and judges how closely 
it approximates to the mores of the society. The development of the 
person is viewed as an acquisition and an accumulation of acceptable 
behaviours, and the acquisition of skills required to execute those 
behaviours is seen as an accumulation of skills and habits. This is the 
approach widely adopted in structuralist/behavioural psychology and in 
cognitive-developmental approaches, notably in the work of Piaget and 
Kohlberg. Their work (and that of others), and the impact of their 
views Dn the acquisition of skills and habits that go to form the 
certain kind of person/certain kind of society will be discussed fully 
in Chapter 6.
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It is my view that such investigations are grounded in the E-approaches 
of observation and description. These are phenomenological/sociological 
in orientation, for they are concerned with the events and institutions 
of which the individual is a part, as perceived by the investigator. To 
my mind, the cognitive-developmental1st's approach of (2) is more mature 
(see below) than that of the structural-behaviourist's of (1), in that 
relational aspects are emphasised. The individual is not seen in an 
idealised Skinnerian sense as an entity operating in a role-free vacuum, 
but is seen as a social being. As such, his physical actions and mental 
structures are subject to the purposeful intentions of his dealings with 
other people.
I consciously use the word 'mature', for it is my intention to 
demonstrate that traditions of thought develop towards maturity, in the 
same way that my own thought processes have developed, and are still 
developing, to a developing maturity. Maturity, for me, is 
characterised by an openness to change, an active seeking-out of moments 
of disequilibrium, and the ability to synthesise conflict, resulting in 
a situation of equilibrium. I shall explore these notions in detail in 
Chapter 6. Kuhn (1962) says that paradigm shifts are caused by a sense 
of crisis in the old, dominant paradigm which results in the emergence 
of a new one, yet this new one incorporates the old. This, for me, is 
the way to the ever-changing scenarios of maturity. Epistemological 
traditions also go through this process, and the historicity involved in 
the project of tracing epistemological development is part of the 
dialectical tradition.
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I intend to argue that the E-approaches of (1) and (2) are not powerful 
enough to deal with the notion of 'person as self; self as an 
individual'. This notion contains the following assumptions: it is an
extension of an epistemology that rests on the idea of personal 
knowledge (knowing + a direct object); further, it metamorphoses the 
procedural quality of that epistemology into the substance of its life, 
where the desire to know becomes the quest, and the quest becomes the 
desire to know. The dialectical tension between epistemology and its 
object (knowing + direct object) integrates the search by the self for 
the self, where self becomes both the knower and the known, researcher 
and researched. This approach is focused on the person as self, and 
subsumes within itself the notion of the person in society. In this way 
it resolves the ambiguity of persons in society, in that it first 
enables the individual to explain to himself and for himself the nature 
of his own personhood, and second enables him to adapt aspects of that 
personhood to the expectations of others (see also Chapter 7). The 
focus has now shifted from a description of the expectations of a given 
society (E-approaches) to an explanation for the workings of the mind of 
a particular individual (I-approaches). It then becomes a study of 
mind; and, specifically, the study of the mind/self by the living 
mind/self. This now becomes a matter of competence. The methodologies 
of the epistemology of a cognitive-structuralist approach to the social 
sciences is inadequate to deal with this, and I submit that it is 
necessary to adopt the reconstructive sciences that attempt to 
reconstruct in an explicit manner what is already part of the implicit 
personal knowledge of the person (McCarthy, 1979).
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I shall now attempt to relate these Ideas more fully to the literature 
and to my practice.
<a) An instrumentalist's view of personhood
Pring (1984) gives an excellent account of this first approach when 
applied to the institutions of schooling. "Teachers exercise control 
over children. Being Iff control, they DO things to them and change them 
in ways they, the teachers, want. Teachers, therefore, make assumptions 
about the appropriate ends of children's development and also about the 
morally acceptable means of achieving those ends. But how teachers 
treat children and what they judge to be appropriate goals of their 
development depend upon what sort of 'things' they see young people to 
be. How you treat people depends upon your concept of 'person'. It is 
necessary, therefore, to sort out first what it means to be a person and 
then what the connections are between the 'development of persons' and 
educating them."
Pring is here talking about schools and schooling, but the same 
assumptions are apparent in all walks of institutionalised life, from 
family and friends to professional life. In all areas of Western 
society we are expected to conform to other people's standards and 
expectations (Marcuse, 1964).
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Traditionally, there is a view that education will somehow bring about 
personhood. Such a statement immediately begs questions about the 
concepts 'education' and 'personhood', and the questions remain largely 
unanswered precisely because there is little current unity in attempting 
to give a valid theory of what the terms means in practice. Langford 
(1973) says that "to become educated is to learn to be a person".
Langford's view of 'to become educated' is in a sense of 'to accumulate
knowledge'. In this view, of course, he is not alone. He has the whole
empiricist tradition behind him, in which the 'knowing that' of
propositional knowledge is seen as the ultimate cognitive ability (see,
for example, Putnam's 11978] stand that ethics is concerned with
practical knowledge). Langford seems also to be interpreting the notion 
of 'to be educated' as part of the social sciences. If being educated 
leads to personhood, and education is seen as a social commodity, then 
personhood will probably also be seen in the same light. A view of 
persons, in this view, follows the circular, self-perpetuating route of: 
persons in society conform to the expectations of that society, which 
leads them to become the persons of the society who in turn impose the 
expectations.
The 'certain kind of person' at (1), then, is a product of the mind of 
the external commentator who is operating in a normative-analytic mode. 
His own view of society is restrictive, in that it operates according to
the idealised criteria of himself, the commentator, and the view of
persons is reductionist, in that individual spontaneity and creativity 
are disallowed. Such a society, peopled by such persons, is grounded in 
the imagination of its creator, and is essentially idealised and
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therefore fictitious. It is to be found, for example, in the scenarios
of ' Brave New World' . In this work, I feel that Huxley was not only
parodying a de-humanised society, but also parodying the workings of the 
mind of the artist who really believes that such events may come to 
pass. He was portraying the potential product of a certain way of 
thinking. This way of thinking falls into the trap of Kierkegaard's 
'unity of imagination', in which thought is divorced from action, and 
human potential, like a rogue animal, is no longer bound to its own 
human subjects. The mind of the creator is the epistemic centre. His 
view of pesons produces the 'certain kind of person'. It is curious 
how, and why, generations of empirically-oriented scientists have failed 
to see this simple fact: that what they are observing in their
'objectively' conducted experiments are not the substantial
corroborations of hypotheses, but the externalisations of their own 
cognitive processes; that is, a form of thought that suggests to them 
that the world can be neatly classified and predicted. The 'knowing 
that' of the formal thinker entraps him into the closedness of his own 
thought processes, and the reductive persons who are the products of 
those processes mirror the reductionism of the processes themselves.
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(b) A sociological perspective of personhood.
As has been noted earlier, current values education seems to be 
overwhelmingly geared towards a view of persons as the product of their 
society. In the early twentieth centruty, Dewey built his educational 
philosophy on the notion of just societies, in which the individual 
affected society, and society affected the individual. So it was in the 
public interest to turn out a moral, well-balanced citizenry. Dewey's 
influence was far-reaching, and is clear in the work of many theorists, 
including, for example, Kohlberg <1972), Rawls (1971), Raths et al
<i978).
Empiric approaches to educational research strongly support the notion 
of persons as products of a given society; as do interpretive 
traditions, and some action research approaches. They support the 
notion by <1) approaching their enquiry via propositional knowledge; <2) 
assuming the intellectual dependence of individuals. By (1) I mean that 
empiric traditions test a given hypothesis against the actions of 
subjects. The methods of the behavioural psychologists (for example,
Skinner, 1953) assume clear correlations between the predictions of
their hypotheses and the behavioural outcomes of their experiments on 
subjects. Most standardised tests and schedules operate on this 
principle (which leads me to question the price put on individuality by 
the 1987 Rational Curriculum proposals with their schedules of
standardised, commonly applied test procedures). Popper (in Lakatos and 
Musgrave, 1970) comments that "we approach everything in the light of a
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preconceived theory", and refers to his own ’The logic of scientific 
discovery' that: "A scientist engaged in a piece of research, say in
physics, can attack his problem straight away. He can go at once to the 
heart of the matter: that is, to the heart of the organized structure. 
For a structure of scientific doctrines is already in exsitence; and 
with it, a generally accepted problem-situation."
This certainty in 'knowledge that' is reflected in the interpretive 
approaches of, for example, Parlett and Hamilton (1972). The approaches 
of the truly empiric traditions were in an etic sense (Pike, 1967); that 
is, the scrutiny by an observer of his subject without access to or 
interference from the subject. The approaches of the interpretive 
traditions were in an emic sense; that is, the observation and 
interpretation of a social or pedagogic setting in collaboration with 
the subject. In this view, actors' and observers' opinions did not 
necessarily coincide, and the mismatch offered rich grounds for the 
attempt to resolve the situation. The epistemological standpoints in 
both approaches are the same, in that they take the expertise of the 
observer as unquestionable. This approach is seen also in the action 
research models of Kemmis and McTaggart (1982), Elliott (1981) and 
Ebbutt (1983). These models tend to be static, disallowing spontaneity 
or creativity on the part of the persons who are following the 1aid-down 
guidelines. They fall into the empiric habit of positing hypotheses, 
mapping the territory, and requiring actors to follow their lines (see 
also my 1988 for a fuller critique). Schon (1983) pleads for an 
alternative form of theory. "When someone reflects-in-action, he 
becomes a researcher in the practice context. He is not dependent on
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the categories of established theory and technique, but constructs a new 
theory of the unique case" (cited in Vhitehead, 1987). The uniqueness 
of each and every individual, however, is not within the focus of an 
empiric approach with its assumptions of reified knowledge.
In (2) I stated that empiric traditions cultivated the intellectual 
dependence of individuals. Harre (in Reason and Rowan, 1981) suggests: 
"If one adopts as a general theory of action, that people are agents 
acting intentionally in accordance with socially grounded rules and 
conventions to a realized project, the entities in need of empirical
investigation are clearly defined." Feyerabend (in Lakatos and
Musgrave, 1970) sees the reification of propositional theories as 
stultifying. The way forward, for him, is in the freedom of the 
Individual to question and criticise: "Progress has always been
achieved by probing well-entrenched and well-grounded forms of life with
unpopular and unfounded values. This is how man gradually freed himself 
from fear and from the tyranny of unexamined systems. Our question 
therefore is: what values shall we choose to probe the sciences of
today?" Elliott (1983) cites the popular, but misleading, "proposition 
that 'objective' inquiry is the study of what exists externally to all 
minds". He goes on to reject the dominance of the empiric approaches in 
favour of approaches of the social sciences that take one-to-one 
relationships between persons as their axis of gravity, such 
relationships finding their expression in practical discourse (Habermas, 
1979): "A reconstructed interpretative paradigm shows how a MORAL
SCIENCE of social procedures is possible" (his italics; Elliott, 1983).
( 3'+3 )
The two aspects of propositional theories and intellectual dependence 
foster a view of individuals as persons-in-society. This approach then 
aims to give descriptions of their form of life as it is shaped and 
determined by society. The theories about the persons and their 
relationships that emerge tend to be descriptive of events in a 
prescribed form (for example, McCauley and McCauley, 1977; Masden and 
Masden, 1974); or descriptive of events in a phenomenological form (for 
example, Rutter et al, 1979; Hamblin, 1978). Descriptions of societies 
and their members are descriptions of performance, at an E-level. 
Theories of personhood that aim for these performance levels will aim to 
perpetutate the theory by perpetuating a normative view of persons; i.e. 
of a certain given type of person.
My practice rested squarely on this basis until about 1984. My first 
recorded indication of a change of view was in my 1985 BERA paper when I 
wrote: "Until 1984 I had operated in terms of 'How do I use my class
practice to bring about a state of personal development?' and in my mind 
I had unclear notions of a personally developed child. Now I changed my 
conceptualisation to 'How can I help a child find and develop his own 
autonomy and become a fully-functioning person in his own right?' A 
massive implication here is that I determined to explore what it means 
to 'be a person' rather than 'be the sort of person I wish you to be'."
( 3hh )
Until then, my view of personhood had been dictated largely by the
literature. I had concentrated on producing a certain kind of person, 
and this focus had been fostered by the lack of clarity in policy
statement documents as to a characterisation in practice of what 'being 
a person' meant (see Chapter 3 of this text). I had undertaken my 
enquiry within the framework of personal development as an outcome of 
social enquiry. If I had then been able to analyse and articulate this 
concept, I would have seen immediately that the questions I was asking 
and the answers I was expecting did not, and could not, match.
The mismatch in questions and answers is also a by-product of empiric 
approaches which rest on propositional logic, in that propositions are 
not immediately concerned with questions and answers and therefore do
not question any variance or inconsistency in their form. Collingwood
(1939) also travelled the path of rejecting 'objectivist' 
interpretations of truth: "I began by observing that you cannot find
out what a man means by simply studying his spoken or written statements 
... In order to find out his meaning you must also know what the 
question was (a question in his own mind, and presumed by him to be in 
yours) to which the thing he has said or written was meant as an 
answer." Collingwood says that the same principle may be applied to the 
idea of truth. The truth of a proposition must be relative to the 
question it answers. "Here I parted company with what I called 
propositional logic, and its offspring, the generally recognized 
theories of truth." For him, there are no 'true' answers - only 'right' 
answers: "By 'right' I do not mean 'true'. The 'right' answer to a
question is the answer which enables us to get ahead with the process of
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questioning and answering." (Collingwood, op.cit. See also Chapter 3 of 
this text).
As I reflected on my practice, I came to be aware of the mismatch. My 
questions to do with social development were being answered by the 
answers of social development as expressed through the methods of the 
social sciences. Thus 1 could ash myself in accordance with Plato's 
notion of thinking as 'a dialogue of the soul with itself' questions of 
the sort: "Are my children progressing in the directions I want them to
go? Are they becoming more social towards each other?" These 
questions, to follow Collingwood's exposition, were the answers to my 
mental propositions, and spoken and written statements (for example, 
AT4), that I knew the end state that my children should be working 
towards. My epistemology was one of propositions, and the closed 
questions and answers displayed my certainty of a given truth that I 
intended to prove.
I have already commented on the fact that the form of my questions 
changed over the years, from the normative-analytic notions of 'when?', 
'where?', 'who?', 'which?', 'what?' to the hermeneutic heuristics of 
'how?' and 'why?'. When the enquiry shifts its focus, as did 
Collingwood's, to questions characterised by 'how?' and 'why?', the 
answers anticipated are in the form of explanations rather than 
propositions. When these questions are asked in social situations, the 
answers have the focus on the science of the singular (Simons, 1980). 
If they do not, there is no 'right' answer, in Collingwood's sense, that 
will enable the enquiry to proceed.
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Consider, for example, the questions: 'Why do football hooligans behave
as they do?' or 'Why do the children in my class truant so much?' A 
glib answer might produce a theory of a 'certain kind of person': the 
'kind of person' who misbehaves at football matches or truants. Such a 
theory will at best describe what people of those inclinations do at a 
performance level. Such answers are not the 'right' answers to the 
questions; more importantly, the questions were inappropriate in the 
first place.
In order to move the enquiry forward, it is necessary to ask the 'right' 
questions. 'Why did Joe behave as he did at the football match? Why 
does Susie truant?' Only Joe and Susie will be able to tell us the 
truth, and according to Collingwood, we cannot rely on their immediately
spoken or written words as the truth. In order to arrive at the 'right'
answer that will move the enquiry forward (in the sense of social
action: Schutz, 1972; Habermas, 1979), that Joe and Susie will think 
again, it is now necessary to engage in a dialogue that will persuade 
Joe and Susie to do some thinking. In this view, the enquiry shifts its 
focus to an I-dimension, in which the self accounts for its own self. 
Perhaps Iris Murdoch (1970) was thinking of the minimal steps of a 
dialogue of question and answer when she suggested that Jesus's 
exhortation of "Be ye therefore perfect" should in fact be "Be ye
therefore slightly improved".
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The questions of my practice that dwell with issues of sociology and 
socialising were answered by propositions in that vein. The question 
'Have my children improved?' was answered by 'Yes, I know that my 
children have improved. ' When I wanted to know why or how they had 
improved, or the meaning (in Collingwood's sense, the appropriateness of 
the context-specific answer) of 'improvement', in order to demonstrate 
publicly that improvement in practice, the questions and answers of 
formal propositions were inadequate. For that, I had to develop another 
set of questions altogether, and consequently another questioning
strategy. In order to answer the propositions of the recommendations 
that a child should 'realise his full potential' or 'develop autonomy', 
I had to formulate questions that would produce answers to carry the 
enquiry forward; and I had to develop strategies that would leave
questions and answers open-ended. The only answers available were of 
the type 'Because I want to' in response to my question of 'Why are you 
doing that?' Here I was looking for personal explanations, trying to 
help my children find out for themselves through their own action
enquiry, and my intentional strategy took the form of a dialogue of
open-ended question and answer. I maintain that it was in this way that 
my study began to be educational, in the sense identified in Chapter 3 
of this text, for I was encouraging the development of my children's 
rationality, as well as my own. The process of question and answer 
encouraged the process of the development of rationality. The 
identified change in my practice which indicated a movement towards 
Issues of education and away from issues of socialisation may be seen 
in the types of questions I asked and the types of answers I
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anticipated. My search for answers about personal development was 
guided by questions about personal development, not about socialisation.
Parallel to this change was my revised view about the nature of persons. 
My early work focused on producing the 'certain kind of person' (Chapter 
1 of this text). My more recent work has focused on assisting an 
individual self to know its own self, in response to the dialectic of 
question and answer that is a characteristic of the dialogues of my 
enquiry. The dialogues take the form of JM to other people (see the 
tapes in Appendix 1), and JM with JM (First Version and this text).
Vhitehead (1989), drawing on the work of Ilyenkov (1977), Marcuse 
(1984), and Polanyi (1958), among others, shows how his own
understanding developed of the dialectic of a dialogical form. He cites
Wittgenstein's insight that "'I' is not the name of a person, nor 'here' 
of a place, and 'this' is not a name. But they are connected with 
names. Names are explained by means of them. It is also true that it 
is characteristic of physics not to use these words." Vhitehead goes on 
to say: "Now 'I', 'this' and 'here' are contained within questions of
the form, 'How do I improve this process of education here?' ... By 
integrating [the contradiction of the living 'I'] in the presentations 
of our claims to know our educational practice we can construct
descriptions and explanations for the educational development of 
individuals. Rather than conceive educational theory as a set of 
propositional relations from which we generate such descriptions and 
explanations, I am suggesting we produce educational theory in the
living form of dialogues which have their focus in the descriptions and
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explanations which practitioners are producing for their own value-laden 
practice.M
The application of the concepts expressed here to my practice will focus 
on the fact that it is my unique practice, and that it involves me 
crucially as a living, thinking part of that practice. Vhat is vital is 
not only that I am a person, but that I am the person that I am. 
Selfhood is a charateristic of self, and may be entered in the lexicon 
as a distinctive feature. The distinctive features of an individual’s 
selfhood, however, may be answered only by that individual’s enquiry 
into self, both as the subject and object of the enquiry.
Thus, 'I know that* transforms through the stages of minimal steps: ’I
'I know + direct object: I know + direct object'. The dialogue is of 
the self with the self, through the negative dialectic of question and 
answer, in which previous stages (answers) are cancelled (S20 [zero]) to 
be replaced by new questions (S03) which will give rise to new states 
(S3) (this model is explained in Chapter 6 of this text). The
structures of the self, in the shape of answers about that self's form
of life, are in a constant state of re-structuring through the
transformations of its own questions. For me, educational theory is the
living form of practitioners' lives as they intentionally engage in this 
process of question and answer, in which the interplay moves the self's 
enquiry into the self forward through the dialectic of cancellation and 
renewal. These questions will be further explored in Chapter 6, when I
know that: I know that' 'I know how: I know that' 'I
know how: I know how' 'I know + direct object: I know
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shall also Introduce the Idea of questions and answers as Innate 
capacities of the living self, and suggest ways in which the self may 
'come to know' those innate capacities as part of its integration as a 
living person.
(c) A DIALECTICIANS VIEV OF PERS0NH00D
In a dialectical approach to knowledge, there is no division between 
observer and what is observed, between knower and what is known. The
basic schema of interrelatedness demolishes barriers. Thus, if I
observe a tree, I see it for what it is: a changing object in a world of 
change. Yet I, too, am a changing object in a world of change, and as a 
thinking, living being, I must acknowledge my potential for my 
dependency on change to make me the thinking organism that I am.
Basseches <1984) underscores this acknowledgement as a mark (Buber, 
1958) of a dialectical thinker: "For tthe formal thinker], whereas the
tree we experience is taken as an active construction, the self we 
experience is reified and taken as given."
In the dialectician's relational world there can be no separate knower 
and known, subject and object, for the tension between the two causes 
them to enter into a relationship with each other which is a blend
rather than a demarcation. It is like making omelettes. The eggs and 
milk are separate entities, yet, when they are mixed, they lose their 
separate form.
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The relationships make a new form of existence. Riegel (in Pervin and 
Lewis, 1978) identifies four dimensions of interaction "between parts Df 
the organism and between the organism and the environment". He argues 
that reciprocal action-transaction between persons (between organism and 
the environment) is dependent on the successful integration of the 
individual (interaction between parts of the organism); in that the 
individual recognises that she is a complex, changing being whose 
contradictory nature is an essential component of her own development. 
Riegel sees this ability to operate at several levels at the same time 
as a mark of ongoing human development. The person who achieves a state 
of living as a contradiction, who seeks out the crises of contradiction 
as watersheds of development, is at a higher level of devlopment than a 
person who shelters in the lee of the cliffs, who refuses to acknowledge 
her own variability. In his 1975 'Toward a dialectical theory of 
development', Riegel sees the determination of psychologists to stay 
with empiric traditions as a mark of immaturity. He says: "The one-
dimensionality of the scientific community does not seem to be able to 
operate with the multi-dimensionality of the exceptional individual". 
(I will hope to show in coming pages that, in my view, persons who 
develop the capacity for dialectical thought are exceptional, in that 
they are the persons who are attempting to realise their full potential. 
I would like to see the day when all individuals will be persuaded of 
their inherent exceptionality, and their capacity to realise it.)
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As I see it, a dialectical view of persons is part of the philosophical 
repertoire of two significant groups of thinkers in the contemporary 
literature. These two groups are the humanistic psychologists mentioned 
by Samples (see above) and the philosophers and psychologists exploring 
critical theories of psychological development. The first group is 
represented by the work of Maslow, Rogers and Buber; the second by that 
of Riegel and Broughton. At the basis of these separate schools of 
thought is the awareness of unrealised human potential. It is accepted 
that the potential of human development is probably unlimited, certainly 
far in excess of the realisation of that potential by many individuals, 
and that the way to uncover, or discover, this potential is through the 
interpretive approaches of dialectical hermeneutics. "Interpretive 
approaches of a psychodynamic nature must play a part, given the 
demonstrably dynamic origin of that undeveloped self that escapes 
consciousness. . . . The unconscious must be understood interpretively 
wherever and however it is manifest - in terms of social and political 
history as well as life history. Hermeneutic approaches provide the 
hope for fostering insight into all that is human in us but is yet to 
develop, and they suggest collective and interpersonal practices of both 
liberating and coming to own that yet-to-be." (Broughton, 1987)
The style of the critical psychologists is crisp and incisive; their 
linguistic structures are rigorously methodological and direct, and the 
thought structures employed are clear. Maslow, Rogers and Buber tend to 
adopt more literary, artistic approaches to their field, and write in 
intuitional rather than critical terms. Such a tendency gives rise to 
comments such as that recorded by Radford (in Radford and Kirby, 1975)
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that "the trouble with this sort of approach (humanistic psychology) Is 
not that there may not be some truth In It. Indeed, the humanistic 
writers have done Psychology a great service by reasserting the 
importance of individual experience and human values. The trouble is 
that so far the approach has failed to lead on anywhere further. 
'Hermeneutic' psychology books have sold extremely widely, largely one 
suspects because they are full of nice comforting uplifting thoughts. 
But the thoughts remain the personal intuition of the writers. They may 
be morally and ethically desirable, but are they psychologically sound? 
If not, they are only a version of what the great religions have 
offered, more systematically and convincingly."
Such dismissive comments, typical of the reductionist mentality of 
positivist thinkers, have been counteracted by the ideology critique of 
the Frankfurt school (Jay, 1973; Horkheimer and Adorno, 1975), and the 
work of Habermas (1975) and Gadamer (1975). In this approach, "the 
surface character of the research or theory in question is treated as a 
literary text, subjected to an active engaged, constructive 
interpretation. The surface forms are penetrated to reveal underlying 
relations and structures which are in turn related to aspects and 
constructs outside the surface text." (Harris, in Broughton, 1987)
Unity may thus be effected through the critical reflection of the 
dialectical tradition. The literary approaches of the humanistic 
psychologists may be subjected to the hermeneutic interpretations of the 
critical theorists. The underlying convictions of the unlimited 
potential of human development which is a philosophical axis for both
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schools of thought are legitimated in the social scientific terms of 
critical analysis, and in the moral scientific terms of dialectical
synthesis.
The dialectician's view of personhood, then, revolves around the notions 
of self as a living contradiction and life as a coming-to-be. My 
interpretations of these two aspects needs clarification, so that you 
and I will understand together, and, according to the criteria of 
Habermas (1979), will agree an understanding of a characterisation of 
the personhood of the dialectician.
Ilyenkov says (1977) that "contradiction as the concrete unity of 
mutually exclusive opposites is the real nucleus of dialectics, its
central category" (cited in Vhitehead, 1987). This notion may present a 
problem to someone who is unfamiliar or resistant to the idea of 
dialectics. It is natural and comfortable to a dialectical thinker. I
say this in full acknowledgement that I have undergone an enormous
mental struggle to transform my cognitive structures from formal to 
dialectical forms (First Version, 3-6). In encouraging new forms of 
thought to emerge, I explicitly acknowledged that I was struggling to 
bring to my surface consciousness my intuitive thoughts, and 
demonstrating the contradictions within myself. This contradiction 
continues to be expressed today in my acknowledgement that I know, yet I 
do not know. I do not know on a cognitive surface level; I know (in 
Polanyi's 1958 and Chomsky's 1965 sense) on an intuitive, deep level; 
and I want to know and be able to demonstrate that knowledge in an 
explicit form. This wanting to know is my driving force; it provides
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the transformations of conation (Chapter 6) that enable me to turn my 
intuitions into cognitives, my latent values into observable practice.
Ilyenkov goes on to say: "No small difficulty arises as soon as matters
touch on 'subjective dialectics' or dialectics as the logic of thinking. 
If any object is a living contradiction, what must the thought 
(statement about the object) be that expresses it? Can and should an 
objective contradiction find reflection in thought? And if so, in what 
form?" (Ilyenkov, op.cit.)
For dialectical thinkers there is no one 'unity of form' such as exists
in other approaches to the organisation of the structure of knowledge.
If there were, it would no longer be dialectical thinking. Basseches 
notes:
"Dialectical thinking is a living, continuously evolving, self-
transforming intellectual tradition. To say that dialectical thinking 
is living and evolving is to say that it has contradictions. Actually, 
it probably has as many internal contradictions as there are thinkers 
who partake of the dialectical tradition. For each person who thinks 
'dialectically' does so in the context of a somewhat different context 
of relationships, and it is that to which dialectical thinking BECOMES 
RELATED that makes it what it is. Dialectical thinking is CONSTITUTED 
over time by various dialectical thinkers, who are in turn constituted 
by their various other relationships. The nature of dialectical 
thinking thus evolves as dialectical thinkers interact with their
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respective circumstances and with each other" (his italics, Basseches, 
1984).
I will draw out only two of the many implications here. One is that 
dialectical thinking has its expression, in answer to Ilyenkov's 
problem, in the 'living, continuously evolving, self-transforming, 
intellectual tradition'. Thus there is no notional 'unity of form' 
unless that 'unity' takes its form in the agreement of the whole 
community of dialectical thinkers that they each think dialectically, 
and therefore independently and individually. The second implication is 
that, given this 'unity of agreement', the community critically uses 
this agreement to ground its constitutent individual members' 
interrelatedness in dialogue, the form of question and answer, as an 
expression in action of the 'living, continuously evolving, self-
transforming intellectual tradition' . In this way, the action of the 
community of individuals is part of the thinking; it is the form become 
substance; and the analytic thought of real people becomes synthetic
through the action of real people. Thus, the dialectician finds herself 
part of an interdependent community of reflexive independents.
The contradiction of my practice is seen, in this light, as a wish to 
realise in my practice the values that are at present being denied in my
practice. The form of my practice has changed over time. From 1981-88
my practice was grounded in my classroom, in my relationships with my 
children, and in my school and other schools, in my relationships with 
colleagues. My practice involved me as a reflexive practitioner, both 
as a teacher and as an in-service supporter. The forum of my practice
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extended in 1984 when I started producing texts. Since 1986, the
production of texts itself has become that practice. My practice has 
evolved and developed over time, Its present form, that of producing 
texts, incorporates its historical form, that of working with other
people in pedagogic settings. As a dialectician, I can say that my 
present developed practice draws on previous experience of practice, 
which I may now include as part of the analysis of a description of how 
I came to be where I am, and use this as part of the explanation for my 
present synthesis. Thus I can travel back, analyse my memories, and 
bring them together in the present focus in which my memories are
constituent parts of my synthesised present.
Vhen I was a teacher in class, some of my educational values were often
denied in my practice. Those educational values were that I wanted my
children to be caring, to be able to see the finer things in life, to be 
independent, thoughtful and alert. My practice showed that these values 
were being denied (Chapter 1 of this text). My practice aimed to
reverse the situation, so that my educational values were realised.
In my practice as a colleague and in-service supporter, some of my 
educational values were often denied in my practice, in that other
colleagues viewed the children in a negative light, and were hostile to 
the ideas of personal and social education, and towards the underlying 
assumptions of personal and social education of the need for warm,
caring, democratic relationships. My recordings of my practice 
demonstrate that colleagues developed their rationality because of my 
encouragement and influence, which led to a gradual cancellation of the
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unsatisfactory situation to make way for burgeoning development. 
Because of my critical intervention in their lives, I, too, developed 
(Chapters 1 and 3 of this text).
In my practice as a thinker, in which the production of texts is the 
externalised form of my thought, some of my educational values are 
constantly denied, in that I do not know, yet I want to know. This
quest for knowledge, seen in an empirical light as being grounded in
epistemology, is the substance of my practice, and shifts its ground to 
ontology. The dialectical frameworks of my forms of thought and action
enable me to see the interrelationships and shift the focus in order to
accommodate those relationships. My need to know is both epistemology 
and ontology. The contradictions inherent in my not knowing and my need 
to know indicates my status as a dialectician, and my public 
acknowledgement of that contradiction indicates my development towards a 
dialectical form of life.
In summary, than, I can suggest that a dialectician's view of personhood 
is not expressed in terms of other people. The synthesis of human
experience requires him to look for the relationships that bring about 
that synthesis. We are changing individuals in a world of changing
individuals. Even before he starts to look for relationships between 
other people (as if he were standing on the outside looking in) the 
dialectician has to enter into relationship himself with others. In
doing so, he is forced to encounter himself (Maslow's 'self- 
actualisation) as a structural prerequisite of his relationship with
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others (Buber's 'I and Thou'). Maslow says (1962): "Change becomes
much less an acquisition of habits and associations, one by one, and 
much more a total change of the total person, i.e. a new person rather 
than the same person with some habits added like new external 
possessions." Habermas says (1979): "In a process of enlightenment
there can only be participants." Buber says (1965): "Man is
crystallized potentiality of existence. ... The uniqueness of man is to 
be found in the meeting of I and Thou. . . . The I exists only through the 
relation to the Thou." As I understand it, this suggests to me that a 
dialectician's approach to personhood refuses to make pronounements 
about other people as objects existing external to himself. First he 
requires himself to understand himself as a changing person, but this 
understanding is part of the process of acceptance that others are 
forces in that change. He no longer sees himself as an 'I' living 
Independently of other 'I's. He enters into an 'I and Thou'
relationship that is not grounded in the sociology of people in
societies, but is grounded in the notion of the interdependent community 
of independents. 'Personhood' is not an end product, but is the
development of the individual.
The dialectician's interpretation of a form of personhood, then, rests 
on the realisation that there is no identifiable, concrete end product, 
but only a continual process of ever-renewed states of coming-into- 
being. The conversation between John Radford and Richard Kirby in their
1975 'The person in psychology' nicely presents the view of the
dialectical and the formal thinker (pp 50-51):
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"RK My argument is ... that man's basic and distinguishing feature is 
his capacity to be an infinitely diverse set of states and contents of 
consciousness. For this reason, all knowledge is potentially available 
to everyone. And 'all knowledge' includes the capacity to modify 
oneself. Therefore we are all the same in the sense that we are all 
omnipotent, POTENTIALLY.
JR That seems to me a string of non-sequiturs. Even if states of 
consciousness are infinite, whatever that means, why should that imply 
being all-powerful? I'm sure I couldn't run a mile in four minutes, 
however conscious I was. And a collection of beings, all omnipotent, 
seems a contradiction in terms, to say nothing of being terribly boring.
RK As usual you completely fail to grasp the nature of human 
potential."
Later in the book (p.115) RK says:
"You could just as well argue that the human potential movement will 
produce an irreversible change the other way - a world in which everyone 
is reaching personal fulfilment, and feels no need to tyrannize over 
anyone else." (Their italics: Radford and Kirby, 1975)
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Broughton (1987) stresses the notion of 'yet-to-be' as a fundamental 
characteristic of personhood: that is, that personhood itself is not a 
steady state, but a present embodiment of the individual's ever- 
renewable potential. The yet-to-be of a moment ago is now, which in 
turn has to be turned into the present state of the 'yet-to-be' of the 
next moment. Thus personhood is an on-going state of development, with 
a historical dimension of what has been till now and a moving towards 
what will be, all brought about through the dialectical transformations 
of now.
© SUMMARY
The question of this chapter is 'What constitutes knowledge of values?' 
I will summarise my answer here, by suggesting that, in terms of world 
views which deal with the nature of human values, we may approach the 
topic from the point of view of the behavioural-structuralist, the 
cognitive-developmentalist, and the humanist-philosopher. An
interpretation of the nature of human values is dependent on the 
interpreter's approach to the structure of knowledge. We have seen that 
the structuralist works in terms of the propositional knowledge of 
knowing-that; the cognitive-developmentalist works in the procedural 
knowledge of knowing-how; and the humanist-philosopher works in the 
personal terms of knowing + a direct object. Both dimensions, that of 
the approach to the structure of knowledge, and an approach to an 
organisation of human values, will influence the interpreter's view of 
the nature of what it means to be human. 'Personhood' may be seen in
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its instrumental, sociological and dialectical-developmental sense. The 
grounding of the notion of 'personhood' is radically different for all 
three viewpoints. In the first approach, the grounding is in the mental 
structures of the interpreter. In the second approach, the grounding 
is, at a remove, in the institutions of society, which » themselves are 
grounded in the mental structures of the interpreter. In the third 
approach, which now takes on the form of a critical theory of current 
theories, the grounding is in the interpreter himself.
It is further suggested that the last of the triad is a more mature 
discipline than the previous two. Because it is within the dialectical 
tradition, it is able to subsume the other two traditions mentioned 
along the dimension of approaches to knowledge (epistemological 
considerations) and along the dimension of the history of the 
development of knowledge (dialectical considerations). The question of 
maturity is dealt with in the first section of Chapter 6.
What is now needed is a theory of development, to explain what is meant 
by 'maturity' and to explain the processes by which that maturity is 
achieved.
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CHAPTER SIX: HOW IS KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES ACQUIRED?
1 OVERVIEW
We have seen in Chapter 5 that a characterisation of the nature of human 
values is determined by at least two factors. The first of these 
factors is the way in which an interpreter organises his approach to the 
structure of knowledge; the second is how he organises his approach to 
the constitution of values. We saw how both aspects - the structure of 
knowldge and the constitution of values - are in turn determined by the 
interpreter's view of persons.
Broadly speaking, there are two schools of thought here, those of (1) 
formal thinkers and (2) dialectical thinkers. The first school 
comprises interpreters who see the idea of 'personhood' as external to 
themselves as reified, unchanging observers. This view colours their 
approach to the other aspects; they see knowledge as their own property, 
a set of structures which they may impose upon the object of their 
enquiry, which is the persons in the society they are studying. As a 
result, they expect the persons to conform to their, the interpreters’, 
expectations. They see the constitution of values as external as well. 
Values are seen as commodities to be accumulated and added on to the 
person. So the study, in its keenness to observe the 'objectivist' 
criteria of empiric traditions, adopts a hierarchical, linear approach 
to its research field, which may be seen as:
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(1) interpreter
person (object of study)
V
values ( property of the person)
The interpreter observes and describes the person who in turn acquires 
values.
I have indicated in various parts of this text that this was my view of 
my practice in schools until about 1984. I saw myself as the reified 
interpreter of my children's actions. I saw values as things, somehow 
reified and unattached themselves, to be acquired by my children and my 
colleagues. I have also indicated in Chapters 2 and 4 that I had viewed 
this text in the same light, that it was an object external to myself. 
Of course it is, in its physical sense, but I viewed the contents (my 
thoughts and interpretations) also as external to myself. The pattern 




text (record of practice)
V
values (constituents of practice)
in that I was an intrepreter of my practice in schools, which in turn 
embodied my values.
The second school of thought comprises interpreters who see the idea of 
'personhood' as resting in the developmental notions of change and 
renewability. These notions are applicable to themselves, as developing 
and renewable organisms, and to themselves with others, forming groups 
which are developing and renewable. These interpreters are aware of the 
relationships within themselves, and their relationships with other 
people, leading to an overarching concept of people as changing and 
developing beings in a world of change and development. The view of 
personhood here does not see ’personhood' as an end state to be 
achieved, but sees it as a constant coming-into-being. The focus is in 
the present, which is shaped by the past, with a view to realising the 
yet-to-be.
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This self-view prevents these interpreters from seeing themselves (or 
anything) as reified. They are prevented from making generalisations 
about other people because:
1 they cannot ’know' other people in the sense of entering into their 
consciousness and saying how they think and feel;
2 any generalisations they may invent are also subject to change and 
therefore conceptually obsolescent;
3 they themselves are subject to change in their own course of 
development.




self (object of study)
v
values (knowledge of self)
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In which the person is both subject and object of his own study, and in 
which the raising to consciousness of an intuitive knowledge of self 
(competence) to a cognitive level (performance) is the aim.
This view sees the nature Df persons and their personhood as a 
continuing state of development rather than a fixed end product; 
reflecting also the view of the structure of knowledge, that is, too, in 
a continuing state of development.
The first approach sees structures of knowledge as fixed, and it is the
interpreter's privilege to impose these structures of knowledge on his
unknowing subjects. The second approach sees the structures of
knowledge as developing and therefore subject to change, and it is the
interpreter's task to invite other persons to share with her in her 
explanations of her own life, and join with them in their explanations 
of theirs.
The way in which these structures of knowledge are acquired will be 
discussed here more fully than the glosses of Part One, along with the 
accompanying aspects of an explanation for an acquisition of the term 
'what is learnt' (Chomsky, 1965).
In diagram (1) the 'subject' of the enquiry is shown to be the 
interpreter, the 'object' of the enquiry is the person, and the 
'indirect object' for the interpreter is the person's study of his own 
properties. Starting from the other end, the properties of commodities 
of personhood, its observable values, are seen in their accumulative
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sense as belonging to the person. Traditional approaches to values 
education have stressed the importance of reified values, along the 
phenomenological dimensions of the institutions of society. Moral 
education is seen as presenting a model whereby these values may be 
acquired. Working upwards through the diagram, the person is seen as 
exploring the given field of values, and deciding which to accept for 
herself. (This is the model of Kohlberg, and others, who have organised 
the anticipated outcomes of their subjects' explorations into categories 
and classifications which reflect their own mental structures which 
operate in terms of 'end products’.) At the top of the tree is the 
interpreter, the puppeteer, watching the scenario before him and fitting 
it all into his own structures.
In diagram <3> the 'subject' of the enquiry is shown to be the 
interpreter, the 'object' of the enquiry is the interpreter's self, and 
the 'indirect object' for the interpreter is the object of the self's 
enquiry, the self's own self. Starting from the end is the same as 
starting from the beginning; the focus of the enquiry is the self in 
whichever one of its manifest forms is the present focus of the enquiry. 
The pattern is one of Chinese boxes, in which there is constant ebb and
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flow, change and re-direction, expansion and contraction. There is no 
beginning and no end, but simply a constant, ever-renewable process of 
development.
The approach at (1) accommodates the notion 'what is learnt' in its 
dependency on the assumptions inherent in traditions of the acquisition 
of habits. Personal and moral development is seen as an accumulation of 
the mores of a given society, with a view to turning out a given kind of 
person. The way to that personal and moral development is through a 
concentration on the knowledge and skills (know-that reinforced by 
'know-how') that will enable the person to live up to the image of the 
'certain kind of person'.
The approach at (3) accommodates the notion 'what is learnt' in the 
exploration by the self of the self.
First, the self acknowledges its own potential for change; this 
potential for change is a prerequisite for development, i.e. a moving 
forward to an improved situation from a previously unsatisfactory 
situation, in which values are denied in practice. (In the coming pages 
we shall see that the notion of values being denied in practice may be 
rephrased in an equivalent form by the notion of competence being 
prevented from emerging into performance. Both linguistic structures 
carry with them the notion of suppressed development.) The self then 
conducts its own enquiry into its own self. This enquiry embodies the
principles of change leading to development. The whorls and spirals of 
the action-reflection mode of enquiry (see below) allow a movement which
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is itself an expression of the notion 'what is learnt'. Personal and 
moral development is seen as a movement away from stasis to one of 
change and disequilibrium, in which formal, imposed structures are 
transformed into the self-transforming structures of dialectical 
metamorphosis.
It is to this latter notion that this chapter now addresses itself. It 
is my intention to review the literature of current theories of values 
acquisition and the application of those theories in current models of 
values education. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate that these 
theories play a part in the edycative process, in that they describe 
possible ways in which knowlege may be organised to meet a specified 
need. I also hope to demonstrate that such approaches to the concept 
'what is learnt' are powerless to provide explanations for individuals' 
development, in that the concept 'what is learnt' is not accommodated 
within their conceptual or methodological repertoire. The assumptions 
of theories of values acquistion which rest on the view of a 'certain 
kind of person' will draw on the methods of the social sciences to 
present descriptions of that certain kind of person who belongs to a 
certain kind of society. The assumptions of theories of values 
acquisition which rest on the view of 'person as coming-into-being' will 
draw on the methods of the reconstructive sciences to present 
explanations for the development (what is learnt) of that person, in 
which 'what is learnt' is the telos of the individual thinker to explore 
turther 'what is learnt' through the process of learning.
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The <for me) essentially reductionist view of the 'certain kind of 
person' of empiric approaches is counterbalanced in the society of 
researchers who adopt the generative view of the 'person as coming-to- 
be' by their discovery, through their own evolving practice, that the 
reductionist view is a more primitive expression of their own closed 
thought processes which they are now encouraging towards the maturity of 
open processes which are a hallmark, in both descriptive and explanatory 
terms, of their own developmental process of 'coming-to-be'.
In this chapter, I will attempt to explain why I feel that a dialectical 
form of being is a more mature state than one of formal structuralism. 
I will attempt to show that such a form of being is brought about 
through the reconstructive sciences, which are themselves grounded in a 
dialectical approach to the structure of knowledge. And I will attempt 
to show that my practice, which was centred on active teaching, and is 
now centred on active reflection, is a realisation in action of my 
educational values which are also grounded in a dialectical form of 
being.
I will aim to make these notions explicit in the coming pages. My first 
step in this direction is to present, in idealised form, my 
understanding of the nature of development towards maturity through the 
process of transformational generative dialectics.
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2 TOWARDS A CHARACTERISATION OF THE TRANSFORMATIONAL GENERATIVE NATURE 
OF DIALECTICS
Let me suggest that many personal enquiries begin with a sense of
vision. The origin of the enquiry lies in the vision of the enquirer 
which embodies her values. Values, in my view, are the latent knowledge 
of the enquirer which take the form of concepts, expressed in the
notional terms of "I believe that .. .M. The notion MI believe that ..." 
incorporates a propositional statement ' ... that all people are free* 
within a dialectical framework 'I believe ... ' in which the concept 'I• 
tsakes the form of a living, material object and the concept 'believe'
is a property of that living 'I' (see also Chapters 3 and 7).
The vision is of a satisfactory state. This satisfactory state is an 
expression of the realised values of the enquirer, in which statements 
of fact and statements of value blend in the same form, both linguistic 
and conceptual, in a homeostatic state. Thus the statement
"I believe that all children should have equal opportunities"
may be seen as an expressed value of the vision of the enquirer. The 
practice of the enquirer may not be within a location in which all 
children have equal opportunities, however, nor may it have such an 
expression; resulting in the statement of fact: "My children do not all
have equal opportunities". Statements of value are separated from 
statements of fact, and therefore form separate realms of discourse.
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The vision of the enquirer is of the day when the negation may be 
negated, and the situation transformed into one of homeostasis.
The separation of statements of value and statements of fact results in 
a denial of the enquirer's values in practice (Whitehead, 1979). This 
denial, itself an unsatisfactory state, causes a state of tension to 
exist in the mind of the enquirer. The sense of crisis occasioned by 
the lack of homeostasis causes her to want to act in order to restore 
the balance.
This sense of crisis is akin to that identified by Kuhn (1962) and 
which, according to his argument, results in a paradigm shift. He says 
that a sense of crisis in a degenerate paradigm generates sufficient 
tension within a scientific comunity to cause the shift, in which the 
new paradigm incorporates the old. This pattern may be applied here, 
where the sense of crisis in the personal enquirer generates the 
necessary tension that causes her to look for ways out of the dilemma. 
The strategies adopted, founded on the insights developed, allow her to 
change her ground, but her new ways embody the old. The old is not now 
dismissed; it is incorporated into the new.
In the initial stages of my enquiry I adopted the model put forward by 
Whitehead (1977) as a schedule to guide the process of my own action and 
reflection. I applied it to my practice in school, and I could then 
document my progress in a systematic fashion:
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'I experience a problem when some of my educational values are denied in 
my practice.' My children were hostile and rude, and did not want to 
learn. My educational values were that I believed they should be 
sensitive and humane, and should want to learn.
'I imagine a solution to my problem.' I explored the field to find some 
way whereby I could teach them to become sensitive and humane, and to 
persuade them to want to learn. I particularly explored the work of 
Leslie Button.
'I implement the solution.' I tried out a Button course.
'I evaluate the solution.' Within the scientific methods of peer, 
client and self validation (McNiff, 1988) I concluded and claimed that 
my children had made progress, in that they demonstrated in action, and 
I could point to recorded instances of that demonstration in action, 
that they had moved closer to an embodiment of the educational values 
that I and others had agreed constituted a living-in-practice of my 
educational values.
' I modify my ideas and practice in the light of the evaluation.' I 
reviewed constantly, changing tack as and when I saw the need to move 
the enquiry forward, in the sense of Collingwood (1939) that a series of 
'right' questions will result in a series of answers to prompt further 
thought and action.
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This action-reflection cycle helped me to follow my own development in a 
systematic way. It also helped me to record my children's development. 
I could claim that I had improved my own practice, and I could claim 
that I had helped them to improve theirs. I saw the 'modification' step 
as being closer to my vision than the initial 'problem' step.
I then experienced a sense of crisis in my applications of the model, 
which, in the view outlined above, generated sufficient tension in me to 
cause me to do something about it. I could see, in the Whitehead
model, that the mental structures that created the relational form were 
those of the dialectician. In its present form, however, it seemed not 
to account for the totality Df my whole class practice which was 
essentially random and spontaneous in nature. In its present form it 
concentrated on only one aspect of practice, that is, on a general 
framework for the malting explicit of a dialectical procedure of posing 
problems and suggesting answers. That framework and the action- 
ref lection cycle needed to be applied to my total practice.
My answer to my identified problem lay in my introduction of a 
generative component (McNiff, 1984) which allowed the model to act as 
the germ, in both form and content, for a system of re-cycling and re- 
application. What resulted was a three-dimensional spiral of spirals 
which allowed me to enter and leave the model at whichever point was 
appropriate for the issue at present under investigation (see Appendix 3 
for the 1984 paper).
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As I have moved on in my action and reflection over the years, I have 
come to understand the significance of the Whitehead model as a 
dialectical framework. I see this interpretation now as incorporating 
the notion of the self as 'subject' of the enquiry - 'I experience a 
problem when some of my educational values are denied in my practice'; 
as 'object' of the enquiry - 'I evaluate my actions'; and as the 
grounding of future decisions concerning practice - 'I modify my
practice in the light of the evaluation'. It incorporates the notions 
of contradiction, in that, at one and the same time, the self 
experiences a denial of its educational values and a wish to reverse the 
denial, to strive for a realisation in practice of those educational 
values. It incorporates the notion of this contradiction in the 
traditional notional terms of thesis (recognition of a problem), 
antithesis (disequilibrium brought about by the enquirer's sense of 
crisis), and synthesis (attempt to resolve the problem to the 
satisfactory state of homeostasis).
I now wish to move my present enquiry forward by focusing on this latter 
aspect; the dialectical procedure of an action-reflection enquiry, which 
cancels out an unsatisfactory state to give way to a more satisfactory 
one.
I now consider the question of traditional forms of dialectics as an 
epistemological procedure.
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First I will refer to the work of Comey (1952), who states: "The
movement of both the real world and rational thought follows an 
evolutionary pattern in which whatever is undeveloped and 
undifferentiated divides up, assuming opposing or contradictory forms 
and then becomes a concrete unity. The higher form in this evolutionary 
process is a realisation of what the lower form is intended to be; each 
higher stage contains all the preceding stages within it. The lower
form is 'negated' in the higher, since it is no longer what it was;
nevertheless it has been actively retained in the higher form." This 
notion formed the basis of Hegel's (1912) theory of contradiction, where 
"the thing passes from its contradictory state, to a reconciled, unified 
state".
I will suggest that, in the light of my practice, this traditional
notion of negation is not always conceptually valid, and that Adorno's 
(1973) notion of cancellation is often closer to the reality of life. I 
will also here attempt to show that my understanding of his work 
indicates that Riegel (1973) is in error when he maintains that the 
'antithesis' stage dismisses the practice of that stage; and that, 
following Kuhn's notion of new paradigms incorporating the old, the idea 
of Basseches (1984) that the 'antithesis' rather incorporate the old
paradigm as the basis for the new. I will also refer to the work of 
Chomsky (1968, 1982) and his notion of self-perpetuating, self-
transforming states, to explain what I see as a formulation for a 
transformational generative approach to the dialectics of practice.
I shall now attempt to clarify and make explicit:
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In his 1912 'Science of logic', Hegel supposed that the reality of the 
world was constantly changing, as were the thought processes that 
reconstructed the subject's perceptions of the world. Change, for Hegel, 
was accounted for by the law of contradiction. Hegel believed that each 
concept, as well as each aspect of the perceived world, existed 
alongside its contradictory form. As I understand his work, the process 
of development is seen in the movement towards a higher form of being by 
anything which is undeveloped. That which is at a primitive level
divides up, assumes a contradictory form, and synthesises itself in a 
higher form of being (Comey, op.cit.). Such an iterative process
depends on the notion of lower and higher forms for its existence, and 
the new form then immediately becomes the primitive level. Hegel's 
model carries within itself the idea of built-in obsolescence, in which 
the new form becomes immediately obsolescent at its nascence. Hovement 
is always towards an idealised higher form of evolution which in reality 
may not be realised until its present state of existence is pronounced 
satisfactory by human judgement.
The way in which movement was effected, in Hegel's view, was in the 
negation of the negation. As each new form degenerated into its instant 
obsolescence, so it was subsumed under the new, emergent form that would 
replace it. This new form was the synthesis of the previous 
contradictions in the old form. This process of evolution through
contradiction has often been referred to as the triad of thesis,
antithesis and synthesis.
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I will suggest that the idea of cancellation is more appropriate than 
negation (Adorno, op.cit.), where a thesis has to be cancelled out - 
i.e. reduced to a nul state - in order to make way for a new one. I 
will also introduce the expressions used by Chomsky (op.cit.) to express 
the notion of a developmental mechanism, and apply this system to help 
me in my understanding of dialectical movement. These combined aspects 
lead to a formulation that an initial steady state, SO (or fixed 
nucleus; see Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980), leads, in a conception of a 
physically finite world, to an ultimate steady state, SS. I am aware in 
putting forward this hypothesis that I seem to be suggesting an end 
state; but I will aim to show that it is an interim state of further 
development. I will attempt to show how this formal conceptualisation 
may be integrated into a holistic view of development as non-end-state.
My original formulation (First Version Chapter 3) held that an initial 
state SI was cancelled out S10 [zero). The resultant 'nul' state, which 
still incorporated the properties of the SI state, now made way for a 
new state, S2. I presented this model in the linear form of
S O -------------- > SI -------- V S10 -------------S2 .......
fs/0)
I now wish to refine and elaborate the model, in the light of the action 
and reflection that have taken place since its initial formulation.
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The initial formulation had a linear format, SI - Sn <SS). The linear 
conceptualisation is contrary to my inclination towards a dialectical 
form of being, as manifested in (a) my early adoption of the Whitehead 
model of reciprocal problem-posing and problem-solving as an action- 
ref lection plan for combating unsatisfactory elements of my practice; 
(b) my expansion of this model into an overall strategy for an 
improvement in practice, by introducing the generative component to 
allow for the action-reflection plan to be infinitely re-created; (c) my 
later adaption of the notion of dialectical processes as an improved, 
matured form of being. When I synthesise these diverse aspects, I am 
enabled to plot the developmental steps in the refinement of my initial 
model thus:
I apply the notion of SO - Sn to the Whitehead action-reflection model. 
I see that the initial steady state SO is reflected in the first phase 
of the action-reflection plan, which is the making explicit of an 
educational problem. Thus:
S0(i) 'I experience a problem when some of my educational values are 
denied in my practice.'
SO(ii) 'I imagine a solution to the problem.'
SO(iii) 'I implement the solution.'
S0<iv) 'I evaluate the solution.'
S0(v) 'I modify my ideas and practice in the light of the evaluation.'
The state itself (SO) is in this way in a change situation, SO(i-v).
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In my 1984 text I showed that my original linear representation was 
inadequate, and opted for a spiral. The linear representation of 
A —  H, in my present formulation now re-caste as SO —  Sn, reflects the 
cognitive structures of formal processes which assume a final end-state 
Sn. However, I have demonstrated in the practice of these pages that I 
do not hold with the notion of a final end-state. In my dialectical 
form of life (which includes my dialectical form of thinking) I believe 
that the only end state that suits me is one which requires an ever- 
developing openness of mind to all things new. Vithin the equilibrium 
is the notion of constant disequilibrium. Conversely, it is only 
through the process of self-regulating disequilibrium that equilibrium 
may be attained.
A more adequate representation than a line was a circle, indicating the 
notion of a return to a conceptual starting point. In the action- 
ref lection model, Whitehead demonstrates this conceptual return. 
However, my initial cricle, in turning in on itself, indicated no
progress. The end state 'E' was back at the beginning ’A’. I maintain 
that the traditional notion of thesis - antithesis - synthesis is often 
interpreted in this form, indicating a linearity that leads nowhere 




or leads to the context-free vacuum of T - A - S - ?. A spiral that has 
the potential to move beyond a defined end state Is a more appropriate 
representation of what happens in real life.
Thus, the potential for recreation of the action-reflection model is 
captured in the visual demonstration. The end-state of S(v) 'I modify 
my ideas and actions in the light of the evaluation' gives the ground 
for the new action-ref lection cycle, and also for a new spiral of the 
dialectic. SO becomes SI thus:
S.iO
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It is important at this stage to consider the difference between the 
concepts of 'negation' and 'cancellation'. In his theory, Hegel 
regarded the negation of the negation as leading to synthesis. The 
negation of a thing was its contradictory form. By passing over into 
its contradictory form and from there into a higher state of 
development, the thing overcame its own negation, leading to a negation 
of the negation. In the Whitehead model, step (1) of 'I experience a 
problem when some of my educational values are denied in my practice' is 
overcome when the experience of this negation passes over into its 
contradictory state of steps (ii) and (iii), when the imagined solution 
is implemented to bring about movement towards a satisfactory state. 
This movement is a negation of the negation. The assumption is not that 
the enquiry has reached an end state in which human judgement maintains 
that an ultimate satisfactory state has been achieved, in that all 
problems have now been solved. The reality is that there is gradual 
movement, in that each new state, SI, S2, S3, ... is nearer to the
vision of the enquirer.
This movement is one of cancellation and renewal. S3 is not a negation 
of S2; it is a cancellation. This means that each state is cancelled 
into a nul state which leaves the field clear for the creation of a new 
state. To return to the visual, the cancellation is one of form rather 
than substance, in that S2 (i, ii, iii, iv, v) is kept in its entirety 
as part of the history of S3; but the form of S3 is now different from 
that of S2 (otherwise it would still be S2). Thus the content of S3 has 
been brought about through the negation of the negation within the
processes of S2; but the form of S3 has been effected by the 
cancellation of S2. S3 is a different form of BEING.
Now, in order to explain the potential of an organism for ever-renewable 
forms of being <S4, S5, S6 ... ), it is necessary to return to the
notion of generative power.
In my 1984 text I was critical of methodological models that they were 
linear and did not allow for individual spontaneity and creativity. I 
suggested that it was necessary to build in a generative component that 
would allow for individual spontaneity and creativity, and, at the same 
time, afford the individual enquirer a systematic framework to explore 
this spontaneity and creativity; that is, provide herself with 
explanations for her own thought and actions. I can apply this notion 
of the importance of the generative component to the Whitehead model. I 
can also apply it to my notion of SI ... Sn. Thus,
(1) Whitehead's model: (v) results from a negation of the negation at
(i): (ii')
(2) Dialectical states of development: S2 results from the
cancellation of SI:
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(3) is given generative power. Sub-enquiries are accommodated, each 
following the dialectical approach of action-reflection. In this way, 
entry and exit are allowed at any stage, depending on the needs of the 
enquirer. Each action-reflection cycle may be treated as an enquiry in 
itself, or may be related back to the whole. The strands of the web are 
all interrelated and interdependent. They may function independently 
within a context-specific enquiry (in the model, notated as 
S2(i[i-vl)), but, in terms of the total life of the enquirer, S2 is 
part of SI and S3. In this way, the horizontal relationships of the 
present may be explained, as well as the vertical relationships of the 
past. Past practice (cancelled states) form the present; other aspects 
of practice (co-existent horizontal states) influence current practice. 
Ho aspect is fully separated from the other. The enquirer is an 
integrated person, and this model of her enquiry reflects the 
integration.
I have suggested repeatedly that a dialectical form of being is more 
mature than a formal one. By implication, dialectical structures 
encourage development, whereas formal structures encourage stasis. Let 
me explain these claims in the light of my previous thoughts and present 
practice.
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Labouvie-Vief (1980) Indicates tbat the type of reasoning needed by 
young people to build stable relationships and environments is well 
characterised by Piaget's conceptualisation of formal operations. Adult 
development is more to do with the pragmatics of accommodating formal 
operations to the realities of social pressures. I will suggest that 
this view is restrictive, for reasons which I shall exemplify shortly.
In her summary, Labouvie-Vief re-focuses the question of the aim of 
developmental psychologists, in saying: "It appears, therefore, that
life-span developmentalists have been misled, in part, by exclusively 
focusing on the question: 'What is the development of logic?' Instead, 
they need to return to the contrapuntal question which has provided an 
original motivation for Piaget: 'What is the logic of development?"'
I will approach this issue from two separate but related standpoints. 
The first standpoint is from the point of view expressed by Canguilhem 
(1980) (cited in Broughton, 1987), who says: "'What is psychology?'
becomes 'Vhat do psychologists hope to achieve, doing what they do?' In 
the name of VHAT have they set themselves up as psychologists? . . . 
Psychology is still based upon the duality, not that of factual 
consciousness and the norms entailed by the idea of man, but that of a 
mass of 'subjects' and a corporate elite of specialists equipped with a 
self-appointed mission." The second standpoint is that of Chomsky 
(1988). Referring to the work of Mehler and Bever (1987), he says: "If
[their] analysis is correct, what we are observing is not a series of 
stages of intellectual development, in Piaget's sense, but rather slow
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progress in bringing heuristic techniques into line with general
concepts that have always been present."
These thoughts lead me to think that the 'logic of development',
advocated by Labouvie-Vief as the proper business of psychologists, is 
part of the view critiqued by Canguilhem, in which a band of elitists 
impose their own mental structures on the world. I have already
indicated that this view is grounded in the interpreter, who sees 
himself and his thought as reified. The questions 'Vhat is the logic of 
development?' (Piaget/Labouvie-Vief), and 'Vhat are the norms entailed 
by the idea of man?' (Canguilhem) do not share a common focus 
(Collingwood, 1939). They therefore cannot be answered in terms of 
responses which share a common focus. The first assumes the reification 
of the interpreter and the dependence and subordination within the 
structures of the enquiry of the 'objects' (people whose development is 
being studied). The second assumes the interdependence of thinking 
people, and therefore the interdependence of the knower and the known, 
in which the 'object' of the enquiry is responsible for organising the 
structures of the enquiry.
Let me now turn to Chomsky's (1972) stand that the notion of stages is 
reductive and stultifying. He rejects the idea of developmental stages 
and suggests rather the development of the heuristics of cognitive
operations. Vhat is not developing, in Chomsky's view, is the process 
of conceptualisation. Vhat is developing is the ability to organise. I 
share this view. Based on my practice as a learner, a teacher, a 
thinker, what I have observed in myself is not a development of
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concepts. The potential for my concepts has always been there. I was 
born with the potential to refine those concepts through my experience 
of life. I was also born with the mental capacity for the organisation 
of those concepts into ways of thinking. I have experienced, and 
demonstrated, the application of my own heuristics in the tackling of 
educational problems through my class practice, and in the construction 
of the first version and of this text. I have moved from formal 
operations to dialectical operations. This has not been a development 
of concepts (the concepts were a property of the thinker throughout) but 
a development of the organisational capacity to refine and make those 
concepts explicit. This 'making explicit' operates at the level of 
mental operations (understanding and explaining) and at the level of 
actual operations (applying in real life).
I suggest that a stage-developmental model is a manifestation of the 
structures of thought of the interpreter who believes in end states. 
There is an ultimate, an absolute, in view. All things are aimed
towards the end. Human development is seen as aiming at this stage, and 
progress towards that state is seen in the formal terms of the model- 
maker, who believes that the persons of his model operate in the same 
way.
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I go on to suggest that this view of human development is immature. It 
operates in terms of the past. The overcoming of the past is seen as 
the end-state. Each stage is described and specified. There is no free 
will, no right to exercise creativity and spontaneity, no right to
refuse (see Beton's comment, in Buck-Morss, 1977) of "man's unlimited
capacity for refusal'). The individual is not free, but is an extension 
of the vision of the model-maker who likes to have things in his view of 
their place. Thus life may be seen as 'getting through' rather than as 
'living'.
A view of development, then, that stops at an end state is immature. It
builds in the concept of stunted growth. The introduction of the notion
of life-span development does not overcome the difficulty, either. Some 
thinkers in this vein (e.g. Levinson, 1968) demonstrate that, in their 
view, the cognitive operations manifested in adult life are the same as 
the final stage of cognitive operations achieved by adolescents - i.e. 
formal operational thinking. Adolescent cognitive processes simply seem 
to be extended into adult life. The downfall of the psychologists who 
think in this vein is that they are offering what appears to them as 
descriptions of other people's lives, rather than offering explantions 
for their own. Descriptions, as I have indicated repeatedly, are not 
explanations. Descriptions are the outcomes of the interpreter's 
notions about the way in which other people act, and are therefore 
operating at E-levels. In issues of epistemology, E-levels themselves 
are less mature than I-levels, and a study that rests at an E-level will 
inevitably have a restrictive view of its objects. If the format of the 
study then requires the objects to fit into its structures, the objects
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themselves will assume the properties of stunted growth. Any 
development that takes place in practice will be seen as exceptional, an 
aberration. Or the model-makers will twist the model to accommodate the 
reality of practice (Kohlberg's level 4te, for example, was introduced 
because people did not fit neatly into levels 4 or 5: Kohlberg, 1976).
I feel it is necessary to break with these dominant views of human 
development on at least two counts. The first is to break with the 
notion of a description of development which is characterised by stages 
which are assumed to have been brought into being by certain forms of 
thought (e.g. Piaget's stage of concrete operations; Kohlberg's stage of 
•good boy, good girl'). The second is to break with the notion of a 
development of cognitive processes per se, and to look towards a theory 
of the development of heuristic techniques (the notion of 'wanting to 
know; striving for mental freedom'). I shall explore these ideas later 
in this chapter.
Let me return to my stand about the immaturity of schemes that are 
arrested (and therefore arrest the growth of their subjects) at a 
certain level because that level is an 'end product' of the structures 
of the formal thought processes of the inventor. I would suggest that a 
dialectical form of thinking will cancel out this form (and 1 will 
attempt to show that the cancellation is part of this development of 
psychological theories along the lines of the present section which is 
dealing with the dialectics of development). Let us assume for a moment 
that there is life after formal operations. Let us further assume that 
that life is characterised by a dialectical form of being. This might
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suggest that we are tacking on yet another ’stage' that is marked 'Stage 
7: dialectical operations'. On the contrary. Dialectical thinking is 
not an end product in itself, but contains within itself the capacity to 
think freely. Basseches (1984) comments on this point: "While I am
reluctant to treat dialectical thinking as an end point of cognitive 
development (since positing a fixed end point would deny possibilities 
for further change and therefore be undialectical), I do claim that the 
capacity for dialectical thinking is an important aspect of cognitive 
maturity." Riegel (1973) characterises dialectical thinking as the 
•final stage of cognitive operations', not in the sense of 'here is 
another stage into which humans must fit' but in the sense 'here is a 
way of life and thinking, which is free, and which seems to represent 
some of the highest values of the human endeavour'. I will suggest that 
this way of thinking is more mature than the restrictive way of formal 
structures; for it opens the eyes to new experiences and "allows the 
instincts to blossom" (PL, AT26).
I will also now dwell on my belief that we are mistaken in looking only 
for patterns of cognitive development. I feel that this notion is 
another shibboleth imposed by formal thinkers in their attempts to 
impose formal structures on the world. Rather, what we ought to be 
doing is looking for ways to encourage heuristic capacities to develop. 
I believe that dialectical thinking is not something to be aimed at, in 
Riegel's sense, but is something that has always been there. I believe 
that humans are born as dialectical thinkers. What happens on their 
Journey through the institutions of life is that the capacity for 
dialectical forms of being is slowly crushed by the pressures of the
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institutions to conform to institutionalised expectations, and that 
natural forms of being are systematically distorted into other forms in 
line with the expectations of the model makers. For me, this is the 
cause of the alienation of the individual from himself. He loses touch 
with the reality of his own focus of being. The freedom of the 
dialectic, with all its seemingly untidy, crisis-laden turbulence of 
intense evolution; its desire to look for relationships, for 
disequilibrium, is eroded by a fearful world of people who have 
themsevles been forced into a defensive mode of life by the political 
thought-makers of organised institutions.
I am saying, then, that the capacity for dialectical thinking is a 
natural property of the human being, from birth to death. Theories of 
development that look for changes in cognitive processes are mistaken in 
their focus, for, in my view, they are not observing the development of 
the mental organisation of a world of phenomena, but rather the mental 
organisation of dealing with a world of phenomena. The two are worlds 
apart. The first is to do with the calssification of structures. The 
second is to do with heuristics and permutations of relationships. 
Approaches to making these interpretations inevitably vary. The 
approach that sees human development as an increasing sophistication in 
the classification of structures opts for formal operations, in which 
mental structures are imposed on the data. These are the E-levels of 
the formal structuralists and cognitive-developmentalists. The approach 
that sees human development as dexterity in heuristic techniques opts 
for a reconstruction (a making explicit) of the implicit, innate 
tendencies of the human being. This approach is grounded in the belief
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for human potential as a living, continuously evolving property of a 
living, continuously evolving person, which rejects the notion of end 
states and focuses on concentration of being. This is maturity. This 
is 'the development of autonomy' (HMI/DES, 1980) and 'developing as a 
person' (FEU, 1981). And it is the task of educators to help persons to 
develop, i.e. bring out that maturity, not in the sense of moving 
towards a higher stage, but in the sense of making explicit their 
innate, implicit properties of heuristic capacities (see also Chapter 
7).
*«»**««t««
So far I have concentrated largely on a description of dialectical 
forms. I have not explained fully how it is (in my view) that forms 
emerge, nor why. I have explored the E-levels of the discussion; now it 
is time to integrate those levels into the I-levels of explanation.
Kuhn says (see above) that a sense of crisis is generated in the thinker 
when an old paradigm no longer meets the identified needs of that 
thinker (or community of scientists, in Kuhn's realm of discourse). 
This crisis causes the thinker to look for new ways of tackling his 
problem. Over time, through the methods of iterative re-focusing, and 
adopting what was later to be known as a hypothetic-inductive approach 
(Medawar, 1969), the thinker comes to new forms of thinking which amount 
to a new paradigm. The new paradigm replaces the old, while still 
incorporating the aspects of the old which led to its new form. From a 
dialectical perspective, we may say that the new paradigm has negated
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the negations in the old paradigm that led to the crisis, and that the 
new state has cancelled out the old, allowing the new one to develop out 
of the old.
If I apply this to my interpretations so far, I can say that a sense of 
crisis is generated in my present forms of thought when I experience a 
denial of my educational values in my practice (Whitehead's action- 
reflection spiral). The sense of crisis prompts me to attempt to 
resolve the problem. I have within me the intuitive knowledge that my 
present practice (SO) has the potential to move toward an ultimate 
steady state (SS) in which my educational values are all realised in my 
practice, and all denials are resolved. My vision is realised, in which 
statements of fact and statements of value are Juxtaposed into the same 
realm of discourse. In the meantime, in the movement towards the Steady 
State, states move through their notional cycles of thesis, antithesis, 
synthesis, as demonstrated in Whitehead's action-reflection spiral, 
leading on to other spirals. The sense of crisis prompts the movement, 
in that crisis brings with it feelings of disequilibrium. Thus, if my 
present practice is characterised as SI, and I am aware of an 
unsatisfactory situation when some of my educational values are denied 
in my practice, this sense of dissatisfaction involves disequilibrium 
within SI. The spiral is set in motion, in which the action-reflection 
cycles moves nearer to a sense of resolution (homeostasis). In graphic 







state of current practice
sense of crisis when some of my educational values are not 
realised in practice. Disequilibrium sets in. Implement 
action-reflection cycle.
I imagine a solution to the problem. Deliberate 
encouragement of disequilibrium. Vision of possible negation 
of circumstances at S<i).
I action the solution. Total conflict and disequilibrium. 
Deliberate encouragement of change situation. Negation of 
the negation at S(i).
I evaluate the solution. Move towards synthesis. Move towards 
stability in the vision of a new state.
I modify my ideas and actions in the light of my evaluation.
New state about to emerge. Negation of the negation at S(i) 
now complete. Synthesis results in homeostasis. SO is now 
cancelled to make way for SI
Sl(i) Sense of crisis when some of my
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In this way I hope to demonstrate the dialectical notion of stability 
through contradiction. The stable states of SO, SI, S2 ... are unstable 
in two ways: first, their internal constitutions (i), <ii), <iii),
(iv), (v) are in a volatile state of crisis and movement towards
synthesis; second, there is constant movement in the process of SO, SI, 
S2, S3 ... Sn. The steady state (SS), in my present conceptualisation, 
has a double character: and here I readily admit that I have to think 
this issue through carefully in order to resolve the ambiguity in my 
conceptualisation. In one sense, SS is a vision, a dream, in which 
absolutes of value and absolutes of practice are realised together. As 
such, it exists in the idealised sense of a goal for human potential, 
not in the sense of an end state, but in the sense of a living, 
constantly evolving sense of mission which is part of the human 
endeavour. In another sense, SS is now, the present state of being that 
is better than the previous one, and therefore the best so far. I will 
refer back to Chapter 2, when I expressed how my view of Truth had 
altered over time, in that before, I had seen Truth as an absolute, 
whereas now I see Truth as resting in mutual agreements of material, 
living persons. In this way, SS is the present realisation of all 
factors which are focused on resolving the unsatisfactory elements of 
practice, and therefore the best situation which has been experienced so 
far.
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This explanation for movement towards maturity/self-fulfilment may be 
seen in the epistemological issues of my project. I have applied Kuhn's 
theory of the development of new paradigms to the movement documented in 
my class practice (Chapters 1 and 3). I have pointed to the movement of 
thought documented in First Version (Chapters 2 and 4). In the rest of 
this chapter I will attempt to show how I considered formal systems of 
values education as the basis for my class practice, and how I came to 
reject them as unsuited to my needs. I experienced a growing gulf 
between the form of my questions to do with my practice, and the form of 
the answers that were to be found in the literature. I will also 
endeavour to show how I was initially dependent on the propositions 
presented in the literature as a guide to my practice, and how such a 
form was inapplicable. I will show how I applied my action-ref lection 
scheme to the literature which resulted in my sense of crisis, and how I 
used this sense of crisis to help me look for other ways of tackling the 
problem. How I moved my own thought and practice forward now becomes 
the theme for the next pages.
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3 HOW IS KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES ACQUIRED?
I believe that there is a close relationship between the term 'values' 
and the notion 'what is learnt'(Jespersen, 1922; cited in Chomsky, 1965, 
1985), according to the following formulation: values are to do with
belief systems; belief systems are grounded in a pre-cognitive level of 
the mind; the notion 'what is learnt' expresses the interaction between 
innate potentials for learning and the environment. 'What is learnt' is 
an explanatory concept to account for the making explicit of the innate 
capacities for belief, i.e. the potentials of the organism to develop 
its innate qualities as a genotype to the levels of functional 
performance.
A normative interpretation of the term 'values' carries with it 
connotations of 'goodness'. Vakeman (1986) uses the term exclusively to 
refer to the notion of an improvement in the quality of life. In a more 
dispassionate sense, 'values' may be applied to negative as well as 
positive aspects of the human condition. I distinctly remember pulling 
a worm apart when I was five. I wanted to see how far it would stretch. 
My values as a curious but cruel child were no less 'values' than those 
I hold today, as an adult, of the sanctity of all life forms. The 
values of Pinochet's Chile are values, even though I do not hold with 
them.
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At present, the rightness or wrongness of values is not at issue. That 
will come later. I shall consider the standpoints of the relativists 
and pragmatists with regard to the use to which a knowledge of values is 
put (Chapter 7) and suggest, with Bernstein (1983) that it is time to 
move beyond relativity and objectivity. I shall also consider the use 
of the term 'education* as implying an improvement, and thus 
'educational values' as the underlying beliefs that will bring about an 
improvement in the educative situation. What is at issue in this 
chapter is the notion of what values are, so that we may move the 
enquiry forward in terms of finding ways in which they may be acquired.
A value, in my view, corresponds to the notion 'what is learnt'. This 
does not imply that learning is a matter of habit formation, in line 
with the dominant assumption in the literature that learning mechanisms 
in general operate on the basis of habit formation. I vigorously reject 
that idea. The notion 'what is learnt' refers to the mechanisms of the 
mind/brain, whereby intuitive, innate matters of conceptual substance, 
interacting with the influences of the environment, are organised into 
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environment
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'Vhat is learnt* is not the assimilation by the organism of external 
information. 'Vhat is learnt' is a notion applicable only to the
individual's subjective experience. In my sentences describing my 
practice I may produce such utterances as: "Let me tell you what my
pupils learned today" or "I will tell you what I learned today". If I 
wish to use the phrase 'what is learnt' I must change the focus of my 
linguistic structures, to produce speech acts such as: "I will try to
explain what is learnt by children when they engage in dramatic 
activities". I am here referring to the mental operations of the
children, in their ability to build theories. 'Vhat is learnt' refers 
to the deep-structure concept of values, organised through the capacity 
to build theories, or ways of looking at themselves and the world.
There is a gap here, however, in the literature. I agree with Baldwin
(1967) when he says: "In psychology, theory building itself is an
activity that the theories should explain. ... Theories of human 
behaviour and development have not been well designed." By implication, 
the notion 'what is learnt' needs explaining before any descriptions of 
overt behaviour are attempted.
It is precisely this notion that dominant theories of development vault 
(see Macbeth's comment on 'O'erweening ambition that o'ervaults itself 
and lands on the other side'). Dominant theories of development seem 
concerned to describe the mechanisms of development without accounting 
for those mechanisms, i.e. explaining why they do as they do. They 
describe learning in operational terms without accounting for the notion 
'what is learnt’.
( 403 )
For me, this is the most interesting issue, and one which has come to be 
the focus of my present practice. For I originally wanted to find out 
if my children would do as I wanted them to do, by falling into line 
with my preconceived notions of 'personal development', as an outcome of 
personal and social education. Then I wanted to find out why they were
prepared to do so. I then wondered what the mental operations were that
enabled them to accept certain things and reject others. From there it 
was a short step to wonder why I wanted to know why they wanted to know. 
Throughout, there is an increasing emphasis on explanations - not only 
explanations of ontology ('Why does this thing work as it does?') but 
also explanations of epistemology ('How do I know why this thing works 
as it does?')
I believe that ontological explanations contain the substance of 
dialectics. Explanations that focus on the workings of a thing aim to 
see its internal workings and Justification for those workings. In the 
question 'Why does this thing work as it does?' answers will be sought 
that see relationships along horizontal and vertical dimensions, which 
have come into being through the process of generative transformations 
thus: "The thing works because A is related to B in its present form,
as it was related to A(-l) and B(-l) in its historical form, and the 
relationships are characterised as the evolving, self-transforming acts 
of the mind/brain involved in bringing the connections to a surface
level. The notion 'How do I know why this thing works as it does?'
involves the relationships of the knower, in her present and historical 
form as a relational being in the question 'How do I know ...' with the 
object of the enquiry, in its present and historical relationships as
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'what is known'. 'Vhat is known' is the realisation as a final state of 
[Sl(v), S2(v)3 of the process of action research which characterises the 
transformations of the process involved in 'what is learnt'.
In this presentation, it is probably clear that I do not accept theories 
that take as a starting point the assumption that learning is a result 
of habit formation. This assumption permeates virtually the whole body 
of literature on the theory of educational psychology. The premises of 
habit formation rest on principles of absorption and assimilation, both 
of which, I feel, are not part of the developmental mechanisms of a 
knowing subject. Habit formation is an accretive act that has nothing 
to do with the personal knowledge of the knowing subject. The whole 
notion operates on the 'plaster sticking' principle. If I put plaster 
on a wall, some will stick and some will fall off. The bits that stick 
will add up. The plaster skin has nothing to do with the original wall, 
and does not change its internal character. The change that has come 
about is in me, the plasterer, in my perceptions of what I believe is 
now a new wall, but which is, in fact, a thin covering that could 
eventually fall off.
I believe that the makers of the theories of habit formation do not see 
the wall for the plaster. The overwhelming assumption that the skin 
formed (the formation of new habits) alters the internal character of 
the wall denies the nature of the person who supposedly forms the habits 
as a thinking, knowing form of life that is in a constant state of 
evolution. The notion of habit formation is a quick, convenient label 
used by formal thinkers who see the world in terms of their own mental
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structures. 'Habit formation' is a label applied to the mechanisms of 
personality which, in my view, have nothing to do with assimilation by a 
knowing subject of aspects of the environment, but attempt, in a crude 
way, to make some sense out of the ability of the knowing subject to 
organise and select aspects of her experience of the external world.
It is probably evident from this project that I very much admire the 
work of Chomsky. I do not accept everything that he says, as in, for 
example, Piattelli-Palmarini (1980) when Chosmky suggests that the 
language ability is a separate organ of the body, such as heart, lungs, 
liver. Even his great supporter Jerry Fodor parted company with Chomsky 
on that issue; and I wondered as I read the text whether Chomsky were 
not deliberately provoking the combatants at the convocation, especially 
Putnam. I also do not join his band of supporters in his adherence to 
structuralism; but, in all fairness, he has stated on several occasions 
(1965, 1986) that he is not so much concerned with the pragmatics of
communication between persons so much as with accounting for the mental
operations that allow the individual to form a universal grammar that 
will enable him to form an infinite number of grammatically correct 
novel utterances in any given language.
In the 1950s, Chomsky found himself in an intellectual world bedevilled 
by structuralist theories of language learning and language acquistion.
’ . jke die-hard school of
Bloomfieldian structuralists, as the dominant paradigm , maintained that
language acquisition was a matter of habit formation. Chomsky rejected 
this notion in his 1957 'Syntactic structures' in which he postulated
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his original hypothesis of the innate qualities of mind as accounting 
for an ability to generate unlimited quantities of well-formed strings. 
By 1986 his thinking had advanced considerably, but the original 
premises and models stayed substantially the same. In 'Language and 
mind' (1968), Chomsky poses what he calls 'Plato's problem' (see 
beginning of this Part) in which the problem of poverty of stimulus is 
presented. Given so little data, how is the individual able to generate 
an infinite quantity of well-formed utterances? The basis can hardly be 
a matter of habit formation, argues Chomsky, but more a matter of 
uncovering pre-conceptual rules of language in the mind of the speaker 
that will enable him to use the language. For every situation which
involves the use of language, each new speech act will have to be 're­
invented' , for no two speech acts are identical in all linguistic forms, 
nor are any two situations identical which prompt the selection of that 
particular speech act. The task of the researcher of linguistics, says 
Chosmky, is to discover more about the rules-system governing the
generation of the language. Habermas, taking many of Chosmky*s theories 
on board, expands the field to require researchers to account for the 
rules governing communication, which involves Chomsky's area of 
interest. Chomsky's interest in the structures of language which are 
inherent in the mind of the speaker is incorporated into Habermas' s
interest in the structures of communication which are an expression of 
the inherent qualities of people as dialogical beings.
( b07 )
Throughout my own project I have seen Chomsky's ideas as eminently 
applicable to my own area of interest in the acquisition of values. I 
have in this section rejected the notion of habit formation on the same 
several grounds. Given that no two social situations are ever identical 
(see the quote from Lorenz, Chapter 2 of this text), the fallacy of the 
inductivist philosophy is exposed. Given the scarcity of data in human 
systems of communication, the nonsense of imitation as the basis for
original acts is exposed. Given the infinite potential of the human 
mind to generate an unlimited set of individual original responses to 
any one situation, the unlikelihood of externally imposed rule systems 
as governing individual behaviour is exposed.
If I apply these generalised notions to my area of interest in the
acquisition of values, I run into difficulties with dominant
assumptions. I feel isolated, but not intimidated, and while I will not
Insist that I am right, I will strongly suggest that this contribution 
throws light on the issues from another angle.
Let me make haste slowly, and consider the assumptions of the dominant 
paradigms. I will also attempt to show how I originally accepted those 
assumptions unquestioningly; and how and why I broke away and developed 
ideas of my own that contained more appropriate questions and answers 
that were being revealed by my practice.
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4 ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT VALUES ACQUISITION (MORAL DEVELOPMENT).
Chapter 5 of this text was concerned with what constitutes a knowledge 
of human values: that is, what is the subject matter of the field to do 
with values. In educational matters, we saw that the areas of concern 
were labelled variously as 'values education', 'personal and social 
education', 'moral education', and so on. An attempt to deal with 
descriptions and explanations often results in the literature as 
definitions of values education. There are chapters named variously 
'Vhat is moral education?' (Downie and Kelly, 1978); 'Vhat morality is' 
(Vilson, 1987; 'Introduction to moral development' (Hersch, Paolitto, 
Reimer, 1979). There seem to be two assumptions here in the minds of 
such writers: the first is to do with the need for definitions, and the 
second is to do with the nature of values education.
The first assumption reflects the need of writers to start off from a 
firm, specific base, in which clear answers are given about the nature 
of values/moral education. I have already suggested that such an 
approach reflects the attitude of the writer who believes in end 
products. Presumably, if a writer gives a clear definition of what 
values/moral education IS, his reader will have a good foundation for 
future thought and action. His practice in school wil be geared towards 
producing young people who will fulfil the procedural criteria for 
continuing that acknowledged system of values/moral education; and 
presumably continue the tradition of proposing definitions for what 
values/moral education IS.
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The second assumption reflects the view that values/moral education is 
to do with 'right living'. The writer has a certain notion about what 
characterises a 'moral form of life', and moral education is there to
help the person achieve that form of life.
I have on several occasions pointed to the variation of terminology in 
the literature, and my situation is made even more confusing when I 
attempt to turn the common nouns of 'values education, moral education, 
personal and social education, values clarification, etc.' into an 
adjective that describes the sort of education dealing with values 
acquisition. For I am left, and so are the vast majority of writers of 
current literature, with the term 'moral education'. Some boohs on
personal and social education (e.g. Pring, 1984) refer to a child being
'personally and socially educated', which in turn makes them explore the 
term 'education'. Most conclusions point to the interpretation of 
'education' as a means to bring about 'right living', and we are caught 
up in the recurrent conceptual circle.
When it comes to the question of this chapter - ' How is knowledge of 
human values acquired?' - the answer to be found in the current 
literature is couched in terms of moral growth and moral development, 
and the procedures whereby this development is brought about are found 
in theories of educational development. It seems that the popular view 
of writers on the constitution of morality and the acquisition of 
morality is that for the first we need to consult the philosophers, and 
for the second we need to consult the psychologists. The first area, of 
the constitution of morality, seems to rest its case in the knowledge of
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the philosophers who can make pronouncements about what morality IS. 
The second area looks to the educational psychologists to provide 
answers on ways in which morality develops. A third area focuses on 
providing teachers with 'the knowledge' to apply the findings of the 
philosophers and psychologists (e.g. Hirst, 1974; Marland, 1974); and 
such books are adopted widely as initial and in-service resources to 
show the skills of teachers to help children 'become moral'.
This procedure is representative of a 'closed shop’ mentality that 
strives to keep its own mores intact by imposing doctrines on its 
personnel that will make them conform to the expectations of that closed 
shop, and produce the 'certain kind of person'.
In Chapters 1 and 3 of this text I have tried to show how my practice 
changed in line with my developing understandings of the nature of 
personal and social education. In this section I now wish to indicate 
how the thinking was itself affected by those understandings; that is,
how my own values underwent a gradual metamorphosis through my
reflection on my practice.
When I first undertook my study in 1981, I thought that behaviour was 
brought about through habit formation. Habits were formed through the 
exposure of the subject to the environment which embodied the values 
which were the mores of the ruling society. I accepted that my Job was
to uphold the values of the society in which I found myself, both as a
citizen of the UK, and as a deputy headmistress; in short, I was to 
produce the 'certain kind of person'. In this, I went along with the
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assumptions of the literature, e.g. Hamblin (1981), Lewis and Mee
(1981), Baldwin, (1979). These assumptions were grounded in a 
philosophical tradition that accepted reified rules as the correct basis 
for living, and assumed that the task of education was to enforce the 
rules. This last point needs some clarification:
Much of the literature of moral philosophy shows that there is a 
distinction between moral dispositions and moral reasoning. Pring 
(1984) explains: "First, the connecting link bewtween what reason says
I should do and what I do in fact do must lie in some feeling or 
disposition to act according to practical reason. There must be some 
sense of obligation, of duty. Secondly, however, this approach to moral 
development - the concentration upon reasoning and obligation - might 
seem rather one-sided, omitting reference, as it does, to the range of 
feelings which are part of the moral life.
"At the beginning of 'The Republic', Thrasymachus asks Socrates, why be 
moral? It is a 'Catch 22' question. If one gives a moral answer for 
being moral, then the question is begged. If one gives a non-moral 
answer for being moral (such as moral people generally propser), then 
the subsequent 'moral' behaviour is no longer moral - it simply has the 
appearance of morality. The point is that, in the absence of a certain 
inclination to take moral considerations seriously, moral reasons will 
not be reasons for ACTION." (Pring, 1984).
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This schism between a view of persons who naturally act morally, and 
those who act morally out of a sense of duty is, in my view, 
instrumentalist, and one that is a favourite grounding for much of the 
literature of the social sciences. It points to the duality of knower 
and known; to a view of persons as divided selves, where one section has 
a sense of moral obligation which another section does not necessarily 
want to adopt; to a theory of action that is geared towards end states - 
all reflections of an approach to knowledge that denies change and 
adaptability.
The view is synthesised in the literature of moral reasoning in the 'is- 
ought ' dilemma. Kant's views, for example, tell us that a sense of 
duty is a significant factor in the morally developed person. It is not 
so crucial that he is not naturally a moral person: what matters is that 
he acts upon his sense of duty to act morally - that is, to employ his 
rationality to cultivate his moral dispositions.
The 'is-ought' dilemma has two foci of attention. The first is that 
there is a certain standard (end state) to be achieved, that which OUGHT 
to be. This OUGHT is the embodiment of a philosophical view (a view of 
individual philosophers who think in a certain way); an embodiment of 
philosophers' values. A number of these philosophers see the embodiment 
of their values as a reflection of divine will or of socially desirable 
higher principles (e.g. Moses's Ten Commandments; Kant's 'Golden Rule'; 
Plato's 'Orthe doxe'; Rousseau's 'First nature': Aristotle's
’Contemplative life').
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The second focus is that there is a human condition which has a form of 
existence separate from the values adopted by the philosophers. This 
condition should be brought into line with the expressed values, and the 
way to do that is through a formation of character by external forces 
(e.g. teachers). Nowell-Smith (1954: cited in Peters, 1981) sums up the 
situation: "Pleasure and pain, reward and punishment, are the rudders
by means of which moral character is moulded; and 'moral character' is 
Just that set of dispositions that can be moulded by this means." 
Peters himself, however, points to the difficulties in this view of 
imposing 'oughts' on present 'is's’. "Moral education is a matter of 
initiating others into traditions and into procedures for revising and 
applying them; these come to be taken as habits of mind. It is also a 
matter of spreading the contagion of sympathy and imagination so that 
such traditions bite on behaviour. But I think that we have little 
established knowledge about the crucial conditions which favours the 
Initiation into this distinctive form of life." (Peters, 1981).
The philosophy that see 'oughts' as reified end states of the human 
condition is well presented by Hare (1952) who formulates the 
epistemologies involved in the development of moral reasoning in terms 
of universality and prescriptivism. He surmises that an end state of 
right living according to agreed higher principles is the ultimate goal 
of life, and that that goal may be made available to all individuals, 
through the proper conditions of an educative environment. Straughan
(1982) characterises Hare's position thus: (1) the moral educator must
show that he is personally trying to live up to his principles; (2) 
children must be shown that moral judgements are not statements of fact
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to be learnt, but choices of principles to be made, leading to a 
particular way of life; (3) if we agree the principle of universality, 
children must learn how to put themselves in other people's shoes; (4) 
if universality means that the individual may not take his own self- 
interests as primary, he must learn to love his fellow man and treat his 
interests as of equal weight as his own.
The way to achieve the IS from the OUGHT - that is, to transform 
statements of value into statements of fact - is through rule following. 
The prescriptivism and universality of Hare may be seen throughout the 
rule systems of moral philosophy. The 'knowledge-that' of the content 
of morality is achieved through the 'knowledge-how' involved in 
following prescribed rules. Perhaps the clearest formulation of the 
notion of rules as guiding moral reasoning and action is seen in the 
work of Kant, who saw rules as "innate moulds into which specific 
experiences are fitted" (Peters, 1981).
As I have indicated in Chapter 1, my practice was based on the idea of 
rules as the basis of social evolution, and habit formation as the way 
to internalise the rules. In Chapter 3 I indicated that, by 1983, I 
became aware of much slippage between my belief in the respect I should 
be affording to my children as autonomous, independent thinkers, and a 
view of them and myself as servants of the system. Yet, even at this 
time, I still saw personal and social education in an ends-means light. 
My concept of 'person' was still interpreted as 'a certain kind of 
person'.
( )
I have indicated that, during my secondment to the Teachers' Centre 
(1982-83) I saw relevance to my work of Chomsky's notions of competence 
and performance, and I became interested in the work of John Wilson and 
the Farmington Trust. Through my study of their work I saw that my 
blind adherence to the notion of blind adherence to rules was in error; 
my own capacity for free thought was limited, and my perception of 
people as persons was prejudiced. I began to become critical of my own 
thought processes, which enabled me to stand outside myself and account 
for my own practice.
One of the triggers for the beginning of the shift was in Wilson's 
characterisation of the morally educated person. He identifies the 
'features of morality', and presents these features as desirable end 
states: "the analysis of the components of moral education in this way
provides a useful check-list and might be useful objectives for teaching 
purposes" (Pring, 1984). Wilson stresses the need for rationality. If 
we act in a moral fashion, he says, our actions are meaningless unless 
we really intend them to be moral. For example, I may look after an
aged neighbour, and my actions would be termed honourable. If I were 
doing this only in the hopes that she would leave me her property in her 
will, my morality is anulled. For Wilson, rationality is the override 
that qualifies actions as moral.
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I applied this idea to the work of Chomsky, and decided to adopt his 
notions of competence and performance in my attempts to understand my 
own practice. I saw 'performance' as related to Wilson's idea of 
rationality. I saw also relationships with Freud's 'super-ego', but I 
never articulated this aspect. The model I produced (MclTiff, 1986) took 
'competence' as the area of emotions (Wilson's regard and respect) and 
applied the faculty of critical appraisal in bringing those emotions to 
the surface (performance). As time has gone on, I have extended this 
view (see later in this chapter) to account for the production of moral 
actions at a surface level by the application of dialectical 
transformations of the material at competence, deep level. The model 
helps me also in my understanding of the 'content' of morality, or 
values acquistion, in that I now have a basis for the reconstruction in 
practice of the innate faculties, including the emotions, at competence 
level.
My extended reading uncovered for me traditions of thought which 
stressed the need for the temperance of rationality to blind rule 
following. I came to realise that my previous practice had been aimed 
at training the children rather than educating them, and this in turn 
expanded my understanding of the nature of morality and moral education. 
Peters (1986) points this out: "'trained' suggests the development and
competence in a limited skill or mode of thought, whereas 'educated' 
suggests a linkage with a wider system of beliefs." I found myself 
engaging in processes of education (see Chapter 3). What I was not 
aware of was the process of self-education that was also taking place. 
I simply felt a general feeling of malaise; I was aware of a future
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opening up, of being on a threshold. I did not see the future clearly, 
nor could I explain the feeling of intense excitement I felt at the 
prospect. I rationalise it today by suggesting that what I was seeing 
was not the future but the present; that I was engaging in now, and that 
my perspective was changing from now as legacy of the past to now as 
harbinger of the future.
I have indicated in Chapter 3 how I tried to develop strategies that 
were aimed at leading out the children's own understandings of 
themselves. My questions moved towards open endings. When I read 
Schutz's 'Phenomenology of the social world' (1972), I was struck by 
Valsh's introductory remarks about Dilthey, and this work became 
relevant; "By interpreting this outward expression tof the individual's 
inner life] in terms of what lies behind it, we come to understand 
(verstehen) others. We do this by reconstituting our own inner 
experience 'in’ the other person by 'reading' him. Understanding is 
therefore a 'rediscovery of the I in the Thou'. ... This insight into
others is, therefore, the paradigm, so to speak, of the knowledge that
is proper to the social sciences." (Walsh, in Schutz, 1972).
I grew to understand the difference between techne and praxis. 
Conversations with colleagues at the University inspired me to read and 
think about these issues. I deliberately adopted the Whitehead action- 
reflection spiral as a guide to my own thinking and action. I could see 
the development of my own practice towards praxis. This manifested 
itself in the more 'open' style of my classroom and of my dealings with
the children in general in school, and of the divergence that was
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setting in in my thinking; and, in consequence, my rejection of the 
political strictures imposed on me by institutionalised expectations. 
My way of thinking moved away from formal structures of thought to 
hermeneutic theories, and their implications of rapid shifts in 
perspective to accommodate the flexibility necessary for an interpretive 
mode of being. I believe that here I began to move towards a solution 
of Peters's problem about rational methods of teaching rationality:-
In his 1981 'Moral development and moral education', Peters poses the 
problem: "Given that it is thought desirable that children should
develop an autonomous form of morality, and given that, if Piaget and 
Kohlberg are right, they cannot, in their early years, learn in a way 
that presupposes such an autonomous form, how can a basic content for 
morality be provided that gives them a firm basis for moral behaviour 
without impeding the development of a rational form of it? What non- 
rational methods of teaching aid, or at least do not impede, the 
development of rationality?"
Mow, I have much to say about Peters's problem: to say why it is a 
problem, and not just one, but several problems; to look to the 
assumptions inherent in the traditions of thought exhibited here; and to 
suggest ways in which I am moving towards answers to similar problems in 
my own way.
( 419 )
First, I do not accept that Piaget and Kohlberg are 'right1. I do not 
accept that anyone is 'right', but that we all have a contribution to 
make in our own interpretation of the situations within our own context- 
specific frameworks. This has come to be a moral tenet for me, that I 
may make prepositional statements on the understanding that I do so from 
the dialectical stand that prefaces my proposition in the notional terms 
' I believe ... '; and that I as a dialectical person agree to set up a 
dialogue with others that will engage in mutually constituted agreements 
about the appropriateness of the form and substance of our questions and 
answers (see Chapter 3). Further to Peters's apology (see above) for 
Piaget and Kohlberg, I do not accept that Piaget and Kohlberg were 
asking questions that were appropriate to a study which was conducted 
within a dialectical framework. The questions and answers of Piaget and 
Kohlberg are grounded in formal, structuralist epistemologles which 
operate in terms of end states, as seen in their love of definitive, 
delimited stages, characterised in transitional terms, all heading 
towards one final stage - a stage to end all stages - which then had to 
serve the person for the rest of his life.
Second, I do not accept Peters's inclination for a "firm basis for moral 
behaviour" that is presumably shaped by a "rational form". This view is 
again symptomatic of a structuralist way of thinking, that sees 
development in terms of accretion, in line with my 'plaster sticking 
principle'. It is somehow supposed that rationality will be tacked on 
somewhere. This is also in line with Wilson's view of an idealised 
process of moral education: "We might be tempted to say that we can
divide the task of moral education into two parts. First we should
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educate people so as to give them the skills, abilities and knowledge 
required for moral decisions: ... and then we should 'give them the
motivation' to put these into practice" <Vilson et al, 1967; see also my 
1986).
Third, I must consider Peters's question of whether "non-rational 
methods of teaching" will aid the development of rationality. Is Peters 
here saying that, in order to develop rationality we must teach in a 
non-rational manner? Is he implying in a circuitous way that a field of 
study to do with organising the emotions is taught through the emotions? 
- or that teachers should develop styles that are grounded in affective 
zones rather than cognitive? He seems to be falling into the way of 
thinking critiqued by Stenhouse (1975) that we teach people to jump 
higher by setting the bar higher.
To continue with the development of my interpretive faculties during my 
school practice, I actively looked for ways to teach the rationality to 
go with the emotions, as Wilson said. I later came to understand the 
formal thought processes that caused me to proceed like this: the
assumption that 'rationality' was another brick to be added to the 
edifice of the human being. My present best thinking (see below) tells 
me that the notional distinctive features of 'rationality' may be 
characterised in terms of the relationships operating between surface 
and deep levels, transformational relationships which enable aspects of 
competence (emotions, feelings, values) to be realised through the 
conative aspects of will and determination into aspects of performance 
(cognitive manifestations). I had been groping towards this thinking
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since the original application of Chomsky's 'competence' and 
'performance' to my interpretations of personal and social education. 
How, with my search for ways to teach rationality, which in turn was 
encouraging my own critical faculties to emerge (Chapter 3), I was 
seeing the relevance of these thoughts to my awareness of a new way of 
thinking and being.
I now became much interested in the different interpretations put on 
personal development, and the different ways of explaining this 
development. My areas of enquiry so far had been grounded in the 
propositions of the literature about moral development. Mow I came to 
be critical of the blanket view that says reified moral values are part 
of the traditions of a given society, and that they are acquired by the 
person's being in that society (habit formation). I had grown beyond 
these descriptions. I now wanted explanations for my children's 
development and for my own. So I turned to the literature of 
developmental psychology; and there found equally solid walls of the 
traditions of formal thinking that provided no answers, but only more 
questions.
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(i) Assumptions of the literature of developmental psychology
First I studied the work of the two giants of cognitive developmental 
psychology, Piaget and Kohlberg. I was instinctively ill at ease with 
the assumptions inherent in theories of stage development. Then I 
turned to the work of the humanist psychologists, Rogers and Maslow. I 
found myself infintely more in sympathy with their views, but still 
caught in the trap of stage development. I became familiar with the 
work of Polanyi, and was much influenced by his ideas. The influence of 
my hero Chomsky was always in the background, and I saw affinities 
between his views and those of the critical theories of Broughton. I 
went on to read the work of Riegel, and many things fell into place in 
my mind. I need to read the work of Habermas much more closely, for I 
see many applications of his work to my own.
I will here attempt to show how I moved my ideas from a focus on stage 
development, which is grounded in the social sciences, to generative 




I wish here to Investigate some of the main features that are identified 
in stage developmental theories, and to show how I originally tried to 
fit my practice to the theory, but then came to abandon such theories as 
inadequate to offer explanations for my practice.
"If Piaget and Kohlberg are right" (Peters, op.cit.) there is a final 
stage of human development. This final stage may be characterised by 
specific criteria. Piaget's Stage 6, Formal Operational Thought, lasts 
from about age 11 through adulthood. This stage involves the ability of 
the person to perform operations on operations, and "the construction of 
all possible combinations of relationships, systematic isolation of 
variables, and deductive hypothesis testing" (Kohlberg, in Scharf, 
1978), All other stages may be similarly characterised by a description 
of their distinctive features. A successful 'completion' of each stage 
will move the subject on to a higher one. It is not possible to move to 
a higher stage without going through the preliminary one. Attainment of 
a logical stage is necessary for attainment of the parallel moral stage.
In Kohlberg's Stage 6, the Universal Ethical Principle Orientation, 
"Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self­
chosen ETHICAL PRINCIPLES appealing to logical comprehensiveness, 
universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and 
ethical (Golden Rule, the Categorical Imperative); they are not 
concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are 
universal principles of JUSTICE, of the RECIPROCITY and EQUALITY of
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human RIGHTS, of the respect for the dignity of human beings as
INDIVIDUAL PERSONS" (Kohlberg, op.cit.; his italics). The same comments 
apply to Kohlberg as to Piaget about the sequentiality of stages, and
the need for the subject to proceed systematically up the ladder in
order to achieve success.
Pring (1984) comments on the features of development in such schemas 
(see also Selman, 1976; Loevinger, 1976: see below; Rogers, 1961: see
below).
"The features of development ... are:
(i) it can be broken up into DISTINCT STAGES;
(ii> each stage demonstrates a QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT MODE OF
FUNCTIONING;
(iii) each stage is a STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF A PREVIOUS STAGE - 
it re-structures in a more adequate way the previous mode of 
operating;
(iv) THE STAGE SEQUENCE IS IRREVERSIBLE, the earlier stages 
necessarily preceding the later one;
(v) the process of development can stop at any stage (thus we talk
of stunted growth).
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"What are transformed stage by stage in personal development are those 
characteristics of 'personhood' that I picked out ... namely the ways in 
which one thinks, feels, and behaves in a meaningful and responsible 
way. It is the capacity to see things, to reflect upon them, to form 
judgements, to relate to others, and to behave accordingly which is 
transformed in a qualitative way. Of course, different children will 
learn different ideas, habits, beliefs and skills, but the way in which 
they will learn will be 'structured' according to the stage of 
development they are at. Whatever the differences in CONTENT of what 
children learn, there will be similarities in the FORMAL ORGANISATION 
of this content. These concepts of 'structure' and a 'transformation of 
structure' and the distinction between 'form' and 'content' are vital 
for understanding development in the sense we shall be considering" 
(Pring, 1984).
Now, it seems to me that the idea of stage development as presented so 
far carries with it several assumptions, assumptions that I have not 
found realised in my practice both as a teacher and as a thinker. The 
assumptions are that:
\
1. Everyone is the same in developmental terms. It is assumed that 
people will, more or less, proceed at the same pace. If some capacities 
appear not to be developed, we speak of ' stunted growth' . The term 
'stunted growth' itself is a concept applied as a shorthand term by some 
of the educational psychologist I have met to explain the presence or 
absence of phenomena for which there appear to be no other explanations. 
'Growth' is assumed to be within the normally accepted dimensions of
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linearity and sequentiality, and refers to what is observable by an 
external observer. 'Growth' is the notional movement between notional 
stages: an abstract concept.
2. The model is reified. There is no in-built laterality to
accommodate individual differences.
3. Less powerful stages develop into more powerful stages. Fodor (in
Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980) attacks this notion vigorously, pointing out 
that a notional stage that is presented in descriptive terms only has 
not the power to produce a more powerful stage. (But see Polanyi, 1969, 
for the concept of irreducible structure.)
4. There is a final end state. Beyond this, no progress is envisioned.
5. The stages presented are prescriptive and universally applicable. 
Harris (1982) has pointed out that Piaget's theory is grounded in the 
socio-economic cultures of the Western world, and, if applied to 
children of the Third World, reveals that most of those children are 
retarded according to the norms of his stages.
6. The concept of stage development was invented by persons who have 
not shown its applicability to their own development as thinking
persons. The idea of stages is not an extension of their own
explanation for their own development, but an extension of their own 
thought structures that see themselves as external to others.
Taken all together, these assumptions allow an enquiry that grounds 
Itself in the notion of stage development to have descriptive power 
(qualify as an E-enquiry) hut not to have explanatory power (qualify as 
an I-enquiry).
Vhen I first seriously studied the work of Piaget and Kohlberg in the 
hope that they would provide the answers to the questions I was now 
asking about my pupils' cognitive and moral development, I felt distinct 
unease because of a clear misfit. The answers were not appropriate. I 
assumed that I was asking the wrong questions. The answers given in the 
literature were in the form of 'at such-and-such an age you can expect 
such-and-such behaviour'.
And, according to Kohlberg (1976), in order to bring about such 
behaviour (observable at a certain stage), I as a teacher had to 
undertake specific tasks of asking probing questions that were 
applicable to a stage higher than the one at which my pupils currently 
seemed to be. I read (Kohlberg, op.cit.) that there would be a marked 
improvement in my children's performance as a result of this teacher 
intervention. I never thought to question the assumptions of Kohlberg's 
experiments, nor the analysis of the data.
This all seemed wonderful, but left me aghast. My problem was not to go 
through complex procedures to ascertain at which level my children 
currently were. Nor was it to go through even more complex procedures 
of planning a lesson that would focus on my asking types of questions 
appropriate to the content of another stage. My problem was to
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understand why my children were as they were; to understand my own 
practice; to help my children move forward as free-thinking by whatever 
educational strategies seemed most appropriate at the time. I seemed to 
be operating in a different language altogether.
At the same tine as reading the literature of Piaget and Kohlberg, I was 
also researching the principles of action research. 'Human Inquiry' 
(Reason and Rowan, 1981) featured very strongly in my life. My practice 
was guided by the principles of action research, but my thinking was 
still inclined towards Piaget and Kohlberg. I could not initially 
resolve the two realms of discourse, other than to feel that action 
research was more in line with what I WAS doing, whereas the literature 
of Piaget and Kohlberg was what I SHOULD be doing.
In retrospect I can rationalise the dilemma thus: the literature of
Piaget and Kohlberg is presented in its propositional sense of 
knowledge-that supported by knowledge-how (Chapter 5). This approach to 
knowledge is reinforced by a parallel approach to values that 
categorises them in terms of their usefulness to society. The 
approaches to knowledge and to values are presented in these terms by 
these researchers who regard persons as external to themselves and as 
'subjects' of an enquiry.
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The literature of action research is presented in its dialectical sense 
of knowledge + a direct object. This approach abnegates a view of
persons as external to the researcher by requiring the researcher to 
'know herself' as a subject of her own research. This perspective takes 
individual practice as the ground for self-knowledge. Dialectical 
hypotheses are statements of individual belief Cl believe ...') which 
incorpoate propositional statements (' ... that this is so . . . ' ) 
grounded in personal practice ('... because I experienced it like this') 
and submitted to public scrutiny C let me show you ...') for
intersubjective criticism (' ... how I think it is so ...') for
interpersonal agreement (' ... so that we can agree ...') about 
dlaloglcal frameworks (' ... a common ground').
At the time I possessed no such formulation. I was unhappy that my 
practice did not fit the propositions of Piaget and Kohlberg. Then I 
read 'Personal knowledge' (Polanyi, 1958). This was one of the most 
influential books of my life. I drew from that the courage to have 
faith in personal instinct. It provided for me a kind of 'meta-
framework' , in a belief in self that was above beliefs in propositional 
forms of knowledge. For me, 'Personal knowledge' is an intensely 
spiritual book, emphasising the spiritual qualities of persons as 
demonstrated by an insistence on the need to encourage a reliance on the 
faith in faith.
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I came to see action research in this light. I came to see it as a 
liberating exercise that encourages freedom of thought and practice. I 
was by now aware of the changes in the thought processes that were 
encouraging a critical approach to my practice, and I was now 
consciously using action research as the guide that would use criticism 
to bring about improvement. I was rationalising and growing in 
understanding of my own practice, but I was still not much nearer to an 
understanding of my children's, seeing explanations for how they were 
still grounded in models presented by Piaget and Kohlberg, or those of 
other psychologists whose work I read, such as Bandura and Valters 
(1965). I still had the view that my children's progress could be 
described in terms of stages, and that their development was a matter of 
habit formation.
Through my reading of Pring (1984), I discovered the work of Jane 
Loevinger (1976). Her ideas of ego development seemed closer in spirit 
to what I was doing. She sees personal development in terms of growing 
towards maturity of inclinations and dispositions. She talks of the 
'ego* rather than the 'self', and sees the constitution of the ego as "a 
rather complex 'fabric' of character traits, ways of interrelating with 
other people, conscious pre-occupations, capacities for controlling 
impulses, and modes of thinking about different issues" (Pring, 1984). 
As I browsed through her work I became aware of the similarities in 
approach to the work of Button. Some things began to fall into place. 
I went back to the texts of Button. In his 1964 'Group work with 
adolescents' he talks of the pupils' personal enquiry. Here was a way 
forward for me, that seemed to be dispelling the ghost of habit
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formation, and I began to review the work I had done and was doing in 
this light.
It became clear to me that Button was advocating an action research 
policy for children's development. I had long ago accepted that it was 
the policy for my own development (see Chapters 1 and 3). I had never 
before considered transferring those notions to the children. Hot on 
the heels of this revelation came another: that what I was doing as a 
researcher was conducting my own action research enquiry into my 
children's action research enquiry.
This was for me a monumental discovery, for these reasons:
In my practice I was critically reflecting on my awn process through the 
action research cycle of observe, reflect, act, evaluate, modify, 
observe ... I was changing my ideas and my actions continually in an 
attempt to move closer to a practice that would enable me to help my 
children develop. The movement in my ideas and actions could be 
characterised in terms of an openness that had been absent before. In 
retrospect I can say that I was moving towards dialectical operations of 
thought and practice. Part of the openness of my thought entailed my 
view of my children as free, thinking human beings; unlike previous 
practice that had aimed to turn out a 'certain kind of person'. At the 
time I had not yet formulated the notion of dialectical operations as 
being a state that had the generative capacity for unlimited acts of 
creation.
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As indicated above, I was concerned at this time to introduce a critical 
element into the children's actions, as per the suggestions of Wilson 
(1967). I felt that if I could make them aware of what they were doing 
they would (a) reconsider 'negative' aspects of their behaviour in order 
to replace them with more 'positive' aspects; (b) adopt those more
positive aspects as part of their moral code (competence). As already 
stated, at the time I did not characterise this as 'action research'; 
but on reflection, I can see that I was encouraging my children to adopt 
the same principles as I in a consideration of our practice. I was not 
so much teaching personal and social education in terms of the process 
of becoming socialised or becoming personally independent, or in terms 
of the content of knowing how to acquire the skills of these
characteristics (see Chapters 1 and 3). What I was now doing was 
teaching my children how to do action research, presenting to them ways 
and means whereby they could develop their own skills of reflection in 
action. Later I came to appreciate that I was also moving myself and 
them toward dialectical forms of being. Certainly we established 
dialogical communities as the form of life in which dialectical humans 
may communicate with each other.
I have indicated in Chapter 3 how I tried to prompt my children to re­
think - to reflect in action on their actions. I tried to get them to 
evaluate their ideas and actions in a critical sense, and to use that 
critical appraisal in the formation of new ideas and actions. The tapes
of 1963-86 are full of such instances. I offer two examples here as a
flavour of our lessons together:
( k53 )
(1) Handy It was stupid.
JH Why do you say that?
Handy Veil, it was. I should have ...
JH Go on, Handy. Vhat could you have done? (AT40)
(2) Here the whole group is given the task of being a validation group. 
In VT10 with the English adviser, RS, the group is talking about their 
own style in our lessons.
Vincent She lets us talk among ourselves.
Colin Ve all listen, and then we say, 'Yes, but you haven't done 
such and such, and then we think about it.
The most apposite piece of evidence is unfortunately lost. It was a 
videotape of PL, headmaster of The Oaks, when he was talking about my 
work, both with the children and with the staff. He commented that I 
had brought personal and professional skills to the staff which they 
were passing on to the children. This tape was stolen during a break-in 
at school. But if what PL was saying held merit, what was happening was 
a three-fold chain: (1) I had come to my own position of adopting an
action-reflection cycle to move my own practice forward, which (2) 
enabled me to pass on the skills to colleagues which helped them to move 
their own practice forward which (3) enabled them to pass on the skills 
to the children which helped them to move their own practice forward. 
By my words 'pass on the skills', I do not mean this in its instrumental 
sense of 'know-how'; but in a dialectical sense, that I was making 
explicit my form of life and inviting others to understand it, and share
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it if they wished. My method was not coercion. Certainly I was always 
enthusiastic, and may have been guilty of persuasion by keenness; but 
by 1983 I can honestly say that I was moving toward a form of life that 
cherished the independence of other individuals and sought to make their 
thinking free, and that included the freedom to be free of my influence 
as well if they so wished.
By now, then, I was acutely aware of the 'meaning' of my practice, in 
terms of ideas being related to action, and the wish to turn statements 
of fact and statements of value into the same realm of discourse. My 
action-reflection procedure was approaching nearer to the vision, and 
the action-reflection procedures of my children were approaching nearer 
to their vision. Together we were agreeing frameworks that would enable 
us to negotiate our separate visions into the universal pragmatics of 
our own situations.
In 1984/85, however, I was still stuck in terms of the question of this 
chapter: 'How is a knowledge of values acquired?' I could see clearly
that my procedures were leading my pupils forward. I still could not 
explain why. My acquisition model was still grounded in the notion of 
habit formation, and its expression took the form of stage development.
Then I discovered the work of Carl Rogers, and this proved to be 
enormously influential in my thinking. As happened on my reading of 
'Personal Knowledge', some sort of intellectual leap took place which 
cleared much mental clutter and shifted the perspective to make way for 
new ways of thinking.
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I found myself in sympathy with Rogers on two main counts. The first
was his view of 'personhood' which was grounded In the notion of
development. Unlike Piaget and Kohlberg, he saw no ’fixed’ end stage of 
rigid structures. An aim, a final state, for Rogers was described in 
terms of personal experience, when that experience of self is one in 
which new experiences are welcomed and sought. Thus Rogers's Seventh 
Stage <1961) is characterised by the following criteria:
" - New feelings are experienced with immediacy and richness of 
detail, both in the therapeutic relationship and outside. The
experiencing of such feelings is used as a clear referent.
- There is a growing and continuing sense of acceptant ownership of 
these changing feelings, a basic trust in his (the client's) own 
process.
- Experiencing has lost almost completely its structure-bound 
aspects and becomes process-experiencing - that is, the situation is 
experienced and interpeted in its newness, not as the past.
- The self becomes increasingly simply the subjective and reflexive 
awareness of experiencing. The self is much less frequently a 
perceived object, and much more frequently something confidently 
felt as process.
- Personal constructs are tentatively reformulated, to be validated 
against further experience, but even then, to be held loosely.
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Internal communication is clear, with feelings and symbols well 
matched, and fresh terms of new feelings. There is the experiencing 
of effective choice of new ways of being." (Rogers, 1961)
The second reason why I felt so much in sympathy with Rogers is his view 
of his own development. He states that his learning is never complete, 
but part of his on-going development in which he is constantly moving 
forward in wisdom. His learning and his knowledge of his own 
development is grounded in his practice, and therefore in himself as a 
reflexive practitioner.
MI have learned to live in increasingly deep therapeutic relationships 
with an ever-widening range of clients. This can be and has been 
extremely rewarding. It can be and has been at times very frightening, 
when a deeply disturbed person seems to demand that I must be more than 
I am in order to meet his need. Certainly the carrying on of therapy is 
something which demands continuing personal growth on the part of the 
therapist, and this is sometimes painful, even though in the long run 
rewarding.
"I would also mention the steadily increasing importance which research 
has come to have for me. Therapy is the experience in which I can let 
myself go subjectively. Research is the experience in which I can stand 
off and try to view this rich subjective experience with objectivity, 
applying all the elegant methods of science to determine whether I have 
been deceiving myself. The conviction grows in me that we shall 
discover laws of personality and behaviour which are as significant for
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human progress or human understanding as the law of gravity or the laws 
of thermodynamics."
I was much taken with the views of Rogers about the educative 
relationships between counsellor and client. It provided new ways for 
me of thinking about my own role, and that of my pupils. Rogers saw the 
client not as someone to be healed or cured. He had not 'gone wrong'. 
He had simply lost touch with himself. It was not the counsellor's job 
to carry out the healing process as an external agent applying remedies; 
it was his job to enter into relationship with the client in order to 
help the client re-establish contact with himself. He documents the way 
in which he came to this point of view:
"One brief way of describing the change which has taken place in me is 
to say that in my early professional years I was asking the question, 
How can I treat, or cure, or change this person? How I would phrase the 
question in this way: How can I provide a relationship which this
person may use for his personal growth?"
I remember that I was very excited when I read this for the first time. 
Here was another teacher who had gone through the experience of trying 
to turn out a 'certain kind of person' as his previous training had 
taught him to do, had found that situation a denial of his values as a 
responsive human being, and had opted to find his own way according to 
his own practice. I felt that I had here a legitimate tradition which 
would provide support for my own emergent thinking.
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Just as I have found through my practice that propositional and 
procedural knowledge is an inappropriate ground for my work with others, 
so Rogers found through his experience:
"It has gradually been driven home to me that I cannot be of help to 
this troubled person by means of any intellectual and training 
procedures. No approach which relies upon knowledge, upon training, 
upon acceptance of something that is TAUGHT, is of any use. These 
approaches seem so tempting and direct that I have, in the past, tried a 
great many of them. It is possible to explain a person to himself, to 
prescribe steps which should lead him forward, to train him in knowledge 
about a more satisfying mode of life. But such methods are, in my 
experience, futile and inconsequential. The most they can accomplish is 
some temporary change, which soon disappears, leaving the individual 
more than ever convinced of his inadequacy."
I saw this view as articulating what I had been intuitively groping 
towards, in terms of the relationships I was trying to establish with my 
children. I saw the action-reflection cycle as a means to heighten 
them; and my own awareness of the need for such relationships, and a way 
of developing a process to bring these relationships about. And I saw 
my role as a teacher to enter into the relationships with my pupils so 
as to foster the basic understandings necessary for the establishment of 
such relationships. Like Rogers, I felt:
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"If I can provide a certain type of relationship, the other peson will 
discover within himself the capacity to use that relationship for 
growth, and change and personal development will occur."
But whereas Rogers was here talking about a one-to-one relationship, 
client and counsellor, I was involved in a one-to-one relationship of me 
and an individual, and me and many individuals. My problem was how to 
apply the principles of one-to-one to one-to-many. A step toward 
solving the problem lay in my adoption of the principle of establishing 
a dialogical community of reflexive independents (see Chapter 7).
This interest in the work of Rogers had two significant implications for 
my practice. First, I changed my perceptions of the children, and 
consequently my teaching style. Second, I formulated my own model, 
based still on the form of stage development, to account for the 
personal and social development of my children.
I deliberately adopted a view of my children as caring, thinking people. 
I attempted to establish an 'I and Thou' relationship that showed 
Rogers's principles of 'positive regard', the same as Buber's notion of 
'affirmation'. I was delighted to read the conversation between Rogers 
and Buber, recorded in Buber's 'The knowledge of man' (1965), in which 
they both explain these thoughts referring to individuals' positive 
acceptance of each other in their struggle to improve the quality of 
life.
( W  )
Rogers ... You’re saying that perhaps we can help the individual 
to strengthen. Yes, that's it, to affirm life rather than 
refuse it.
Buber I differ only in this word; I would not say life. I would 
not put an object on it.
My changing attitude toward my children could be characterized by what 
Elizabeth Newson (in Vesey, 1976-77) calls 'unreasonable care'. She 
says that the task of teachers is to go out of their way to make 
children feel valued: "Children who have no sense and recognition of
their own value are defeated children", and she goes on to say that 
positive regard offered unstintingly by their teacher will encourage 
them to extend the same regard to themselves and to others. I had 
always cared for my children, those that deserved it. Mow I determined 
to care actively for all my children, even the horrible ones.
I have no record of this change, other than this present testimony and 
the tapescripts which speak for themselves. I feel, also, that the care 
is reflected in the videotapes of my 1985/86 practice (e.g. VT9 and 10). 
To my mind, there is a vibrant empathy between the children and myself, 
and between the children to each other. I have already referred in 
Chapter 3 to the touching episodes, such in as Jason’s stories about 
his motor bike prowess, when genuine affection was displayed. If I 
compare these episodes with those showing the same group as uncouth, 
rowdy louts (VT5; AT38) who fall about with glee when someone in the
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group is made to feel small, I wonder at the enormous strides that the 
children made within a year.
For myself, I am pleased to point to VT10, as validation of my claim 
that I helped my children to develop, in the sense hypothesised in this 
text, which is validated through their acknowledgement to RS, the 
English Adviser:
Sheila Ve understand what we're doing now. She's helped us.(VT10)
I was so impressed with the work of Carl Rogers that I adopted his 
framework in an attempt to explain the development of my children, What 
I ended up with was a description in terms of stage development. 
However, I was progressing, as I saw it, to try to capture the essence 
of my children's development in notional terms of features. Those 
features, unlike the rigid structures of Piaget and Kohlberg, looked at 
general inclinations, in the style of Rogers. I recorded this approach 
in a BERA paper (1986), but, as I have already indicated in Chapter 3 of 
this text, the model lasted a very short time.
The model appeared as this: all the quotes are from the transcripts:
( H2 )
STAGE ONE: FIXITY 
Characteristics include:
- a self-contruct of low esteem: "We are dinloes." "We're thick."
- a rigid view of lack of potential: "We ain't no good."
- little regard for personal actions: "He made me do it."
- little regard is shown for other people: "Miss, she thinks she's 
great, just because her dad's a taxi driver."
- there is little desire to change: JM "Why do you behave like 
that?" P. "It's a good laugh. I like it."
STAGE TWO: AN EMERGING CONTINUUM 
Characteristics include:
- the self-construct is improved: P. "We're no good." JM: "I
don't agree. What's the matter with you?" P: "Nothing, really."
- responsibility is perceived as an object. JM: "Why did you do 
that?" P: "He hit me so I hit him." (As opposed to "He started 
it.")
- limited personal regard is extended. P: "I suppose Ann is all 
right."
- potential is acknowledged but not acted upon: PI: "We're thick."
P2: "Speak for yourself."
- there is an acknowledge that perhaps change is necessary:
( bk3 )
P: "My mum says I've got to stop mucking around,"
STAGE THREE: A FREEING OF EXPRESSION
Characteristics include:
- an increased willingness to communicate self: P: "No, that's not 
what I think. You don't understand what I'm saying."
- an increased sensitivity in communication: P: "Miss, why don't
you have your ears pierced?" JM: "I'm squeamish. I couldn't
bear the thought of it!" P: "If you did it would make you look
much younger." JM: "Vhat's having my ears pierced got to do with 
making me look younger?" P: "Well, you know."
- a growing awareness of other people's feelings: P: "We've stopped
calling each other names now." "We agreed with Miss not to muck 
around."
- a growing awareness of the need to accept responsibility: P: "I
hate this school. I hate all teachers." JM: "Because you were 
caned." P: "Yes. (Pause). My own fault really."
- an acceptance of personal potential: P: "I'm thinking of taking
that exam like you said."
( bkk )
STAGE FOUR: INTO FREEDOM
Characteristics include:
- self-constructs are less rigid: P: "They say my folks are hippies 
because of the way they dress. I'm not a hippy. I think I look 
like Michael Jackson. I like it."
- there is an awareness and consideration for other people:
P: "Shush! Julie’s trying to say something."
- there is an emergence of self-reliance: P: "I'm not going to muck
around from now on. I want to be a prefect."
- judgements about other people are held much more loosely and
rationally: P: "Mr X is not bad, for a teacher." "The police
nicked us but they let us off. That was quite fair, really."
- the children are prepared to listen to each other and engage in 
dialogue: P: "No, I don't agree with you."
STAGE FIVE: TOWARDS AUTONOMY 
Characteristics include:
- a developing construct of self as process: Visitor: "What do
you do in these lessons?" P: "We learn how to get on with each
other. We learn about how to improve ourselves." P: "I'm growing 
up now. I'm much better in myself."
- as easement of relationships with adults in authority: JM "How do
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you see me, then?” P: "You're our teacher. You're a friend."
JM: "How do you see other teachers?" P: "Some of them are all 
right, really."
- an enhanced ability to communicate: P: "It's nice when I can't
find the right words and they listen to me." P: "I can talk to
the group without feeling stupid."
- a movement towards a state of process: P: "We didn't understand.
We've learnt a lot."
- the present is now not so much rooted in the past as a preparation 




- a development of self-direction: P: "I've decided what's best
for me."
- a trust in personal potential: "I'm going to have a go at the 
exam. I might not pass it, but I'll still have a go."
P: "Miss, I really fancy Julie. Shall I ask her out?" JM: "Why
don't you? I'm sure she'd love to go out with you." P: "Yes, all 
right, then. Got to watch my spots, though."
- a readiness to trust other people: P: "Marcus is my friend. He 
won't let me down." P: "Sometimes I see my mum as a real friend 
rather than my mum."
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- the ability to listen sympathetically: P to a visitor: "Go on,
Mr X, tell us about it."
- an awareness and acceptance of a sense of process: "I'm growing 
up now." "Ve're getting there."
Almost as soon as I had created the model (Chapter 3), I found it
deficient. I record my dissatisfaction in a revised version of the BERA 
paper that I wanted to get published, but never got round to sending it 
off:
"I have come to the view now that I reject the stages as inadequate to 
explain the life of an individual. Stages may indicate general trends, 
but I am still focally concerned to show the PROCESS at work.
Objections to my stages will point out, for example, that some
individuals are already well advanced to higher stages when they first 
begin work with a group; some do not go further than intermediate 
stages; some take a long time to move, while others, in Platonic style, 
will progress to autonomy by leaps and bounds. Stages are useful 
indicators in the description of the process; they are not explanations 
for that process." (McNiff, 1986(b)).
This was now finally movement away from the notion of stage development, 
itself a casualty of the 'fixity' concept. This was the point at which 
I made a complete break with stage development in my search for
explanations. All that I had achieved had been a more complex 
description of what was happening. I was still thinking in linear 
terms. I cannot say when or where I actually moved beyond propositional
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thought, which is the ground for the linear notions of stage 
development, or even exactly why. The 'when' was some time in 1986. 
The ’why' is probably answered by the sense of crisis caused by my 
insights into personal development because of the intense action and 
reflection of the research process so far.
I am still much taken with the ideas of Rogers, and I have later 
expressed the application of his ideas as an example in practice of the 
establishment of warm caring relationships (1986(c), 1987(a)).
I will now proceed to the idea of generative transformational dialectics 
as a possible explanations for an acquisition of a knowledge of values 
(this chapter) and as a basis in which to ground the use of a knowledge 
of values (Chapter 7).
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5 GENERATIVE TRANSFORMATIONAL DIALECTICS AS A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR 
AN ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES
In this section I shall attempt to draw a number of different strands 
together, to present a synthesis of my present best thinking which is an 
expression of the thought and action of my practice over the years. I 
shall present what I have found to be a useful device to explain what I 
see as a way in which humans acquire values; and I shall then use this 
notional device as a basis for the grounding of communicative competence 
(Habermas, 1979) within dialogical frameworks (Chapter 7).
In this chapter I have pointed out that the dominant model for values 
acquistion is currently:
(a) General learning mechanism - stimulus response; assimilation of 
the environment by the individual;
(b) General learning method - habit formation of responses to 
stimuli from the environment;
(c) General cognitive organisation - stage development.
I have shown how I initially adapted this model to my own practice, 
without necessarily agreeing with the underlying assumptions inherent in 
the model, but have come to reject it as being inappropriate to my 
needs. My reasons for rejecting it may be summarised as follows:
( k k 9  )
(1) It does not answer Plato's problem.
(2) It does not answer the questions of my practice.
To make these reasons more explicit:
(1) It does not answer Plato's problem
The questions posed in Plato's problem are to do with poverty of 
stimulus and richness of response. In the field of values acquistion, 
we are dealing with issues that have as deep significance for the human 
condition as any field of enquiry. If the notions of stimulus-response 
and habit formation are correct, what we are saying is that the child 
learns to make judgements on which he will act according to the data
presented to him, and will build habits on the basis of those data.
To any reflexive observer, this just plainly is not so. In a 
superficial sense it may be. If my child worries the cat and I tell her 
to leave the cat alone, she will do so. Her actions are governed by 
criteria other than concern for the cat, tempered even by Wilson's 
element of rationality (1967). If my 13-year-old pupil stops 
misbehaving because I tell him to do so, I cannot automatically assume 
that he will generalise his assumed 'good' behaviour to any and all 
future situations. The field of human experience, even for infants, is 
so vast and complex that it is quite shortsighted to limit the variety 
of human responses to only those that may be observed. Further, it is 
imposing an unnecessary limitation on the mind of the thinker to suppose
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that stimuli and responses may be classified in terms of events past 
rather than events to come.
If we assume that each new response by the individual to the environment 
is new, we must then accept at least two corollaries:
(i) The 'values system' or 'system of acquisition of morality' has to 
be 'reinvented' with each new act. No two situations are going to be 
identical, to assume that identical responses will result from identical 
stimuli. Nor is it possible to invoke the ghost of generaUsability, 
assuming that similar situations will produce similar responses. Real 
life shows that it clearly is not so. No amount of telling or 
intellectualising stops an alcoholic from taking the next drink. To 
stop drinking, you have to want to first. A child who 'learns' to wait 
for the green man every time he is out with his mother still enjoys 
himself defying the traffic when he is out by himself.
There is no one 'pat' answer, or formula, to assign to responses, 
particularly, but not only, in the field of morality. The furore in the 
literature about Williams’s (1967) 'The cost of saving lives' is 
evidence of that.
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(ii) Because there is no standard formula of specific or generalised 
responses to specific or generalised situations, it must be assumed that 
each new act is an act of individual creation. The inductivist fallacy 
is shown to be what it is: a convenient shorthand form used in an
attempt to predict human behaviour. Although human behaviour is often 
predictable (support for inductivism), it is not always so (rejection of 
inductivism), and humans always have the option for it not to be so. (I 
speak here of 'normal' humans in 'normal' circumstances, and not, for 
example, of ill persons, or persons whose personalities have been maimed 
as in, for example, people who have been subject to mental assault.) In 
other words, although it may suit the person to build up certain habits, 
he will not necessarily take them on board as part of his mental life. 
He always has the option to change. (The problem is that people are 
often not aware that they have the option to change: see also Chapter 
7).
The questions of Plato's problem are not answered by the answers of the 
dominant paradigm. They do not match. The fields of discourse are 
separated by a gulf. Plato's paradigm is asking about mechanisms which 
allow the re-creation of moral responses; the paradigm involving 
behavioural psychology and cognitive developmental psychology is 
answering in terms of generalised responses produced by the sorting 
system of the brain. Plato's paradigm is asking about the novel acts of 
developing individuals; the dominant paradigm is operating in fixed 
concepts about a 'certain kind of person' who is, in fact, an 
abstraction. The questions about generative capabilities cannot be
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handled by a way of thinking that has intermediate and final end 
products as an objective of the human enterprise.
2. The dominant model did not answer the questions of my practice
I wanted to know why my children thought and acted as they did, not as 
the literature assumed they would. I genuinely tried with many groups 
to get them settled sufficiently to go through a Button programme, or a 
Kohlberg programme, or a structured input that would provide the basis 
for some sort of standardised test. I saw my teaching not in the 
'input', the content of a programme when they were settled, but in my 
getting them to the state where they were settled. It was this pre-set 
phase that called for the teaching skills. The 'input' stage called for 
technical skills. In the ’input' stage I simply had to apply the 
technology, go through the programme and wait for the 'right results'. 
The 'meta' framework, of establishing the right relationship with the 
children, put demands on me as an educator. I recorded this difficulty 
in a progress report as early as 1982, when I wrote: "It is easy to get
the children to agree to co-operate in the Button work; but how do I get 
them to the stage where they are prepared to agree?"
The dominant model does not tackle the problems of naughty children, or 
the dissatisfaction with practice. It tackles the problems of plotting 
children's progress in decision making and in social skills along fixed 
dimensions in which cognitive structures are supposed to change in order 
to deal with environmental circumstances of increased complexity.
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Kohlberg's model requires teachers to be aware of their students' 
present level of awareness and development in order to lead them on to 
higher levels.
I see this model as one in which skills may be refined and insights 
developed. I do not see it as answering the questions of the practice 
of me as an individual or of my children as individuals. Human practice 
itself is heavily value-laden. I am not so interested by the responses 
of the child within the controlled conditions of a specific input, but 
by the responses in the wider framework of classroom life, and life in 
general.
It will be argued that an input such as Button's, McPhail's, Kohlberg's 
will work, will in itself teach the child the necessary moral behaviour 
to apply to the wider terms of life. He will supposedly gain insights 
during his formal training that he will transfer to general life 
situations. I accept this argument, but also complain that it is 
limited in its scope. It is limited because it again rests on the 
notions of habit formation. It is also limited because it assumes that 
children learn to make moral decisions only through formal programmes. 
Those programmes will certainly intensify and accelerate the acquistion 
of their own latent knowledge, as I demonstrated to my own satisfaction 
(Chapter 1). But such programmes still do not demonstrate to me as a 
teacher how I can account for this development of latent knowledge, my 
own as well as the children's. It still does not answer the questions 
of my practice of the form 'How do I improve this process of education 
here?' (Whitehead, 1980)
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The considerations so far suggest that the dominant model for values 
acquistion seeks answers in the social sciences. The model presents a 
picture of the individual in society, the individual 'over against 
others'. This approach has not the power to provide explanations for 
individual practices. It will produce observations and descriptions; 
and those descriptions include the observations of the researchers who 
interpret the world in terms of their own mental structures. Those 
descriptions operate in terms of prescript!vism and universalisation, so 
their creators assume that the models they produce are reified and 
generally applicable. I cannot accept all this as an explanation for my 
own practice. So, for the reasons specified so far, I am rejecting the 
dominant model of a stimulus-response orientation, habit formation, 
cognitive-developmental stages, an approach via the social sciences. I 
am proposing a new model which suits my practice. I am not presenting 
it in a reified sense. I started thinking about this way of thinking 
many years ago, as I hope to have demonstrated in this text. This text 
is the first time I have drawn my present best thinking together, but 
already the ideas expressed here are being discussed in the community of 
researchers (McHiff 1984, 1986, 1988), and later work shows modification 
of earlier work as a direct result of colleagues' criticisms.
I will continue to make my ideas public in an attempt to engage in 
dialogue to move the ideas forward. I was pleased to read of Lewin's 
presentation of theories (in Baldwin, 1967). Lewin had the knack of 
writing up his best thinking, but then moving beyond it almost 
immediately. I sense that the same thing happens to me. Certainly I 
have found that what I had considered to be a satisfactory answer is
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rapidly replaced by a better one. The in-built obsolescence I spoke 
about earlier in this chapter is doing its work, in preventing us from 
resting on our laurels, but spurring us forward to look, and look again.
I shall now present what I have come up with as a possible answer. No 
doubt it will change as I continue to reflect in action.
(a) THE DEVICE
Throughout this text I have indicated my belief that what is observed in 
human behaviour is often a surface level manifestation which is not 
always congruent with the latent ability of the individual. In the 
study of language, which is where my interest in this area of enquiry 
originated, Polanyi's aphorism that 'we know more than we can tell' is 
immediately relevant.
Chomsky <1957), drawing on the innateness hypothesis of Vilhelm von 
Humboldt and Leibniz, rejected the currently dominant paradigm of a 
structuralist approach to the study of linguistics as being inadequate 
to deal with the latent knowledge of the individual that allows him to 
recognise deviant sentences, and to produce an unlimited number of well- 
formed strings in any given language. Thus, a native speaker-hearer 
would know that the string
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* ’sincerity frighten may boy the' is syntactically deviant;
* 'sincerity may frighten the boy' is semantically deviant;
* 'the boy elapsed' is interpretatively deviant;
t 'I'm memorizing the score of the sonata I hope to compose one 
day' is pragmatically deviant.
(All these examples, and some of those following, are taken from 
Chomsky's various works.)
The native speaker-hearer will also distinguish between sentences that 
are acceptable in performance terms and purely grammatical or syntactic 
terms. The string
'I called up the man who wrote the book that you told me about'
is marginally acceptable, whereas
'The man who the boy who the students recognised pointed out is 
a friend of mine'
is unacceptable in performance terms, though grammatically correct. 
Discourse is often guided by acceptability, rather than grammaticality.
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The native speaker-hearer will recognise the ambiguity in sentences such 
as
•Time flies'
'Visiting relatives can be a bore'
'Flying planes can be dangerous';
and will be able to produce unlimited strings, both of the sort
'This is the cat that ate the rat that . , . '
and of the sort
''Twas brillig and the slithy toves 
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe';
i.e. utterances that are limitless (and therefore novel) by accretion, 
and utterances that are novel by creation (that no other person has, or 
is likely to, produce).
I am applying Chomsky's hypotheses concerning the innateness hypothesis, 
the interplay between competence and performance, and the ability of the 
human mind to generate an infinite number of novel responses to my own 
notions concerning the acquisition of values, or moral knowledge.
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Let us suppose that observable acts are those of performance. Let us 
also remember Collingwood's (1939) advice that we should not always 
accept observable behaviour as the truth of a person's intentions. When 
we look at VT1, we see children behaving in a socially unacceptable 
manner. Ho amount of cajoling on the part of the teacher (JM) persuades 
them to reform their behaviour. There are momentary lapses by 
individuals, but, by and large, the group is a mob of loud-mouthed, 
silly children. It would be an interesting exercise to try to place 
them within a Piagetian or Kohlbergian structure. What would be the 
response of Piaget or Kohlberg, or Selman or Loevinger, I wonder, if 
they were confronted by my children? TM, I remember, cautious about our 
preliminary taster of Leslie Button's work in 1981, commented wryly: 
"Put Leslie with 3A2 last thing on Friday afternoon and see how he gets 
on."
If we do not believe, as I do not, that children are as bad as they 
would have us believe, we must look for other explanations. These same 
children, I found out in my practice, could be caring, sensitive and 
curious, once removed from situations in which they felt they had to 
show off. Their silly behaviour, I assumed, was a matter of choice. 
Their 'true' characters were manifested in more thoughtful, self- 
critical moments.
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Let us, then, further suppose the notion of competence, the area within 
the individual that is the place of his inner beliefs and values, his 
sense of right and wrong. Competence is at a deep level and performance 
at a surface level. The way in which competence may be allowed - or 
prevented - from reaching the surface of performance is through the 
intention, the choice, of the individual. Now, competence may be
deliberately presented in a distorted fashion, such as in my children's
abberative behaviour. This choice is the application of Wilson's <1967) 
element of intentionality that makes the morally aware person.
The three areas of my proposed model draw on the traditional areas of
affection, conation and cognition. To explain:
The wrangle in the literature over which of the three aspects of the 
human mind is dominant is grounded in a view of these three areas being 
in competition with each other. They are to be found in writings as 
early as Aristotle, who compared the three areas to the winged steeds of 
the charioteer, often at a loss to know which should take the lead. 
Peters <1964) expresses confusion; Russell <1908), commenting on Plato's 
theory of education, talks of "good behaviour with the wrong emotions". 
Straughan <1982) comments: "Education aims to produce a certain
'rational' state of mind in the learner by bringing him to acknowledge 
the validity of reasons, but this state of mind may have a greater or 
lesser effect upon how the person actually behaves. His reasoning may 
or may not remain at a theoretical level; his judgements may or may not 
be translated into action; his beliefs may or may not guide his 
behaviour."
( 2f60 )
Let me suggest that the lack of vision throughout the literature is 
caused by the insistence of thinkers to approach a theory of acquisition 
of values through the medium of the social sciences, which seek to 
impose explanations for individual behaviour within the framework of 
social morality. Even Downie and Kelly (1978), whose message focuses on 
the need for individuals' interpretations of morality ("Moral education 
.. . must enable people to do their own moral thinking rather than 
encourage them to conform to an externally imposed moral code"), assume 
that morality is learnt through exposure to a moral, appropriate form of 
life.
I am here suggesting that it is necessary to turn to the reconstructive 
sciences, i.e. an enquiry into how the innate faculties of the human 
mind may be reconstructed into cognitive structures. So, instead of 
viewing affective (to do with the emotions), conative (to do with will) 
and cognitive (to do with ratiocination) areas as being in opposition, 
or at best in some sort of uneasy acquaintanceship, let us interpret the 
situation dialectically, and look for relationships, transformations, 
and movement forward through negations and cancellations. Drawing all 
these strands together, let us suppose competence to have to do with the 
affective zone. This will embrace feelings, beliefs, emotions. Let us 
then suppose performance to do with the cognitive zone, relying on the 
processes of ratiocination. In order for competence to be reflected in 
performance, it has to go through a system of transformations. I will 
call these 'dialectical transformations' for they are to do with 
conative areas of the will, determination and attitudinal factors. So
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competence may be transformed into performance by the application of 
conscious decisions.
Now, it may be, as in the case of VT1, that individuals will 
deliberately present their deeply-held beliefs in a distorted fashion at 
a surface level. I know that I should not lie, but I do. This decision 
to distort does not in fact distort competence - only the surface 
presentation (see also Habermas's 1979 notion that intuitions may not be 
false, but their representations may be). The task of educators is not 
only to present learners with the correct performance models (for habit 
formation is a non-sequitur) but with appropriate mechanisms for making 
choices. If we can put learners in touch with their own dialectical 
processes, we are using the key to the door, the key to the generative 
capacity that makes possible the transformations in the first place.
Visually, the model is:
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deep structure competence affective zones
dialectical conative zones
transformations
surface structure performance -cognitive zones
To support this model it is necessary to suppose an acquisition model 
(AM) which entails the notions 'generative capacity' and 'what is 
learnt'.
competence
input > AN >  output
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Let us suppose that the AM itself is an aspect of competence. Thus, a 
specific ’input* from the environment will be processed by the AM to 
produce a certain output. The AM contains the notion 'what is learnt', 
i.e. internalised aspects that the individual has accepted as a 
distinctive feature of his own personality. Let us also suppose that 
the AM contains the generative capacity that enables the individual to 
produce an unlimited number of novel actions (i.e. his creative 
faculty). In performance terms, the output generated by the Individual 
reflects the input, determined by the dialectical transformations.
Return with me for a moment to my naughty children on VT1. I maintain 
that they are not really like this, not deep down. In the terms of my 
model I am saying that they have deliberately distorted their 
performance, as a potential manifestation of their competence. The 
conscious decision lies in the conative aspects of the transformations.
Vhat my children perhaps were not employing was the criticism that is 
the steering control of action (performance). 'Criticism' as such is 
perhaps not a value that may be prefaced by the notional term 'I believe 
... '; but the ability to be critical is a value, as in the dialectical 
sentence 'I believe I should be critical of myself'. The act of 
criticism is part of performance, as is action and reflection; i.e. 
consciously employed strategies to strengthen the link with competence. 
I have seen and demonstrated in my practice as a teacher, and in the 
preparation of this text, that critical action-reflection will encourage 
the learner (my children and myself) to observe, criticise, attempt to 
solve, evaluate and modify aspects of practice that are unsatisfactory,
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because the action of that practice at a performance level does not 
match the values at competence level that the practitioner really wants 
to action. Critical reflection-in-action at a performance level enables 
the practitioner to modify practice so that it may reflect competence 
and make competence accessible - i.e. enable the practitioner to 
understand her own values - put her in touch with herself - to enable 
her to bring about an integration of self in the synthesis of competence 
and performance through action-reflection.
I have mentioned before that the transformations necessary are in the 
nature of dialectical transformations. These transformations act as a 
kind of Jacob's ladder, providing a two-way communication link between 
surface and deep levels of the human mind. Aspects of competence may be 
raised for cognitive appraisal; access may be gained to competence by 
the conscious mind. This communication is effected and facilitated by 
acts of will. Competence and performance are in constant interplay 
within the open mind of the practitioner. The conscious applications of 
dialectical strategies allows the practitioner to employ the heuristics 
of discovery in play (Gadamer, 1975). There is no restrictive notion of 
'objective', 'end product' or 'aim'. All these notions are dissolved in 
interplay and diffusion. An end becomes a starting point; a goal 
becomes a state of being. The transformations themselves, I suggest, 
are in the nature of the model already detailed at the beginning of this 
chapter. In the mind of the practitioner, they are the link between 
competence and performance, effected and shaped by acts of will. As 
such, the transformations belong more to performance, and for the time
being I shall include them in the aspect it is now important to discuss 
- a performance model that will explain the process whereby deeply held 
values of competence are enabled to be realised in the practice of 
everyday life.
<b> THE PROCESS - TOWARD A MODEL OF PERFORMANCE
We have already noted that an acquisition model is part of competence, 
receiving an input (I shall say more about the input shortly) to produce 
an output that may be characterised in performance terms. The output is 





It is now also that we apply the generative component to allow the 
production of an unlimited number of novel acts (i.e. creative 
faculties).
Let us suppose that the human is born with certain inherited faculties 
that promote the development and well-being of mind and body: physical 
organs - heart, lungs, liver; capacities - language, senses; and 
mental mechanisms - curiosity, restlessness; along with the biological 
formulae that will enable the physical and mental aspects of growth to 
come about. All these aspects are part of the natural inheritance of 
the person, I am aware in suggesting this that I have parted company 
with a number of philosophers who believe that the mind of the child at 
birth is a 'tabula rasa', on which experience of the environment writes 
the script.
I will maintain, for the time being, that the human at birth is not a 
formless lump but is a creature already in a state of intense BEING, 
containing the potential for all future acts of life. I am not saying 
that the potential has as yet been realised - given form or substance - 
but that the potential is already there, and that this potential is 
infinite (see also Scheffler, 1980). The capacities of the individual 
may be specific to that person - i.e. the form and substance of 
individual mechanisms - but I truly believe that each and every person 
is born with unlimited potential. I ground my belief in the notion that 
humans are a reflection in action of the competence (knowledge) of the 
universe, that which some people call God. God made man in his own 
image. The universe is without end, untrammelled by any finite
( 467 )
expectations. An atom has within it the capacities of the universe; and 
the universe is made up of atoms. Each monad is constituted of monads: 
the ebb and flow, the to-and-fro of life is seen in the interplay 
between macro and microcosm. The universe is made of the same substance 
as persons. In death the person becomes the universe; in life she holds 
the universe within herself. The potential of the universe is 
boundless, and the potential of all persons, in their state of being a 
person, is also without end.
I am careful in this text not to rest my case on religious or 
theological grounds. I hope to demonstrate the validity of my claims 
through the rigour of scientific procedures. Yet it must be evident 
that my life and being is founded upon the strong foundation of a 
concrete belief in a personal God. This belief enables me to produce 
complex theories about my practice, yet, at the end of the day, to see 
the complexity synthesised in an elegant simplicity in a simple act of 
faith. It is like the artist, who views the ever changing scenarios in 
front of him, and his interpretation of the vastness, in its interplay 
of unity and diffusion, causes him to paint his expression of the single 
unity of form in a vibrant red canvas.
So I will stand by my theory that every human, at birth, has the 
potential for an infinite number of acts of creation. Clearly I cannot 
•prove* this theory, any more than Chomsky can 'prove* his theories. 
Vhen challenged about his innateness hypothesis (Piattelli-Palmarini, 
1980) he explained: "You can't demonstrably prove it is innate - that
is because we are dealing with science and not mathematics; even if you
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looked at genes you couldn’t prove that. In science you must have 
demonstrative inferences; in science you can accumulate evidence that 
makes certain hypotheses seem reasonable, and that is all you can do - 
otherwise you are doing mathematics."
Let me consider, then, the nature of this potential. Let me suggest 
that the person is born as State of Being SBO [zero], but, according to
my hypothesis, has the potential to go on to SB1, SB2, SB3, . . . SBn. To
a large extent, his choice of which SB to go for will be influenced by 
the environment into which he is born. However, the shaping of his 
choice does not cancel out the potential, that he could adapt to the 
environment of other cultures or conditions if he wished. As the person 
proceeds through life, the choices presented to him are going to cause 
him to opt for ever-more complex and refined SBs. Thus, the original SB 
may be shaped by cultures and sub-cultures: initially the society into 
which the person is born; then into family cultures, friendship
cultures, and so on, which will move the person forward in the
directions in which he wants to go.
How, the structuralist school tells me that the environment imposes its 
structures on the individual (e.g. Piaget, 1932). I maintain that the 
individual imposes her structures on the environment. The innate 
potential never dies, but is always in a state of generative activity, 
allowing new forms of being to emerge according to the decision-making 
strategies of the person.
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Let me apply this schema to an acquistion of the knowledge of values. I 
have considered changing the title of this chapter to 'A development of 
the knowledge of values', for, to my mind, values are already there, in 
the pool of potential, which is part of the competence of the 
individual. I would welcome comment on this aspect to help me clarify 
my own thinking.
Let us suppose that SBO [zero], the original State of Being, has the 
potential to take on each and every value of the human condition. The 
process of selection determines which values are accepted and which are 
rejected. Now, the process of selection just referred to is embodied in 
the notion of dialectical transformations outlined at the beginning of 
this chapter. A sense of crisis causes the organism to seek a new state 
of being, and this state is brought about by the cancellation of 
previous states, which then acts as the foundation for the new state. 
The newly created state still maintains the characteristics of the old 
degenerate state within itself.
So an application of this notion gives us the formulation, in our
discussion about the development of systems of values, that SBO
(competence) has the potential to accept each and every value. SB1, a 
State of Being that has opted for a certain position, still contains the 
characteristics of SBO: the potential is still there, undiminished. So 
it goes through the device: increasingly complex States of Being are
selected, according to the criteria of dialectical transformations, in
the sense of spirals of spirals containing the steps of negation,
( W?o )
cancellation and renewal; and the aspects of negation, cancellation and 
renewal put together spell 'recreation*.
How, we are still left wondering, Where does performance actually come 
in here? I will answer that performance itself is part of the 
dialectical process that is subject to negation, cancellation and 
renewal (recreation). Performance itself is in a state of continual 
recreation. There is no end state that may be labelled 'performance'. 
There are only continually evolving SBs. Within the dialectical process 
(SICi-v]) we have seen the progression Sl(i) sense of crisis Sl(ii) 
imagining a solution Sl(iii) action of the solution -<^ Sl(iv)
evaluation of the solution Sl(v) modification of the old paradigm 
focusing into creation of the new paradigm-<^ S2(i) sense of crisis . . . -< 
Sn. Performance may be placed at any S(v) of any cycle (Sti-v)), but 
this is immediately replace by a new S(i).
So a model of performance is going to contain elements that will not 
allow it to be static, but require it to be in a self-transforming state 
of evolution. The potential at SBO (competence) is the creative 
capacity that allows and requires this evolution.
The story does not stop there. For we have seen that any S(v) embodies 
the notion of movement towards the vision of the individual, in which 
statements of fact and statements of value blend and are one. Put into 
the wider context of the model, in which SO may be viewed as the 
original source of vision, or pool of values, and S(iv) is the movement 
towards the realisation in any SB of a realisation of those values, then
( W? 1 )
SO may be regarded as competence and S(i-v) as performance. But states 
are not annihilated; they are cancelled. All the characteristics of 
previous states, including SO, are incorporated within each new state. 
In this view, any S(i-v), as a characteristic of any SB, holds within 
itself SO and SBO (i.e. competence). The 'input' for the AM at 
competence, characterised here in terms of SO, comes from the 'output' 
at the PM. Performance is the input for competence, not in the linear 
sense of
competence ^ ^  performance
in which the two aspects influence each other reciprocally, but in a
dialectical sense Sl(i— > ii  ^iii ---^ iv — -^v) (S -1) S2 ...
Thus, an overall model of
expresses the central notion of competence and performance as questions 
of value and questions of fact. Each new sub-spiral is a new SB which 
in itself is movement towards a fusion of questions of value and 
questions of fact. The whole model is bounded by the finiteness of 
human life. Perfection is an ideal of the SB at birth, a vision of the 
yet-to-be; and, because there is no final IS, there is simply always a
( W?z )
'yet—to-be', which is synthesised in the 'now' of the struggle to turn 
values into practice.
My belief is that the notion of 'yet-to-be' is realised at death, which 
is then a continuation, but in a new form, of States of Being. Death 
for me is no great penalty, but, as for Peter Pan, the promise of great 
adventure. In the meantime, my present form of being in this life 
causes me sufficient senses of crisis to look for explanations of my 
present form. And I need now to consider another aspect of my present 
discussion of an acquisition of knowledge of values through a 
consideration of the notion of dialectical operations.
(c) Dialectical operations as a form of being
It is interesting to apply Fromm's (197k) analysis of forms of having 
and forms of being parallel to the theories of structuralists and the 
theroies of dialecticians.7 The structuralists hold that development 
comes about in terms of accretion: new states are restructured from old 
ones. The mental operations required for an interpretation of the new 
states are seen in terms of the restructuring of previous 
interpretations. Progress is linear, one stage growing out of another 
towards a final end state.
( b73 )
Fronnn equates a form of life that is geared towards acquistion with a 
form of thought that sees knowledge as an accumulation of facts. This 
form of knowledge was presented in Chapter 5 as 'know that' and 'know 
how' Fromm's theory is that forms that exist by accumulation and 
accretion are forms of 'having'. In his view, a 'having' mode of life 
is restrictive of the individual, for the situation becomes that he does 
not own his possessions so much as his possessions own him. In his 
eagerness to gain, he puts all his energy into having, so that his life 
is devoted to protecting his assets as he loses his 'being' form of 
life. "What will it profit a man if he gain the whole world yet lose 
his soul?" (Matthew, 16:26)
Fromm then goes on to say that a form of life that is grounded in 
'being' is one that is free of possessions. I am always delighted at
his example of the blue glass that absorbs all colours of the spectrum 
except the blueness. It is in 'giving away' the essential quality of 
its being that it maintains its essential quality of being: it is blue 
because it 'gives away' the blue.
I will relate this idea of being with a theory of dialectical 
operations. A dialectical form of life does not envision any end or 
intermediate state as a criterion of development. It sees development 
as a constant state of 'coming into being': a constant state of renewed 
states. There is no beginning and no end: "I am the alpha and the
omega, said the Lord God, who is, and who was, and who is to come, the 
Almighty".
( W ? k  )
Klaus Riegel (1973) indicates that dialectical operations are the final 
stage Df cognitive development. I would agree but go beyond. I have 
already stated that I do not accept the notion of stage development. 
Vhat I believe we are observing in studies which focus on discrete 
phenomena of development is the development of the ability to organise. 
Riegel accepts part of Piaget's theories but maintains that there is a 
stage beyond formal operations, that of dialectical operations. I 
believe that persons always operate dialectically. They are born and 
die, capable of dialectical operations as part of their innate 
competence. In my view, small children are tremendous dialectical 
thinkers, rapidly seeing relationships, happily at ease with 
contradiction (and, if contradicitions are not immediately observable, 
inventing one), crossing heuristic gaps between the one and the many by 
natural leaps and bounds. Vhat I think is perhaps the greatest tragedy 
of organised education is the insistence by teachers, trained in formal 
operations themselves, systematically to destroy and belittle the 
capabilities of children for dialectical ways of being (see also Chapter 
7).
To suggest the theories that I have been expounding is to fly in the 
face of the established literature. I fully appreciate that mine is a 
minority position, but that does not invalidate the relevance of my 
theory as a way of explaining my practice to myself. I have discovered 
that the questions of my practice simply are not catered for in the 
answers of the current literature, Therefore I have looked to other 
fields of human enquiry, and I have shifted perspective dramatically.
( W75 )
The answers I have so far come up with have raised new questions in my 
mind. The more I go on in my practice, the more I realise I do not 
know. I am seldom certain of anything, and I am always prepared to 
shift my ground. But some things I am fairly certain about, and some 
things completely sure about. I am fairly certain that theories of 
stage development do not mirror the reality of a person's life; and that 
'morality' is not learnt through habit formation. I am absolutely 
certain that the theories of the current literature cannot explain ray 
own practice. Only I can do that through the theory that has developed 
out of my practice. The theorists who suppose that they are capable of 
explaining my life are talking abstract nonsense. They hope to describe 
what I am doing; they do not really KNOW. At best they will present E- 
schemas that generalise to all people. Only I, as a living person, can 
undertake my own enquiry into my own mind and being. And the answers I 
may give, though not yet qualifying as an academically legitimated 
theory, are appropriate to the truth of my practice. Time will tell, 
"in truth and honesty" (Habermas, 1979) if you, the reader, agree that 
what I have said strikes the necessary chord in you that makes us want 











In Part Two I have considered some questions inherent in the notion 
'knowledge of values'. In Chapter 5 I considered the questions (a) what 
does 'knowledge of - ' mean, and (b) what is the nature of values that
they may be known? In Chapter 6 I considered how such knowledge may be
acquired.
In this part I wish to consider some of the hypotheses I have put 
forward in relation to the notion 'knowledge of values' to suggest some 
ways in which this knowledge may be put to use.
There are two separate but interrelated issues here. In line with my 
reasoning of Chapters 5 and 6, I may say that it is necessary to 
consider the questions
(1) how is knowledge of values put to use?
(2) how is knowledge of values acquisition put to use?
( '+78 )
In attempting to formulate theories that answer (1) I shall be dealing 
with issues of the use of an individual's knowledge of her own 
competence; the way that that knowledge may be equated with 
Wittgenstein's notion 'form of life'; and how the exercise of a shared 
form of life by consenting individuals may provide the basis for social 
evolution.
In attempting to formulate theories that answer (2) I shall be dealing 
with issues that focus on the need for individuals’ personal responses 
to the problems inherent in their own practices, in line with 
Whitehead's (1979) apology for the need for teachers' personal theories 
of education, in which they attempt to integrate matters of value and 
matters of fact.
Consideration of these two questions and their implications is the 
essence of Chapter 7.
Chapter 8 looks at the justification of educational knowledge. In 
response to the statement 'I know - ', there is the question 'How do you 
know?' I shall attempt tD show that there are different forms of truth 
conditions for different forms of knowledge claims. I shall also 
attempt to show how my own claim to educational knowledge - that I have 
improved the process of education for myself and for the poeple in my 
care - is justified, by responding that:
(a) "I know this is so because ... M and drawing on extant evidence 
(my inferential knowledge claim);
<b> "I know this is so because ... M and indicating my form of life 
(my personal knowledge claim).
In Chapter 9 I shall suggest what I consider are issues of educational 
research that need urgent attention. These are some of the areas that I 
shall try to explore in the future, and that I think need taking forward 
by the wider community of educational researchers.
( H80 )
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CHAPTER SEVEH: HOW IS KNOWLEDGE OF VALUES (ACQUISTION) PUT TO USE?
INTRODUCTION
In 'The concept of the knowledge of God' (1988), Haymes considers, as I 
have done In this text, the different interpretations in the literature 
accorded to the notion 'to know'. He references in particular the work 
of Ryle (1946, 1949) in drawing the distinction between 'knowing that' 
and 'knowing how'; the work of Popper (1972) in his classification of 
the three worlds of knowledge; the work of Malcolm (1967), in his belief 
of 'knowledge by acquaintance' (parallel to the notion of the 'personal 
knowledge' of Polanyi 11958), which I have drawn on in this text); and 
the work of Malcolm's tutor, Wittgenstein (e.g 1970), in his notion of 
'fundamental propositions'.
Toward the end of his book Haymes says:
"There is, in the end, a mystery here ... The mystery is that the notion 
of knowledge ... seems to run out into this question of how 'knowing 
how' and 'knowing that' are held together, that is, how the fundamental 
propositions we believe in and the rules we live by relate. The mystery 
is that in some way the one is the other. But it is impossible to 
illuminate this further and, indeed, all that Wittgenstein could say 
about it is 'This is how we live'," (Haymes, 1988)
( h%?- )
I would suggest that the resolution to the paradox remains a mystery so 
long as It is approached via areas of discourse that relate to the 
social sciences. Haymes throughout maintains that personal knowledge is 
manifested as a form of life (see below and Chapter 8 of this text), yet 
seems not to make the necessary intellectual leap away from theories of 
social science that regard 'knowledge' as 'given' to reconstructive 
theories of Innate potential that regard 'knowledge' as created, this 
leap, I maintain, being the clue to the answer to the mystery.
I shall consider this question in more detail in (i) below.
Haymes also alludes to the notion that beliefs (values) are worthless 
unless they are acted upon. Quoting Wittgenstein (On Certainty) that 
"It is our ACTING which lies at the bottom of the language game", he 
concludes that "to know these propositions ... is something you do".
I wish now to present my own views on this issue. As I have indicated 
in the preface to Part III, I see two separate but interrelated aspects. 
The first is to do with grounding the theory; the second is to do with 
applying the theory.
( **83 )
(i) Grounding the theory: How is knowledge of values put to use?
Let me go back to Chapter 4 where I suggested that prepositional
knowledge (know-that) and procedural knowledge (know-how) is grounded in 
a framework of dialectical knowledge (know + direct object). I 
explained there that propositions of the form ' It is raining' and ' I 
know how to play the piano’ are emcompassed within the wider belief 
system of the person who is making the claims to knowledge. Thus 
uterances of the form 'It is raining' may be characterised syntactically 
as
I HP - It] + [Predicate - is raining]
The propositional HP + Predicate is embedded within the HP + Predicate
in the dialectical form of the belief system of the speaker. This then 
enters the semantic component, where meaning may be applied to the
propositional sentence in its syntactic (surface level) form through the 
linguistic transformations which link it with its semantic (deep level) 
form. Graphically:
( k S k  )
deep 'I believe it
level is raining'
surface  "It is raining"
level
The notion 'I believe' is an assumption in the mind of the speaker who 
produces the surface utterance "It is raining". The MEANING of the 
utterance ' It is raining’• is grounded in the relationship between its 
surface structure and deep structure; between the articulation and 
mental operations of the speaker.
Chomsky has often been termed a structuralist. Until recently I 
rejected this label, seeing his work grounded in the notion of the 
mental structures of the individual and, by implication, to do with 
dialectics. Yet I see that his approaches are essentially structuralist 
in character. For Chomsky's work operates at the 'horizontal' level of 
syntactic structures. In the ideas presented above, a characterisation 






transf ormat i ons
syntactic
component
tNP + Predicate] - I believe: INP + Predicate] - it is raining.
( W 5  )
I am now saying it is necessary to go beyond syntactic structures to 
dialectical operations, whereby the sense of propositional statements is 
determined by the belief system of the speaker. I am suggesting that 
the abstractions of syntactic structures are themselves seen as elements 
of propositional discourse. Wilder makes the point (in Piattelli- 
Palmarini, 1980) that Chomsky's work is not to do with communication, 
but with the formulation of abstract principles to explain the knowledge 
of language. What governs the use of language in real situations is 
another area of enquiry altogether, and which is considered in <ii) 
below.
However, still adopting Chomsky's terminology and notation system, let 
me propose that the syntactic structures of propositional discourse, 
characterised above by [NP + Predicate] 'It is raining' enter into a 
dialectical relationship with the self that is making that proposition. 
Every utterance at a surface level of phonology and syntax has a deep 
level semantic interpretation. That semantic interpretation itself is 
now subject to the belief system of the speaker who holds it. In terms 
of a theory of universal pragmatics, we can suppose that an outcome of 
this notion is that propositional discourse is, by its nature, embedded 
in the individual belief systems of the participants of that discourse. 
Thus, propositional discourse, conducted with the provisions of the 
notion 'I believe ... ' becomes dialectical discourse. It all depends 
on the perspective of the agents in the discourse.
( 486 )
So far I have dealt with the belief system of the individual as an 
abstraction. I will consider now what might happen if someone wishes to 
turn his held value (termed as [NP + Predicate: NP + Predicate] ’I 
believe: I believe it is raining') into a stronger form, in which his
value is externalised as a knowledge claim. It seems a common sense
notion that claims to knowledge become that through the act of
externalisation. So long as they remain the undisclosed property of the
thinker, they are not knowledge claims. As soon as he declares them, 
they are. The corollary is that, in making this knowledge claim, the 
speaker then declares his intention to defend his knowledge; and defence 
of knowledge implies action of some sort.
I am saying, then, that propositions of the form [NP + Predicate] 'It is 
raining' are a suffix to an implicit prefix ' I believe ... ' that
indicates that the proposition is an externalised belief of the speaker. 
So long as the belief is undisclosed it may remain as a tentative 
hypothesis in the mind of the speaker. If he wishes to turn the
hypothesis into a knowledge claim, he uses the strong version ’know' 
rather than 'believe', to produce a statement characterised as "I know: 
I know it is raining". It is the nature of the term 'know' that is the 
nub. If 'know' is part of the declared proposition, as in the notional 
term
'I -x- : I know it is raining'
where the propositional statement 'It is raining' is the continuation of 
the implied 'I know', all operating at surface level, the ' -x- ' in the
( W 7  )
notion NP + Predicate ' I -x- ' at deep level reflects the competence of
the individual and the strength of his commitment. In his values system
he will characterise ' -x- ' as ’ I believe’ or 'I know'. I maintain
that when the ' -x- ’ takes the form of 'I know' at deep level, this is
the time when the individual makes a commitment - accepts this as part
of his personal knowledge. And the implication of commitment is that
such personal knowledge needs must be acted upon, and turned into an
externalised knowledge claim - that is, a form of life.
In terms of the question of this section, then, of ’How is knowledge of 
values put to use?' I would reply that what we are really dealing with 
here is the area of the mind/brain that organises commitment. By the 
term 'organise commitment', I am suggesting that it is possible to
envisage levels, or degrees, of commitment, where the notional term ' I 
believe' indicates hypotheses that are loosely held, and where the
notional term ' I know' indicates hypotheses that are held with a good 
deal of commitment. The theme is evident in the work of Polanyi, that
such personal knowledge involves an act of commitment. What I am
suggesting is the process at work in the mind of the speaker that
enables him to make the commitment.
We cannot leave it there. I have been speculating about the internal 
activities of the mind of the individual in organising his values sytem. 
The term 'commitment' implies action: in the lexicon its significant
features would include ' + intended action '; and in my present area of
discourse, 'intended' transforms the underlying belief/knowledge into 
its manifested 'action'. I have considered the use of knowledge of
values, and I am surmising that it is a process within the mind/brain of 
the individual that organises the degree of commitment to a potential 
form of life, I need now to consider how that commitment is manifested
as a form of life. My discussion so far has operated in terms of the
competence of the individual. Now I need to consider a paradigm of 
performance, the shift of perspective that moves beyond the individual- 
specific structures of mind, to embrace the notion of how individuals 
may share their knowledge (their degree of personal comraitmen t) in
adopting a shared form of life.
(ii) Applying the theory: How is knowledge Df values acquisition put to
use?
To summarise the foregoing, and to refer back to Chapter 6, I may say 
that an interpretation of what constitutes a theory for the acquistion 
of values is to propose a model that starts off with a reconstruction of 
the innate potentials of a human being (to be found in the area of 
competence). The way in which the potentials of this deep level may be 
realised in action is to propose a theory of performance that allows the 
individual to account for his ability to turn values into practice. The 
theory of performance proposed entails the use of dialectical 
transformations that enable the individual practitioner to apply 
critical correctives to his choice of actions. These dialectical 
transformations are set into motion by a sense of crisis when present 
practice (performance) is not congruent with the values that sponsor
( m  )
that practice (competence). The transformations move the structures of 
values closer to the structures of practice through the process of 
minimal steps entailed in an action-reflection cycle.
I now wish to take the discussion beyond a theory of individual 
performance to embrace the wider community, and suggest that an enquiry 
that focuses on the self's knowledge of the self may be extended to
include other selves who are similarly engaged.
I have indicated in (i) that personal commitment/knowledge involves 
action. In this sense, the person's values determine his action/form of
life. The combination of 'values-into-action' constitutes a personal
knowledge claim, and knowledge claims need to be defended, for by 
implication the individual enters into the pluralist world of other
individuals who do not necessarily share his form of life. I have
suggested in Chapter 6 that statements (implicit or explicit) which
constitute a knowledge claim are answers to latent questions in a
companion's mind (Collingwood, 1939). The idea of 'latent questions' is 
directly parallel, in my interpretation, to the ideas of Polanyi's 
'latent knowledge', and, in terms of my formulation, part of competence. 
Latent questions are grounded in the competence of the speaker, and the 
form of the question is to probe the competence of the other. The level 
(competence) at which this probing is conducted suggests that the two 
participants are entering into an 'I-Thou' relationship in which there 
is the desire to share levels of commitment.
( k90 )
Collingwood says that we cannot take an immediate verbal or actual 
response of the companion as a 'true' indication of his intentions or 
his meaning. In my interpretation, I can apply this to say that we
cannot take a person's observed performance as an indicator of his
competence. The dialectical transformations that he is using may be 
deliberately distorting the presentation of his values. Collingwood
says that, in order to get at the true meaning in his mind, we must
enter into a question and answer relationship (a dialectical 
relationship) where the ongoing cycle of question and answer will move 
us ever closer to what constitutes, for that particular situation, the
'right' answer. But we have already seen in this section that questions
and answers in the form of propositions are externalisations of the 
value system of the individual. Questions and answers are embedded 
within the notion ' I believe ... ' or in the stronger claim, ' I know
.. . '. Vhat is happening in a dialogical relationship of question and 
answer, then, is not simply the uncovering of propositional beliefs, as 
in the syntactic 'I believe: it is raining' (tNP + Predicate: NP +
Predicate]); but is also the probing of the belief system of one by 
another; the attempt to share personal knowledge and enter into and 
dwell in the mind of the other, The questions that are answered by the
syntactic ' I believe ... ' in its propositional form are those of the
pragmatic heuristics 'when?', 'who?', 'what?', 'which?', 'where?'. The 
questions that are answered by the dialectical ' I believe ... ' in its 
relational form are those of the hermeneutic heuristics 'why?' and 
'how?'. The syntactic form is looking for causes in the nature of 
descriptions;- the dialectical form is looking for reasons in the nature 
of explanations. The first is attended to by the phenomenological
( 491 )
theories of, for example, Schuts (1972), who posits 'in-order-to' and 
'because- ' motives as descriptive of human intercourse (see also
Chapter 3 of this text). The second is attended to by, for example, the
critical theories of Habermas (1976) who takes agreement among
thoughtful individuals as the explanatory override for reaching inter-
competence understanding - in my terms, sharing personal knowledge.
Vhat I am trying to work toward is an understanding of a theory of
communication that is an application of the notions I have arrived at in 
my enquiries about the constitution of, and acquistion of, knowledge of 
the nature of values. This theory of communication is grounded in
individual competence. I have suggested that material stored at 
competence level, the values system of the individual, is raised to
surface consciousness (performance level) by the intentionality of the 
individual engaging in dialectical operations, The implication here for 
a theory of competence is that people engaged with each other will 
intentionally operate at competence level as well as performance in 
their shared knowledge claims - i.e. that the utterances they produce 
will not only be phonologically and syntactically acceptable utterances 
but will also be reflective of the underlying competence of the 
individual. The criteria that Habermas suggests (1979) to steer 
communication, those of authenticity, sincerity, truth, 
comprehensibility, are instances of this point. The values and truth 
conditions he puts forward are to do with the validity of dialogue. 
Dialogue, for Habermas, is valid (meaningful) if parties are authentic 
in themselves, are sincere in what they say, if they choose an utterance 
that is appropriate to the situation, and if the utterances may be
( *f92 )
demonstrated as true. All these conditions are mutually agreed criteria 
of dialogue that will produce 'right' answers and questions 
(Collingwood, op.cit.); they will create mutually agreed truths that are 
manifestations of the shared knowledge of committed individuals.
I am saying that these criteria are grounded in competence, and may be 
accepted as criteria by individuals who are aware of them (performance). 
They may not actually articulate or analyse them, but the individuals 
concerned are aware, as part of their known values system, that these 
are the things they want to do. In applying the values of competence in 
their lives (performance), individuals are forming dialogical 
communities (Bernstein, 1983) which are founded upon intersubjective 
agreements to understand. In this way, shared knowledge becomes a 
shared form of life; and a form of life, in Wittgenstein's philosophy, 
is the truth condition for a claim to knowledge.
I shall have more to say about the justification of knowledge claims in 
the next chapter. For now, I wish to consider some of the implications 
for educational research that may be drawn from my hypotheses so far.
( h93 )
(iii) Implications
In this section, I wish to consider five major implications. They are.*
(a) The need to distinguish between theories of schooling and theories 
of education
(b) The need to break with propositional forms of knowledge
(c) The need for individual enquiries by teachers
(d) The need for individual enquiries by learners
(e) The need for educational research to be educational
In Chapter 8 I shall consider issues involved in the justification of 
knowledge claims. Bearing in mind that I will hope to Justify my claims 
to knowledge, these are the claims I make:
<1) I have helped to improve the quality of education for the 
people in my care;
(2) I have improved the quality of education for myself;
(3) I can account for this improvement; that is, I can make 
explicit my understanding of how this improvement has come 
about - I have developed my own educational knowledge.
This third claim is to be found in the title of this text. I maintain 
that my study has of itself been educational. I will enumerate the 
reasons and substantiations in Chapter 8, but here I will simply say 
that I am a better person for having undertaken my study than I would 
have been if I had not done so.
( b9b )
What I now have to say indicates the implications I see for my own life. 
I have stated above that my understandings, in order to qualify as true 
for me as an individual, will lead me to a form of life that reflect 
those understandings. My intention is to make my own knowledge 
explicit, to invite you, the reader, to share that knowledge with me, 
and to agree or not as the case may be. If we do reach agreement, we 
shall agree to share our knowledge, and to adopt a common form of life 
that reflects our agreement. The implications that I am about to 
explain are, in fact, my values-in-action; and, if we agree our common 
knowledge, we shall abide by our shared knowledge in our future 
intentional actions.
(a) The need to distinguish between theories of schooling and theories 
of education
Theories of education need to be grounded in a valid explanation of what 
education is. The dominant assumption in the literature is that 
education is to do with schooling, and that educational research should 
be focused on an improvement in the management of schooling. Some 
recent recommendations <e.g. Wilson, 1989) rest on the assumptions that 
education is to do with schooling, that educational knowledge may be 
controlled by external experts, that education is a commodity geared 
towards the consumer, and that theory, the 'packaging' of educational
( 495 )
knowledge, Is reified and external to teachers In classrooms. I cannot 
accept these assumptions on the grounds that none of them has been 
applicable to my own study. In trying to adhere to the principles of 
these assumptions, I was deliberately and systematically distorting my 
own practice, including my way of thinking. It took extreme turbulence 
to make me realise the need to shift my ground (Chapters 3 and 4 of this 
text).
Having shifted my ground, I will suggest that these assumptions need to 
be overtaken, to make way for new approaches and fresh ways of thinking. 
I believe that these ways of thinking consider that education is to do 
with individuals, that educational knowledge is formed by practising 
teachers through the reality of their own practices, that education is a 
discovery by the self of its own innate potential, and that educational
theory is an organic device that helps researchers to explain the
organic nature of their own development.
From my study, I have come to believe that theory may become research.
Because it is organic, the theory of now has the potential to change
into a new state of being, a new theory. The process by which it 
changes is research. In the model of S(i-v), research takes the form of 
the hermeneutic heuristics that lead toward temporary structures 
(theories) which are themselves volatile and inherently obsolescent. I 
can claim legitimacy for this concept by pointing to my own practice as 
a teacher, when my desire to stay within the confines of the 
specifications of the literature led me nowhere. I have stated earlier,
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and ray conviction grows, that an adherence to prescriptive forms of 
practice leads only to stunted growth. In my deliberate attempts to 
warp the development of myself and my children, I was disallowing the 
creativity of life, and intentionally attempting to stop progress.
I believe that education is not to do with school. The management of 
schooling is part of sociological issues. While I accept that efficient 
management of schools and schooling is necessary for a promotion of an 
improvement in the quality of education, I do not equate the two. An 
improvement in schooling does not mean an improvement in education, and 
research into schooling does not mean research into education. 
Schooling ie, to my mind, to do with the turning out of people who will 
adopt appropriate standards which will entitle them to a legitimate 
place in a given society. It is not to do with helping them to think, 
to be aware of states of being, that will help them rationalise which 
standards they want to adopt, nor explain why they should.
I believe that a similar mismatch of approaches is evident in the 
majority of the current literature. Much energy has been expended on 
arriving at definitions of education and applying those definitions. 
Although such an exercise has a place in indicating the stands that have 
been taken - i.e. descriptions of practice - I feel that much of the 
energy that has been used by many investigators in the name of
educational research would have been better employed if those
investigators had applied a critical awareness to their own practice. 
The literature abounds with descriptions and recommendations. It is
thin in explanations. Few investigators see the need to account for
( W  )
their own educational development. They prefer rather to make 
pronouncements, at a safe distance, on other peoples'. Because those 
pronouncements are distanced and reified, they cannot qualify as 
explanations; they qualify simply as descriptions of what other people 
are, or ought to be, doing. As such, they emerge as pronouncements on 
schooling. They may not qualify as explanations of personal practice.
(b) The need to break with propositional forms of knowledge
It is not enough to speak about experience. Ve have to experience the 
experience for ourselves.
Speaking about experience results in descriptions of practice, either in 
terms of other people's practice or one's own. The case studies to be 
found in the most of the literature are from this standpoint (e.g. 
Nixon, 1981; Hustler et al, 1986). Vhat is needed, I feel, is for 
researchers to use research as a means to demonstrate in practice how 
they have come to know - to show how they have moved in time from a less 
satisfactory state of being in which values were denied in practice to a 
more satisfactory state of being in which values are in process of being 
realised in practice. They need to demonstrate publicly how they have 
come to know - i.e. to Justify their claim to understand their own 
personal development - by making their reports available to a wide 
audience, and using that public scrutiny as a means of validating their 
claims to educational knowledge.
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I am moving toward this in my own work. 'Action research: principles
and practice' was published in November, 1988. In this text I included 
individuals' accounts of their own practice, and I have expressed the 
views in general that I am voicing here.
(c) The need for individual enquiries by teachers
There has been a significant shift in the focus of in-service education 
during the 1970s and 80s. Stenhouse's Humanities Curriculum Project had 
much to do with the promotion of the view of the teacher as researcher. 
The shift in focus was towards school-based curriculum reform, when 
Individual schools were encouraged to take stock of what they were doing 
and suggest ways of improving their practice (e.g. Davies, 1980; Lawton, 
1973). I will suggest that this was a move in the right direction, but 
the emphasis was still on schools and their organisation, rather than on 
the individual practices of teachers. In-service education is still 
more to do with schooling than education.
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At present, the dominant paradigm for in-service education is still 
grounded in the notion of the control of educational knowledge. This 
knowledge is still seen as a reified body of accumulated knowledge, 
which teachers are required to accept. Educational research is still 
seen in the light of the application of this body of knowledge, in terms
of a clear process (knowledge-how) of the application of a specific
content (knowledge-that). In-service provision is grounded in 
prepositional knowledge. So long as this situation obtains, teachers 
will always be relegated to the service role of technicians.
I broke out of the mould. I was one of the lucky ones. I have rejected
the view of controlled knowledge and the control of my practice, and I
exercise my right as a "person claiming originality and exercising (her) 
personal Judgement responsibly with universal intent" (Polanyi, 1958). 
I feel very strongly that teachers should be given the support and 
encouragement to do the same.
For me, personal enquiry is the only way to improve personal practice. 
I have attempted to demonstrate this throughout the text. There is an 
urgent need for teachers to be encouraged to see the control of their 
practice as resting within themselves, as well as influenced by social 
structures; the need to give reasoned Justification for' that practice in 
making public their claims to knowledge; the need to have ratified in 
public forum the legitimacy of those forms of knowledge.
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These recommendations themselves rest on two assumptions. I have used 
this text to show how these assumptions have come into being - i.e. to 
show how and why I think as I do - and I may articulate them here as (1) 
a belief that personal enquiry will bring about an improvement in an 
educational situation and (2) the notion 'education’ embraces the ideas 
of improvement and development. I am aware that my interpretation of 
the terms 'improvement' and 'development' do not coincide with their use 
in much of the literature, in this way:
I will suggest that published aims of education, and particularly moral 
education, tend to rest on the assumption of an external, reified Truth 
that is the guiding light of teachers' practices (e.g. FEU, 1981; DES, 
1981). Our current educational theory is couched in propositional terns; 
our current theories of moral education rest on the assumption of an 
external, absolute Good towards which we all must strive, and the 
teacher's task is to help her pupils attain this state of grace.
In a propositional sense, the idea of improvement is that of moving 
towards the abstract good. I have critiqued the literature for the lack 
of guidance in a clear characterisation in operational terms of its 
recommendations (see Chapter 3 of this text): when we read 'to help
pupils attain their full potential' what do the terms 'attain' and 'full 
potential' mean in practice. What is the nature of the abstract good?
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I will say that it is time to break with propositional forms of 
knowledge and think rather in dialectical ways that focus on the 
realities of now rather than the abstractions of never-never land. 
Philosophies of moral education that are based on the notion of an 
abstract good do not add to the everyday, commonsense desire to improve 
this present situation here. They do not explain why a child is 
naughty, or how a teacher decides which strategy to employ in moving the 
child forward in his own understanding.
I find the idea of absolute goodness comforting, and I truly believe in 
the ultimate perfection of God. At the same time, I also truly believe 
in the present goodness in man (for me, God working in man) that is to 
be found in situations of intersubjective agreement. The goodness that 
we can understand, and agree to bring about, is grounded in the reality 
of the present when a situation is made beneficial for all parties. 
Happiness is to be found Just as much in dreaming as in achieving; I 
enjoy the party just as much in anticipation as in the experiencing; for 
the acts of dreaming and anticipation are themselves rich mental 
experiences which I dismiss at my peril. The dialogical communities on 
earth are perhaps an anticipation of a heaven yet to come, but, to my 
mind, they are in fact heaven on earth. Goodness is here, in each one 
of us (in our individual competences), and it is up to every one of us 
to use it (performance; values-in-action) to the best of our ability.
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Seen in this sense, 'improvement' does not mean working toward an 
ultimate good, but proceeding by minimal steps toward a present good. I 
have characterised (Chapter 6) the 'end product' of a series of minimal 
steps as a new state. As one structure is cancelled, so another begins; 
so that there is no end, but always new states of being.
The notion of improvement is in the idea of movement forward toward a 
state of new being. Goodness is not to be found only in an absolute 
Truth, but in the notion of ever-evolving states of being.
For me, the idea of Grace is not to be found in an absolute Truth, and 
therefore unattainable to mortals, but is immediately accessible to each 
and every one of us. I share the views of Bernstein (1983) that "if we 
are truly dialogical beings - always in conversation, always in the 
process of understanding - then the dynamics of the play of 
understanding underlie and pervade all human activities." Bernstein 
considers the work of Gadamer: "We can see why for Gadamer, the process
of understanding can never (ontologically) achieve finality, why it is 
always open and anticipatory"; and the work of Habermas; " (His work) 
can orient our collective praxis in which we seek to approximate the 
ideal of reciprocal dialogue and discourse, and in which the respect, 
autonomy, solidarity and opportunity required for the discursive 
redemption of universal normative validity claims are not mere abstract 
' oughts' but are to be embodied in our social practices and 
institutions." (Bernstein, 1983)
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This, then, is the foundation for my first assumption, that personal 
enquiry will bring about an improvement in an educational situation. 
Vhat of my second assumption, that the notion 'education' embraces the 
ideas of improvement and development?
In the terms of this text, 'education' is the process whereby the self 
comes to know its own self. In the terms of Chapter 6, the knowledge of 
self comes about through the dialectical transformations that enable 
competence to be realised in performance, and for performance in turn to 
shape competence. The action of the transformations is brought about 
through the action-reflection of the knowing subject. Educational 
enquiry is to do with individuals' enquiries into their own personal 
practice, seeking to understand those practices and make those 
understandings available to public debate.
It is the understanding through critical reflection that enables the 
process of improvement to come about. Improvement, as we have seen in 
the recent discussion, is inherent in the notion of an openness to new 
forms of being. Similarly, development is not characterised in terms of 
end states, but is the state of openness, the actioning of the 
generative component that releases the potential for ever-evolving new 
states of being. Education is movement; education is process - not 
towards final end states, but towards new beginnings. An understanding 
of being, for self is being, and self-development is the evolution and 
metamorphosis into ever-new states of being.
( 50h )
For me, this is where the future lies. The future is not to be found in 
degenerate theories of education which jealously guard the notion of a 
control of abstract knowledge. It is to be found in the living reality 
of teachers' practices, as they try to make sense of what is going on, 
here and now, in order to improve the the quality of life for 
themselves and the people in their care.
(d) The need for individual enquiries by learners
I am pleading in these pages for the establishment of a new tradition of 
educational enquiry that focuses on the integrity of individuals in the 
living reality of their own locations. I have suggested that teachers 
need to be encouraged to take on the role of researchers, but that their 
field of enquiry should not be in the propositional sense, as 
traditional models suggest, of applying reified theories to their own
practices. Rather I am saying that teachers need to take on the
responsibility of investigating their own practice through their own 
action-reflection, in order to produce personal theories of education
(Whitehead, 1984) to provide explanations for those practices, and
provide publicly agreed substantiation for their claim to knowledge.
In the same way, I have suggested that this is the same method by which 
learners may come to know themselves - i.e. engage in their own personal 
process of education. This has enormous implications for traditions of 
teaching methodologies.
( 505 )
I am drawing a comparison here between the control of knowledge by 
writers of the literature, and by teachers, consumers of the literature. 
Throughout this text I have challenged the view that legitimate 
knowledge rests in the academy or in the literature, and is not
generally viewed as a creation of individual teachers. I have said that 
teachers come to understand their own development through the action of 
their practice, and through a critical reflection on that action. Such 
understandings as they do have form more adequate and appropriate 
theories of education than the reified theories to be found in the 
literature; and, once shared in public forum, provide the basis for a 
shared form of life with other practitioners that will help those 
practitioners move forward THEIR own practice. Such a process, I have 
said, is educational, on an I-basis, and offers teachers explanations by 
themselves for their practice rather than descriptions by other people 
which often prove to be distortions of their practice.
I am now saying that teachers also need to relinquish their vested
interest in the control of their clients' knowledge. Some current
models of teaching methodologies - didactic/expository, methods aimed ajj 
encouraging discovery learning - are not always, to my Jfiind, 
educational, in that they do not require the learner to think for 
himself.
To make this concept more explicit: traditional didactic/expository
styles are grounded in the notion of reified knowledge. Teachers 
acquire information and pass it on to their learners, who receive it and 
accept it. This was true of my practice in personal and social
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education, 1981-83, where, although I used the methods aimed at 
socialisation, such as group work and role play, I always controlled the 
action so that it would fit in line with my preconceived goals. I can 
say that this view of teaching is similar to a view of empiric methods 
of educational research, in which the testing out of a researcher's 
original hypothesis often results in a confirmation of that hypothesis, 
(see also Adelman and Young, 1985)
The idea behind discovery/enquiry methods is that learners will discover 
the truth for themselves. I do not agree that this is always the case. 
I am reminded, for example, of Socrates's conception of education, where 
the learner is gradually brought to see things for himself. I have 
already referenced his account of his encounter with the slave.
Socrates was intending to show how he brought the slave to see for
himself, but Socrates had the answers all the time, and led the slave to 
the point of sharing his view. To my mind, this is manipulation rather 
than education. I can draw a parallel between this style of teaching
and the methods of the educational interpretive tradition, in which an
investigator tries to agree his interpretations of observed practice 
with those of the teacher (Parlett and Hamilton, 1972; see also Walker, 
1985). The guiding light here is still the validity of externally 
imposed control on individual practice. This was representative of my 
practice in personal and social education, roughly 1983/84, when I 
engaged people in their own learning with a view to bringing them, by 
their own volition, to my interpretation of the truth. In reality, I 
was not really engaging them in their own learning so much as engaging
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them in my master-plan; and, as such, I was guilty of deception and 
manipulation, of myself as well as of them.
I believe my later practice of 1985/86 was beginning to qualify as 
educational. I began to relinquish control, in that I genuinely
afforded validity to the children’s views, rather than attempted to 
distort them to fit my own. I did this by encouraging enquiry learning, 
by encouraging the children to engage in their own systematic action- 
ref lection (Chapter 3 of this text). In so doing, I attempted to move 
away from the image of the courtroom, in which they were on trial and I 
was the judge, to the image of a dialogical community, in which we 
intentionally set up the framework for a foundation of intersubjective 
agreement that would allow us genuinely to communicate as persons of 
integrity. This was initially a most difficult task for me, for I felt 
that I was abdicating responsibility as an efficient teacher. As I saw 
it, I was not teaching anything. My understandings today tell me that I 
was moving away from content-based styles to client-based styles; I was 
educating the children rather than manipulating them.
This is, in my opinion, an area that needs urgent attention by
educational researchers. I conducted my own action research into ray 
pupils' action research. I had to leave teaching, unfortunately, at 
precisely that time when the most fundamental insights were beginning to 
be made explicit and contribute to my practice. What is needed, I
believe, is other enquiries into children's enquiries, to see if such an
approach will contribute to teachers' understandings of how to encourage 
children's understandings; to build dialogical communities of enquiring
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practitioners, from the ranks of teachers and learners, who engage in 
shared forms of life to improve the quality of education for themselves 
and for others.
(e) The need for educational research to be educational
I have indicated above my belief that much of what goes on in the 
community of researchers in the name of educational research often does 
not qualify as educational. I need to clarify this issue, and I will 
suggest that two areas in particular come into focus in <1) the use of 
the concept 'educational' and (2) the purpose of educational research.
(1) A clarification of concepts
In (a) above I indicated that the term 'educational' is often used where 
the term 'sociological' would be more appropriate. There seem to be two 
tendencies in the literature: the first to use the terms synonymously, 
and the second to confuse characterisations of the two terms.
'Educational' and 'sociological' tend to be used synonymously when 
commentators are referencing the activities of schools and schooling, 
such activities often to be classified under the term 'management'.
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For example, if I am planning to evaluate a curriculum change (e.g. 
House, 1980), the exercise may not always qualify as 'educational'. I 
am concerned with pragmatics and logistics, the efficient allocation of 
timing and its effects, and so on. My activities are perhaps within a 
location where education goes on, i.e. a school or other institution, 
but my activity is not intrinsically educational - i.e. my own education 
is not the focus of the exercise. What I am practising and improving, 
perhaps, is my managerial expertise; I am not immediately concerned with 
developing my own understanding of myself.
Of course, such an explication as I have outlined immediately begs the 
use of the term 'education', which may be, and often is, all things to 
all people - hence such confusion and liberty-taking in the literature. 
I will return to this point shortly.
The second point I have made is that 'educational' is often confused 
with 'sociological'. Carr and Kemmis (1986), for example, tend to make 
this confusion systematically; "A critical educational science must 
then be a participatory science, its participants or 'subjects' being 
the teachers, students and others who create, maintain, enjoy and endure 
educational arrangements".
I agree with Carr and Kemmis in their apology for a 'critical 
educational science', but I would suggest, before going too far, that 
the concept of 'education' is characterised and used consistently.
( 51 o )
For me, as I have indicated throughout, ’education' is to do with the 
process of the development of the rationality of the individual. 
Education is the way in which the self comes to understand its own self. 
If I apply this concept to my discourse about education, the only way in 
which it makes sense - is context-semantically valid - is if I apply it 
to myself.
I may legitimately say, "I am conducting my programme of educational 
research into my desire to improve my own practice". I may also 
legitimately say, "I am helping my children to improve their education 
through my own educational research" for I am attempting to understand 
the practices in which I am engaged which will in turn help the children 
to understand the practices in which they are engaged. But I would 
strongly resist anyone who, as Peter did in my account in Chapter 3, 
attempted to indicate that he was doing 'educational' research into my 
practice. Only I, as a reflexive practitioner, may do that. Research 
ON other people is not, for me, educational. Research into self IS.
For me, research is to do with creativity. I see research as an 
enterprise, conducted by an individual, or group of individuals working 
collaboratively, in order to develop understandings about a particular 
self-specific issue, and to use those understandings to build innovative 
theories which may explain the issue more adequately. I do not take the 
view of research as defined, for example, by Wilson (1981) that it is an 
activity conducted by experts on an unknowing person-object or group of 
persons-object. In this way, research becomes a content-based exercise 
of documenting facts and figures, the normative-analytic methods of the
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social sciences and of empiric and interpretive paradigms of so-called 
educational research.
(2) The purpose of educational research
Let me now consider what I see as the purpose of educational research.
Recent moves in directions of research paradigms show certain shifts in 
emphasis:
In the 1960s there was a move toward school-based curriculum reform 
(see, for example, Lawton, 1973). In the 1970s the influence of
Lawrence Stenhouse was evident in his encouragement of practitioner- 
centred, rather than institution-centred, research. Eggleston' et al 
(1976) speak in favour of 'lifting the lid off the black box of 
classroom practices', in their view, aiming to help teachers describe 
what goes on in their own classrooms. A number of dissertations have 
been submitted by my contemporaries that follow this line, for example, 
Denley (1988), Jensen (1987), Larter (1987), Gurney (1989), Eames, 
1987).
I maintain that, although such views of practice and resultant texts are 
to do with education, they do not intrinsically qualify as educational 
research, in that they do not make explicit the understandings of the 
researchers involved in improving the quality of their own education.
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This, I believe, is the nub. Educational research has to demonstrate 
the understanding of an Individual’s enquiry-in-action for that 
individual to claim legitimate educational status for the enquiry. I 
believe, with Torbert (1981), Walker (1985), Stronach (1986) and 
Whitehead (1989), that educational research needs to be educational. 
The person doing the research needs to be prepared to shift ground, 
because her intentions, in embarking on her enquiry, are (a) to change 
her understandings, and (b) to change her form of life in line with her 
created understandings. Such change constitutes the nature of 
education; the creation of new forms of being is the implicit notion of 
•education'. I have come to this understanding precisely because, when 
I first embarked on my study, I was not prepared to change; and I was 
forced to change in view of the new forms of life I had to adopt in
order to stay true to the emergence of my own personal knowledge.
Polanyi's aphorism (1958) that personal enquiry is a hazardous journey
was never so true as what I encountered. But it was worth it.
So I would claim that my enquiry has been, and still is, educational: 
and I will defend my knowledge claim in the coming chapter. I believe 
that this text may qualify as part of the emergent tradition that Carr 




There are some incisive implications in these views. I am forced to 
consider central aspects of my own role over the years, and to decide 
whether that was adrift from my educational values. I am forced to 
reconsider my educational values, and to wonder if they have changed. I
need to consider if and how I will change my form of practice to
accommodate my learnings.
Let me first consider what I was doing in my research study. It started 
life, in 1981, as an evaluation of the social, personal and careers 
education programme at school. Jack Whitehead and I decided on a 
strategy that, before I could enquire into other people's practices, I 
first had to understand my own. I have come to the view today that,
before I enquire into other people's practices, I need to make explicit
and public my own understandings of my own practice, and ask other 
people to share my ideas and, if they so desire, my form of life so that 
we may continue a dialogue that will move forward our individual and 
joint understandings.
I am aware now that the term 'personal and social education' is a 
misnomer. I am a great advocate for personal education; that, I am 
inclined to think, is the field of enquiry where my future lies. I am 
doubtful about the idea of 'social education'. There can be, and is, a 
phenomenon called 'social training' or 'social instruction', which is a 
body of theories about personal conduct in social situations. Such 
theories stem from normative standards of personal conduct. I cannot
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see, however, that social training has anything intrinsically to do with 
the personal education of the individual. The connection lies in the 
applications, as outlined in this chapter, that people who conduct their 
own enquiries into self may join with others who are similarly inclined 
to form dialogical communities that will encourage the personal growth 
of the individual members.
I am aware that I must call into question my own role and teaching 
style. In advocating the setting up of dialogical communities in 
classrooms, I am not suggesting that I, or others, should opt for a 
laissez-faire style or abdicate responsibility. On the contrary. I 
believe that it is even more necessary to set up clear frameworks, and 
these to be frameworks of care (1987b) that will allow the spontaneous 
development of individual creativity.
My role as a teacher needs to be that of a strong leader; but mine needs 
to be the leadership that will insist on the keeping of mutually agreed 
rules. Straughan (1982) says that "a major factor in achieving the 
disciplined commitment will be the personal example set by the teacher." 
He cites the work of Mary Warnock (1975) who says: "The teacher must be
a LEADER in argument if he is to teach argument . . . the children must 
not be deprived of the spectacle Df a teacher who holds, or clearly 
expresses, moral views (for) there is nothing but benefit in the 
contemplation of a [wo3man of principle." Pertaining to the question of 
teaching style in moral education, Mary Warnock suggests a procedure of 
"firstly, by teaching (on some occasions at least) what he himself 
believes to be morally right and wrong, and WHY he so believes, thus
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exemplifying what it means to seek to justify a moral viewpoint: and 
secondly by ENCOURAGING critical questioning and appraisal of that 
viewpoint, so demonstrating the value that he, as a moral agent, places 
upon independent judgement and rational discussion. By adopting this 
approach the moral educator is not debarred from declaring and arguing 
for his own moral beliefs, but he must also strive to convey that all 
moral conclusions are PROVISIONAL, in the sense that they must be held 
open to the reasoned criticism of others, however firmly one believes in 
their validity" (her italics, Varnock, 1975).
I agree with Mary Warnock's views on teaching style. For me, moral
education is not only to do with content areas about whose validity
opinions may be expressed, but with the process of bringing children to 
the state where they WANT to KNOW. The WANTING to KNOW is the spur to 
their own action enquiry. The teacher's task is then to help the
learner through the maze, not by imposing ideas, but by supporting the
learner in the personal discovery of his own. In this task, the teacher
has two massive methodological resources to hand: the first is to
encourage dialectical ways of being; the second is in the building of 
frameworks of care.
I have already stated my belief that humans are dialectical beings, 
From the work of Basseches (1984) I can suggest that maturity of thought 
is reflected in dialectical ways of thinking, with the emphasis on
openness to new experience (Buber, 1965); whereas formal structures
impose restrictions on thought processes and the ways of being which 
reflect those thought processes which lead to stunted growth. I will
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agree with Iris Murdoch (1970) that "the search for unity is deeply 
natural", but that unity comes from a synthesis of development rather 
than a destruction of development.
I would say that the insistence of the policy makers (as, for example, 
in the current legislation, DES, 1987) on formal structures is geared 
toward legitimating the notion of institutionalised retardation. It is 
envisioned that children's development depends on sufficient input from 
their teachers, who will act according to the propositions of the policy 
makers themselves. This efficient machine will produce the 'certain 
kind of person' who will perpetuate the system.
I would suggest that a policy of freedom is in tune with a valid 
interpretation of the term ' education' as it is used in ’ educational 
research', 'educational theory' and 'educational practice'. Freedom of 
thought is to be found in dialectical ways of thinking. I have already 
suggested that it is not enough to surmise that dialectical thinking is 
a stage beyond Piaget's formal operations. I believe that dialectical 
thinking is the 'natural' way for people to think, and that formal 
schemes indicate methods of organisation which reflect the formal 
structures of their creators' thought processes, rather than provide 
explanations for the mental life of persons. Organisations of curricula 
which are analytic - i.e. emphasise the contrasts in a field of study, 
rather than the relationships - and teaching methodologies which are 
analytic - i.e. aim to develop the cognitive abilities of the learner 
without taking note of his affective inclinations - perpetuate the
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propositions that education is to do with schooling and personal 
development is to do with producing a certain kind of person.
I have found in my practice that my strategies of helping my children to 
dialaogical forms of being - i.e. to encourage their view of themselves 
as dialectical beings - promotes their well-being as individuals, as 
outlined in this text. Vhat I now need to do is share this idea in a
dialectical form. I am doing that through this present text, and
through my future teaching activities. I am anxious that my work should 
not in itself appear propositional, and my corrective is always the fact
that I make explicit that my propositions of the form ' I believe : that
.. .' are embedded within the dialectical framework of myself as a living 
person whose articulated values system is an expression of the semantic 
'I believe ... * at the deep level of competence.
This is now where I draw on my second resource of frameworks of care. 
In my theory of performance and communication, I have indicated that the 
building of dialogical communities will support the notion of an 
interdependent community of reflexive independents, whose telos is the 
need for intersubjective agreement that will enable personal enquiries 
to go forward, This notion, I have said, applies to communities of 
enquirers in every location: teachers following taught courses at
institutes of education, teachers following their own classroom 
enquiries, teachers of teachers engaged in in-service work, learners in 
classroom situations, and so on. I agree with Whitehead (1986) that 
"the majority of circumstances in education require warm and caring
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relationships to improve them. These qualities are often more important 
than the use of a systematic form of enquiry."
Relationships do not Just happen. They are created by caring teachers 
who are prepared to pay attention to personal practice in which there is 
a supreme realisation of the value of persons.
This is the point that I came to in my practice as a teacher. I moved 
from seeing my role in 1981 as an imparter of information to children 
whom I was determined to turn into persons who fitted my view of the 
'certain kind of person' who was the end product of personal and social 
education; to seeing myself as the person who could create the 
relationship that would encourage each child to want to explore her own 
form of being, to grow. In my practice as a thinker, I have moved from 
seeing myself as a 'certain kind of person' who makes propositional 
statements in accordance with the tenets of the dominant paradigm; to 
seeing myself as an independent, who is qualified to interpret the world 
as I see it (Polanyi, 1958) with a view to improving the quality of 
education for myself and for the people in my care.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE JUSTIFICATION OF EDUCATIONAL KNOWLEDGE
(NOTE: I am indebted to the work of Brian Haymes [ 1988], for helping me
to clarify many of the concepts about justification that are expressed 
in sections 1 and 2 of this chapter)
INTRODUCTION
In this text I have imagined that the notion 'knowledge' has its 
expression in three forms (see Chapter 5):
1 knowledge that
2 knowledge how
3 knowledge + a direct object
I now need to consider what constitutes the nature of claims to 
knowlege; that is, the sort of knowledge an individual is claiming for 
using a particular form of expression. I also need to consider how such 
knowledge claims may be - or if they need to be - justified. When it is 
a question of claims to educational knowledge, I need tD consider if the 
claim is legitimate - i.e. if the speaker is selecting an appropriate 
form of expression in which to place his claim; if his claim 
demonstrates the concept that his own education has been extended in 
some way; and if his claim is justified.
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To begin with, I shall consider the nature of the concept 'claim to
knowledge'.
1 THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT 'CLAIM TO KNOWLEDGE'
I have hypothesised three distinct forms of knowledge (above and Chapter 
5), and I have argued that knowledge + a direct object may be linked, in 
some of its forms, with the notion of personal knowledge, and can 
contain within itself the formal structures of propositional and
procedural knowledge (Chapters 6 and 7).
I now wish to make some further observations on the nature of these 
forms of knowledge, so that I may consider the methods by which persons 
claiming to 'know' in such forms may justify their claims.
My observations follow a general hypothesis that, for each form of
knowledge so far discussed, there are two levels involved: (a) a level
of abstraction, and (b) a level of personal commitment. When I come to 
speak about justification of knowledge, I shall surmise that the level 
of abstraction may be Justified by inference, and that the level of
personal commitment may be Justified by a form of life.
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<i) Forms of 'knowledge that'
Propositional knowledge may be characterised by the clausal form 'know 
that'. It is my contention that 'know that' may operate at two levels 
in the mind of the speaker who claims 'knowledge that' in these ways:
People usually make propositions about the world in terms of know-that: 
"I know that it is 10 o' clock"; "1 know that he lives there".
Bertrand Russell drew the distinction (1919, 1973) between knowledge of 
propositions and knowledge of objects and persons; he termed them 
'knowledge of truths' and 'knowledge of things'. In his terminology, 
knowlege of truths fits the formula 'know that P': "I know that it is
Friday". Knowledge of things moves toward what I have called, following 
Polanyi, 'personal knowledge’: 'I know X'; "I know John". (I draw a
distinction between utterances of the form ' I know John' and ' I know 
myself': I shall follow through this train of thought in (ii) below).
Let us stay for a moment with the easily-recognised form of 'know that 
P', in order to consider the existence of abstract and personal 
knowledge within this form.
I propose that 'know that P' is the usual form of utterance in which 
persons externalise their knowledge about the world. In Chapter 7 I 
have suggested that 'know that P' is a manifestation at performance 
level of the underlying values system of the speaker, which entails the 
tacit form 'I believe/know: know that P'.
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Consider, for example, H.H. Price's story (1969; cited in Haymes, 1988) 
about passengers waiting for a train. Passenger A is worried about the 
lateness of the train, and demonstrates his anxiety by looking at his 
watch, shuffling his feet, and so on. Passenger B observes his 
behaviour, and makes the statement, not abnormal in any sense: "I know
that he is worried". It would be quite unusual, however, for Passenger
A to say: "I know that I am worried". He would simply say: " I am
worried". In answer to the question about the justification of their
knowledge claims 'How do you know?', B would draw on his inferential 
knowledge: "I know that he is worried because A is doing such-and-
such", whereas A would draw on his personal knowledge: "I just know".
Yet the phrase 'I just know' in this case is nevertheless an 
externalisation of an underlying tacit claim ' I know that I am worried'.
I would contend, then, that propositional 'know that P' operates at the 
level of abstraction in which we organise and express our formal 
knowledge about the world. We may choose such a form of discourse to 
explicate our externally-oriented knowledge.
At the same time, however, there is a vast pool of underlying latent 
knowledge, which may be expressed in terms of personal commitment: ' I
know that P', where P is to do with self: ' I know that I am worried’ .
The difference is significant when it comes to justification (see (ii) 
below).
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The same duality, I believe is apparent in the field of discourse which 
I have termed in this text 'procedural knowledge', that is, knowledge 
how.
(ii) Forms of 'knowledge how'
Gilbert Ryle (1949) is critical of the intellectualists' stand that 
'knowing that' precedes 'knowing how' - the perpetuation of the theory- 
practice dichotomy. For him procedural knowledge of necessity 
incorporates propositional knowledge. "Knowing a rule of inference is 
not possessing a bit of extra information but being able to perform an 
intelligent operation. Knowing a rule is knowing how."
I have indicated my agreement in this text - that procedural knowledge 
can incorporate propositional knowledge within itself. But I will now 
go on to say that, parallel with (a) above, there is an abstract form 
and a personal form of procedural knowledge.
The abstract form again focuses on our organisation of our experience of 
the world: "I know how to play the piano; I know how to speak German”.
Vhat, however, of the intransitive form of these two sentences: "I know
how to play; I know how to speak"?
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I believe there would be some debate about the validity of the 
application of the term ‘know how' to such utterances. It would be 
acceptable for me to say "I know how to swim" or "I know how to climb
trees". It would be unusual for me to say "Fish know how to swim" or
"Monkeys know how to climb trees". Such organisms do not know how; they 
just do. So perhaps there is a parallel in the concept of birds singing 
and humans singing: it is part of their natural endowment that they do.
I may now draw again (see Chapter 6) on the innateness hypothesis. I 
maintain that persons are born in an intense state of being in which the
potential for acts of creation is unlimited. This potential, in one of
its externalised forms, may be characterised 'know how'. Knowledge how 
to do things, in this personal sense, leads to a form of life: if I have 
the innate knowledge how to speak, my form of life will incorporate that 
knowledge - I will speak.
I may hypothesise, then, that procedural knowledge operates at the 
abstract level of, for example, 'know how to drive a car', in which we 
organise our experience about the world; and at the personal deep level 
of competence, in which procedural knowledge of 'know how to speak' may 
be externalised at performance level in a form of life.
Again, the distinction is significant when it comes to justifying claims 
to knowledge.
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(iii) Forms of 'knowledge + a direct object'
In this section I am able now to articulate some concepts that have been 
glossed in the text so far.
I have characterised (above and in Chapter 5) this third form of 
knowledge as 'knowledge + a direct object', and I will now attempt to 
show that this may be considered, as in <i) and (ii), in its abstract 
and personal form.
Russell (1919) argued for categories of knowledge generally termed 
'knowledge by description' and 'knowledge by acquaintance'. Knowledge 
by description enables us to 'know' things external to ourselves - the 
conceiving of our awareness of Universals. Knowledge by acquaintance 
enables us to have immediate, direct knowledge of something or someone - 
the 'concepts' which are the Universals of which we are aware. By
description I may know of the Queen; but I may not know her unless by
immediate acquaintance. Knowledge by description enlarges our knowledge 
ABOUT the world; knowledge by acquaintance enlarges our knowledge IN the 
world.
I will suggest now that such immediate knowledge about persons may
operate at an abstract level. Ve may see persons as external to us and
unrelated to us. "I know John" has no further significance to my life 
than as an utterance - until I am called upon to justify my knowledge 
(see below).
( 327 )
There is also a deeper level of knowledge + a direct object, what I have 
termed throughout as 'personal knowledge', and is the result of a 
commitment to knowledge. 'I know myself' is the concept aimed at when I 
make relevant to my life concepts of the order ' I know John’ . For if I 
make a commitment to the idea of 'I know John' - i.e. if I see John not 
as an abstraction but as a living entity who will have an influence in 
my life, I have to entertain the notion that I as a living person am 
capable of making such commitments. Such a mental 'set', a state of 
readiness to enter a form of life in which knowledge of John is a 
signficiant feature, involves my acceptance of myself as a person who 
may make such a claim to knowledge. Knowing John as an abstraction is 
knowlege by description, and involves my formal structures of thought; 
knowing John as a person is knowledge by acquaintance, and involves my 
dialectical forms of thought. The difference is one of direct and 
indirect knowledge. Indirect knowledge may rightly be termed 'knowledge 
+ a direct object'. Direct knowledge involves the self, and the 
relationship of the self with that which is claimed to be known. Thus 
knowledge + a direct object metamorphoses into personal knowledge, where 
'knowledge of John' is the catalyst to the self's knowledge of self.
As in (i) and (ii), the difference between the two forms is significant 
when it is a question of the justification of claims to knowledge, and 
that is the aspect to which I turn now.
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2 THE NATURE OF THE JUSTIFICATION OF CLAIMS TO KNOWLEDGE
I will argue in this section that there are two main forms of 
justificaiton to knowledge claims: the first is through inference; the
second is through a form of life (Scheffler, 1985). I shall also 
consider the need for justification, and I shall suggest that certain 
forms of knowledge - for example, the knowledge of personal commitment - 
does not require justification.
(i) Forms of justification
(a) Verification conditions and truth conditions
I wish to consider here two types of conditions that are applicable to 
knowledge claims. They are (1) verification conditions and (2) truth 
conditions. I will argue that they are essentially distinct when 
applied to different kinds of knowledge claim.
In my view, claims to propositional knowledge ground their truth 
conditions in verification: the utterance "I know that today is Friday" 
is true because it can be verified by looking at the calendar. The 
utterance by the golfer in the conversation: Golfer's wife: "Do you
know you look exhausted!" Golfer: "I only know my legs ache." is true
because his form of life bears out his personal knowledge in that he is 
limping; his claim cannot, under any circumstances, be verified by
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recourse to an other's knowledge of his state; his truth Is not open to
verification or question, but it is essentially true to him.
The dominant tradition in the literature is that claims to knowledge may 
be justified by inference. A.J. Ayer (The problem of knowledge, 1972) 
equates verification and truth conditions in his definition: "... first
that what one is said to know be true, secondly that one can be sure of
it, and thirdly that one should have the right to be sure." Now, this 
arrangement may be appropriate to claims of the form ' I know that P' . 
As I write, I know that P is true - yes, this is a pen in my hand. I am 
sure that P is true - this is a pen and not a pencil. I have the right 
to be sure - I have the evidence to say that this is a pen and not a 
pencil.
However, as Hick (1967) says (cited in Haymes, 1988), if knowledge is 
such that it has to fulfil both truth and verification conditions, we 
may not know that we know. 'I know that P' has no "independent 
guarantee" (Haymes, op.cit.) other than its own grounds. The 
distinction highlighted here is that claiming to know and knowing are 
separate realms of discourse. Knowledge itself cannot be erroneous by 
definition, as Haymes points out, but claims to knowledge can. What we 
are talking about is the possibility of certainty.
Haymes continues:
"Nothing is lost or gained by admitting the logical impossibility of 
absolute certainty in some cases. It is true that one can be absolutely
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sure of some knowledge claim. Ve can know, for example, the truth or 
fal6l‘ty of analytic propositions; for example. 'All bachelors are 
unmarried men' . If true such statements are tautologies; if false they 
are contradictions. They can only be tautologies or contradictions as 
a result of the meaning of the words used in them. So this kind of 
'certainty' has restricted application. It is about the meaning of 
symbols or words and not things.
"But in other cases where there is not the possibility of demonstration 
of this symbolic kind all we can ever have is the right to be sure. 
From this we infer a conclusion and claim to know it. It is always 
logically possible that we may be mistaken. What we considered good 
grounds, or a properly accredited route, may prove to be insufficient or 
inaccurate. It is an empirical fact that no one can be absolutely
certain of vii\at they say.
"This is true of all knowledge claims, except the tautologies we have 
already mentioned." (Haymes, 1988)
I will return to the question of how I can 'know that I know' later in 
this section. I wish now to consider some forms of knowledge which are 
resistant to Ayers's definition that verification and truth are in mutual 
distribution. I shall make two points in my argument. The first is to 
do with the internal logic of propositional claims to knowledge: the 
second is to do with the ontology of personal claims to knowledge.
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In the first case I return to Ryle's notion mentioned above that 
procedural know how incorporates propositional know that. In Ryle's 
sense, know how/that is voiced in the sense of 'be able to': 'I know
how to type' = 'I am able to type'. Now, there is a fundamental area of 
human knowledge that defies verification, and this is to do with 
Wittgenstein's notion of 'language game' (a notion that I discuss 
below), or context-specific semantic-specific utterances. As I 
understand his work, this is the notion that Habermas (1979) has aimed 
to characterise in his postulated criteria for the formation by mutually 
agreeing individuals of dialogical communities. What I am saying is 
that there is an area of human knowledge that may not be verified unless 
participants of that form of knowledge share the same realm of 
discourse.
Consider, for example, the conversation:
A: I saw a UFO last night
B: You couldn't have. It was dark.
or:
A: Waiter, waiter, there's a fly in my soup.
B: Quiet, sir, otherwise everyone will want one.
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In both cases, the participants are engaging in different fields of 
discourse. They do not share the same language game. They cannot 
achieve intersubjective understandings, for they do not share the 
ontology of common semantic or pragmatic interpretations, nor the 
epistemology of the desire to reach agreement.
This is significant when it is a question of establishing truth 
conditions, if we equate truth with verification. For if A, the visitor 
to the spiritualist's meeting hears B, the spiritualist, say: "I see
you have someone with you", he will say, "Ho, you're wrong; I have come 
alone". As Haymes says, for a non-believer to ask a believer to prove 
the existence of God simply does not make sense. The believer takes the 
existence of God as given, as a Fundamental Proposition (Wittgenstein, 
1974), and his field of discourse pivots on that given belief. 
Discourse outside that game, for the believer, is of another form that 
he may engage in in an abstracted sense but not in the sense of personal 
commitment.
This is significant when it comes to verification of knowledge how. I 
have said above that a claim of the form 'I know ...' may be answered by 
'how do you know?' - in other words, 'Prove it'. A knowledge claim of 
the form 'I know how to . . . ', in the sense of 'am able to' may be
verified by ostensible proof: I will play the piano, or type - I will 
demonstrate the skills that are involved in my claim tD procedural 
knowledge.
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Taken a step beyond, I may communicate these skills to an other. I may 
teach someone how to play the piano, or type. This level of discourse, 
I suggest, is at the abstracted level identified in (ib) above.
Vhat, though, of a claim to procedural knowledge when the claimant is 
operating at the level of personal commitment. When the student reads 
the theory of dialectical thought and professes, "I know how to think 
dialectically", and is then asked by a colleague, "Teach me how to think 
dialectically", he cannot. He has no personal knowledge of the process. 
He has abstract knowledge of the principles, but no personal knowledge 
of how to apply them in practice.
From my argument, I am saying that it is possible to demonstrate
abstracted procedural knowledge as veridical justification for the claim 
' I know how to do' . It is not always possible to do so for claims to 
personal procedural knowledge; nor is it always necessary (see below).
Yet the lack of verification does not nullify the truth value of a
claim. "I know how to think" may not be subject to veridical
Justification (inference), but it is the major truth condition for the 
thinker's form of life.
This is the point I wish to take up in (b) below: that a form of life is 
a Justification for claims to personal knowledge. Before I do that, I 
must consider a point raised above - that of the necessity of
justification.
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The need for justification
I will leave for the time being the question of verification conditions, 
for I hope to continue to demonstrate that verification is not always 
necessary in establishing the truth. I will now focus only on truth 
conditions - that is, on the speaker's certainty of the truth of his 
claim to knowledge. In making his claim, the speaker is claiming truth 
for his situation in which his claim is made.
How, in order for me to justify the concept which I have just expressed, 
let me consider again the idea of truth. In this text I have indicated 
on several occasions how I moved away from the notion of an abstracted, 
reified Truth, to the idea that truth may be expressed in the form of 
the mutually agreed values-system of consenting individuals.
Incorporated within this principle is the notion of language game. 
Wittgenstein said that language is the expression of a chosen form of 
life: " . , to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life"
(Investigations, 19) and "Here, the term 'language game' is meant to 
bring into prominence the fact that the SPEAKING of a lnaguage is part 
of an activity, or a form of life" (Investigations, 23).
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When, as children, my sister and I talked to the fairies in our shed, 
the exercise was true for us. It was not true to father who thought we 
were playing in the shed. Nor did he share our field of discourse.
The truth of the shared beliefs of consenting individuals provides, for 
them, a form of life. We children did not attempt to draw father into 
our shared truth, but that did not invalidate that particular truth for 
us. Nor did it need justification. We could not justify it, nor was 
there any need to. When father finally banned us from the shed we took 
our shared knowledge to other locations. The locations changed; the 
knowledge did not. Nor did it change until we agreed to change it - 
probably by changing our views about the existence of fairies. But what 
is not forgotten is the fact that we did share the idea of truth - we 
did share a common basis for a form of life; and that union of
childhood, the willingness and ability to share, continued as a form of
life throughout.
My understanding of the work of Gadamer helps me to rationalise this 
issue. Gadamer says (1975) that "understanding is never subjective 
behaviour toward a given 'object', but towards its effective history - 
the history of its influence; in other words, understanding belongs to 
the being Df that which is understood." Forms of life based on
agreements are not vested in the objects of discourse (our childhood
fairies) but in the heritage of mental states that gave rise to such 
agreements. As I have indicated before, consensus is not the aim of 
discourse, but an agreement to share understandings that will provide 
the 'right' answers to move forward individuals' ability to question.
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"In an idea of play, the difference between faith and pretence is 
dissolved," says Gadamer. I believe that an implication is that 
hypotheses as to what constitutes truth are held loosely; that the
thinker is ready to move into new states of being, to generate new
truths within that particular dialogical community.
So I would continue to maintain that justification is not always 
necessary. A knowledge claim that rests on the basis of a form of life 
as its ground does not need to justify itself to other individuals who 
share the same area of discourse in which that knowledge claim is 
embedded, and therefore the same form of life.
I now need to consider more closely the notion 'form of life', and the
type of knowledge claim that is contained within it.
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(b) Knowledge as a form of life
At the basis of this notion is a very simple formulation. It is that:
I claim to know something;
I am committed to that knowledge - i.e. I believe it is true;
I take this knowledge into my values system;
I am committed to my values system;
I show that commitment in my actions;
My claim to knowledge is apparent through my actions;
My values-in-action result in a particular way of living;
My knowledge is manifested in my form of life;
My claim to knowledge is justified by my form of life.
I am not here speaking about the veritude of knowledge. I am speaking 
about the justification of an individual's claim to knowledge. 
'Knowledge' by definition cannot be in error. The question of whether 
other individuals subscribe to the particular values of the individual 
who professes to own that knowledge is another matter, and one to be 
resolved by dialogue. Vhat I am speaking about is an individual's right 
to claim justification for his particular knowledge claim through a form 
of life that reflects the knowledge that is his property.
I have alluded above to Wittgenstein's notion 'form of life'. For him, 
belief and knowledge are synonymous (On Certainty, 42, 308). The 'aim' 
of knowledge is to act or participate in a form of life (110).
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Let me now relate this idea to the views I have expressed in Chapters 6 
and 7 of this text. I have acknowledged my debt to the work of Chomsky, 
in helping me to understand the ideas inherent in the innateness 
hypotheses of Leibniz and von Humboldt. I carried this understanding 
into my formulation of the process of the development of the values 
system of the individual (Chapter 6), and the application of this 
knowledge of values to models of communication and pragmatics (Chapter 
7). I will now say that I may apply the notion 'form of life' in my 
hypotheses in two separate but interrelated fashions: (A) the idea that 
I may imagine 'performance' to be characterised as 'form of life' in an 
abstract, notional sense; (B) that I may apply the notion 'form of life' 
to myself, as Justification for my own claim to knowledge.
(A) Performance as a form of life
In Chapter 6 I hypothesised a model for the acquistion/development of 
values. I suggested that the mind of the individual could be imagined 
as existing at separate but interrelated levels, where the deep level of 
competence acted as the 'pool' of potential, and the surface level of 
performance was the manifestation in action of the values held at 
competence. In Chapter 7 I went on to say that agreements of substance 
(ontological issues) were reached by individuals at performance level, 
through the method Df probing the competences of each other in an effort 
to share, or make a commitment together, to certain values 
(epistemological issues). In (b) above in this section, I have said 
that the form of an individual's life is sufficient justification for 
his knowledge claim (that the values he holds are 'true' for him). His
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performance is justification for his competence. I can go on to say 
that a form of life shared by consenting individuals is sufficient 
Justification for their shared claims to knowledge (that the values they 
hold are 'true' for them). Their joint performances justify their 
shared competences.
How, throughout this text I have argued that an enquiry may operate at 
different levels: observational, descriptive, explanatory. In line with 
Chomsky's formulation (1965), the meeting of the requirements of 
internal justification awards explanatory status to a grammar: that is,
if a language L may be shown to demonstrate internal validity (it does
not deviate from its own rules) it may be said to have explanatory 
status. If the language is only noted and recorded, such activities 
will enable the enquirer to claim observational and descriptive status; 
but if the rules inherent in the mind of the speaker/hearer are
reconstructed - i.e. made explicit - and may be shown to adhere to the 
rules of grammar of L, the enquirer (speaker/hearer) may claim 
explanatory status for his enquiry. He has justified his knowledge of 
language by demonstrating in action that the language itself has 
explanatory adequacy.
Vhat I am getting at here is the relationship between the notions
'justification' and 'explanation', with a view to applying such concepts 
to the notion 'educational'.
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I have also Indicated throughout this text the notion of the scope of an 
enquiry, the concept of E- and I-levels. An E-level, for me, aspires 
only to descriptive adequacy. In terms of a study in education, the 
enquirer may describe what is going on in orther people's practices; she
will attempt to characterise what is external to herself. Such an
activity, in my view, does not qualify as 'educational'. If the 
enquirer approaches the study at an I-levei, however, she will be able 
to account for what is going on in her own practice by delving into her 
assumptions (or held values), considering them, and modifying them, with 
a resultant modification of practice. Such an enquiry is an enquiry 
into mind, and may be applied only to self. This form of enquiry, I 
submit, is educational, for it has reached explanatory status. The link 
is that, the fact that the individual is constantly in a state of 
readiness to adopt a new form of life as justification for an 
improvement in values-in-action is itself justified as educational. The 
state of mind that is open and enquiring qualifies as <is justified in 
claiming knowledge that is) educated, and the study that enables the 
mind to encourage a dialogue of question and answer in the self may be 
justified as educational. Such a form of life as is generated by an
educated individual who is seeking to continue her education, in the
sense of continuing the on-going process of the development of 
rationality, may qualify as educational, and the individual who is 
engaged in this form of life may claim educational knowledge: that is, 
she may explain the process by which she is, and continues to be, 
educated.
( 5/+1 )
(B) An individual's form of life as justification of a claim to 
knowledge
This is my basis for the Justification of my claim to educational 
knowledge. I may select from the two forms of justification I have 
already considered: either recourse to evidence (inferential
Justification) or demonstration of my known values as a form of life. 
In my view, the latter is the stronger form. An individual's LIVED 
values are more significant that her SPOKEN values. Belief-in-action 
is more powerful than belief-in-abstraction. I believe that my claim to 
knowledge is doubly strengthened, for I may say that I can point to the 
form of life I have now, as well as the evidence that that form of life 
has produced (in records of my practice). I may say, not only that I 
know (make a knowledge claim), but that I know that I know (understand 
the evolution of the knowledge claim). I shall analyse the detail of my 
levels of knowledge claim in (3); and for the time being I shall rest my 
case and look at the pragmatics of the justification of such claims to 
educational knowledge.
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3 The Justification of individuals' claims to educational knowledge
In Chapter 7 I said that I would like to see the establishment and
institutionalisation of a tradition of critical educational research. I 
would further like to see norms agreed by the community of researchers 
about the validity of this practitioner-centred mode, such validity 
resting in the forms of justification that I have outlined above. In 
this section I hope to show (i) the criteria I would suggest as
assisting toward the agreement of validity norms and (ii) how my own 
claim to educational knowledge meets those criteria.
(i) The need for universal acceptance of personal claims to validity
There are two points I wish to bring out here. The first is the need 
for clear criteria by which a practitioner may demonstrate that she has 
improved her educational knowledge - i.e. the inferential justification 
of her knowledge claim by appeal to evidence - those criteria to be used 
by the community of researchers as universal validity norms. The second 
point is the need for conditions for the establishment of such validity 
norms. The first point refers to the justification of personal
knowledge claims; the second refers to the justification of individuals' 
claims to award justification to others' knowledge claims. In 3<ii) 
below I shall be making explicit my own claim to educational knowledge, 
in the hope that I may demonstrate that I have fulfilled the criteria 
below. While I am prepared to submit my claim to public scrutiny, I
wish to be assured that my critics are qualified to criticise. I am at
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pains to justify my claim. I wish to be accorded the reciprocal 
courtesy that my critics are prepared to share the same language game, 
to be prepared to dwell in my mind as I endeavour to show how I have 
come to know the need for the justifications I am expressing. I will 
take further the idea of reciprocal justification in (ii) below.
(a) The establishment of universal validity norms
While I was preparing the notes to this text, I produced five criteria 
for the establishment of universal validity norms, and these I reproduce 
in (ii) below. Coincidentally, I was in correspondence with Jack 
Whitehead, who sent me some of his work along the same lines, and I will 
reference his work here.
In his (1985) he uses a number of standards in judging the validity of a 
claim tD educational knowledge. For example, in judging the validity of 
a teacher's claim to know her own professional development, he asks 
questions of the kind:
Does the evidence show that the teacher has carried out a systematic 
enquiry into her own practice?
Are the values used by the teacher to characterise her educational 
enquiry shown to be emerging in practice?
( W f  )
Are the assertions made about her practice supported sufficiently by 
evidence from practice?
Are the criteria used to judge the quality of pupils' learning 
clearly defined?
Is there evidence which shows changes in the quality of the pupils' 
learning?
Is there evidence of a relationship between the teacher's intentions 
and the quality of the pupils' learning?
Is the explanation for an individual's educational development 
presented in terms of the practitioner's educational values, and related 
sufficiently to the wider forms and fields of knowledge?
I believe that it is by specifying criteria for the principles of claims 
to educational knowledge in this way that common standards of judgement 
may be agreed to justify individuals' claims to educational knowledge.
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<b> Conditions for the establishment of validity norms
I would suggest the need for a common constitution agreed by the 
community of researchers, that colleagues wishing to participate in the 
process of justifying an individual's claim to educational knowledge 
should apply standards of judgement to themselves before embarking on a 
validation exercise. I would put forward the following criteria to be 
considered among the establishment of such conditions:
- Does each participant fulfil the criteria of (a) above - i.e. does he 
demonstrate in practice that he has justified his own claim to 
educational knowledge?
Does each participant demonstrate a willingness to establish a 
critical dialogue with others involved in the justification of the 
knowledge claim?
Is each participant willing to use the validation exercise as part of 
the educative process already in question - that is, to move forward his 
own understanding as well as that of the researcher's? Is he prepared 
to learn, as well as to judge?
Is dialogue grounded in the notion of personal rationality, in which 
the aim is not consensus of content but consensus of form - we agree to 
share our understandings of each other, if not to share our opinions 
about the substance of our conversation.
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In democratic jurisprudence, the person on trial has the right to refuse 
a juror who, he feels, is explicitly or implicitly prejudiced against 
his case. As yet, the same principle does not apply to researchers who 
submit their work to an academic board. I feel very strongly that the
selection of examiners should not be a matter of logistics - for 
example, who is the most available person at the moment - but a matter 
of qualification - who will show himself prepared to fulfil the criteria 
at (b), to Justify his own claim to educational knowledge, in order to 
participate in another's. At the moment I dare say mine appears as a 
minority view; but I would hazard a guess that it is a view shared by 
all those who, like me, have been Judged by research committees and 
examining boards whose members are ignorant of the researcher's areas of 
enquiry, and who are not prepared to help his emergent thinking nor take 
the trouble to ask the right questions.
I will now turn to my own claim to educational knowledge, and attempt to 
Justify it in the terms outlined above.
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<ii) The Justification of my claim to understand my own educational 
development
I have said above that I may draw on two forms of justification: the 
evidence which I may use as inferential justification, and the form of 
life I have, which, as I have pointed out, is a manifestation of my 
values-in-action. I will draw these two concepts together in this 
section.
I may Justify my claim to educational knowledge by demonstrating in 
action (in this text and in debate about it) that I fulfil the criteria 
at (a) above. I will organise these and other criteria of my own into 
five sections to show that:
(1) I can demonstrate in action an improvement in practice;
(2) I can demonstrate in action a critical understanding of my own 
development;
(3) I can demonstrate in action that I can communicate my knowledge 
to other knowing subjects;
(4) I can demonstrate in action the form I life I have adopted as my 
values-in-action;
(5) I can indicate future directions in which my present understandings 
will lead.
I will now expand on the above:
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(1) I can demonstrate in action an improvement in practice
I may do this by recourse to the personal and social education project 
and to the writing project (Chapters 1-4 of this text). In the personal 
and social education project I have outlined the actions I undertook in 
my attempt to turn an unsatisfactory situation in which some of my 
educational values were denied in my practice into a satisfactory 
situation in which those educational values were closer to a realisation 
in practice. I may point to the validation exercises I conducted (for 
example, VT3, JV and Peter; AT42; VT10: RS and the children) and the 
corroboration of the participants in my study that the process of their 
education had been improved by my involvement. I may use this evidence 
as proof of my claim that I had engaged in the improvement of my own 
education to improve my practices which would encourage my children to 
engage in the improvement of their own education.
I may point to the improvement of my practice by recourse to the writing 
project. In Chapters 2 and 4 of this text I have tried to show how I 
conducted my action enquiry into my practice as a writer and a thinker: 
how I observed, reflected, acted, evaluated and modified, in order to 
resolve an unsatisfactory situation. I am involving you, the reader, in 
the validation of my claim to educational knowledge. Let us define the 
criteria by which we judge improvement to have taken place; and then let 
us agree instances in this text, and perhaps compare them with the first 
version, to show that improvement in action. I am certain that my claim 
is justified when I say that the second version is better than the 
first. The form of life I have adopted in writing the second version
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is, in my mind, justification in itself of the validity of my claim. I 
would welcome the participation of yourself to corroborate my certainty: 
to 'validate my validation'.
(2) I can demonstrate in action a critical understanding of my own 
development
In Chapters 1 and 3 of this text, concerning the personal and social 
education project, I have attempted to show how I consciously shifted my 
values to accommodate the emergent notions of creative personal 
development. I have told how I had fixed ideas about personal 
development and how, over the years, a critical awareness developed to 
make me adopt a new form of life that took as its telos the freedom of 
the individual. My teaching practice, as outlined in Chapters 1 and 3, 
showed the beginning of an increase in educational knowledge - that is, 
an awareness of the need to develop my understandings in order to 
improve my practice. At this time, pre-1987, however, I was not aware 
of the need to know that I know (see above). At the time I was aware of 
an increase in knowledge; I was not yet aware of my emerging critical 
faculties. I was not using my rationality consciously.
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Such awarenesses did not emerge to consciousness until I became involved 
in the writing project, which entailed intense reflection on how past 
practice affected and shaped present practice. This was when the 
critical faculties began to take over and caused me consciously to shift 
my values. I developed from being a practitioner to becoming a 
reflexive practitioner (Schon, 1983). I became aware of the need to 
know that I know - that is, not only to be content with my educational 
knowledge, but to desire to justify that knowledge, such a process of 
justification itself making my study educational.
I may point to Chapters 2 and 4 of this text as an account of my own 
understanding of the development of that critical awareness. The text 
of the first version is in existence to show in action that process of 
emergence; Chapters 2 and 4 of this text are my present reflection on 
the action of past reflection. In terms of my form of life, I may say - 
but I cannot justify my claim other than to point to my form of life - 
that I think differently than I did, and my values-in-action cause me to 
act differently than I did.
Today my thinking is free. I interpret the world as I see it, as 
Polanyi would have me do, as a person claiming originality and 
exercising (her) personal judgement responsibly with universal intent. 
The 'universal intent' mentioned is not the form of my early practice, 
when I sought to impose my will on others in a desperate attempt to 
prove my hypothesis of an end Truth. The 'universal intent' is to make 
my findings known through my form of life, which includes this text, so 
that I may invite others to share the understandings I have created that
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shape my form of life, and to share that, too, if they wish. My claim 
to educational knowledge is justified by my form of life. I declare my 
universal intent by inviting you, the reader, to share my sense of 
Justification. In so doing, I ask you to exercise your critical
faculties to comment on the emergence of my critical faculties.
My universal intent lies in my ability to communicate my form of life,
and this is my third point.
(3) I can demonstrate in action that I may communicate my educational 
knowledge to other knowing subjects.
I believe that I was able to communicate my educational knowledge to 
others throughout my personal and social education project. Chapters 1 
and 3 of this text explain how I involved pupils, colleagues, parents, 
my supervisors, and other interested parties in the study. I not only
kept them informed about what I was doing; I actively sought their 
advice and acted upon it. Although I was the focus of my own study, in 
that initially I was subject <1981-83) but later also became the object, 
I asked others to collaborate closely with me. This was done not only 
in a logistical sense, but also in an epistemological sense - I did not 
ask people only to contribute time and equipment, but also their 
opinions. Nor did I keep other people 'external' to the study, 
requiring, for example, visiting colleagues to the group to 'act' as 
visitors; anyone who joined us immediately became part of the study. My 
view of the children changed over the years (Chapter 3) so that I moved
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from informing them about what I was doing to making them and their 
values part of what I was doing.
I communicated my educational knowledge via the printed word, and via 
seminars in which I held up my best thinking to public scrutiny.
Sometimes I received criticism that was painful, because it meant re­
thinking dearly held positions. I always acted on criticism; not 
necessarily to re-write, although I usually did, but certainly to re­
think in order to Justify my educational knowledge more coherently. The 
texts which I have produced over the years are included in Appendix 3.
When I came to my writing project I was aware that I was using the text
for several purposes. It was to be an amalgam of my present best
thinking; it was to help me clarify concepts by the mechanics of 
organising thought into symbolic form; and it was to communicate my 
educational knowledge to other knowing subjects.
In the introduction to this text I have indicate how some parts of the 
text initially failed to communicate easily, and how I came to see the 
necessity of producing this text. Time will tell if you and I agree 
that I have communicated adequately with you.
Throughout the project in all its aspects I have become increasingly 
interested in the idea of communication. I need to read more widely
than I have done so far, but my emergent thinking indicates that I want 
to know the mechanisms by which people make sense. I ask myself how I 
made sense out of the chaos of my practice when I seemed to be losing
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all stable references (Chapter 3); how I made sense out of my writing 
project when I had much to say but no identified form in which to say 
it. My glib answer would be that I undertook action-reflection cycles 
to move my understanding forward; but there are many questions I want to 
explore which are outside the scope of my present thinking.
<4) I can demonstrate in action the form of life I have adopted as my 
values-in-action
First, I may say that this text is a demonstration.
I am unable to demonstrate my form of life, however,in a professional 
educational setting. I am not actively involved in teaching, so I may 
not apply my ideas to an active teaching practice. But I may say, in 
terms of my own educational development, that it moves forward by the 
minute. The crucial difference for me is that I operate in terms of the 
future rather than the past. When I was at school I looked always to an
end product - the end of the day, the end of the children’s life in
school, the end of my professional development - everything was geared 
toward some sort of imminent end. I never stopped to rationalise what 
the end was, or if there was anything after it. The end was simply
there, and my purpose was somehow to get prepared in order to meet it.
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My life as a dialectical thinker* began in action from about 1984. This 
new form of life began to take hold over the next years, and was
crystallised in form in my mind in 1988 when I made the crucial
discoveries about dialectical thinking through writing the first 
version. I could now rationalise what was happening to me, and it was
then that I started looking forward. As I have said in the text, I
began to see now not as a full stop to the past, but as the beginning of 
the future. I realised that there was no end to anything, ever.
This realisation has had a profound influence in my life. I realise the 
nonsense of looking back to the so-called best years of my life, or 
looking forward to the best that is yet to come. My life is now. The 
anticipation of the future is in the now. The nostalgia for the past is 
in the now. I am now. I remember, when I first read Goethe's work, how 
astonished I was at his outpouring of joy over the most ordinary 
phenomena; and I read that he did not start thinking like this until his 
middle years. I am not astonished now; I am delighted to be following 
the same path. My life is a life realised fully in the present; and I 
am aware how lucky I am.
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(5) I can indicate future directions in which my present understandings 
will lead
In Chapter 9 I briefly detail some of the ways for my future thinking, 
I may precis what appears there to say that I am interested in ’the 
generative exercise' (Chomsky, 1982). I want to move away from the 
formal theories that have a stranglehold on the literature toward 
dialectical theories, within areas of discourse involving theories of 
learning, theories of personal development, theories of knowledge, and 
theories of communication. My thinking is still emergent in many areas, 





CHAPTER NINE: THE GENERATIVE ENTERPRISE 557
1 Theories of learning 557
2 Theories of personal development 558
3 Theories of knowledge 558
4 Theories of communication 559
( 557 )
CHAPTER HIKE: THE GENERATIVE ENTERPRISE
This chapter is a brief account of what I see as future directions for 
educational research. I hope to go in these directions with my own 
enquiries, but the field is massive and offers fruitful avenues for the 
general community of educational researchers.
I feel there is need of a 'turn' in educational research that will make 
it an educational critical science.
I see the need for the turn in these areas; there are probably many 
more.
1 Theories of learning
There is a need to move beyond theories of habit formation and 
acquisition devices. There is a need for the development of theories of 
learning that are grounded in individual rationality, such as generative 
transformational theories that see learning as creation rather than 
acquisition.
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2 Theories of personal development
There is a need to move beyond structuralist theories such a cognitive- 
developmental theories; there is a need to move beyond synchronic 
theories that are static and that aspire only to descriptive adequacy. 
There is a need to develop diachronic theories such as life-span 
theories that will attempt to account for the on-going development of 
mature adults and adolescents. There is a need to develop dialectical 
theories that see the organism acting with and shaping the environment, 
instead of the main current assumption that the environment shapes the 
individual.
3 Theories of knowledge
There is a need to move beyond propositional forms and the assumptions 
of reified knowledge. Such forms aspire only to descriptive adequacy, 
and depend on and encourage structured mentalities. This is the way to 
stunted growth. There is a need to develop critical forms of personal 
knowledge. Such forms aspire to explanatory adequacy, and depend on and 
encourage dialectical mentalities.
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4 Theories of communication
There is a need to move away from object-centred epistemologies that 
exclude researchers from their own research. There is a need to develop 
subject-centred epistemologies that involve the living 'I'. There is a 
need for researchers to agree to establish dialogical communities that 
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